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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis considers the definition of persecution in international refugee law 
and how one might consider this definition at the domestic level.  The theories 
of Robert Alexy’s are adopted as a lens through which to reconstruct refugee 
law. The case for viewing human rights as worthy of special protection is put 
forward and the implications for refugee law are considered. It posits that the 
concept of human dignity dictates a special status for human rights that gives 
refugees’ claims high priority. This rejects the notion that states have absolute 
discretion to control borders. This claim is strengthened when one considers 
the nature of the claim to human rights protection made by refugees: 
protection from persecution. This ties refugeehood to political legitimacy, a 
concept evolving through notions such as human dignity and Responsibility 
to Protect, to demand higher standards of human rights protection. This, in 
turn, requires the Refugee Convention to evolve to maintain its protective 
scope. This thesis will use notion of collective violence to demonstrate that 
article 1(2) is conceptually capable of supporting this required expansive 
notion of ‘refugee’ whilst retaining the boundary between ‘refugee’ and 
‘refugee-like.’ It will show also how this reconstruction of refugeehood 
dismantles many of the obstacles to recognition facing female refugees.   
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The question ‘who is a refugee?’ escapes an easy answer. It can be approached 
from innumerate different angles with correspondingly varied answers. This 
thesis is concerned with the answer provided when one considers the 
definition through the prism of jurisprudential analysis of the key terms and 
underpinning concepts. At first glance international law provides a clear 
answer; a refugee is a person who fits the definition provided by article 1(2) of 
the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. A refugee is: 
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.1 
Yet the issue of who is a refugee under international law remains unresolved 
to a great extent by article 1(2). There are claims both that article 1(2) is too 
narrow and obsolete, excluding many experiences of (post-)modern 
refugeehood2, and that article 1(2) is being applied too broadly so as to 
include people who cannot be said to be refugees within the scope of the 
Refugee Convention.3 This thesis seeks the development of refugee law by 
critical reconstruction of article 1(2). It seeks, in some way, to address the 
                                                
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into 
forced 22 April 1954) 189 U.N.T.S 150 (Refugee Convention) article 1A(2). 
2 These claims are widely made but are focused in particular on the recognition of 
victims of wide-spread violence as refugees, for example,Kaelin 'Refugees and Civil 
Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretation' (1991) 3 International Journal of Refugee Law 
435 and the victims of gendered persecution, see Macklin 'Refugee Women and the 
Imperative of Categories' (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 213 
3 These will be discussed in greater detail below. Key advocates include Matthew 
Price [2004; 2006; 2009] and David Martin [1991; 1993]. 
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need, revealed by the millions of people identified by the UHCR as in need of 
international protection4, for a principled basis for determining the scope of 
article 1(2) and the responsibility of contracting states to refugees. 
 
This thesis seeks not to list types of refugees or circumstances that can be 
identified as being refugee-producing. This task would be as impossible as it 
would be pointless.5 Instead this thesis seeks to set out how one might 
approach refugee claims. It seeks to consider the foundations of the definition 
of refugee, particularly the persecution criterion, in order to set some 
guidelines for how to assess refugee claims. It draws on the foundations of 
refugee law, namely the concept of human dignity, the protective purpose of 
the Refugee Convention and the concepts of political legitimacy and collective 
violence to consider refugee law. It is necessary to consider the foundations of 
refugee law in order to identify the core principles that ought to guide 
interpretation of refugee law in determination of refugee case. It is also a 
recognition that refugee law does not stand in isolation. Refugee law overlaps 
considerably with human rights law and other facets of international law 
concerned with the protection of individuals against human rights violations. 
As Judge Cançado Trindade in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has noted:  
                                                
4 In 2011 the UNHCR estimated that there were 43.7 million people forcibly displaced 
from their homes. The figure includes 15.4 million refugees, 27.5 million internally 
displaced people and a further 840,000 people waiting to be given refugee status 
(assessed by the UNHCR as refugee but without protection). The populations of 
concern report 2012-13 estimates a rise on the current figures, see 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ec230f516.html.  
5 This echoes Goodwin-Gill’s statement that ‘there being no limit to the perverse side 
of human immagination, little point is served by attempting to list all known 
measures of persecution’ (The Status of Refugees in International Law (1991) 193). 
This sentiment was approved in Gashi [1996] UKIAT 13695.  
! & 
when the sources […] of human rights violations are so diverse […]the 
juridical development of the obligations erga omnes of protection becomes all 
the more important, as do the convergences –at the normative, 
interpretational and operative levels- among the International Law of Human 
Rights, International Humanitarian Law and International Refugee Law.6 
Such judicial pronouncements reveal a significant overlap between fields of 
international law. This overlap is to be found, or might be said to stem from, 
the common foundational principles. Judge Cançado Trindade identifies this 
in the obligations of erga omnes. The broader underlying obligations of 
human dignity and human rights are put forward here as the foundational 
principles and take centre stage in the discussion in chapter three. 
 
It is not novel to identify issues of interpretation in relation to article 1(2). 
However only rarely are issues of interpretation addressed at the conceptual 
level, with the preferred focus, particularly in the case of those advocating a 
broader approach, on the empirical, political or legal sphere with little enquiry 
into the conceptual foundations of the refugee definition. It is argued here that 
consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of refugeehood 
is essential to the interpretational debates underway in refugee law. The 
interpretational confusion arises, it could be argued, not in the application of 
the definition (although it is here that the confusion is revealed) but at the 
conceptual level where unexplored and, therefore, unresolved theoretical 
questions remain. Terms with undetermined meanings are capable of 
                                                
6 Concurring opinion in Kankuamo Indigenous People (November 2011) Inter 
American Court of Human Rights 4. See also Concurring Opinions in the Matter of 
the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (2002) 19 and Matter of The 
Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó (2003) 5.   
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becoming little more than projection screens for ideological attitudes.7 The 
aim, then, is to elaborate the concept of refugeehood in order to give the terms 
‘refugee’ and ‘persecution’ more determined meaning, within a human rights 
framework, to flesh out the abstract concept in order to allow it to be used 
with more clarity in refugee law. This builds on Ronald Dworkin’s distinction 
between concepts (what something means) from a conception (a particular 
and more concrete specification of that concept.) Dworkin argues that such 
principles as fairness or the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment have a settled although rather abstract meaning (the concept), 
even though what is to be construed as cruel and unusual punishment (the 
conception) may vary with time and circumstances.8 
 
In international law the term ‘refugee’ is a term of art and one of considerable 
significance. It is by no means the only label attached to those on the move; 
from the plethora of categories, ranging from ‘illegal alien’, ‘Internally 
Displaced Person’ to ‘humanitarian refugee’, although hard to gain, once 
awarded ‘Convention refugee’ is amongst the more privileged labels. It was 
intended to give the bearer priority in regards to leave to remain and 
treatment in a host country when compared to other non-nationals. In 
addition, as Grahl-Madsen explains, “the definition in the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol is decisive for the convention-contractual obligations 
                                                
7 For discussion of the domestic attempts to bring in a ‘domestic version’ of the 
Convention, see generally Alice Edwards, “Tampering with Refugee Protection: The 
Case of Australia” (2003) 15 IJRL 192, 202-204; Roz Germov & Francesco Motta, 
Refugee Law in Australia (Oxford, 2003) at 189-192.This thesis will assume, however, 
that the text of the Convention must prevail and only the Convention text will be 
addressed.   
8 Dworkin ‘Liberalism’ in Hampshire, S ed. Public and Private Morality (Cambridge 
University Press 1978) 226. 
! 9 
of states parties to those instruments.”9 Thus, the content of the term is crucial, 
for allocation of resources cannot be undertaken or scheme of entitlements 
discussed, before determining who is included in the labels being used. A 
definition must be useable (and useful), i.e. it provides a clearly delineated 
category, and representative, i.e. it reflects what it seeks to describe. As Vernant 
observes, “[l]ike all definitions, if it is a good one it is not purely artificial.”10 
We must be able to use article 1(2) to say who is and who is not a refugee and 
the definition of a refugee in international law ought to reflect experiences of 
refugeehood to be meaningful as a legal concept. 
 
It is acknowledged in the Convention itself that article 1(2) does not 
encompass all experiences of what might be described as refugeehood. The 
drafting conference introduced the Convention in the hope that signatory 
states would consider it to have “value as an example exceeding its 
contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it in granting [refugee 
status] so far as possible to persons in their territory…who would not be 
covered by the terms of the Convention.”11 Why then continue to explore the 
parameters of the term ‘refugee’ if the Convention accepts that it will not 
include all experiences of refugeehood? The reason is this; in order to even 
begin to address the issue of reform the boundaries of the discussion must 
elucidated. Numerous different theoretical models of refugeehood have been 
proposed. What is often overlooked, however, is that these models largely 
employ different frames of reference and assumptions that, without a 
                                                
9 Grahl-Madsen 'Identifying the World's Refugees' (1983) 467 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 11 
10 Vernant The Refugee in the Post-War World (George Allen & Unwin London 1953) 5. 
11 Final Act of the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons (adopted July 25 1951), 189 U.N.T.S 138, 146, article IV(I). 
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common starting point, inevitably result in diverse, even contradictory, 
interpretations of the term ‘refugee’. My intention is to explain the concept of 
refugeehood at a conceptual and analytical level. In order to do this the thesis 
considers the key notions underpinning refugee law, in particular, human 
rights, human dignity, state sovereignty and political legitimacy. The thesis 
will also put forward the notion of collective violence as a newly identified 
concept behind refugee law.  
 
It is argued that it is the concept of refugeehood that provides the range of 
plausible meanings that the term ‘refugee’ can convey. The content of the 
concept sets the ‘boundaries of sense’ by placing limits on plausible usages of 
the word and criteria for application of the term. Without examining the 
normative content of the term ‘refugee’ it is difficult to assess competing 
interpretations of the term in any meaningful way.  
 
Hathaway and Goodwin-Gill, amongst others, decry lack of formal status of 
human rights norms and refugee rights under the current system, arguing 
that there is no attempt to strike a balance between refugees’ rights and the 
interests of states; instead formal priority is given to the latter as states are 
granted full discretion in applying international refugee law. It is often 
claimed, again by Hathaway, Garvey and others, that in order to achieve any 
real level of protection for refugees nothing short of complete overhaul of the 
current international law relating to refugees is required.12 The practical 
difficulties in achieving a human rights centred refugee law in the present 
                                                
12 See, for example, Hathaway 'Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights 
Protection' (1991) 4 Journal of Refugee Studies 113 and Garvey 'Towards a 
Reformulation of International Refugee Law' (1985) 26 Harvard International Legal 
Journal 483. 
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political climate seems to result in a stand-off in which it is acknowledged that 
the current system is unable to provide meaningful protection for many 
refugees but with little hope of reform.  This thesis argues that creative 
interpretation of the current refugee law will reveal more robust protective 
scope of refugee law.   
 
Despite all of the various competing conceptions of refugeehood and asylum 
policy, there seems little question that the primacy of the demands of human 
rights protection underpins the Refugee Convention: this is explicitly accepted 
by all signatory states of the Refugee Convention. Yet, all too often, the aim of 
the Convention in protecting human rights becomes lost with states asserting 
absolute rights to determine who enters their territory. Reconstructing 
national refugee law along the lines of Alexy’s structural theory13 shows the 
flaw in this, namely that if the primary importance of protecting human rights 
is acknowledged (which it is argued it must be to satisfy law’s claim to 
correctness as human rights are moral rights qua correctness) then the 
balancing act which takes place in determining the claims of refugees (against 
the claims of the potential host state) must prima facie be resolved in favour of 
refugees with more modest deference given to national interests. The concept 
of human dignity, it is argued, bolsters this argument for the special priority 
to be given to refugees’ rights. Human dignity also underpins a more 
expansive definition of refugeehood as will be set out in chapter three and, in 
terms of female refugees, in chapter six. 
                                                
13 Alexy’s theory is set out across a number of different works, including, his two 
major books Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002, Trans. Julian Rivers, Oxford 
University Press) and The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism (2002, 
Oxford University Press, reprint 2010). Both of these, and many of Alexy’s other 
works are referenced and discussed in chapter two. 
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It will be argued that the right to deny entry to territory (if such a right can 
even be said to exist) cannot outweigh the right to human rights asserted by 
refugees. Whether acknowledged by the international community formally or 
not, a commitment to protecting human rights must create a duty to assist 
refugees. This argument will be put forward by considering the background 
assumptions of refugee law and demonstrating the impact of these 
background assumptions and the limits these place on plausible 
interpretations. The background assumptions of refugee law might be 
summed up as a) human rights are a special category of rights producing 
positive duties to protect as well as negative duties of non-interference, b) 
states are presumed to have the primary role in protecting these key rights c) 
if these rights are not protected by the state then the international community, 
via host states, is called on to provide subsidiary protection. Closer 
examination of the structure of human rights and the way in which these 
particular fundamental rights generate international responsibility will reveal 
a range of different duties to refugees as those in danger of suffering human 
rights violations.   
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This thesis is based on several fundamental assumptions. First, international 
refugee law must contain a concept of human rights. It rejects the contention 
by some, such as McIntyre14, that human rights do not exist at all from the 
outset. International refugee law would not be required if this were the case as 
                                                
14 After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd edn University of Notre Dame Press 
1984). 
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there would be no refugees to claim refugee status without basic 
acknowledgment that rights exist the (potential) violation of which is so 
heinous that it causes the victim to flee their country of origin. As will be set 
out in Chapter One, a refugee is a person who leaves the country of origin or 
residence primarily due to push rather than pull factors i.e. involuntarily. The 
push factor in the case of a refugee is the human rights violation and, as will 
be discussed in the following chapter, the lack of national protection against 
this human rights violation.  
 
This does not directly address McIntyre’s critique. It may seem appealing to 
follow Rorty and state that human rights have been sufficiently justified so as 
to no longer require further explanation in order to provide a solid foundation 
for refugee law.15 And to an extent, this thesis follows Rorty in arguing that 
human rights are a fact of the historical circumstances we now find ourselves 
in, as Rorty notes, whether justified philosophically or not, human rights are 
used and have uses in the modern world and are, in this sense, beyond 
debunking.16 For paradigmatic cases of persecution, based on torture, severe 
discrimination on Convention grounds or political imprisonment, for 
example, it might be enough to say that these are human rights violations 
without further explanation. However, for cases where the violation is of a 
newly emerging or less well-established human right, some mechanism is 
needed to provide sufficient determinacy of content to guide interpretation of 
                                                
15 Rorty 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality ' in a Shute, Hurley (eds) On 
Human Rights (Basic Books 1993). 
16 For discussion of the continuing need for philosophical foundations of human 
rights, see for example Tasioulas 'Human Rights, Universality and the Values of 
Personhood: Retracing Griffin's Steps' (2002) 10 European Journal of Philosophy 79. 
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international refugee law.17 Human Rights cannot be, therefore, beyond 
justification. If one entirely dismisses any discussion of the foundations of 
human rights, there seems to be no way of determining what is or is not an 
international human right, beyond recourse to international human rights 
treaties, which would render human rights static and very quickly as 
outdated as critics of the Refugee Convention allege.  
 
Secondly, international refugee law assumes human rights to be universal in 
scope, without this assumption the violation of these rights in one jurisdiction 
would not allow another state to grant refugee status.18 As chapter one sets 
out, persecution (the heart of which is a human rights violation) is what 
allows the host state to deny the jurisdiction of the home state to their citizen. 
Thirdly, although this chapter will argue for a generous concept of human 
rights, it is accepted that there is a distinction between human rights and other 
rights. There must, therefore, be some limitation on the concept of human 
rights which separates these rights from other rights a person can claim (be 
they legal, civil, political or social). What is it, then, that makes human rights 
special, what justifies these rights giving rise to refugee status where the 
violation of other rights does not?  
 
                                                
17 The charge levelled at Rorty by Griffin and Tasioulas is that he overlooks this 
problem of new or contested human rights, although the idea of human rights might 
be largely accepted and established, there is far from being a settled list of human 
rights.  
18 To be applicable in a useful way for refugee law, human rights need not be proved 
to be universally held by all people in all times but they must, at least, be accepted as 
having what Nickel refers to as “temporally-constrained form of 
universality…within some specified historical context” and that within this historical 
context human rights are “possessed in virtue of being human” Nickel Making Sense 
of Human Rights (Blackwell 2007) 3. 
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It is noted that refugee law is not the only form of legal protection of human 
rights. Many states include the notion of ‘humanitarian protection’ within 
their immigration law. However, this form of protection is usually 
considerably more precarious than refugee status, involving more limited 
leave to remain, more conditions placed the leave and more limited access to 
citizenship applications. It should not, therefore, be used as a catch all for 
those who do not satisfy a strict interpretation of refugee law. For this reason 
an expansive definition of refugeehood is to be preferred to reliance on a 
secondary category of humanitarian protection.  
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The first chapter will consider the scope of the term ‘persecution’ and the 
historical foundations of refugee law. It will be argued that even if one 
considers persecution to be an inescapable feature of refugeehood it does not 
follow that this must represent an inherent limitation on the parameters of the 
term. The boundaries of the term are elastic enough to encompass ‘new 
experiences’ of refugeehood whilst retaining the distinction between ‘refugee’ 
and ‘migrant.’ It will be argued there is no conceptual reason why the 
boundaries of the term must be narrowly set and that the term ‘refugee’ can 
support an expansive interpretation without losing the distinction between 
‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. Restrictive interpretations do not hold, then, as a 
matter of definition and must be justified against the underlying principles of 
refugee law which will be identified further as the thesis proceeds.  
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The second chapter sets out the framework for the thesis. The thesis takes 
Robert Alexy’s ‘principles theory’19 and ‘correctness thesis’ as the point of 
departure to address the place of human rights norms in international refugee 
law and in domestic refugee status determination cases. This chapter seeks to 
establish the first four basic propositions stated above.20 First, Robert Alexy’s 
principles theory will be adopted as providing a guideline on how to 
approach the issues of interpretation and responsibility in refugee law. It will 
be argued that this under utilised reconstruction of duties is capable of 
providing a system for thinking about the rights of refugees, which clearly 
elucidates the priority that ought to be given to these rights. Principles theory 
will be shown also to provide a framework for understanding both the 
process of admitting refugees and of adjudicating refugee status claims, 
particularly where competing claims of public interest are raised. In this 
sense, principles theory provides a framework for reconstructing how the 
rights of refugees work at an international and national level with particular 
emphasis on the law of balancing. Second, the argument for viewing 
fundamental rights as principles will be briefly introduced and adopted. 
Thirdly, Alexy’s correctness thesis that posits a necessary connection between 
                                                
19 Here I shall focus on the core ideas of Alexy’s principle theory. Principle theory is 
not, originally, Alexy’s term but rather was developed by Ronald Dworkin in 
response to legal positivism. See Taking Rights Seriously in which Dworkin argued 
that every legal system contains both rules and principles as distinct categories. 
Dworkin argues that positivism misses the uses of principles in legal interpretation, 
claiming principles are background standards against law is to be interpreted and 
applied (Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 22). Alexy, however, demonstrated in A 
Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 12), that principles can be directly applied and 
explained the relationship between the application of principles and proportionality. 
The debate on principles theory has developed, however, into a field of its own, and 
much of this debate goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
20 I shall use ‘refugee status determination cases’ to refer to applications (formally 
submitted or made by presence in another state alone), and any subsequent appeals, 
by those individuals seeking to claim refugee status under the Refugee Convention. I 
have avoided using the term ‘asylum seekers’ as it raises many issues, such as the 
distinction between refuge and asylum, which I do not have space to address here. 
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law and morality will be put forward and it will be argued that the connection 
places certain requirements on lawmakers and decision-takers to consider the 
claims of morality.   
 
The third chapter will consider normative aspects of the debate to determine 
how principles theory might operate in the area of refugee law. It looks to the 
foundational principles of refugee law with the argument that whilst Alexy’s 
theories provide a theoretical framework for refugee law human rights and 
human dignity provide a normative framework. The chapter will first 
consider the underlying concept of human dignity and the arguments for the 
particular demand for respect in respect of human rights. The importance of 
human rights relative to other competing rights then will be set out. It will be 
opined that this claim is of special significance in the context of the nature of 
the claim asserted by refugees to protection of human rights. Demonstrating the 
particular importance, or value, of human rights protection will establish 
proposition nine, stated above.  It will consider the frequently counter 
principles to the primacy of individual human rights, namely the ‘priority to 
compatriots thesis’, which claims that the needs of compatriots should be 
placed in front of those of strangers.  It will be posited that such debates can 
be resolved, prima facie in favour of the rights of refugees, with more modest 
deference toward state interests, by considering the law of balancing, which 
requires that preference is given to the principle which has greater abstract 
weight and is given greater relative concrete weight on the facts of the case.  
 
Chapter four will consider further the background principles of refugee law, 
namely the presumption that the primary duty to protect human rights falls 
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on the home state. The content of this primary duty, based on notions of 
political and sovereign legitimacy and the concept of collective violence, it 
will be argued, is significant in determining the content of the persecution 
criterion and the protective scope of article 1(2). Closer examination of the 
underpinnings of primary duty theory, it will be argued, suggests a broader 
interpretative scope of article 1(2) than is often applied in refugee status 
determination cases. In particular, it will be posited that an examination of the 
concept of violence underpinning refugee law will support a broader reading 
of article 1(2). The aim here is to consider which human rights violations 
might be said to demonstrate a broken bond between citizen or state.  
 
Chapter five concerns the secondary duty stemming from the importance of 
human rights, which falls on the international community in the event that the 
primary duty is not fulfilled. This frames refugee law as a facet of obligations 
owed by states to the international community as a whole and not merely an 
act of charity or individual action. The view will be put forward that this 
secondary duty is not merely a discretionary duty but also includes concrete 
duties in certain circumstances. In particular, the notion of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ will be explored and applied to refugee law to argue that all members 
of the international community have a general responsibility to protect 
refugees. The chapter will also examine circumstances in which contracting 
states might be said to have a concrete and individual duty to protect 
refugees, namely the situation of individuals already within the jurisdiction of 
a contracting state.  
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The sixth chapter applies the notion of collective violence to circumstances 
facing female refugees. In discussing female refugees the evolution of the term 
‘persecution’ in line with shifting notions of political legitimacy can be traced. 
The limited impact of this shift will also be revealed. In particular, the 
continued restrictive interpretations of ‘persecution’ and ‘political opinion’ 
will be highlighted. In light of the assertions of the previous chapters as to the 
expansive potential of the refugee definition it will be argued that the plight 
of many female refugees, who see their claims to refugee status refused, 
demands a closer examination and greater consideration of the interpretations 
of refugee law.  
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In this thesis the terms ‘refuge’ and ‘asylum’ will be used interchangeably, 
although it could be argued that they can support different meanings. The 
term ‘asylum’ is used in a variety of situations, including humanitarian 
asylum, outside of the Geneva Convention and the granting of refugee status 
within the Geneva regime. The differences in meaning are overlooked here as 
the thesis is concerned only with the Geneva regime. The term ‘refugee’ refers 
to people who satisfy article 1(2) whether or not this has been formally 
recognised. The term asylum seeker is, therefore, not used. This usage, it is 
argued, is supported by the assertion that refugee status is declaratory rather 
than constitutive. It is, therefore, possible to speak about ‘refugees’, in the 
abstract, to refer to those who have not yet claimed refugee status, those who 
have claimed refugee status but whose claim is yet to be determined and 
those who have already formally satisfied article 1(2). The term is used in this 
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manner as the thesis concerns, in the main, abstract discussions of refugee law 
rather than critique of actual cases.  
 
The thesis seeks to explore the limits of article 1(2) and the concept of 
refugeehood against the backdrop of the underpinning notions of human 
rights, political legitimacy, collective violence and subsidiary protection and is 
not, therefore, primarily concerned with those who make false or 
unsustainable claims for refugee status. Instead the thesis is concerned with 
the boundaries of the term ‘refugee’ and the types of claims that can be 
supported within the current definition supplied by article 1(2). It considers, 
therefore, abstract notions and how these might impact actual cases but does 
not seek to, or claim to be able to, provide a finite list of claims of ‘genuine 
refugees.’ The aim instead is to provide some idea of the conceptual 
boundaries of article 1(2) in order to supply an interpretive guide to article 
1(2) to be applied in actual cases to determine concrete outcomes.  
 
The term ‘asylum’ is then used to refer to the protection afforded to those 
granted refugee status, as UNHCR has pointed out, in critiquing the EU 
Qualification Directive21, there is a distinction between refugee status and 
asylum, ‘the Qualification Directive appears to use the term “refugee status” 
to mean the set of rights, benefits and obligations that flow from the 
recognition of a person as a refugee. This second meaning is, in UNHCR’s 
view, better described by the use of the word “asylum”.’22 The terms are used 
                                                
21 Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted (29 April 2004).  
22 UNHCR, Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC (OJ L 
304/12 of 30.9.2004) January 2005 10-11. 
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here in line with this critique and ‘asylum’ is used interchangeably with 
‘refuge’ to refer to the granting of protection. 
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The first chapter examines the conceptual coherence of the claim that the 
persecution criterion is an intrinsic limitation on the term refugee as it 
represents the semantic boundary between the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. 
This claim is of considerable legal, practical and theoretical significance as it 
argues that persecution is an inescapable element of refugeehood and one that 
represents inherent limitation  “on the parameters of the definition’s 
protective mantel”1, which cannot be exceeded without resistance from the 
theoretical underpinnings of the concept. Thus, the claim is not simply that it 
is preferable to interpret ‘refugee’ and ‘persecution’ narrowly, or even that 
one ought to select a restrictive interpretation from the range of possible 
interpretations, but rather that the only theoretically supportable 
interpretation is one that does not include many situations that are claimed to 
be experiences of refugeehood. The chapter asks if there are inherent 
limitations provided by the semantic and conceptual boundaries of the term 
‘refugee’, which explain the exclusion of certain experiences of refugee-like 
situations. This issue will be approached by asking, firstly, is persecution an 
inescapable feature of refugeehood? And secondly, if persecution can be said 
to be an inescapable feature of refugeehood does it represent an inherent 
limitation of the term of ‘refugee’? It is argued that the issue of the scope of 
the persecution criterion must first be explored before positing any claims 
about a broader scope of protection under article 1(2).  
                                                
1 Bhaba ʻThe Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rightsʼ 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 167, 167. 
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In order to explore these issues the chapter begins with a discussion on how 
refugeehood is conceptualised, before examining the key contradistinction 
between refugee and migrant. It then moves to the core issues, namely the 
place of persecution in the concept of refugeehood and the different 
interpretational models of the term ‘persecution’ before making some brief 
observations as to the impact of the conclusions on the boundaries of the term 
‘refugee’.2  What is argued here is that it is not necessarily a concern that 
international protection is extended to one category, refugee, and not to 
another, migrant, but that the issue, raised by Foster and Hathaway, is where 
the boundaries of these terms are drawn. The challenges by Foster and 
Hathaway might be better seen as challenging the drawing of the boundary 
between these terms rather than challenging the distinction per se.  This thesis 
seeks to be part of the project redrawing this boundary so as to include many 
previously excluded people within the term ‘refugee’ and explores the 
distinction between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ with this aim in mind.  
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There can be little doubt that the conceptual boundaries of the term ‘refugee’ 
are contested. This stems partially from the many and varied uses of the term 
                                                
2 This proceeds on the assumption that there is a distinction between refugee and 
migrant. This assumption is by no means universally accepted and has been 
challenged. Arguably works such as Foster Refuge from Deprivation: International 
Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights (Cambridge University Press 2007) challenge 
this distinction. Hathaway has also rejected the presumption that individuals fleeing 
conflict do not fall under the protection of the Refugee Convention (see ‘Refugee 
status arising from generalised oppression’ in Alfredsson and MacAlister-Smith 
(eds.) The Living Law of Nations (Engel 1996) 61-67). However, the challenges 
presented in these works are not to any distinction between refugee and migrant but 
to the existing, or at least oft-made, distinction between the terms. The words are not 
synonyms and as such must have some difference in meaning.  
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in every day parlance and partially, it is argued, from conceptual confusion. 
As Turton observes, for many concepts- ‘table’ is offered as an example- the 
relationship between intension and extension is unproblematic, but this is not 
so for more abstract concepts such as migration, or, refugeehood.3 It is for this 
reason that interpretation of the term ‘refugee’ remains contested; ‘refugee’ is 
not a term that has clear content. The claim is not that of some legal and 
literary theorists such as Cornell 4, Burton5 and Fish6, that all terms require 
interpretation, but that of Wittgenstein7, namely that there are some situations 
where interpretation is unnecessary but others where interpretation is 
essential, namely where the meaning of a term is far from clear. It is in these 
contested situations that the use of a particular interpretation may also be said 
to require justification. As Tully8 notes, in his discussion on Wittgenstein and 
Habermas, although there are certain things it would unreasonable to raise 
doubt about- the example of a person stating their name in the course of an 
everyday conversation is given but equally one could use Turton’s example of 
a table, in neither of these situations would it usually be considered 
reasonable to respond by raising doubt either as to the identity of the speaker 
or the use of the intension ‘table’ when, say, extension is clearly in front of the 
                                                
3 Turton ʻConceptualising Forced Migration (Working Paper No. 12)ʼ (Refugee 
Studies Centre, October 2003) 2. 
4 Cornell The Philosophy of the Limit (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1992). 
5 Burton An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning (Little Brown and Co. 1985) 
6 Fish 'Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary 
Criticism' (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 20.  
7 This is an interpretation of Wittgenstein, which, naturally, has been contested [see 
Cornell n 4]. It is argued, however, it is persuasive given, for example, §201 of 
Philosophical Investigations in which Wittgenstein states, “there is a way of grasping 
a rule that is not interpretation” Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell  
1963). 
8  Tully  ʻWittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Critical 
Reflectionʼ 17 Political Theory 172 186. Stone describes these as situations “in which a 
call for interpretation seems superfluous” Stone ʻFocusing the Law: What Legal 
Interpretation is Notʼ in Patterson (ed) Wittgenstein and Law (Ashgate Publishing 1995 
[2004]) 262. 
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speaker- in other circumstances, however, it is entirely reasonable to raise 
doubts as to the use of a particular term. This applies to contested concepts 
particularly and it is here, argues Tully, that justification of the use of one 
interpretation over another is essential because where there are several 
competing and contested uses of the term and there is no self-justifying, i.e. 
obvious, reason to use one sense of the word over another then the need to 
give grounds for the use of a term arises. 
 
The aim is not to evaluate the political desirability of particular interpretations 
of ‘refugee’, or to assess the practicality of applying the various 
interpretations, there will only be evaluation of an interpretation on 
conceptual grounds. Thus, no claim is being made as to whether experiences 
of refugeehood ought to be included in practice- this is a separate enquiry- but 
if experiences of refugeehood are to be excluded from the definition of 
‘refugee’ these exclusions must be justifiable within the theoretical framework 
being used otherwise the conceptual coherence of the model being applied is 
called into question. Thus, if it is claimed that the concept of refugeehood 
requires that article 1(2) excludes, for example, those fleeing starvation (and it 
is widely argued that this is the case), this exclusion must be supported by the 
same theory that explains the inclusion of, for example, political activists 
within the concept of refugeehood being employed by the Refugee 
Convention, in order to be persuasive as an interpretational explanation.  
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How then is refugeehood to be conceptualised? Concepts are elements of a 
system of concepts. We do not form a concept without relating it to other 
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similar- and dissimilar- concepts. The more abstract the concept one seeks to 
provide content for, the greater the reliance on other concepts to contextualise 
the term. As noted above, refugeehood is an abstract concept. It seeks to 
reflect a universal condition of refugeehood not merely the particular 
experiences of a refugee. As Kunz argues, the definition of a refugee under 
international law was supposed to be “both sufficiently wide and refined to 
relate the Saints of the Mayflower to the Czech refugees of 1968.”9 In order to 
encapsulate what is common to experiences as disparate in time and place as 
those mentioned by Kunz, above, refugeehood is often conceptualised 
through a series of dichotomies; to give content to the term by distinguishing 
‘refugee’ from ‘refugee-like’. The distinctions between forced and voluntary 
migration, between persecution and prosecution, between types of violence 
(targeted and generalised, public and private and political and economic) 
have been used to give content to the abstract notion of refugeehood. In 
addition, refugeehood is a ‘compound concept.’ It does not stand-alone but is 
based on a series of contested concepts, such as alienage, ‘fear’ or 
‘persecution’.  
 
Within article 1(2) no term provides as much insight into the complex concept 
of refugee employed by the Convention as the persecution criterion. In the 
introduction to the UN publication of the Convention Beyani characterises 
persecution as “clearly the most important factor concerning the 
determination of refugee status.”10 In a leading case before the House of 
Lords, Lord Lloyd described persecution as  “the exclusive benchmark for 
                                                
9 Kunz ʻThe Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacementʼ 7 
International Migration Review 125 129. 
10 Benyani ‘Introductionʼ in Weis (ed) The Refugee Convention vol 7 (Cambridge 
University Press 1995). 
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international refugee status.”11 The importance of the persecution criterion 
cannot be overlooked, therefore, and this importance lies in the centrality of 
the concept of persecution to the notion of refugeehood. It is the persecution 
criterion that conveys a sense of the normative judgments made when 
creating the legal category ‘refugee’ by revealing the distinctions present in 
the concept of refugeehood employed by the Convention and the influence 
these distinctions have on the answer provided by international law to the 
question ‘who is a refugee?’ This thesis seeks to discover if the concept of 
persecution can explain why a person fleeing a civil war is not a refugee under 
international law12 but a person fleeing a targeted attack13 is? It asks if the 
concept of persecution can offer an adequate account of why a person fleeing 
starvation14 is not a refugee but a person fleeing imprisonment for opposing 
the ruling government is. At present there is no adequate explanation as to 
                                                
11 Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 WLR 379. 
12 Some regional refugee instruments do recognise a person fleeing civil unrest as a 
refugee, for example under article 1(2) of Organisation of African Unity Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (adopted Sept. 10 1969) 
UNTS 14691 but the construction of the article makes it clear that these individuals 
are not considered persecutees, stating “The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply[…]”. The 
definition represents, as Shacknove notes, “the only salient challenge to the 
proposition that persecution is an essential criterion of refugeehood” (Shacknove 
ʻWho Is a Refugee?ʼ 95 Ethics 274 275). Although the subsequently adopted Latin 
American Cartagena Declaration, Organization of American States (1985) contains a 
similar provision including individuals fleeing “generalized violence, foreign 
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other events 
which have seriously disturbed public order” these definition remain secondary in 
importance to the Geneva Convention to which has 147 signatories (to either or both 
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).   
13 See Bolanos-Hernandez v INS, 767 F.2d. 1277 (9th Circ., 1985). 
14 The examples are numerous, Shacknove (n 12) notes, for example, the refusal of the 
UNHCR to provide refugee camps for 90,000 people who fled from the famine in 
Mozambique to Zimbabwe- the rationale for this decision was that the individuals in 
questions were not victims of persecution and therefore were not under the mandate 
of the UNHCR. The UNHCR has subsequently expanded its mandate to cover all 
displaced persons, including those internally displaced persons who do not qualify 
for refugee status since they are not outside the country of origin. However, the list 
could go on; why is a person fleeing natural disaster or compulsory military service 
not a refugee but a government official fleeing a military coup is? For further 
discussion see Aleinkoff T, Martin DA, Motomura H and Fullerton M (eds) Forced 
Migration: Law and Policy (Thomson Gale 2007). 
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how claims from victims of civil war violence could be grounded in current 
refugee law if the requirement of targeted persecution is retained.15 
 
This enquiry is a pressing one because, as Arboleda and Hoy observe, the 
causes of international migration are increasingly inter-related, generated by a 
complex nexus of “wars, including civil wars, human rights deprivations, 
natural calamities and poverty.”16  The multi-dimensional nature of modern 
international migration makes it increasingly difficult to identify refugeehood 
solely by distinguishing it from the conditions of general migration, as the 
former UNHCR Commissioner Mme. Ogata noted in 1991 “the refugee issue 
has become part of much larger movement of people across frontiers and 
within them.”17  
!
*F> +=@7!/3!D,-:;?!J/1-@7/,0K!
Despite the complex causes of movement across borders, the dichotomy 
between forced and voluntary migration remains the key contradistinction 
upon which the notion of refugee is built. Almost all concepts of refugeehood 
                                                
15 See Kaelin ‘Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretationʼ 3 
International Journal of Refugee Law 435.  Some cases seem to allow asylum claims 
from those fleeing civil war (cf Bolanos-Hernandez (n 13) but it should be noted there 
is a distinction between a person fleeing a civil war whose claim for asylum is 
grounded in factors independent of the civil war and those whose claim is solely 
based on danger due to the unrest. However, due to space constraints the issue of 
targeted persecution will not be discussed further here. 
16 Arboleda and Hoy ʻThe Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of 
Interpretation and Applicationʼ 5 International Journal Refugee Law 66 71. 
17 ‘Refugees in the 1990s: Changing Response’ cited in ibid 72. The UNHCR mandate 
dictates that they cannot deal with IDPs displaced due to natural or man made 
disasters. 
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understand it to describe forced migration.18 There is no explicit reference to 
forced movement19 contained in article 1(2) but that is not to say the Geneva 
Convention overlooks it. There is, however, much debate on what is meant 
when migration is referred to as ‘forced’, and how this notion of ‘forced 
migration’ links to the persecution criterion is heavily contested.  
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Differing interpretations of ‘forced’ have considerable impact on the 
experiences considered to include in the scope of the concept of refugeehood. 
According to one view ‘forced migration’ denotes “lack of choice.”20 A refugee 
is “the victim of events for which, at least as an individual, he cannot be held 
responsible.”21 Lack of choice is used here to signify absence of decisions 
taken (lack of agency). Following this model, in order for migration to be 
deemed ‘forced’, the individual must not have made any choices that resulted 
in the circumstances motivating migration. This suggests treatment is 
persecutory only if it can be said that the person would have suffered the 
same treatment regardless of any action or inaction on her part. This would 
                                                
18 Although this is not say all forced migrants are refugees, for the purpose of this 
discussion it is assumed that refugee status can only be awarded to those outside 
their country of origin or nationality (as required by the Refugee Convention). Thus, 
Internally Displaced Persons cannot be refugees under the Refugee Convention 
although they might quite accurately be described as forced migrants and are, due to 
this, considered within the mandate of the UNHCR. The issue here is contested 
experiences; described variously as ‘involuntary’ and ‘voluntary’, and which, 
dependent on resolution of the first issue, might or might not be considered 
experiences of refugeehood. 
19 Some regional refugee instruments do recognise a person fleeing civil unrest as a 
refugee, for example under article 1(2) of Organisation of African Unity Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa Sept. 10 1969 (UNTS 
no. 14691). The construction of the article makes it clear, however, that these 
individuals are not considered persecutees, stating “The term ‘refugee’ shall also 
apply…”. The definition represents, as Shacknove notes, “the only salient challenge 
to the proposition that persecution is an essential criterion of refugeehood” 
(Shacknove (n 12) 275). See also n 14. 
20 Vernant presents this model most succinctly although he is not an advocate, see The 
Refugee in the Post-War World (George Allen & Unwin 1953). 
21 ibid 50. 
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encompass, for example, victims of the Nazi deportation programmes who 
can be said to have been ‘forced to migrate’ in the most basic sense; they were 
simply moved, having no choice as to whether to remain or go and no control 
over the destination. Building on laws of extradition, it is claimed that forced 
migration, understood as a lack of agency, also explains why ‘common 
criminals’ are excluded from refugee status; the decision taken by the 
individual to transgress national law renders any subsequent movement 
voluntary. This is a problematic claim. As Turton notes, on one level it is 
nonsensical to talk of involuntary migration in terms of lack of agency, “to 
migrate is something we do, not something that is done to us. You can move 
people and displace people, but you can’t ‘migrate’ them.”22  
 
It could be argued it is misleading to classify forced migration as resolving 
around the concept of choice; it would be better expressed as focused on lack 
of options.  Although ‘innocent victim’ is often the sense in which ‘refugee’ is 
used23; this is not the model of refugeehood employed by the Refugee 
Convention. This can be seen through an examination of article 1(f). Article 
1(f) is separate, and subsequent, to the definition of refugee and excludes from 
refugee status any person who has committed an international crime or a 
                                                
22 Turton (n 3) 11.  
23 Coverage of displaced persons leaving war-torn areas is the most obvious example, 
most of the individuals involved will not seek or be granted refugee status but as a 
group will be referred to as ‘refugees’, such as Georgian citizens who fled during the 
conflict in South Ossetia, ‘Georgian Conflict takes toll on Refugees’ 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26125821/ (accessed 19.05.10). Other who might be 
described as ‘innocent victims’-those targeted due to unalterable personal 
characteristics- are included in the concept of refugeehood employed in the Geneva 
Convention. 
! 8R 
serious non-political crime. 24  The reference to serious non-political crimes 
makes it clear that under article 1(f) ‘common criminals’ are not excluded 
prima facie from refugee status. Thus, it is not accurate to say that the ‘common 
criminal’ is excluded from the definition of refugee in article 1(2). As refugee 
status is declaratory not constitutive, even in reference to criminals suspected 
of serious offences, article 1(f) operates as a subsequent negation of refugee 
status, so as to exclude an individual who would otherwise be recognised as a 
refugee from being awarded refugee status rather than to exclude criminals 
from the concept of refugeehood.25 This suggests that refugeehood, as a 
concept, does not exclude those who can be held ‘responsible’ (in sense that 
the individual made a choice resulting in the circumstances motivating flight).  
 
This view has been reinforced in the recent case of HJ (Iran) [2010] in which 
Lord Hope stated, “the fact that he [the applicant] could take action to avoid 
persecution does not disentitle him from asylum.”26 The enquiry into whether 
or not the treatment suffered, or feared, amounts to persecution cannot rest on 
a causal account of actions of the applicant without endangering many whom 
would be thought of as paradigmatic Convention refugees, such as those who 
suffer persecution due to religious belief, political opinion, or as confirmed in 
HT and HJ, sexual orientation. In these cases a strict causal approach would 
prove problematic as the persecutory acts could be said to have been caused 
by (in the sense of being a result of) a choice to subscribe to a certain view 
                                                
24 ‘Common criminals’ might be further distinguished from refugees if they are 
subject to prosecution not persecution but here the argument is that criminals are 
distinct from refugees because they made a choice to transgress national laws.  
25 This is not to say, however, that in practice article 1(f) is not often used to exclude 
suspected criminals from any consideration of a grant of asylum. 
26 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 
3 [15].  
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point27 or, in the latter case, to be open about one’s sexuality.  
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If the notion of ‘forced’ migration does not denote lack of choice as lack of 
agency what concept of choice does it use? Beyond the case of criminals other 
examples can be found of those who can be deemed responsible (in the loosest 
sense) for the circumstances that led to migration being recognised as 
refugees. The history of asylum, as well as case law under the Geneva 
Convention, demonstrates that refugeehood includes, to use Zolberg’s terms, 
‘activists’- the politically engaged- as well as ‘victims’- those targeted due to 
unalterable personal characteristics.28 The politically engaged cannot be 
described as ‘victims of events’; indeed Martin argues that the political 
dissenters are often seen as paradigmatic examples of the refugee because 
they are not the victims of events but rather those who make a conscious 
decision to act.29  
 
Inclusion of those who made active choices contributing to the circumstances 
motivating migration is most easily explained by saying that forced migration 
requires only that the decision to leave be classed as involuntary. Thus, the 
focus is solely on the options available at the point of emigration and not on 
                                                
27 This approach has been further rejected in UK jurisprudence by the Supreme Court 
ruling in RT and Others; KM (Zimbabwe) [2012] UKSC 38 in which it was held that 
HJ(Iran) ruling applied also to political opinion (even where that opinion were 
neutral or apathetic). The judgment was clear that people could not be expected to lie 
to avoid persecution.  
28 Zolberg et al Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing 
World (Oxford University Press 1989) 31. 
29 In addition Martin argues an asylum system focused only on ‘mere victims’ “tends 
to treat people as history’s pawns” and could be viewed as patronising, Martin ‘The 
Refugee Concept On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of a Scarce Resourceʼ 
in Adelman (ed) Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States (York Lanes Press 1991) 
46.  
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how the conditions of exit were created. This is not to say that an individual 
must have been forcibly deported in order to be a refugee; a refugee may still 
have taken the decision to leave but the conditions of exit must be such that 
the individual cannot be said to have had any meaningful choice as to whether 
to remain or leave. A refugee is distinguished from a migrant on the basis of a 
lack of choice but choice here signifies lack of available options rather than 
active participation.  
 
The only options available to a refugee are migration or what might be termed 
‘tragic choices’30- choices that can be described as involuntary as they do not 
involve the opportunity to pursue personal preference over both the 
outcome(s) and the choice process and, therefore, do not represent a choice at 
all. 31 This model argues that the choice act itself is of fundamental relevance. 
Applying this to migration, it could be described as forced where the 
alternative to migration is such that it cannot be characterised as a real 
alternative but rather a ‘tragic choice.’ For refugees, the act of leaving cannot 
be described as voluntary as they did not exercise a choice in leaving; they are 
unable to pursue personal preferences over either the outcome or the choice 
process and migration was the only viable course of action.32  
                                                
30 This is a term borrowed from Martha Nussbaum who uses it in a similar context 
but to refer to choices made in the absence of an alternative free from serious ethical 
wrongdoing, see ‘Tragedy and Human Capabilities: a response to Vivian Walsh' 
(2003) 15 Review of Political Economy 414. Here I am using it to denote choices made 
in the absence of an alternative free from serious- if not life threatening- implications 
to the individual making the choice. 
31 Sen 'Maximization and the Act of Choice' (1997) 65 Econometrica 745. The 
explanation above is a simplification of Sen’s model of choice, which is to be applied 
to volitional choices in particular in relation to economic, social and political 
behaviour, none of which are relevant or examined here but the basic distinction is 
instructive. 
32 This is not to say, however, that every person finding herself in the situation will 
decide to leave, an individual is still able to make a ‘tragic choice’ but it is argued that 
this is not a free choice.  
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But when can migration be said to be the only viable option? In certain cases 
determination of this question might be said to be reasonably uncontroversial. 
Thus, although the holder of a particular opinion might be said to have the 
option of hiding or even changing her opinion available, it is clear within the 
meaningful choice model that this would not represent a viable alternative to 
flight. If one’s only alternative to migration is to conceal a personal opinion, or 
for example, to hide one’s sexuality, this does not represent a meaningful 
choice, even assuming such concealment would be possible. Although not 
stated in these terms this was clearly the analysis applied in HJ(Iran), referred 
to above, as although the UK Supreme Court confirmed that the possibility of 
concealment was relevant per se33 concealment could not be expected or 
                                                
33 There was some suggestion that the possibility of [successful] concealment might 
be relevant if it could be demonstrated that the claimant would act to conceal his or 
her sexuality on return to the country of origin whether or not the threat of 
persecution was present. In paragraph 15, Lord Hope states clearly, “The question is, 
what will the applicant actually do.” It is respectfully submitted that this question 
risks misapplication. It is not a relevant question at any stage of the enquiry as if an 
individual is seeking asylum on the grounds that he or she has, or will, suffer 
persecution due to sexual orientation, the decision to be open about sexual 
orientation has, presumably, already been taken (or either freely or forced due to 
circumstance) otherwise there would be no desire to seek asylum. Determination of 
whether persecution is objectively to be feared by homosexuals in the country in 
question ought to be the first step and if established then the ‘actual behaviour’ of the 
applicant in question is irrelevant. Decision can only be made in the case of 
reasonably provable questions or asylum decisions risk becoming exercises in mind 
reading; there is simply no test to determine whether a person is telling the truth as 
to their sexuality, it is a personal matter, the internal aspect of which cannot be 
proven one way or the other. Furthermore, it is submitted that applying an ‘actual 
behaviour’ test risks claims being denied on the grounds that there is no ‘proof’ that 
the individual in question will make, or has made, his or her sexuality (or political 
opinion or religion) known to others. Such an approach leaves no room for 
individual who may have chosen previously to be discreet- or indeed to not practise 
homosexuality- even for reasons other than fear of persecution (perhaps for religious 
or family reasons)- but who now wishes to be open in a country where it is 
reasonably likely that this decision will result in treatment amounting to persecution. 
It would be virtually impossible for such an applicant to offer objective proof that on 
return to the country of origin he or she would ‘actually’ practice homosexuality 
openly despite previously having refrained to do so.  It is suggested that countries 
where homosexuals are routinely subject to persecution are likely also to be countries 
where homosexuality is culturally and/or religiously condemned. It would be most 
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demanded.34 Lord Rodgers stated, “[u]nless he [the applicant] were minded to 
swell the ranks of gay martyrs[…] he would be compelled to act discreetly.” 35 
In the view of Lord Rodgers, it is clear that the opportunity to act discretely 
does not represent a meaningful option and can be dismissed, therefore, as a 
viable alternative to migration. 
 
If forced migration denotes lack of meaningful choice (due to conditions of 
exit) then it is difficult to explain why refugee law has traditionally rejected 
victims of natural disasters or widespread violence as refugees. Can it be said 
that a person leaving a place where there is a high risk of starvation, for 
example, is making a choice? There are no options available for the individual 
to rank (thereby pursuing their personal preferences and rendering the choice 
act meaningful); the only viable option is migration, the other option(s) 
representing ‘tragic choices’. The classic model of migration identifies 
refugees, in both legal and sociological terms, as being motivated by ‘push’ 
rather than ‘pull’ factors.36 In order to be recognised as a refugee, the 
                                                
unlikely, it is respectfully argued, that an individual from such a cultural and 
religious background would willingly identify as a homosexual unless he or she was, 
in fact, homosexual. The stigma attached to homosexuality in many societies is such 
that it would be unlikely that such a claim would be made by an applicant simply as 
a matter of expediency to secure refugee status in a contracting state.  
34 Again, this reasoning was confirmed in RT and KM (Zimbabwe) (n 27). These two 
cases express an emerging recognition that the Convention does not, and cannot, 
contain a requirement to lie to avoid persecution.   
35 HJ (Iran) (n 26) [26]. Similar interpretations have been applied in other jurisdictions, 
see for example, the Canadian case of Atta Fosu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [2008] FC 1135 and the American case, Karouni v Gonzales 399 F 3d 1163 
(2005) .  
36 As expressed, for example, in Dorigo and Tobler ʻPush-Pull Migration Lawsʼ (2005) 
73 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 1 and Hayden ʻWhat's in a name? 
The Nature of the Individual in Refugee Studiesʼ 19 Journal of Refugee Studies 471 474. 
This emphasis on push factors is, argues Hayden, what explains the focus on 
repatriation as the only durable solution to refugeehood. The argument assumes that 
if one involuntarily left home then one must wish to return once the reasons for 
leaving are no longer present. There is no space in this paper to explore the idea 
further. It is worth noting , however, that this view overlooks a key factor- that 
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overriding motivation must be to leave ‘home’ rather than to arrive anywhere 
in particular.37 Adopting Ravenstein’s long established theory of migration38, 
pull factors can be defined as “those life situations that give one reason to be 
dissatisfied with one’s present locale” whilst pull factors are “attributes of 
distant places that make them appear appealing.”39  As Dorigo and Tobler 
note, this provides “a very elementary equation system”40 that might be 
symbolised by a set of scales with one set of factors being deemed decisive 
only when they can be said to outweigh the other. If push factors are defined 
as in-country factors it is hard to see how a person fleeing starvation could be 
said to be motivated by pull factors; lack of food would surely constitute a 
‘life situation giving one reason to be dissatisfied with one’s present locale’; in 
contradistinction to an external factor, such as the opportunity of higher 
earnings elsewhere.     
                                                
people are involved and it is simply impossible to make a general rule as to how all 
people who leave home will react, some may wish to return, others might settle in 
the host country, still more might have children who are born in the host country 
making it impractical if not impossible to return home, and, of course, some may 
have actually wished to leave but not actually have done so before the event that 
finally made it impossible to stay. 
37 This attitude can be clearly seen in policies such as the ‘first kick of the can’ rule 
adopted by the EU ‘Qualification Directive’ [to n 18 in Introduction] whereby a 
person wishing to apply for asylum in the EU must do so in the first Member State he 
or she arrives in; failure to do so can result in deportation from any subsequent 
Member State visited without the state having to fulfill the usual requirement to hear 
a claim for asylum before ordering deportation. This rule has caused considerable 
political and judicial tension, particularly between Germany and other Member 
States. Before a change to the law in 2006, German asylum law required an applicant 
to demonstrate that the agent of persecution was the state- or at the very least 
directly sanctioned by the state, which led to several challenges before the European 
Court of Human Rights, including the T.I case (App. No. 43844/98) [2000] I.N.L.R. 
211 in which an asylum seeker due to be deported to Germany from Britain, where 
non-state agents of persecution were recognised as within the scope of the 
Convention definition, succeeded in arguing that deportation to Germany under 
these circumstances would be tantamount to refoulement and therefore prohibited 
under Article 33. 
38 Laws of Migration from 1876,1885 and 1889. Ravenstein presented a statistical model 
of analysis for migration patterns, which has been built upon by generations of 
human geographers, cited in, and cited in Dorigo(n 30).  
39 ibid 1.  
40 ibid. 
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The traditional exclusion of those fleeing starvation- or natural disaster, civil 
war or wide spread violence- from the concept of refugeehood put forward by 
the Geneva Convention could be explained in a number of ways. To begin 
with, one might argue that forced migration denotes only lack of meaningful 
choice due to conditions of exit and correspondingly these examples (of an 
individual fleeing starvation, civil war etc.) are experiences of refugeehood. 
This might lead to the conclusion that the exclusion of these experiences from 
article 1(2) is invalid or unjustified. One might pursue the argument sketched 
out in brief above to argue that refugeehood encompasses all forms of forced 
migration and that anyone unable to exercise a meaningful choice 
(understood as the availability of options through which to pursue personal 
preferences) in regards to migration is a refugee.  
 
This much broader concept of refugeehood is used to suggest article 1(2) is 
need of reform as it requires lack of available options due to specific 
circumstances, namely a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on Convention 
grounds. Equally, it could be acknowledged that certain experiences are 
excluded from article 1(2) but one might argue that this is necessary, for 
example, in order to reduce the number of refugees in host countries. The 
legal term refugee is, then, purposively curtailed and these other experiences 
are merely those not selected within the legal term but otherwise equally valid 
uses of the vernacular term ‘refugee.’ As noted in the introduction, in order to 
be coherent as a conceptual model the selection of certain experiences of 
refugeehood, and the corresponding exclusion of others from the scope of 
! &D 
international protection, should be explainable within the interpretational 
theory being used to provide content to the term ‘refugee’.41  
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A further, and more complex, explanation as to why article 1(2) does not 
encompass all experiences of forced migration is the contention that migrants 
and refugees are not to be distinguished solely on the basis of the 
voluntary/involuntary dichotomy. This interpretational model might be 
called the ‘persecution model’ since it claims that the persecution criterion is 
the fact(or) used to identify refugees from amongst the many people crossing 
borders. Herein lies the function of persecution within the discussion; the 
persecution model of refugeehood claims that the contradistinction 
voluntary/involuntary rests not only on lack of available alternatives to 
migration but also requires a certain type of harm, namely treatment 
amounting to persecution. Persecution, then, is used to further differentiate 
those motivated by a need to leave home (refugee or Internally Displaced 
Person) from those motivated by a more general desire to be elsewhere 
(migrant).  
 
On one level the use of persecution to demonstrate forced migration could be 
seen as pragmatic, as Hayden notes “it is far more practical to find social 
conditions that we believe can be relied on to indicate that people could not 
have done otherwise but flee than to ascertain exactly what each individual 
                                                
41 Models of explanation, which range from the claims of realism to communitarian 
‘priority to compatriots’ theories, have been deliberately omitted from discussion at 
this juncture. The ethical justifications for exclusion of certain experiences of 
refugeehood are necessarily subsequent to the enquiry as to whether any exclusion of 
experiences has taken place and will be explored in greater depth.   
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felt at the moment of emigration.”42 Determining whether or not a person has 
been persecuted- or has reason to fear persecution- is seen (rightly or 
wrongly) as verifiable, through examination of evidence, in a way in which 
determining whether or not a person felt compelled to migrate is not.43 The 
existence of compulsion is presumed from the fact of persecution, based on 
the proposition that if remaining is life threatening then one cannot be said to 
have had any meaningful choice in leaving.  This is then used to impute 
motives for migration in individual cases. In their extensive study on forced 
migration Moore and Shellman, starting from the premise that without any 
further information we can assume that staying is preferable to leaving44, 
contend, “one will leave one’s home when the probability of being a victim of 
persecution becomes sufficiently high that the expected utility of leaving 
exceeds the expected utility of staying.”45  
 
                                                
42 Hayden (n 36) 475. 
43 This argument is also used to support the assertion that ‘fear’ is to be interpreted 
objectively under article 1(2); a claim further bolstered by the adjective ‘well-founded.’ 
See Hathaway and Hicks ʻIs there a subjective element in the Refugee Convention's 
requirement of "well-founded fear"?ʼ (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 1 
526 in which they argue ‘fear’ criterion denotes “forward-looking expectation of risk” 
rather than the alternative definition of ‘standing in trepidation’. This is an 
interpretation supported by the Australian Federal Court in Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. Kord [2002] 125 F.C.R 68 [69] in which 
Heerey J stated, “the use of a passive voice [in the Convention] conveys a compound 
notion concerned both with the conduct of the persecutor and the effect that the 
conduct has on the person being persecuted.” See also Cameron '‘Risk theory and 
"subjective fear": the role of risk perception, assessment, and management in refugee 
status determinations’' (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 432. 
44 This is a general claim but one based on empirical evidence; although, of course, 
there will be people whose experiences defy this assertion. It can be observed that 
people choose to move all the time, however, it is a tiny minority of the world’s 
population who chose to move without any time frame for return. Mass migration as 
seen in the nineteenth and early twentieth century has largely ceased. Migration now 
is comprised of “small numbers moving from many places to many places” Vertovec 
(ed) Migration (Critical Concepts in The Social Sciences Routledge 2010) x.   
45 Moore and Shellman ʻFear of Persecution: Forced Migration, 1952-1995ʼ 48 The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 723 726-7.  
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This explains, then, the function of persecution in the concept of refugeehood; 
to act as indication of forced migration by demonstrating conditions of exit 
that can be said to be coercive thereby allowing imputation of motives of 
migration. However, this merely explains why it could be seen to be 
convenient to include the persecution criterion in the determination of refugee 
status; it does not justify it. In order to justify the exclusion of other 
experiences of forced migration from article 1(2), the persecution model 
claims persecution is inherent in the concept of refugeehood. Thus, according 
to the persecution model it is the persecution criterion that “establishes a valid 
claim to refugee status”46 under international law.  
*FNF* 23GH45!@0?!B;-3;:47/,0O!2!P-/;<!Q/37,-/:@H!&R;-R/;S!
The traditional interpretation of ‘refugee’ emphasized the historical basis of asylum 
and the context in which the Convention was drafted. This led to a focus on the 
concept of persecution and, in particular, paradigmatic examples of persecution as 
perceived in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and in the context of 
the burgeoning Cold War.47 Cole and Garvey, amongst others, argue that persecution 
is not a constitutive feature of refugeehood but rather a relic from the Cold War, best 
discarded and replaced with a new conceptual standard. This critique of article 1(2) 
                                                
46 Shacknoven (n 12) 277. Shacknove is using validity here solely in the legal sense, he 
is not claiming that persecution ought to establish a morally valid claim to refugee 
status but rather that under the Geneva Convention persecution is the evidence 
selected as establishing a valid claim to refugee status. It is perhaps surprising, 
therefore, that this key term has been left undefined by the Convention. Although 
Hathaway suggests there are persuasive reasons as to why this is so The Law of 
Refugee Status (n 8 in introduction) 7. 
47 The Travaux Preparatoires contain no discussion of whether or not to include 
persecution in the definition (there was, by means of contrast, considerable debate on 
the wording of the standard of proof before the drafters settled on ‘well-founded 
fear’). Persecution is left undefined by the Convention, Preamble and the Travaux 
Preparatoires. The individualistic definition also represents a contradistinction to 
nationality specific definitions of refugee such as those adopted by the League of 
Nations to respond to Russian and Armenian refugee flows. It is in this way that 
article 1(2) is considered to provide a universal definition of refugeehood (that is in 
the sense of general), see Weis (ed) The Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Cambridge University Press 1951) x. 
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cites examples such as those mentioned above, people fleeing starvation, civil war or 
natural disasters, to conclude that the persecution criterion is “simply not an 
adequate definitional standard to embrace all those who require protection because 
they have been coerced to migrate.”48 Thus, the claim by Cole, Garvey et al. is that the 
parameters of the definition, and the scope of protection provided by the 
Convention, are far narrower than the parameters of the term ‘refugee.’    
 
The inclusion of the persecution criterion can be explained, according to Hathaway, 
as representing a desire “to give priority in protection matters to persons whose 
flight was motivated by pro-Western political values.”49  In Hathaway’s view the 
concept of persecution, far from being a necessary feature of refugeehood was 
selected, in the first place, as a condemnation of the Soviet system. This view is 
supported, argues Hathaway, by the inclusion of the five ‘Convention grounds’; the 
selection of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion was designed to enumerate violations 
most often associated with the Eastern bloc rather than the socio-economic human 
rights violations found in the West.  
 
Price, on the other hand, places persecution at the centre of the concept of 
asylum to conclude “the persecution criterion has a long history, and is 
inextricably connected with the way asylum has historically been understood 
and practiced.”50 Certainly, the notion of a refugee as a persecuted person can 
be traced much further back than 1951. Price identifies the residual impact of 
the Greek concept of asylia, where ‘applicants’ were required not only to reach 
                                                
48 Hathaway (n 11 introduction) 117 For the sake of clarity, this is not the view taken 
by Hathaway but rather his characterisation of the approach taken by Garvey and 
Cole. His article goes on to suggest that persecution could be reinterpreted in line 
with human rights norms to breathe “new life into refugee law” ibid 122.  
49 Hathaway ibid 6. 
50 Price 'Politics or Humanitarianism: Recovering the Political Roots of Asylum' (2004) 
19 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 277 277.  
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a sacred space but also to convince the priest that they deserved protection51 
and the more formal adjudication process in the Roman Empire. Price argues 
persuasively that the current system has more in common with these ancient 
conceptions of asylum than with the medieval idea of sanctuary- asylum 
granted by and in the church- the purpose of which was mercy, and, 
therefore, did not involve any form of judgment but instead was to be 
extended to anyone who reached a sacred building. It may be the case that the 
concept of asylum has, in Western thought52, always contained the notion that 
it is to be granted rather than simply given on request but this does not 
determine the content of the concept of asylum or the place of persecution in 
the concept of refugeehood.53  
 
Price’s argument, and it is one put forward by Martin, Grahl-Madsen and 
Weis as well, goes further. It claims that if asylum can be said to involve some 
element of judgment of the ‘applicant’ (as deserving or not), persecution- 
variously defined- was the criterion used to determine the judgment. That 
asylum, as an institution, has its origins as a mechanism for protecting the 
persecuted is a well-supported claim. The influence of the religious 
fragmentation of the reformation is still evident in refugee studies today; the 
targeting of and/or discrimination towards individuals due to personal 
                                                
51 ibid 289.  
52 For an account of the concept of asylum in the Muslim world see Suhrke ‘Refugees 
and Asylum in the Muslim World’ in S Cohen (ed.) The Cambridge Survey of World 
Migration (Cambridge University Press 1995) 457. Suhrke notes that in Islamic 
thought the concept of asylum grew out of the hijra, the flight of Muhammad and his 
followers and focuses, therefore, on the duty of a Muslim to leave a non-Muslim 
society rather than on the duties of host states. 
53 There is also something to be said for the observation of the French representative 
in the travaux preparatoires that although in practice they may amount to the same 
thing there is both a difference in meaning and origin of the word asile and refuge, 
Weis (n 47) 16.   
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beliefs- or matters of conscience- remain paradigmatic examples of 
persecution. If the Reformation solidified the notion of religious persecutees 
as refugees, the French Revolution can be said to have done the same for those 
persecuted on grounds of their political beliefs. The first French Constitution 
guaranteed asylum to any foreigner forced to flee his country of origin for 
‘advancing the cause of liberty.’54 Although the victims’ experiences varied, in 
the case of these early refugees, the common element that identified the 
treatment as persecutory was the public pressure brought to bear on 
individuals for the sole reason of personal belief.  
 
It could be argued that this remains the vernacular meaning of ‘refugee’ 
today, as Zolberg notes, those escaping religious or political persecution are 
still seen as ‘classic refugees.’55 However, as a legal notion refugee has not 
always included a formal link between persecution and refugee status. The 
first legal definitions of refugee were nationality specific; such as those 
adopted in 1905 to deal with the refugee flows from Armenia and Russia. 
Nationality specific definitions encompassed any person of the specified 
nationality outside their country of origin without any further enquiry into 
the personal experiences of the individual. Thus, membership in the specified 
group was sufficient to establish refugee status.56 Similarly, the first definition 
                                                
54 For further details see Price (n 55) 306-8; Zolberg (n 33) 8-11. 
55 Zolberg (n 33) 5. The classic French dictionary Le petit Robert states that the term 
‘refugee’ was first used in 1573 in the conjunction with the concept of asylum for 
those fleeing religious persecution. Indeed, the case of the persecuted Huguenot 
fleeing France is often cited as the first refugee flow and the UNHCR felt the 
Huguenot experience so closely fitted the idea of refugees that on the tricentennial of 
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes- which had, officially at least, allowed France’s 
Calvinists to live alongside the Catholic population – they published a remembrance 
article. 
56 This method of awarding refugee status ‘prima facie refugee status determination’ is 
still used today, particularly in countries that border refugee producing states, access 
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in international law, introduced by the League of Nations in 1921, focused on 
remedying the problem of statelessness rather than individual experiences;  
the denial of diplomatic protection by the country of origin or nationality was 
the defining characteristic of inter-war refugees and not persecution.57 The 
emphasis on individuals rather than groups did not return until the post-war 
period. In the post-Holocaust world, in which the United Nations was 
established, persecution was, understandably, the “recurrent theme 
in[…]instruments dealing with refugees.”58 Persecution is not only a feature of 
article 1(2); it is also specifically mentioned in the Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which classifies “the right to seek and enjoy 
asylum from persecution”59 as a Human Right. 
 
The history of the refugee offers a mixed legacy in terms of the place of 
persecution within the concept of refugeehood. Whilst Price and Martin’s 
argument might be persuasive in terms of historical accuracy; it is hard to see 
why, or how, it follows without further justification that asylum today must 
be conceived as such. The theoretical appeal of an argument based on the 
claim ‘it was always so’ is limited. The question is whether there is some 
                                                
to the vast refugee camps, in for example Jordan and Chad, is allowed on the basis of 
nationality of the refugee producing country and presence in the neighbouring 
country without further enquiry, see Albert ʻPrima facie determination of refugee 
status: An overview and its legal foundationsʼ (Refugee Studies Centre (University of 
Oxford) 2010).  
57 That is not say that denial of citizenship and/or diplomatic protection cannot be 
forms of persecution but merely that the emphasis was on a factual enquiry as to 
whether the individual was stateless rather than into any further victimisation 
suffered. The definition was introduced by the newly formed Office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees created to manage refugee flows, largely through the 
granting of so-called ‘Nansen passports’ to allow refugees to travel and seek 
protection. 
58 Grahl-Madsen A, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol One: Refugee 
Character (A.W Sijthoff 1966)  
59 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 
217 A(III) (UDHR) art 14 (emphasis added).  
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conceptual reason why persecution should be seen as inescapable feature of 
refugeehood? Martin, Price and Grahl-Madsen certainly believe so. Moreover 
this claim is based on a very specific, and restrictive, interpretation of 
persecution. A key tenet of the traditional notion of refugeehood is that it is 
conceptually limited by the concept of asylum as a political institution and 
persecution as a political wrong. According to this view persecution is used to 
identify refugees from amongst the mass of people on the move because it is 
an inherently political concept. It is argued, however, that a restrictive concept 
of ‘refugee’ does not necessarily follow from stating that persecution is an 
inescapable feature of refugeehood.  
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Following this view, the emphasis on persecution, as Hathaway claims, is not 
simply a hangover from the Cold War but rather a requirement inherent in 
the institution of asylum, which operates as “a grant of immunity against 
wrongfully exercised authority.”60 Price sees here a link back to the Roman 
concept of asylum which was reserved for slaves, who were required to 
demonstrate that their master’s treatment justified them being placed beyond 
his jurisdiction. The legal model of asylum as a political asylum became 
crystallised as an institution with the rise of the nation-state. Early scholars of 
international law, such as Grotius, linked the emerging concept of asylum to 
extradition, which Price identifies as a practice that developed as a counter to 
the earlier practice of granting sanctuary to common criminals.61  
                                                
60 Price (n 3 in introduction) 281. 
61 The link between refugee status and extradition is perhaps not surprising when one 
considers that the laws on refugee status and extradition might both be applicable to 
one individual. For example where refugee status granted will operate so as to 
prevent extradition A-G (Minister of Immigration) v Tamil X and RSAA [2010] NZ SC 
107. 
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Asylum, in the view of Grotius, was for those who would face persecution 
rather than prosecution if returned home (and extradition applied if the case 
were reversed).62 Until the twentieth century asylum was used, as Grahl-
Madsen notes,  almost exclusively to “denote…nonextradition for political 
offences.”63 Thus, argues Price, building on Grotius’ approach, asylum 
requires justification to deny the legitimate claim of a state to exercise 
jurisdiction over their citizen(s) and persecution provides this.64 Persecution is 
used as proof that the state’s claim is illegitimate. As with the Roman master, 
the claim to jurisdiction over the individual has been forfeited due to 
wrongful treatment. The mistreated citizen is viewed, as Arendt expressed it, 
as “stateless in the deep meaning of the term.”65 Accordingly, claims Price, in 
order to constitute persecution the treatment must have been inflicted either 
“by the state or by an agent acting under the color of state authority.”66  
 
This model of asylum, it is claimed, explains why states are not placed under 
an obligation to provide asylum, but instead are given the right to grant it. 
The emphasis is on the interaction between the country of origin and the host 
state, rather than on the individual. The experiences of the individual are 
                                                
62 Grotius, however, also suggested that those states, which transgressed the 
boundaries of natural law be subject to invasion by other states to restore justice. A 
view rejected by Wolff and Vattel who, in a foreshadowing of modern international 
law, advocated non-intervention except in cases of self-defence and asylum as a 
corollary of the duty of hospitality. This distinction between persecution and 
prosecution remains key, however, to the determination of refugee status under 
article 1(2). 
63 n 58 11. 
64 ‘Claim’ is not used here in the active sense (of demanding an entitlement) but is 
used descriptively to signify jurisdiction over an individual in international law 
(regardless of whether the state in question actually seeks- or even wishes- the 
individual in question to be returned).  
65 Cited in Zolberg et al (n 33)33. 
66 Price (n 3 in introduction)219 (emphasis added). Price’s aim is to “recover a 
conception of asylum as a definitively political practice” 245. 
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relevant only in so far as they justify the denial by one state of the claims of 
another state to that individual. This analysis is consistent with the traditional 
view of international law as inter-state law with states as the only actors on 
the international stage, reflected, for example, in the fact that (except for 
certain limited exceptions) states are the primary entities with legal 
personality in the international sphere.67 Within this understanding of 
international law, the states are the constitutive elements of the international 
political and legal system. Individuals are, by contrast, the constitutive 
elements of the domestic political and legal systems. Individuals are only 
present in the international sphere as citizens of one (or perhaps more) of the 
states.68  
 
Furthermore, within the statist analysis of international law the key principles, 
upon which the international legal order rests, are said to be the right to self-
determination of peoples and the norm of non-intervention. Asylum is 
conceived as ‘mitigation of the principle of sovereignty’69 and “the reverse 
                                                
67 It is for this reason that the focus of the Convention is the obligations of the 
(potential) host state and refugees bring claims in the domestic context, from within 
the legal system of the host state, not in the international arena, see Weis (n 47) 480. It 
is interesting to note that initially many European countries included the newly 
formed UNHCR in its determination process- France, for example, had a three 
person panel for hearing appeals on refugee status determination, one member of 
whom was a UNHCR representative. Similarly refugee status determination in Italy 
was through a joint process involving the Italian Government and the UNHCR 
equally. However, an admissions clause was deliberately left out of the operative 
part of the Convention and instead the final committee made a recommendation that 
Governments ‘continue to receive refugees on their territory’ and acted in ‘the true 
spirit of international co-operation so these refugees may find asylum’ (U.N Doc 
A./CONF.2/108 cited ibid 9).  
68 That this is the traditional model of international law is not disputed by critics of 
the political concept of asylum, such as Hathaway and Goodwin-Gill. This explains, 
they argue, the fact that (re-)emergence of the term ‘refugee’ coincided with the rise 
of the nation-state and the drive to produce an international legal framework for 
refugee protection was contemporaneous with the collapse of many of these new 
states in the inter-war period. 
69 H Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Macmillan 1977) 13. 
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side of the coin to tolerance.”70 If plurality (which self-determination 
necessarily produces) is to be preserved, non-intervention is necessary, it is 
claimed, to provide assurance that if the potential extremes of plurality are 
realised, those who suffer can find refuge elsewhere.  
 
Yet even if one accepts this view of international law- and it is certainly the 
view cited by many of the opponents of a more inclusive refugee regime - 
does this necessarily entail a purely political model of persecution? What is 
the justification for excluding the victims of starvation, civil war or natural 
disasters (especially where the government response could be said to be 
inadequate) if asylum is an institution designed to protect ‘victims of 
sovereignty.’ Could it not be argued that all those who suffer because of 
where they are born- and manage to leave- are refugees? The key factor is not, 
according to Martin, the need of the particular individual but the need for 
foreign relocation.71  In essence, the argument returns to question of how we 
define forced migration and argues that whilst a “wide range” of alternative 
solutions72 is available to deal with the needs of the general population, even 
in a failed state, asylum is the “only form of effective relief”73 for the 
politically engaged or socially marginalised.  
 
                                                
70  Goodwin-Gill International law and the movement of persons between states (Oxford, 
1978) 138. 
71 Martin, 'Strategies for a Resistant World: Human Rights Inniatives and the Need 
for Alternative to Refugee Interdiction' (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journa 
753 793. 
72 Price (n 4) 309. This is built on the idea of ‘distinctive need’ put forward by Michael 
Walzer in ‘Distribution of Membership’ in Brown, Shue (ed.) Boundaries: National 
Autonomy and its Limits (Rowman and Littlefield 1981). 
73 Price Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 309.  
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This would seem to be a practical, rather than theoretical, justification and, 
without entering into a discussion on the availability or effectiveness of these 
alternative solutions here, it can be observed that if unique need for foreign 
relocation is the only justification for a political model of asylum; then its 
persuasiveness would be undermined if the group in need of foreign 
relocation could be shown to include others beyond those included in the 
scope of protection, namely the politically engaged or socially marginalised. If 
the ‘wide range’ of alternative solutions for others in need were to be 
unavailable; then presumably asylum would have to be stretched to include 
all of those in need who have fled their country of origin or nationality. 
Alienage would be the last remaining distinction between those in need in situ 
and refugees. Yet this is not what Price, Martin et al. argue; to repeat, the claim 
is that asylum is inherently political and refugeehood only includes the 
persecution, and persecution can only refer to the politically active or those 
socially marginalised by government (in)action. If this claim is to be sustained 
then it must be explained why only these groups of persons are entitled to be 
granted foreign relocation and why the scope of protection does not 
encompass all cross-border migrants who are in need.  
 
It is a key assumption of the political concept of asylum that states have an 
obligation to protect their own citizens and that refugees are created when- in 
exceptional circumstances- this obligation is not fulfilled.74  Thus, when 
                                                
74 Warner argues that the current premise upon which international refugee law rests 
is that if states fulfilled their obligation (to their own citizens) there would be no 
refugees, that refugees are an exception to the norm, thus “the norms dealing with 
refugees are extensions of the normal obligations of states in extraordinary situations: 
they are not extraordinary rules” Warner 'The Refugee and State Protection' in 
Nicholson and Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International 
Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge University Press 1999) 137. 
! DK 
defining refugeehood the search is for indicators that can be relied on to 
demonstrate that the individual does not stand in the usual position of citizen 
in relation to their home state rather than simply signs of more general need. 
As noted already, the link between persecution and refugeehood rests on the 
assumption that persecution is proof that migration was the only viable 
option; persecution, it is argued by the political model, is selected not only 
due to the serious nature of the harm feared or inflicted75 but also because of 
its significance as evidence of a political wrong. The construction of a state’s 
duties to citizens will be undertaken more comprehensively in chapter four. 
At present, however, it will be considered in relation solely to the contours of 
the definition of persecution. 
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If one accepts this model of refugeehood, as the result of a broken bond 
between citizen and state, this has considerable impact on the link between 
persecution and lack of national protection. The fourth requirement under 
article 1(2) that the individual be ‘unable or unwilling to avail himself of 
national protection’. First, it suggests that this ought not to be separate 
                                                
75 Although the qualitative dimension to persecution has largely been overlooked 
thus far, it should be noted that there is general consensus that in order to constitute 
persecution the act would need to amount to (the threat of) a serious violation of a 
core human right. In relation to the Geneva Convention it is argued that this 
requirement can be found within the Convention text. Article 33, which contains the 
principle of non-refoulement, stipulates that return of an individual to a country 
where his or her life or freedom would be threatened is prohibited, suggesting any 
conduct threatening life or liberty unequivocally would amount to persecution under 
the Convention. Further to that the fact that Article 1(2) does not specify that the 
treatment must present a threat to life or freedom suggests that persecution may 
have a broader qualitative meaning in the definitional article than in article 33. In EU 
Member States, this view is reinforced by Article 9 (1) of the Qualification Directive, 
which states that persecution entails acts “sufficiently serious by their nature or 
repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights.” Some link to 
human rights violations is, however, uncontested and will be explored in greater 
detail later. 
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enquiry and second, the need arises for an explanation of cases where the 
courts found a lack of national protection but deemed the persecution 
criterion unfulfilled.76  
 
The political model of asylum asserts that persecution necessarily denotes a 
lack of national protection, for it is the state- the body assigned under the state 
system and international law to protect its citizens- subjecting (directly or 
indirectly) the victim to harm. Although the political model of asylum is often 
viewed as restrictive in the case of national protection, it actually serves to 
lessen the burden on the individual asylum seeker by viewing persecution as 
demonstrative of a lack of national protection. It renders satisfaction of the 
persecution criterion tantamount to a statement that the claimant is ‘unable or 
unwilling to avail himself of national protection’ without any further proof 
being required.  
 
This is a significant difference to the approach adopted across many 
jurisdictions, Canada, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom 
for example, where lack of national protection is treated as a separate, and 
subsequent, enquiry to the persecution criterion. This view can be supported 
semantically by article 1(2). A refugee is a person who demonstrates “a well-
founded fear of persecution” and is “unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling, 
to avail himself of the protection” of his country of origin or nationality. As a 
matter of construction, the definition seems to require enquiry into whether or 
not the claimant has been-or has good reason to fear being-persecuted 
                                                
76 It could, of course, merely be argued by those advocating the political model of 
asylum that these cases were wrongly decided and based on a misunderstanding of 
article 1(2). They are far from isolated examples, however, for most jurisdictions 
conduct a separate enquiry into the availability of national protection. 
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separately from the enquiry as to whether national protection was available. 
However, if two separate enquiries are conducted. First into whether the harm 
suffered amounts to persecution and subsequently as to whether national 
protection is available it can result in the denial of refugee status to an 
individual whom the court recognises as satisfying the persecution criterion (a 
result insupportable under the political model of asylum).  
 
At the national protection stage of the enquiry the refugee’s own experiences 
seem to have little place. Instead the focus is on the current situation ‘on the 
ground’ in the country of origin. The question asked is ‘is there some 
mechanism of the state that could protect the claimant?’ This could be 
anything from a functioning police force to a relevant statute. In Horvath77 the 
applicant’s claim failed because Slovakia was considered by the House of 
Lords to have a functioning police force and court system to deal with those 
targeting the Roma minority. In reaching the decision Lord Lloyd rejected 
Lord Hoffmann’s approach in ex parte Shah78, which stated, in line with the 
political model of asylum, ‘Persecution [for a Convention reason] = serious 
harm + the failure of state protection.’ Under this reading of article 1(2) Mr 
Horvath would have been awarded refugee status. However, the court 
adopted the formula ‘Persecution [for a Convention Reason] + Failure of State 
Protection = Refugee Status.’  Thus, Mr Horvath’s claim failed 
notwithstanding the ‘successful’ establishment of harm constituting 
persecution.   
 
                                                
77 Horvath (n 11).  
78 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Regina v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 WLR 1025. 
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Alternatively, an applicant might state that they are unwilling to avail 
themselves of national protection. To succeed here they must show that this 
unwillingness is “by reason of that fear” of persecution. Logically, a fear of 
persecution must have already been demonstrated and ‘that fear’ clearly 
requires the claimant to link unwillingness to avail herself of national 
protection due to fear of the specific harm already established as constituting 
persecution. Instinctively, it seems a claimant-friendly addition to the 
definition; it could be envisaged as operating in situations where national 
protection is available (now) but due to the persecution the refugee suffered a 
deep mistrust of the authorities or a natural fear of returning to ‘the scene of 
the crime’ is present. In practice, it is virtually impossible to succeed under 
this limb; it could even be argued that the inclusion of ‘unwillingness’ was a 
meaningless addition to the definition. ‘Unwillingness’ (when contrasted with 
‘unavailable’) implies that national protection does exist and if the 
requirements are read disjunctively and interpreted objectively then it is 
impossible to claim a well-founded fear of persecution if national protection is 
deemed by the national adjudicator to be present.  
 
The distinction here is between unwillingness due to fear of persecution and 
‘mere’ unwillingness (i.e. unwillingness due to a desire to remain in the host 
country). The argument goes. If national protection exists then an individual 
can have not objectively have anything to fear by returning home.79 In Dularie 
                                                
79 The application of an objective standard fits squarely within the interpretational 
model that views persecution as a political wrong for it suggests that the behaviour 
of the home state is being subjected to scrutiny against the backdrop of a model of a 
state ought to behave. This is not the forum to engage in discussion of whether 
objectivity is ever achievable. It suffices here to observe that, at least in the arena of 
judgment of political system, it is difficult to envisage a truly objective standard; one 
must be applying a concept of political legitimacy against which the actions of the 
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Boodlal v Canada80 the claim for asylum in Canada of a Trinidadian woman 
fleeing a violent husband was rejected on the grounds that Trinidad had 
recently passed a statute on domestic abuse, which the court interpreted as 
evidence of national protection for battered women. Mrs Boodlal’s argument 
that even if Trinidad now had sufficient legal protection for battered women 
she had a genuine fear of returning home lest she suffer the treatment 
(accepted by the court as persecution) was dismissed. Mrs Boodlal’s 
concurrent claim that a statute on family violence did not constitute available 
national protection also failed despite her husband’s staggering eleven 
convictions for assault or issuing death threats against his wife during their 
residence in Canada, a state with established domestic abuse laws. The 
disparity between available and effective national protection was not even 
addressed.  
 
It would be of considerable significance, therefore, to individual claimants if 
persecution were to be viewed as demonstrative of a lack of national 
protection. As noted above, if one takes persecution to be demonstrative of a 
lack of national protection asylum claims, such as Mr Horvath’s or Mrs 
Boodlal’s, that are currently dismissed may well succeed.81 In addition, it 
would suggest the need to reassess cases in which applications were denied 
                                                
state are being judged. This observation links, as well, to arguments put forward here 
in subsequent sections and will be discussed in greater detail then. 
80 (Unreported) cited in Macklin ʻRefugee Women and the Imperative of Categoriesʼ 
17 Human Rights Quarterly 213 215. 
81 This is not to say that demonstrating past persecution on a Convention ground 
would necessarily be sufficient to establish refugee status, the persecution would 
have to be reasonably contemporaneous with the asylum claim as persecution is, of 
course, demonstrative of a lack of national protection at the time of persecution and a 
change of government, for example, could defeat a claim. Here, however, the claim 
would most likely fail on the grounds that the applicant no longer had a ‘well-
founded fear’ of persecution.  
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on the grounds that, although the treatment suffered amounted to 
persecution, the option of ‘internal flight’ was deemed to be available.82  To 
repeat, if persecution is viewed as demonstrative of a lack of national 
protection then these cases would require new analysis, because, the findings 
of persecution but denial on grounds of available national protection would 
be unsustainable within the interpretational explanation given; one or other of 
the findings- either that treatment amounted to persecution or that national 
protection was available must have been incorrect if the former is 
demonstrative of the latter. The ‘unwillingness’ option would be equally 
meaningless under this reading as under the current interpretation. There 
cannot be any need to demonstrate an unwillingness to avail themselves of 
national protection if national protection cannot be said to be available. 
Further, as will be demonstrated below, persecution as demonstrative of a 
lack of national protection is not merely one interpretation of the political 
model of asylum but rather an inherent feature of this model. 
 
If persecution is demonstrative of lack of national protection, is it the only 
manifestation or merely one amongst many, selected for priority in awarding 
refugee status? If it is only one manifestation of lack of national protection 
further justification for the exclusion of other manifestations would be 
necessary, and, it is argued, difficult to maintain as the basis of the award of 
refugee status in the political model of asylum is the assumption that 
persecution is demonstrative of lack of national protection. On this argument 
                                                
82 See, for example, R (Yogathas) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 
AC 920. For indepth discussion of when internal relocation is considered suitable see 
Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5. This case set up 
what is referred to as the ‘unduly harsh’ test requiring an individual to show it 
would be unduly harsh for them to be forced to relocate elsewhere in their country of 
orgin.  
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protection must be extended in all instances, where there can be said to be a 
lack of national protection for an individual. It is hard, therefore, to envisage a 
successful argument for excluding other manifestations of a lack of national 
protection. This suggests that the relevance of the state-/non-state agent 
distinction is minimal.83 As will be posited in chapter four, the public/private 
dichotomy would be another distinction that would be difficult to maintain 
whilst advocating a political model of asylum and a concept of refugeehood 
based on the state-citizen bond. A lack of national protection resulting in 
harm must necessarily be persecutory if, as Shacknove suggests, persecution 
is seen as the manifestation of a broken bond between state and citizen and, 
therefore, as a political wrong.84  
 
An articulated concept of legitimacy ought to be the anchor point to the 
determination of refugee status. It is this step that has been largely overlooked 
in discussions on refugeehood and persecution. The problem is not, 
necessarily, with the use of persecution as proof that migration was forced but 
with a lack of discussion on the content of the concept of persecution. In order 
for persecution to operate as evidence of forced migration, “we need to make 
some assumptions about how people make decisions and…assign a value to p 
[persecution].” As argued above, the ‘meaningful choice’ model provides a 
plausible basis for voluntary/involuntary distinction but what remains 
                                                
83 A76491421 (unpublished) US BIA Apr. 25 2000 cited Anker 'Refugee Law, Gender, 
and the Human Rights Paradigm' (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 134 149. 
84 A fusion of persecution and state protection is not an argument that only state 
persecution is covered by the Refugee Convention. Chapter four considers the notion 
of collective violence in some detail. This concept, it is argued, explains why a 
practical fusion of persecution and state protection criteria does not exclude non-state 
actors of persecution.  
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unarticulated, and therefore unresolved, in refugee law is what is to be used 
to ascribe value to persecution.  
 
Moore and Shellman offer one model of forced migration which could be 
applicable to refugees in particular, when conceptualising persecution we 
“[a]ssume that people are (1) purposive; (2) value their liberty, physical 
person, and life and (3) develop beliefs about the actors in society with respect 
to those values.”85 The first assumption is implicit in argument relating to 
forced migration and forms the basis of the rejection of the lack of agency 
model of choice and supports the ‘meaningful choice’ model by suggesting 
that as people are purposive they can, and do, make decisions; the first task of 
refugee law is, then, to identify when this decision is forced i.e. there is a lack 
of alternative options. The second point asks us to identify things we believe 
people (in general) value. The third assumption relates again to human 
agency, it assumes that people will decide to leave (or at least see leaving as a 
viable option) if something they value is threatened, and will monitor threats 
from other actors in society to these values (and might, therefore, flee pre-
emptively). Moore and Shellman argue, “as p [persecution] rises from 0 to 
1…(for most people) there is some threshold value that will lead them to 
prefer leaving to staying”86 and it is at that point any subsequent movement 
can be described as involuntary.  If the movement is cross-border, the person 
is then, a refugee.  
 
To return to the second assumption, if persecution can be defined as a threat 
to anything we presume people value, such as, liberty, physical person and 
                                                
85 Moore and Shellman (n 45) 726 
86 ibid. 
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life, our definition of persecution is dependent on assumptions as to what 
people value (and based on what we value ourselves).87 Moore and Shellman 
make their assumptions explicit, which is exactly what most models of 
refugeehood fail to do. It could be argued that all models of refugeehood 
follow this pattern. First they all assume people are capable of making 
decisions; if no one could decide to leave all migration would be forced. 
Forced migration must be, therefore, when the decision is forced due to lack 
of alternative options. Secondly, some assumptions must be made as to what 
people value in order to assess when people can be said to have a lack of 
alternative options. Thirdly, we must assume that people act on threats to 
these values, thereby becoming refugees (or Internally Displaced Persons). 
The determination of what people value is, therefore, key to identifying 
refugees precisely because, as Grahl-Madsen argues, refugeehood signifies 
“those who are threatened with sanctions for struggling to protect their 
human rights.”88  
 
Refugee law can, therefore, only be explained in reference to a doctrine of 
rights to provide a framework for determining whether an act can be deemed 
illegitimate violence.89 Normatively the link between legitimacy and human 
rights is strong, as Bilder notes, “to assert that a particular social claim is a 
human right is to vest it emotionally and morally with an especially high 
                                                
87 Discussion of value and value-judgments is taken up in chapter three, in particular, 
p18-9. 
88 Grahl-Madsen (n 58) 11. 
89 This refers to human rights rather than citizens’ rights. Otherwise, following 
Weber’s definition of a state, these rights would be meaningless just when the would-
be citizen needs them the most i.e. the moment power was wielded illegitimately and 
they ceased to live in a state and could, therefore, no longer claim to be citizens of 
anywhere. ‘Citizen’ is used here in a non-legal sense to (admittedly incorrectly) 
signify all those living in the given territory where power is being wielded. 
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order of legitimacy.”90 However, asserting that refugee law must begin with a 
reference to a doctrine of rights immediately raises a number of complex 
theoretical questions. When one begins to discuss human rights one is 
immediately confronted with a series of sub-questions. What do we mean by 
human rights? Which rights are human rights? What are they rights to?91 
These are the questions addressed in chapters three, four and five. 
 
By applying the involuntary/voluntary dichotomy coupled with a broader 
understanding of persecution, tied to evolving notions of political legitimacy, 
article 1(2) could encompass a broader understanding of refugeehood and 
persecution than the traditional paradigmatic examples of the refugee. To 
return to the example of the individual leaving a country where there is 
widespread starvation discussed in relation to forced migration; not only 
would the absence of viable alternative beyond migration or ‘tragic choices’ 
allow the individual to satisfy the requirement of involuntary migration but 
also it could be argued lack of food could represent a human rights violation, 
and a political wrong, thereby fulfilling the persecution criterion, arguments 
taken up in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
The key to explaining and justifying restrictive or expansive concepts of 
refugeehood and persecution lies, therefore, in the model of human rights 
used to give content to these concepts. Whether one views rights as 
                                                
90 ‘Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions’ 1969 Wisconsin 
Law Review 171, 174 
91 See for example M Nussbaum, 'Capabilities and Human Rights' (1997) 66 Fordham 
Law Review 273, Gerwith The Community of Rights (Chicago University Press 1996), 
Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press 
2003).  
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entitlements, interests that require protection or “artefacts of state action”92 
will not only have a profound impact on the interpretation of ‘refugee’ 
favoured but will, or ought to, provide the starting point for all theorizing 
about the concept of refugeehood. It is due to confusion over these core 
theoretical issues that uncertainty in regards to the concept of the refugee 
remains unresolved. Without an agreed frame of reference, in many cases 
commentators, adjudicators and asylum advocates are simply talking past 
each other. The starting point for determining ‘who is a refugee’ must be, 
then, a discussion on applicable human rights doctrines and concepts of 
political legitimacy, which will be undertaken in subsequent chapters.   
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This chapter has addressed the underpinnings of the concept of refugee in 
international law. It has been accepted that there is a need to maintain some 
distinction between the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ and that the persecution 
criterion may be seen as serving as the boundary between the terms. What has 
been disputed, however, is the impact of these claims. It has been argued that 
it possible to maintain a distinction between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ as based 
on the persecution criterion without producing an inevitably restrictive 
concept of refugeehood. The borders of the term ‘refugee’ in international law 
depend not on a reiteration of traditional concepts of political legitimacy 
based on sovereignty but on an examination of the demands evolving 
                                                
92 This phrase is borrowed from Nussbaum ibid 273. These are merely a few ways of 
theorizing about human rights: if, for example, one adopted Robert Nozick’s view (in 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books 1974)that rights provide moral constraints on 
state action the framework for assessing illegitimate action is clear; any action 
transgressing the boundaries is illegitimate. Refugee Law could then be seen as 
transforming a moral right (to have these constraints on state action respected) into a 
legal right (to be afforded protection when these constraints are ignored).  
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concepts of human rights place on the notions of political legitimacy and 
sovereignty. The scope of international protection, it is argued, is dynamic 
rather than static and, as such, capable of shifting along with these notions 
without dissolving the boundary between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ entirely.    
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Chapter one sought to set out some of the historical and conceptual 
background of international refugee law. This chapter will set out an 
analytical and normative framework for interpreting international refugee law 
drawing on the theories of Robert Alexy. Alexy’s theories are a useful lens 
through which to reconsider refugee law and provide a good basis for 
reconstructing our intuitions about refugee law. Alexy considers critical issues 
that also lie at the heart of refugee law, namely the connection between law 
and morality and conflicts between fundamental rights. The latter issue is 
raised explicitly in many refugee cases and the former is implicitly raised 
when considering the underpinnings of refugee law. Alexy’s theories point 
towards a clearer understanding of many of the unexpressed assumptions of 
refugee law and the impact of these understandings on interpretations of 
existing refugee law. In particular, Alexy’s theories offer us a guide for 
addressing, and assessing, hard cases in refugee law1 such as those that 
appear to pose challenges to the conceptual foundations of refugee law. 
Alexy’s theories are useful to refugee law, therefore, in helping to 
demonstrate how critiques of refugee law decisions may be based on practical 
and legal reasoning grounds and not only on moral or policy differences. It 
will be demonstrated that often criticisms, or support, of refugee law 
decisions that are couched in policy terms are capable, in fact, of being 
                                                
1 As Menéndez argues “Alexy’s theory does not predetermine the answer to be given 
to those cases, but it brings analytical clarity and precision in the reasoning of hard 
cases, and thus, renders it possible to replicate the train of reasoning of judges; 
consequently, it increases the extent to which decisions can be criticised inter-
subjectively” Constitutional Rights through Discourse: On Robert Alexy’s Legal Theory - 
European and Theoretical Perspectives (Arena 2004) 12. 
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assessed- and reinterpreted- in legal terms. This allows us to reconstruct 
refugee law such that we can begin to identify when decisions are false in that 
the legal reasoning behind the decision is flawed. A criticism of a decision on 
refugee status based on flawed legal reasoning, it is argued, is given a 
different status within legal systems than criticism based on differing 
interpretations of policy aims. Importantly, a legally defective decision can be 
challenged within the legal system.  
 
This chapter will provide the foundation for the remainder of the thesis by 
using Alexy’s reconstruction of basic rights as principles and law as having a 
necessary connection to morality (the connection thesis) as the basis for a 
more sophisticated understanding of refugee law. This chapter will begin by 
setting out Alexy’s principles theory. In elucidating the key characteristics of 
principles, Alexy’s model provides a clearer understanding not only of the 
nature of principles but also of the analytical role of principles in refugee law. 
In particular, the argument for viewing fundamental rights as principles put 
forward by Alexy will be discussed. The chapter will move on to discuss the 
normative role of principles in refugee law through discussing the connection 
thesis in conjunction with what Alexy terms ‘law’s claims to correctness.’ 
Finally, it will begin to tease out the background principles to refugee law, 
which will reveal that human rights norms are already contained within 
refugee law and that this moves the site of criticism away from the Refugee 
Convention and places it instead on the governments and adjudicators of 
potential host states. Alexy provides a model for reconstructing the 
interpretation of international refugee law in domestic courts in a manner 
compatible with the background principles of international law. These 
! KC 
background principles and this claim will then be fleshed out in the 
remainder of the thesis.  
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Alexy’s theory begins with the claim that every norm must be either a rule or 
a principle.2 For the purpose of this thesis, the exclusionary thesis will not be 
explored further; what is salient here is Alexy’s characterisation of principles.  
Principles are contrasted with rules, which are portrayed as definitive 
commands that must be obeyed exactly. The nature of rules as definitive 
commands must result in either complete adherence to the rule or non-
compliance (i.e. breaking of the rule). It is not possible to ‘partially obey’ a 
rule. If one is faced with contradictory or incompatible rules (two legal 
‘oughts’). This ‘conflict of rules’ can be resolved only by creating (and 
applying) an exception, or declaring at least one of the rules invalid. Alexy 
gives the example of a school regulation prohibiting students leaving class 
before the bell.3 A school is most likely also to have a rule that upon hearing 
the fire alarm, students must leave the building immediately. This conflict of 
rules is resolved by introducing an exception to the rule that one may not 
leave class before the bell except in the event of a fire. As neither rule has been 
declared invalid both continue to operate.   
 
                                                
2 I will not address the theorem of exclusive identification, here it suffices that we 
consider human rights norms as principles in refugee status determination cases 
though they need not be seen exclusively as such. Why they ought to be seen as such 
is discussed in greater detail in later sections. 
3 Alexy ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 160 161.  
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Alexy depicts circumstances in which one is faced with contradictory rules are 
described as ‘conflicts’ whereas situations in which an individual encounters 
incompatible principles are characterised as ‘collisions.’ In engaging with 
Klaus Guenther’s critique of principle theory4, Alexy sets out an example of a 
collision of principles, asking us to imagine a scenario where an individual (a) 
has promised to attend the party of a friend but, at the last minute, hears that 
another friend has been taken ill and is in need of assistance. This results in a 
collision of two principles, namely, the principle that ‘promises must be kept’, 
and, the principle that ‘friends in need must be helped.’5 Alexy posits that 
without a distinction between rules and principles, the collision of principles 
has three potential solutions. If one views principles as norms like any other 
norms, including rules, three solutions present themselves: 
1) The ‘tragic model’- here a is subject to both obligations although she 
cannot fulfil them with the result that no matter what course of 
action a decides to take she violates a norm and does wrong.  
This would fail to provide any guide for behaviour as it focuses solely on the 
problem created but offers no solution. 
2) Alternatively, one can decide that in the event of a collision of 
principles neither principle applies and a is, therefore, not under any 
obligation to either friend.  
This, as Alexy observes, does not make any allowance for different 
circumstances in which the collision of principles occur and does not 
distinguish, therefore, between different types of obligations. In this example, 
no recognition is given that the promise is only a promise to attend a party 
and the other obligation is to help a friend in need.  
                                                
4 See, K Günther Der Sinn für Angemessenheit (Suhrkamp 1988). 
5 Alexy ‘Justification and Application of Norms’  (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 157. 
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3) The collision can be solved by determining conditional priority of 
one principle over another in the specific circumstances through the 
application of the principle of proportionality.6  
In this example, then, the balancing of the colliding principles would result in 
conditional priority being given to the obligation to help the friend in need 
over the principle that one ought to keep promises as the promise in this case 
is relatively insignificant to the need of the other friend. 
 
In the third solution, Alexy identifies the very nature of principles and the 
basis of principle theory. The third solution allows for recognition of 
circumstances and different types of obligations. The alternative solutions 
presented above allow both principles to remain valid whilst presenting a 
solution to the collision and is in contrast to the ‘all or nothing’ nature of rules.  
The principle of proportionality, mentioned above, as the structure of 
weighing and balancing the sub-principles of appropriateness, necessity and 
proportionality in the narrow sense, is used to determine which principle is to 
be given conditional priority. This reveals two of the features of principles; 
incompatible principles result in collisions rather than conflicts (which is the 
case with rules) and a collision of principles is resolved through balancing 
(rather than declaring one principle invalid or creating an exception as with 
rules).   
 
If both principles remain valid it follows that neither principle is to be entirely 
dismissed, hence application of the principle of proportionality to determine 
                                                
6 See Alexy (n 3) for discussion of some objections to principle theory , for example, 
the argument that ‘rule’ and ‘principle’ just refer to different uses of norms (see in 
particular 230 – 297).  
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conditional priority of one principle over the other. The application of the 
principle of proportionality requires that each principle be weighed up 
against the other. Balancing, of course, reminds one of scales. If each principle 
is placed on the scales; neither is entirely rejected but, to resolve the collision, 
balancing of reasons for one principle or the other will continue until one 
principle outweighs the other (to a greater or lesser degree). Although in the 
example above, the promise to attend a party could easily be classified as 
trivial in comparison to the need of a friend, one could think of an example 
where the promise, which would be broken to meet the need of the ill friend, 
is far from trivial. For example, it may have been a promise to collect a 
friend’s child from school, which if broken would leave the child alone. One 
might still decide to give conditional priority to the ill friend in need, if the 
situation were an emergency, but this decision would not be taken as easily as 
the decision to skip the party. It would also require that some action be taken 
to ensure the safety of the child.   
 
It seems difficult to accept that a principle can be dismissed entirely if it has 
been only marginally outweighed. This leaves a situation little better than 
option one or two above. Principle theory argues that the principle that has 
been outweighed ought to be realised to the extent possible whilst retaining 
conditional priority of the other principle. For example; one might render 
emergency assistance to the ill friend and then rush to pick up the child or one 
might phone another friend and ask for assistance. This follows the claim that 
principles are to be realised to the greatest degree possible within the context 
so colliding principles may both be realised (although, of course, one to a 
greater and the other to a lesser degree). This is quite a different scenario to a 
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clash of rules where, if no exception exists or can be created, one rule is 
declared invalid and ignored entirely. This is why Alexy characterises 
principles as optimisation commands or goals to strive towards; although the 
principle may not be entirely realised it ought to be achieved to the extent 
possible given the actual and legal possibilities.  
 
Alexy depicts principles as ‘optimisation commands’ to which the meta-
principle of proportionality, defined as the structure of weighing and 
balancing the sub-principles of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality 
in the narrow sense, applies. Principles are “norms commanding that 
something be realised to the highest degree that is factually and legally 
possible”7 or, goals to strive towards.8 There is a duty to optimise the 
normative impact of every relevant principle.  
 
When one examines the nature of a principle viewed as an optimisation 
command, two inter-connected elements of a principle are revealed. The first 
contains the characteristics of a rule, the second retains the nature of the 
principle (thus distinguishing principles from rules, which contain only the 
first part). The first part of the principle is a definitive obligation to realise a 
principle to the highest degree and in this sense, principles have the structure 
                                                
7 ibid. 
8  Dworkin further distinguishes principles and policies, arguing that principles are 
not goals to be reached in the sense of striving to improvement in the community but 
are to be seen rather as “standard[s]…to be observed….because it is a requirement of 
justice or fairness” (Dworkin Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) 22-3). 
Dworkin accepts that this distinction is often blurred and, at least in the sphere of 
human rights, it seems impossible to maintain a distinction between policies and 
principle. It is, also, a particularly unhelpful distinction in terms of refugee rights as it 
would require a serious debate over whether things such as immigration control 
were ‘merely’ policies or were in fact principles. Here I argue, in line with Alexy, that 
human rights norms are principles although as Sen notes, they may motivate policy 
‘Human Rights and the Limits of Lawʼ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 2913.   
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of rules in that failure to realise the principle to the highest degree possible 
represents a broken rule. These are what Alexy refers to as ‘commands to be 
optimised.’  Although principles might not be fully realised they are still 
definitive commands to be fulfilled by optimisation- or achieved- to the 
greatest extent possible. The second part is the content of the principle, 
whatever is to be optimised, to return to the original example, this might be 
the principle that promises must be kept or friends in need must be helped. 
The principle is, then, the ideal ‘ought’ (to be optimised) and the rule is that 
this principle must be optimised (the optimisation command).9 Optimisation 
is, in essence, the overall purpose of balancing and this duty to optimise has 
the character of a rule (and not a principle).  
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Principles theory is of use in international refugee law primarily as Alexy’s 
asserts that fundamental rights have first and foremost the character of 
principles rather than rules.10 It is posited here that this observation applies 
not only to constitutional rights but also to international human rights law, 
especially when used in national courts. Fundamental rights are necessarily 
asserted by a claim to refugee status as, as set out in chapter one, the 
persecution criterion requires the actual or feared violation of a human right. 
Principles theory tells us then that fundamental rights raised in refugee law 
are subject to balancing and that this balancing must be undertaken in 
reference to criteria to determine the weight given to each principle.  
 
                                                
9 See Alexy (n 3) 300-302 for discussion.  
10 Theory of Constitutional Rights (trans. Julian Rivers 2002 Oxford University Press) 55 
[TCR].  Fundamental rights might be seen as “positive expression of the most basic 
principles of practical morality” Menéndez (n 1) 17. 
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It has been claimed that fundamental rights receive better protection when 
viewed in the form of a rule than in the form of a principle. This 
misunderstands Alexy’s assertion. Alexy’s claim is that fundamental rights 
are by their nature principles. This does not prevent formalisation of a principle 
into a legal rule but the right would retain the features of principles also.11 For 
example, the first article of the German Basic Law might be said to have the 
characteristic of a rule. It states ‘human dignity is inviolable’, thus any act 
violating human dignity is unconstitutional. It is, however, also a violation of 
the principle of human dignity that underpins that rule. It is not only a 
violation of article 1 of the German Basic Law but also a violation of a basic 
right. The fundamental right retains the structure of a principle even when 
formalised.12 Fundamental rights, such as human dignity, also provide 
background standards against which interpretations of other laws are made 
and measured. As such, “fundamental rights norms constitute the positive 
expression of the most basic principles of practical morality.”13 Fundamental 
rights as principles provide, therefore, the building blocks of the legal system 
due to what Alexy terms their ‘radiating force’14 as other legal norms in the 
legal system are (re)interpreted in line with basic fundamental principles 
expressed, for example, in a constitution. In Dworkian terms, principles here 
set limits on the discretion of judges such that the absence of a rule limiting 
discretion does not mean that the decision is not controlled by any 
                                                
11 TCR (n 11) 80. Fundamental rights transposed into national constitutional law 
contain both a constitutional rule and a principle that can be used as a guide for 
interpretation of other principles also. For the purposes of clarity, given the number 
of Alexy’s works being referenced shortened titles will be used as well as pinpointed 
references. 
12 Thus the German Constitutional Court refers to “the principles [...] expressed by 
constitutional rights” (BVerfGE 81, 242 [254] Handelsvertreter, emphasis added). 
13 (n 1) 17. 
14 TCR (n 11) 60. 
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standards.15 Principles, including or indeed primarily fundamental rights, 
provide background standards for interpretation of laws.  
 
It has been claimed that some fundamental rights cannot be accurately 
described as principles as they are exempt from balancing. For example, the 
prohibition on torture is described as ‘absolute’ which would preclude torture 
from balancing exercises. Indeed Alexy is not arguing that these rights known 
as ‘absolute rights’ are capable of being lawfully infringed but instead is 
claiming that they take precedence over other principles only according to “a 
large set of conditions of precedence…together with a strong degree of 
certainty that they are satisfied it takes precedence over other competing 
principles.”16 It is better to see these rights as containing balancing in the 
characterisation of the right rather than as absolute in the sense of rules. The 
right to be free from torture, for example, contains inherently, in its 
characterisation, greater weight than any other principle that might be raised 
in opposition.17  
 
In this sense core human rights (basic human rights and the core of other, 
more marginal rights) become absolute as the balancing has already taken 
place, rendering them of greater weight than other rights. These principles 
then take on the character of a rule as “precedence at the level of principle 
[can result in] a breach at the level of rule.”18 The content of the rule, that is 
when which actions can be said to constitute a breach, is determined by 
                                                
15 (n 16 in introduction) 32. 
16 TCR (n 10) 63. 
17 The discussion here involves abstract weight rather than concrete weight. Concrete 
concerns the disagreements about the correct solution of individual cases not general 
propositions about the weight of particular principles, ibid 81. 
18 ibid 64. 
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“preference relation between [the core significance of the right] and other 
competing principles.”19 Thus, the rule is breached each time the ‘wrong’ 
principle (that is a principle that does not have the greater weight) is given 
precedence. In terms of fundamental rights the argument is that the principle 
at stake, for example, human dignity contains, in its characterisation, greater 
weight than competing principles in certain conditions determined by the 
content of the right to human dignity thus transforming the principle into a 
rule whenever the conditions are satisfied “conditional statements of 
preference give rise via the Law of Competing Principles to rules which 
require the consequences of the principle taking precedence.” Such a principle 
can only be outweighed then20 when the conditions are such that the 
importance of satisfying the other competing principle is greater. With some 
fundamental rights, such as right to be free from torture, the conclusion has 
been reached that we can, at present at the very least, not conceive of 
conditions in which the importance of a competing principle would be greater 
than the importance of the right to be free from torture.  
 
In addressing the concerns of those who argue fundamental rights cannot be 
principles, as expressed above, we have strayed from ‘pure’ principles theory. 
We are now considering evaluative terms such as ‘importance’. As Alexy 
notes, when we are discussing ‘importance’ of a principle “the question is not 
how important somebody thinks [the competing principles] are but how 
important they actually are.”21 This is because Alexy’s principles theory is not 
meant merely as a decision-taking model of balancing, although it certainly 
                                                
19 ibid. 
20 According to the law of competing principles which “sets the conditions under 
which one principle takes precedence over another” ibid 69. 
21 TCR (n 10) 103. 
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provides this, but is also a justification model.22 In assigning weight to each 
principle, as required by the balancing exercise, we move from the decision-
taking model to the justification model for Alexy requires that this weight is 
assigned ‘rationally’, in other words is justified, and this is where value 
judgments come into the process. 
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Although principle theory, as Alexy notes in response to Sieckmann23, says 
nothing about the content or validity of the principle per se but merely 
explains how principles are to be used it is not a facet of positivist law. The 
criticism of the principles theory, that it if everything is subject to balancing 
nothing can be persuasively criticised24, then, not valid in relation to Alexy’s 
formulation of principles theory. To claim otherwise misses a key element of 
Alexy’s overall theory of law, namely the connection thesis: that all law is 
necessarily connected to morality. In addition, as balancing is subject to the 
meta-principle of proportionality, although silent on the weight of colliding 
principles per se, it does require that the ‘Law of Balancing’ is satisfied. The 
law of balancing states:  
                                                
22 For the distinction see ibid 100-1. 
23 Alexy (n 3) 294.  
24 See, for example, Poscher Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte. Reflexive Regelung rechtlich 
geordneter Freiheit (Mohr Siebeck 2003). Habermas has also criticised principle theory 
for reducing ‘reasons…to policy arguments’ trans. W. Rehg. Between Facts and Norms. 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Polity Press 1996) 258. This, 
however, seems to overlook the meta-principle of proportionality which requires that 
the criteria of suitability, necessity and proportionality are met. This immediately 
precludes all decisions that would not meet these criteria. This does not, of course, 
guarantee that principles theory is the best route to achieving the just result in every 
decision but that it is helpful in most decisions and particularly instructive in cases 
concerning basic rights.  
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The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one 
principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.25 
In stating that the relative importance of satisfying the principle determines 
the weight to be given, normative concerns inevitably enter the equation. The 
relative importance of a principle cannot be determined in a vacuum and, it is 
argued, it is determined, therefore, by reference to law’s correctness thesis set 
out below. Thus, although principles theory alone provides no answer to the 
question of how to determine the weight to be given to each principle in the 
case of a collision, Alexy is not silent on this issue. Alexy’s principles theory is 
to be taken in conjunction with his correctness thesis, which supplies the 
analytical foundations, and discourse theory, which might be said to provide 
the normative basis for Alexy’s legal theory.    
 
In this section, the second function of principles theory is considered, namely 
as an explanation for the necessary connection between law and morality. 
Here it will be shown that although principles theory when taken in isolation 
might be thought to remain silent as to which principle ought to succeed in 
balancing, when combined with law’s claim to correctness principles theory 
contains also a requirement that the selection of the winning principle is made 
on justifiable grounds. Alexy links his principle theory to his interpretive 
approach to assert that every legal decision contains some balancing and, 
therefore, necessarily incorporates principles.   
 
The question is, then, two-fold: which principles are relevant to international 
refugee law? And what weight is to be given to each of the principles? The 
                                                
25 TCR (n 10) 130. 
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former question, it will be argued, is answered by reference to the nature of 
law and, more specifically, to human rights theory and, as such, there are 
definitive limits within which principles can be selected. The former question 
occupies the subsequent three chapters. The latter question, however, will 
vary depending on circumstances but is also governed by the requirement of 
justification. It is this part of the process, the balancing, which is determined 
by factual circumstances and possibilities. Mead’s example of a team game 
might be instructive here. Mead asks us to imagine a team game where 
individuals are required to take a specific role within the team (a business, for 
example, or, indeed a football team). This dual role requires individuals to 
consider what is best for their own position and that of the team, so they have 
a dual perspective of ‘I’ and ‘We the team.’ This requires that: 
Each adopts not merely the perspective of the good of the team or of all of the other 
players on the team, but also a second-person plural perspective in which they all 
assess the state of play and the expectations and possibilities of members of both 
teams engaged in play[…] each moves back and forth between perspectives in order 
to see what it is that one ought to do at any particular time.26 
In other words, principle theory does not tell us which particular perspective 
succeeds at any given time; it merely requires that we consider the different 
perspectives (or normative concerns) relevant at any given point to determine 
what is best for everyone ‘in the game.’ In a Rawlsian sense, we are moving 
back and forth between theories, adjusting the weight given to principles in 
line with the shifts in emphasis. In this ‘game’ of balancing, Alexy’s 
correctness thesis argues the underlying principles remaining intact whatever 
may be factually possible at any given point and whatever other principles 
these underlying principles may come into collision with. These underlying 
                                                
26 ibid 244. 
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principles govern the validity of the law and, most pertinent for our purposes, 
the interpretation of laws.  
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Alexy considers not merely the analytical structure of law but the normative 
structure. In short, a claim is made that moral rights are necessarily included 
in the law making and adjudication process due to a necessary connection 
between law and morality. To say that norms are moral is to say that they are 
“justificatory, universalisable and categorical.”27 To say that there is a 
necessary connection is to argue that it is conceptually necessary (to hold as a 
matter of definition).28 The concept of law is to be defined such that moral 
factors are necessarily included.29 For Alexy, this is demonstrated by law’s 
‘claim to correctness.’ This claim, made whenever it is asserted ‘X is law’, is 
one that can be challenged: the claim to correctness may be found to be false. 
If it is found to be false, it is on the grounds of morality, or, more specifically, 
on the grounds of having transgressed the minimum requirements of justice 
such that any judge applying the rule, principle or norm would be 
administering lawlessness rather than law.30 This is because the claim to 
                                                
27 Beyleveld and Brownsword Law as Moral Judgment (Sweet & Maxwell 1986).  
 31. “Categorical” here refers to Kant’s categorical imperative that one should act 
only according to principles that one can rationally will everyone to act on (that one 
would ‘will that it become a universal law’) Kant Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals (trans. & ed. A. Wood with essays by J. B. Schneewind et al. Yale University 
Press 2002 [1785]) 37.    
28 Though as Alexy notes it could also be seen as a factual connection as invalid 
systems of law have not lasted such that it might be said that no invalid system has 
been held to have long-term validity, Alexy The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to 
Legal Positivism (Oxford University Press 2002 reprint 2010) 93 [AFI].  
29 AFI (n 28) 34. 
30 This threshold of “extreme injustice” (emphasis added ibid 48) is arguably set too 
low; this, by Alexy’s own admission, gives more weight to the factual dimension of 
law vis-à-vis its ideal dimension. This creates a problem when one considers rights, 
which are, for factual reasons, unrecognised or unenforceable. Here, flawed, but not 
yet extremely unjust, systems would continue to flourish if the factual can outweigh 
the ideal unless it passes such a high threshold of lawlessness. Yet, Alexy states that 
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correctness, raised by the act of enacting a law (a), necessarily contains the 
assertion “that a is correct and, second, guarantees that a can be justified and, 
third, expects that a that all addressees of the claim will accept a.”31 Unlike for 
Raz, law does not merely claim authoritative status as a social fact but also 
claims a basic moral correctness of law: an assertion which if proved to be 
invalid renders the ‘law’ illegal. In an argument similar to Dworkin’s notion 
of a threshold of ‘moral acceptability’32; Alexy asserts that if the act a ‘law’ 
requires fails to satisfy the claim to correctness, this law is ‘defective’ or 
‘invalid’.33 The claim to correctness, in turn, is built on discourse theory. It 
presents legal reasoning as a (special) form of general practical reasoning.34 
This presupposes human beings are capable of making arguments and, 
indeed, it is premised on the assumption that human beings are characterised 
                                                
the claim to correctness is made by individual norms and that a whole legal system 
becomes lawless (Unrecht) when too many individual norms within the legal system 
fall below the threshold. It seems, therefore, that there might be an argument for 
raising the threshold for individual norms from the bare minimum to more 
comprehensive protection for core basic rights as it would not endanger an entire 
legal system for more norms to be invalid rather than just legally defective. Legal 
certainty would not, therefore, be significantly impacted. Alexy seems to consider the 
possibility of setting the threshold at a different level, stating that his “thesis of 
forfeiting legal character by crossing a certain threshold of injustice” could apply 
“however that threshold is determined”, with the obvious proviso that the threshold 
could not be determined in a manner incompatible with concept of justice TCR (n 10) 
28. Indeed, Radbruch argued that legal certainty must give way to justice stating 
“legal certainty is not the only value that law must effectuate, nor is it the decisive 
value. Alongside legal certainty, there are two other values: utility (purposiveness) 
and justice” (‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (1946) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 1, 13). However, for the purposes of this thesis, this debate is perhaps 
unnecessary as it is sufficient that the norm, or interpretation of a valid norm, be 
labelled ‘legally deficient.’  
31 ‘Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen 
Verfassungsstaat’ in Gosepath and Lohmann (eds) Philosophie der Menschenrechte 
(Suhrkamp 1998) 244, 208 and AFI (n 28) 4.  
32 Law’s Empire (Hart Press 1998 ed. [1986]).  
33 TCR (n 10) 35. 
34 A Theory of Legal Argumentation (Oxford University Press 2009) 211-220 [TLA]. It is a 
special form of practical reason as it is concerned not only with practical logic but 
also logic within the legal system in question, See, TLA 12, 220. As Alexy states:  
Unlike the case of general practical discourse, this claim does not relate to whether or 
not the normative statement in question is absolutely rational, but rather only to 
whether it can be rationally justified within the framework of the valid legal order 
(289). 
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by this ability to put forward arguments.35 That human beings are discursive 
beings is what gives us our interest in the claim to correctness.36 The claim to 
correctness cannot be avoided. 
 
The claim to correctness, Alexy argues, means law necessarily contains some 
normative underpinning to set limits on what can be law. The principle of 
injustice, contained, in a simpler form, as part of the Radbruch formula37, 
states:  legislature, administrator and adjudicator are obligated to realise justice. This 
would render unjust law faulty, and if the law is faulty to the extent of 
violating the most basic, minimum requirements of justice then the law 
becomes invalid i.e. its legal character is destroyed. Although this might , at 
first glance, appear to risk invalidating many laws, Alexy (and indeed 
Radbruch) are not attempting to remove any legal pluralism or to deny that 
different conceptions of justice might exist but rather make a claim to a 
minimum standard required in order to be able to satisfy the claim to justice 
                                                
35 Alexy ’Discourse Theory and Human Rights’ 9 (1996) Ratio Juris 209 “Whoever 
never in his life makes an assertion and puts forward an argument does not take part 
in the most general form of life of human beings” 217.  
36 This claim is made in relation to all human beings in general, for, as Alexy explains, 
even those who do not subscribe to the view of correctness must appear to do so in 
order to participate in the system, which may lay their claims open to charges of 
incoherence later if they seek to reject these claims to legitimacy later. Alexy notes: 
Tyrants, dictators, and despots have always known this and have usually attempted 
legitimations by employing arguments. That those arguments were regularly bad and mere 
propaganda is not important here. Decisive is the fact that they try to use these arguments at 
all. In this way, the maximization of individual utility leads into argumentation and 
consequently into the field of discourse rules, because a sufficient interest in correctness has to 
be taken into account (ibid 219.) 
37 The Radbruch formula requires that “ ‘flawed law’ yield to justice” G. Radbruch, 
‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (1946) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
1. Radbruch transformed his position from that expressed in 1932 that the primary 
role of judges was to “validate law’s claim to validity…to ask only what is legal” 
(Radbruch, ‘Legal Philosophy’ in Patterson (ed.) The Legal Philosophies of Lask, 
Radbruch and Dabin  (Kurt Wilk trans. Harvard University Press 1950) 15-249.) See, 
also Paulson ‘Radbruch on Unjust Laws: Competing Earlier and Later Views?’ Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (1995) 15 489. Radbruch dismissed a value-blind view of the 
law stating that the law must be defined by some reference to the law’s purpose 
(Radbruch ‘Legal Philosophy’ 50-1.) 
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raised by the label ‘law.’ Just as with the discussion of ‘persecution’ in chapter 
one, what is at stake here is the semantic limits of the term. When Alexy- and 
Radbruch- speak of unjust laws, these are laws that offend the basic principles 
of equality and justice such as to render these laws invalid, such as those 
enacted during Nazi dictatorship that stripped Jewish citizens of their rights 
and citizenship, not laws which are in some minor way deficient or not 
entirely ideal.  
 
It is this connection between law and morality that is denied by positivists. 
Not only does the correctness thesis suggest that this separation cannot be 
maintained but, it is argued, the correctness thesis is further strengthened by 
the claim made, including by positivists, that the law carries with it a legal and 
moral obligation of obedience. This, argues Fuller amongst others, is 
nonsense, asking, “how can we have a moral obligation to obey without 
guarantee that our obedience will not result in immoral acts?”38 The moral 
obligation to obey the law can only be seen as binding, it is argued, if the law 
can claim to be moral. This is exactly what the law is asserting in the claim to 
correctness: that it is morally valid and, thus, can be considered binding.  
 
                                                
38 Fuller (1957-8) ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart’ 71 Harvard 
Law Review 630 p656 in response to Hart’s (1957-8), ‘Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals’ 71 Harvard Law Review 593. The debate is beyond the scope of this 
thesis but in support of Fuller’s position see, the papers collected in 83 New York 
University Law Review, Symposium: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty (2008) [published 
also as Cane (ed.) The Hart-Fuller debate in the Twenty First Century (Hart Publishing, 
2010)] in particular, David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Grudge Informer Case Revisited’ 1000-
34; Leslie Green, ‘Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals’ 1035-58; 
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller’ 1135-
69. On the impact of the debate, see Nicola Lacey, ‘Philosophy, Political Morality and 
History: Explaining the Enduring Resonance of the Hart-Fuller Debate’ 1059-87 of the 
collection. 
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Indeed Hart seems to acknowledge this when stating “it will often be 
pointless to acknowledge or point to a legal obligation if the speaker has 
conclusive reasons, moral or otherwise, to urge against fulfilling it.”39 It seems 
also to follow from Hart’s assertion that for what he terms a ‘rule of 
obligation’ gains it obligatory force because: 
i) deviation from the rule is seen as serious, thus generating “an insistent 
demand for conformity and great social pressure on those who deviate or 
threaten to deviate 
ii) of a belief that conformity is necessary to the maintenance of society or 
“some highly prized feature of it.40 
These requirements at the very least demand criteria external to the law and 
legal system against which to determine whether deviance from the rule 
would produce a serious consequence or a feature ought to be highly prized 
in society. Without entering into the debate in too much depth, it can be 
asserted that the criteria against which this is to be judged are to be found in 
moral norms. The law gains obligatory force, then, when deviation from the 
rule is morally serious and conformity is deemed necessary to maintain 
society or some highly prized moral feature thereof. If legal validity is not 
impacted if the content of the law requires conduct prohibited by a rule of 
moral obligation, as Hart claims, then what grounds the ought in ‘ought to be 
obeyed’? This is, essentially, a restatement of the claim that ‘ought’ cannot be 
derived from ‘is’ so the law cannot derive its ought claim from the fact of the 
law alone.41 If this is so, then law must necessarily be connected to morality 
                                                
39 The Concept of Law (Second edn, Claredon Press 1961 [1994]) 199. 
40 ibid 84-5. 
41 This claim, known often as Hume’s bridge, requires that “one cannot travel from 
ought to is without first paying ‘ought tolls’.” (Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 27) 19). 
Here we are referring to moral oughts rather than predictive oughts, which are 
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and “the concept of law is the concept of morally legitimate power”42 such 
that the authority claim of law is fulfilled by the content of the concept.  
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If law is necessarily connected to morality, this brings with it the idea of moral 
justification, as posited by Alexy in the correctness thesis and, carried into 
principles theory, in requiring justified reasons for giving greater weight to 
one principle over another. Accordingly, incorporation of morality into law 
via positive law is not the only route that Alexy sees for the necessary 
recognition of moral principles within the legal system. Whilst Alexy accepts 
that it might be possible to enact rules without necessarily engaging normative 
justifications, this is not possible when one considers principles. Principles, as 
Alexy demonstrates in his reconstruction set out in more detail below, 
necessarily require balancing and balancing requires justified grounds for 
selecting one principle over another. As Menéndez notes, the connection 
between discourse and the claim to correctness is intended to address 
reasoning in hard cases for “[t]he aim is to establish criteria which allow 
replicating the judgment in order to test its correctness.”43 Proportionality in 
the law of balancing, combined with the claim to correctness, provide criteria 
against which to reason in hard cases.  
 
                                                
derived from ‘is’ in the sense of being factually based so whilst ‘John ought to beat 
Simon at chess’ can be derived from ‘John is a better chess player than Simon’ moral 
oughts are derived from moral premises not from factual circumstances.   
42 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 27) 119-20. Thus Hart’s effectiveness condition for 
classifying something as law is a condition of stability not legal validity (ibid 210-11). 
The same could also be said of Kelsen’s requirement of coercive force in order to be 
labelled law (and to be distinguished from moral obligation).  
43 (n 1) 10. 
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Here the connection between law and morality cannot be denied: if justified 
grounds for selecting principles are required, then basic moral norms must 
dictate the selection. As weight cannot be ‘enacted’ it must determined 
relative to something and this ‘something’, Alexy asserts, is provided by 
moral norms. Following this, the law of balancing requires a value-judgment 
as to relative importance of the competing principles in order to determine 
which principle can be said to be more important to satisfy. As noted above, 
this requires determination of which principle is actually more important, not 
which principle is preferred by any of the parties involved, thus although the 
balancing is undertaken in relation to specific circumstances only the value-
judgment as to the importance of a principle must already have been made. 
This abstract value-judgment creates also conditional preference for the 
principle expressing the more important value such that “what under a 
system of values is prima facie the best is under a system of principle what 
ought to be.”44 Similarly, if the principles are ranked equally in the abstract 
then a “smaller degree of satisfaction, or a greater degree of infringement [of 
principle 1]…is only permissible…when the relative degree of importance [of 
principle 2] is very high.”45  
 
Moral principles, then, enter the law even where the moral principle in 
question has not been transformed into positive law.46 They function as “a 
                                                
44 TCR (n 10) 92. 
45 ibid 104. 
46 That a reason might be chosen that is not based on valid positive law or morality is 
denied by Alexy as necessarily excluded by the claim to correctness as a judicial 
decision necessarily raises a claim to correctness, and this claim will not be satisfied if 
the judge does not justify her decision, see Alexy ‘The Nature of Arguments about 
the Nature of Law’ in Meyer, Paulson, Pogge (eds.), Rights, Culture and the Law 
(Wildy 2005) and Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford 
2003) 14. 
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greater law” that “may function as a corrective vis-à-vis written statute.”47 
Even where positive law contains no moral requirements- moral principles 
still enter into the adjudication process as the judge must consider these in 
order to fulfil the claim to correctness necessarily raised by her decision.48 The 
requirement that the judgment of one principle as outweighing another be just 
demands, then, that the law is interpreted justly: that it is interpreted bearing 
in mind relevant moral principles or normative concerns.49  If legal norms, 
decisions, and indeed the legal system as a whole, necessarily lay a claim to 
legal correctness (the correctness thesis) and if principles, as optimising 
commands, require a realisation to the greatest possible extent (principles 
theory), then at least some of the arguments with which the judge justifies the 
balance she strikes must, regarding their content, have the character of moral 
arguments.50 There is, then, not only a conceptual connection between law and 
morality at the systemic level. There is also a substantive connection between 
law and morality at the level of individual norms. This substantive connection 
is present also in the application of a legal norm.  
 
In other words, as the dimension of weight cannot be created, or “enacted” by 
the lawmakers weight cannot be simply relative to the other principle(s) 
                                                
47 TCR (n 10) 198. 
48 R. Alexy ‘An Answer to Joseph Raz’ in G. Pavlakos (ed.) Law, Rights and Discourse. 
The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2007) 55. 
49 Although, it has been noted that law’s claim to correctness is not (necessarily) 
identical to morality’s claims, indeed, this is accepted by Alexy himself (TCR (n 10) 
214). The complicating factors stem from the fact that laws are embedded in a specific 
legal system. Further elaboration of that issue is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
need not concern us overly, for the legal system refugees’ rights are embedded in is 
that of international law which contains, and assumes, universal acknowledgment of 
core human rights. 
50 Alexy AFI (n 28) 77. A non-justifiable norm is defective (qualifying connection) 
and, in the case of extreme injustice, even forfeits le- gal character (classifying 
connection). 
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involved. Here weight given would be merely arbitrary and would not 
constitute a justified decision. It, therefore, must be weight relative to 
something external to the legal system. This commitment to moral principles 
then is independent of the legal system as, Beyleveld and Brownsword state, 
“an agent, if he is to adopt Moral Reason, must commit himself to his Moral 
Principles on the understanding that, from the moment of commitment, those 
particular principles take on a life of their own independent of his future 
contingent desires.”51 The moment of commitment can be taken to be the point 
at which the claim to correctness is made.  
 
This external source of reasons provides interpretative guidance for the 
principles at stake so as to supply, through reasoning, the relative weight to 
be given to each principle in particular circumstances. This external force is 
provided by moral norms, in the guise of the meta-principles of 
proportionality, justice and equality and, of particular relevance to refugee 
law, the assumption, set out in the subsequent chapter, that all human beings 
have human rights. These meta-principles are relevant to all legal decisions, 
but, it is argued here, there are also law-specific background principles 
relevant to particular laws or situations. These law-specific background 
principles are to be found in the moral principles that guided the enactment of 
the law in question and, it is argued, remain relevant in guiding interpretation 
                                                
51 n 27 25. Alexy would very possibly object to the combination of his thesis with 
claims by Beyleveld and Brownsword, whose theories he has labelled as 
‘overidealised’ (‘Effects of Defects—Action or Argument? Thoughts about Deryck 
Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment’ Ratio Juris 19 (2) 2006 
169. Yet as noted above for the purposes of this thesis, even if morally incompatibly 
that falls short of extreme injustice only renders a decision ‘legally defective’ and not 
‘invalid’ this is sufficient. Alexy’s dispute with Beyleveld and Brownsword is 
primarily concerned with the effect of inconsistency with moral principles on legal 
validity rather than in challenging the claim that moral incompatibility has some 
effect. 
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of law as they form a central part of that specific law’s claim to correctness by 
providing specific grounds on which the law is to be seen as correct, justified 
and ought to be accepted.52 In other words, it is asserted that these law-
specific background principles are merely the explanation of how this law 
satisfies the principles of justice, which are then subject in individual cases 
also the principle of proportionality.  
 
Kratochwil53 makes a similar point when arguing there is both determinacy 
and indeterminacy within system of principles as principles (and rules) state 
the duties of actors providing a determinate ‘class of permitted actions’ within 
which discretion may be exercised, the outcome of which is inevitably 
indeterminate as it is based on individual choice from amongst the viable 
options. The limit set by the background principles (both informal principles 
accepted by all parties and general moral norms that ought to be adhered to 
by all parties), however, mean that one is not free to do nothing if required to 
act by the principle or rule; one is only free to choose from within the ‘class of 
permitted actions.’ If, Kratochwil states, one is required by law to give to 
charity to receive a tax deduction, one is not free to claim the tax deduction 
without a charitable donation, however within the range of charities each 
donation is equivalent: one may give to Unicef, or the National Trust or 
indeed any other recognised charity and legitimately claim the deduction. In 
the case of refugees, if one accepts that states are under some obligation to act 
to protect refugees (either a moral obligation or as signatory states of the 
                                                
52 These specific grounds cannot, of course, violate law’s original claim to correctness, 
the claims must be specific formulations of the meta-principles applicable to all laws.  
53 Kratochwil ‘How do Norms Matter?’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in 
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2000) 47.  
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Refugee Convention a legal obligation), states must act as the requirement of 
action falls within the determinate area of the rule (i.e. action is unequivocally 
required) but how a state acts to protect refugees is within the area of 
individual choice. Provided the action falls within the ‘class of permitted 
actions’ (i.e. it may be said to be an action which would protect some 
refugees) then the state cannot be chastised for its choice, however, the key 
point remains; to not act is to not make a choice and, therefore, takes the state 
outside of the ‘class of permitted actions’54 and in to conflict with the 
determinate rule requiring action.  
 
For Kratochwil, in a similar claim to Dworkin55, the boundaries to the class of 
permitted actions are determined by background principles, which are not 
necessarily explicitly stated but instead are provided by the use and 
justifiability of the rules (laws) in question.56 The boundaries are set by the 
limits of plausible interpretations accessed by reference to the original 
justification for the law. The justification of the law, as Kratochwil notes, 
inevitably brings with it some reference to norms, principles and takes the 
interpreter of the law beyond mere invocation of rules. This asserts that it is 
impossible to merely invoke rules, rules (or laws) are applied, that is they are 
only invoked in real circumstances when the rule is raised to deal with actual 
events. The connection between rules and ‘the real world’ is provided, 
Kratochwil argues, by implicit understandings as to the use and justification 
of the rule and legal/moral principles more generally. This suggests, then, 
that the positivist conception of law as a system of rules in which the character 
                                                
54 It is key, therefore, to precisely determine the set of ‘permitted actions.’ 
55 n 16 in introduction 2. 
56 Kratochwil (n 53) 42. 
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of the rules is established only by reference to the system (i.e. in which 
morality plays no part) cannot be maintained. In reference to international 
law, Kratochwil claims, it particularly challenges this underlying notion of 
‘national interest’ which is often invoked as a determinate concept; this, 
argues Kratochwil, following Shklar, it cannot be as its content is provided by 
background assumptions, for example, as to the role of government, the 
nature of ‘the state’ or existence and importance of borders.  
 
In terms of refugee law, then, if norms such as ‘national interest’ are to be 
relied upon to restrict access to asylum for refugees then this invocation of 
national interest must be subject to balancing and interpreted with reference 
to the purpose of the convention, namely the protection of refugees. To 
entirely ignore the claims of refugees- to give no weight to these claims in the 
balancing process- would not only be outside the class of permitted actions 
but could also be seen as producing a decision, which fails to satisfy the claim 
to correctness raised by the judge or law maker. The basis of this statement is 
a claim that to exclude refugees from host countries would be to violate not 
only the background principles of refugee law but also such a ranking of 
principles will not withstand scrutiny. This claim is taken up in the remainder 
of the thesis.  
 
Chapter three of the thesis is concerned, in part, with establishing the ranking 
of principles relevant to international refugee law in the abstract such that this 
value-judgment can be applied in concrete cases. Chapters four and five then 
consider the implication of a higher ranking of the principles of fundamental 
rights by assessing hard cases outside the paradigmatic examples of 
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refugeehood that refugee status determination bodies may be asked to 
consider, such as victims of domestic violence, in terms of legal reasoning 
against the backdrop of the principles considered in chapter three. It is 
suggested that as decision-makers are under an obligation to satisfy the most 
important principle to the greatest degree, the competing principles to those 
that argue in favour of a refugee’s admittance must necessarily be stronger in 
the abstract or be of very high relative importance on the facts to be given 
greater weight. If a decision fails to do this, it might be said to be ‘legally 
defective’.  
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The first objection to this project may well come from those who argue that 
Alexy’s developed his theories to explain national (German) constitutional 
law and this renders it inapplicable to international law, perhaps even to other 
domestic legal systems that do not have a comparable constitution. This is 
rejected here.57 Although Alexy’s theory is focused on national judicial 
decision-making, in the context of constitutional rights, the correctness thesis, 
as a classifying and qualifying condition of law, cannot be limited only to 
constitutional law or domestic law but to anything claiming legal status. As 
the connection thesis is positing certain truths, and underpinnings, that go to 
the heart of law as a general concept it applies equally to national or 
                                                
57 The latter objection is dealt with by Julian Rivers in his introduction (TCR (n 10) 
xvii-lii) to TCR in which Rivers argues that Alexy’s theory is as applicable to the 
British system, which arguably contains no constitution, as to the German. Rivers 
argues “there are ample grounds for the thesis that his theory is applicable more 
widely” due to “the formal abstraction and substantive openness of his theory” ibid 
xviii).  
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international. Thus, this obligation to realise justice stems from the nature of 
law, as Alexy posits:  
Law consists of more than pure facticity of power…[i]ts nature compromises 
not only the factual or real side but also the critical or ideal dimension.58  
The critical or ideal dimension not only allows for criticism, and 
disapplication of ‘laws’ that have no sound moral footing (many of those 
enacted in Nazi Germany or Apartheid South Africa could be set aside as 
lacking legality on these grounds), but the ideal dimension could also be said 
to create the corresponding requirement that these ideals be given legal force 
in some manner.59  
 
It often has been argued that a lack of formal acknowledgment of 
responsibility for refugees in the Refugee Convention, and other international 
instruments, results in any duties to refugees remaining, at best, moral duties. 
It would follow, then, that without reform of international and national law to 
include concrete assertions of refugees’ rights and the duties of potential host 
states, the situation will remain static with a moral right to asylum enforceable 
nowhere. The only countries under concrete obligations to refugees then are 
those, like Germany, that have chosen to place themselves under this 
obligation by including a right to asylum in their Constitution. Alexy’s 
                                                
58 Coercion has been described by Alexy as another “Coercion is necessary if law is to 
be a social practice that fulfills its basic formal purposes as defined by the values of 
legal certainty and efficiency”, Alexy ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ (2008) 
21  Ratio Juris 281, 293.  
59 As Wang states: “if a judge does not ground his decision on correct balancing of 
moral principles, we might be inclined to say that he makes a moral rather than a 
legal mistake. But this moral mistake will lead to some false propositions of law and 
therefore has a significant impact on the correctness of his decision”; in this manner 
morality is part of law regardless of whether it is part of positive law as legal 
correctness is moral correctness (Wang Rechstheorie 41 (Max Planck Institute 2010) 
300, 315). In this manner, Alexy’s claim to correctness is similar to Dworkin’s notion 
of ‘truth conditions’ for- or doctrinal concept of law see Dworkin (n 8) 234-238. 
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reconstruction of balancing within principles theory could easily be applied in 
such cases, his theory being concerned primarily with the German 
Constitution and Constitutional Court. The refugee can appeal to her 
constitutional right to asylum that is, in turn, weighed against any counter 
claim. The German Constitution demands that the weighting is done by 
reference to the principle of human dignity by making the right to human 
dignity absolute and formally foundational to any other constitutional rights. 
Human dignity might, thus, be described as the background principle 
relevant to all decisions concerning application and interpretation of the 
German Constitution. The absolute nature of human dignity serves then as a 
limitation on all decisions, even those concerning those who are not citizens.  
 
What is argued here is that although international refugee law is not 
constitutional, it is subject to the same basic reconstruction as any constitution 
when applied in domestic courts. 60 Alexy’s theories might be concerned 
primarily with domestic laws and thus have an easier task in reconstructing 
the process and explaining the decisions in constitutional courts than in courts 
applying international law but the principles theory and the correctness thesis 
can be of use in examining any legal decision, in particular those involving the 
                                                
60 The debate on interaction between public international law and domestic 
constitutional law is beyond the scope of this thesis but it might be argued that the 
fundamental principles of international law, particularly those pertaining to human 
rights, express the basic limits on all constitutions. If these principles are contravened 
then the said constitution would not able to assert a valid claim to correctness. In this 
sense, though perhaps only in this sense, national constitutional law might be said to 
be subject to international law. See, for further argument on this point, Kleinlein 
‘Constitutionalization in International Law’ (2012) Beiträge zum ausländischen 
öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht (Band 231) 703. Kleinlein argues “public 
international law recognizes a common interest of humanity transcending state 
interests, hierarchically supreme ‘constitutional principles’ set boundaries to the 
hitherto unlimited will of states…[o]n the basis of these observations, constitutional 
doctrine in public international law scholarship tries to put public international law 
on a constitutional foundation” (ibid).   
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assertion of fundamental rights as refugee cases inevitably do. Whilst it might 
not be as clear cut when discussing the application of article 16 of the German 
Constitution, principles theory and the correctness thesis explain the demands 
on law makers and adjudicators (at the very least in signatory states to the 
Refugee Convention) that limit the range of plausible interpretations to those 
justicable against the backdrop of law’s general claim to correctness and the 
specific ‘claim to correctness’ asserted by refugee law and discoverable 
through examination of the underpinning norms of the Refugee Convention.  
 
We are not, then, dealing with ‘merely’ moral rights and duties but also legal 
rights and duties established by reference to the background principles of 
international refugee law. Although these legal rights might be ‘soft’, as 
opposed to ‘hard’ definitive rights such as the right to asylum contained in the 
German Basic Law, they are nevertheless legal rights as failure to give 
precedence to these rights in cases where the principles behind these rights 
have greater weight would result in a legally defective decision. As set out 
above, these rights enter into the formal legal process in two ways: the 
correctness thesis demands that laws passed by legislators (such as national 
immigration and asylum laws) conform to the principles of justice so as not to 
be deemed ‘defective’ or, in extreme cases, ‘invalid’. The correctness thesis 
also requires decisions by adjudicators (such as refugee status decisions) be 
justified and justifiable. In simple cases this does not present a problem but in 
hard cases when interpretive questions are raised and balancing is required 
then it becomes particularly important and instructive.   
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The background principles, both those relevant to all law of justice and 
equality and those specific to refugee law (relating to the special claim of 
human rights and the role of states) operate so as to constrain possible 
decisions by adjudicators to those that can be justified by reference to these 
principles. The background assumptions against which refugee law sits, then, 
are of primary importance and will form the basis for the subsequent chapters 
as these background assumptions form the norms against which balancing is 
undertaken and decisions are to be justified.  
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When one considers a refugee status case several different principles and, 
indeed, rules are at stake. It is important to note that whilst international law 
may be applied (directly or indirectly through incorporated measures) in 
these cases; decisions are taken by domestic governments and appeals are 
heard in domestic courts and tribunals and not in international courts. The 
rules to which the court determining refugee status is bound are likely, 
therefore, to be largely those enshrined in domestic law. For example, if the 
refugee is applying in a signatory state that article 1(2) of the Refugee 
Convention applies can be seen as a rule. As the majority of signatory states 
apply article 1(2) either directly or, more often, through incorporation into 
domestic law, we can proceed on the assumption that this rule applies to most 
refugee status determination hearings. This is a rule for were article 1(2) to be 
overlooked entirely, rejected or misused the decision making body would 
have failed to apply a rule correctly and the decision would need to be 
retaken (although the decision would not necessarily reversed).61  
                                                
61 There are also numerous other rules which are more obviously rule-like in 
character that are applied in asylum cases (such as, controversially, timely 
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There could be said to be a rule also, following Alexy, that principles need to 
be applied. Here, Alexy’s principles theory merges with his correctness thesis 
to state that the meta-principles relevant to interpretation are not only the 
formal principle of proportionality but also substantive principles of equality 
and justice. When discussing the rights of refugees, a realm where moral 
rights are almost readily acknowledged but the impact of these moral rights 
on positive law is as readily denied, the correctness thesis has particular 
traction. Interpretations of the Refugee Convention often might be said to fall 
into the category of ‘interpretative injustice’ or incorrect interpretations of 
valid law. This, as Alexy notes, would be more than simple incorrect 
interpretation, it would be a violation of legal rules as well as judges are 
obligated to interpret prevailing rules correctly. This changes the terms of the 
debate when critiquing decisions taken in refugee law. It shifts the debate 
from one in which ‘human rights advocates’ are calling for the imposition of 
additional standards into refugee law and instead argues that the norms 
against which refugee status decisions are assessed are internal principles 
international refugee law is already subject to. As Dworkin notes, “the rights 
thesis guides […] criticism by exposing the deep structure of judicial 
arguments in hard cases, including the principle of rights it contains, and 
therefore the more general political and moral theories these [background] 
principles presuppose.”62  
 
                                                
application and, perhaps less controversially, the exclusion of those convicted of 
serious crimes rules.) 
62 Dworkin (n 3 in introduction) 313. 
! UC 
Principles enter the decision making process as guides to interpretation in the 
Dworkinian sense of principles as ‘background standards.’63 Thus although 
human rights standards have led to an evolution of interpretations of the 
‘persecution’, the boundaries of the term are ‘policed’ by fundamental 
principles, such as fairness, which cannot be contravened. Although “the 
content of rights may vary with background justification”64, rights cannot be 
varied, restricted or expanded, without adhering to background principles. In 
refugee status determination cases, human rights norms act as principles 
understood in the Dworkinian sense and operate as moral background 
standards against which key terms, such as persecution, are (to be) 
interpreted. Secondly, when being used as background standards, principles 
ought to operate in the Alexy sense, as goals to be reached to the greatest 
degree possible. This demands that when balancing (refugee) rights against 
other rights, human rights are protected to the greatest degree factually and 
legally possible. Conversely, following the principle of proportionality, 
infringement of rights must be to the least degree legally and factually 
possible.    
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The framework put forward in this chapter provides the foundation for the 
thesis. It has been argued here that Robert Alexy’s theories are relevant to 
international refugee law. Alexy’s principles theory, it is claimed, sets out key 
propositions for this thesis, namely that fundamental rights are principles, 
that principles contain the dimension of weight and as such are subject to 
balancing and that balancing requires a determination of relative weight. This, 
                                                
63 This argument, ‘the rights thesis’, is set out in ibid.  
64 ibid 365. 
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for refugee law, is key. Refugee law concerns fundamental (or human) rights, 
as will be set out in the subsequent chapter. Characterising fundamental 
rights as principles brings into refugee law Alexy’s principles theory and 
determines that decisions made involving these principles involve balancing 
and as such must satisfy the laws of balancing. In order to satisfy the laws of 
balancing determinations of relative weight must be made as in order to 
produce a justified decision the principle given the greater weight must be a) 
of greater abstract weight and b) of greater abstract importance (or value). The 
claims of a justified decision stem from Alexy’s correctness thesis, which, it is 
argued, provides some basic normative requirements for law, including 
international refugee law. It proves a necessary connection between law and 
morality, which requires that balancing decisions are justifiable and justified 
relative to the requirements of morality. This normative framework guides the 
choice of normative principles. In international refugee law, it will be argued 
in the following chapter, the notion of human rights, and in particular the 
principle of human dignity, provide the underlying principles. Viewing these 
principles through the framework set out in this chapter, it is argued, clarifies 
the position of human rights in refugee law and challenges the hitherto 
virtually unchallenged presumptions of the current system of refugee law. 
This will demonstrate, it is argued, that the current refugee law system 
encapsulated in the Refugee Convention is in need of interpretational reform 
but it is not, necessarily, in need of a complete overhaul or abolition. Given 
that states seems unwilling to implement a new refugee law system, the 
framework set out here, it is argued, shows us how to better use the system 
we currently have. The thesis now turns to examine the concept of human 
rights with this project of reinterpretation in mind. 
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This chapter builds on the assertions of the previous chapter to argue that 
when one is engaged in a balancing exercise; the conceptual foundations of 
the principles one is balancing necessarily become relevant. In other words, in 
order to engage in a balancing exercise one must also consider the relative 
value of the principles one is balancing.  It is argued that in order to consider 
if the widespread state practice of viewing refugee status as something to be 
granted, rather than a right, can be justified; it is necessary to consider if the 
claim that human rights have priority over other rights- be these competing 
rights collective or individual- can be made out. The position of non-
derogable rights will also need to be considered.  When one considers the 
development of refugee law almost inevitably the recognition of a ‘new’ 
refugee goes hand in hand with the fleshing out of the concept of human 
rights.1 Human rights have been identified as the standards against which 
refugee law is to be interpreted and applied. As Foster has noted, “the need 
for some objective guidance has underpinned the development of human 
rights approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention.”2 Human rights, and 
the interpretation and underpinning thereof, are becoming increasingly 
central to refugee law.  
 
The chapter will examine the notion of human rights and the underpinning of 
international refugee law that stems from the principles of human rights, in 
                                                
1 Chapter six considers this development in regards to the recognition of rape, sexual 
violence, domestic violence and forced marriage as a forms of persecution. 
2 Foster (n 2 chapter one) 87. 
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particular the foundational principle of human dignity. The case for viewing 
human rights as special rights worthy of protection is put forward and the 
implications of this view for refugee law are discussed. The obligations, both 
practical and interpretational, human rights place on signatory states will be 
considered, in the abstract at this juncture. The claim advanced in this chapter 
is foundational to the thesis, namely that if core human rights (which refers to 
basic human rights such as right to life and the core of all rights considered 
human rights) can be shown to have a special claim to protection that 
outweighs other rights, in the abstract, when subject to balancing this gives 
refugee’s rights conditional preference over competing rights and goods.3 
Although definitive priority might be granted to other rights on the facts 
establishing conditional primacy would already be a great leap forward in 
securing refugees’ rights, which at present are relegated to second place 
behind the rights of states. The priority given to human rights might be said to 
be recognised in International Law in the notions of jus cogens and erga omnes 
in which certain norms, including arguably human rights, are hierarchically 
superior to other international norms in that their violation renders a territory, 
or decision, invalid.4    
 
Following the framework laid out in the previous chapter the widespread 
assumption that the weight given to refugees’ rights is to be determined by 
potential host state(s) is denied. As the law of balancing5 applies and it follows 
                                                
3 Alexy ‘Law, Morality and the Existence of Human Rights’ (2012) 25(1) Ratio Juris 2. 
4 Although the notions of human rights and jus cogens are not coextensive, there 
might be said to be “an almost intrinsic relationship between jus cogens and human 
rights” Bianchi ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19 (3) European 
Journal of International 491, 491. Human rights can be said to be erga omnes as they 
are, by definition, owed to everyone. This argument is out forward below. 
5 Alexy TCR (n 10 in chapter 2) 104. 
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that the weight given to a principle must be justified. If we recall the 
assertions of the previous chapter, discussing a collision between national 
security and press freedom, Alexy asserts:  if principles are ranked equally in 
the abstract then a smaller degree of satisfaction of one principle is only 
permissible if the relative importance of satisfying the competing principle is 
greater. The important word here is ‘if’: if the principles are not ranked 
equally in the abstract then we are not concerned with the relative importance 
of satisfying principles on the facts but on the abstract importance of 
satisfying a principle such that it is ranked higher in the abstract requiring, 
then, an even greater degree of relative importance in satisfying the 
competing principle than if the principles were ranked equally in the abstract. 
The implications of this for refugee law are as followed, if human rights are 
ranked higher in the abstract then they are given conditional priority in the 
abstract and must be given definitive priority on the facts if a) the competing 
right is not a human right b) the competing right is a human right, the relative 
importance of which is less. We can, then, begin to put forward some tentative 
conclusions as to the ranking preferences of principles at stake in refugee law 
cases.  
 
The approach of using human rights standards to assess refugee claims 
‘makes sense’, as Marouf notes, as it is in an international treaty and requires 
therefore that principles of international treaty interpretation apply.6 The 
starting point is Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969. Art 31.1 states: 
                                                
6 ‘The Rising Bar for Persecution in Asylum Cases Involving Sexual and 
Reproductive Harm’ (2011) Scholarly Works Paper 788. 
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of 
its object and purpose. 
Article 32 reminds that the preamble is relevant in regards to the 
interpretation. The matter was addressed by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in its 1951 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide 
Convention in terms that could apply equally to the 1951 Convention as 
follows: 
The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The Convention was 
manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilising purpose. It is 
indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a 
greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very 
existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the 
most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention, the contracting 
States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a 
common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those higher purposes which 
are the raison d’être of the convention.7 
With these purposes in mind it is necessary to examine the interaction 
between morality and law through the prism of human rights protection with 
particular regard to the limits of state interests. This task will not be 
accomplished in one chapter but will form the basis of the subsequent 
chapters.  
 
As was argued in the previous chapter, proportionality provides a method of 
legal reasoning when considering refugee claims. It was argued also that 
proportionality via the balancing exercise necessarily engages moral 
                                                
7 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention of and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 23 
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considerations. As Linderfalk notes, “proportionality is tied to moral and 
political norms”8 as it is “inevitably relative to some certain criterion or 
criteria. Such criteria derive from the intended purpose of the particular law at 
issue.”9 The purpose of refugee law, it is asserted, is the protection of human 
rights.10  
    
Further to the preceding chapter, in order for a connection between law and 
morality to be operational there must be some identifiable moral principles, 
violation of which leads to either legal defectiveness or legal invalidity 
(depending on the severity of the violation). It is necessary first to discuss the 
existence of moral elements. The discussion here will be limited to human 
dignity and human rights and, in the subsequent chapter, the principles of 
(political) justice. The discussion is so limited as if any moral elements are 
relevant to refugee law it is these. The discussion will also be brief, although 
some time will be spent discussing the so-called ‘existence problem’, it will 
only be undertaken to the extent necessary to refute relativism. The focus of 
this chapter is underpinnings of human rights, namely the principle of human 
dignity and the demand for special protection. The existence of human rights 
is supposed to be proven and justified; why will be briefly set out below.  
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The relevance of human dignity to human rights law is irrefutable. Human 
dignity is often stated as the foundational principle of human rights.  It is 
                                                
8 Linderfalk ‘Towards A More Constructive Analysis of the Identity of Special 
Regimes in International Law: The Case of Proportionality’ (2013) 2 Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 859. 
9 Ibid 860. 
10 This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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frequently used in other international and domestic legislation. For example, 
doctors are endured to practice ‘with respect for human dignity’, the term is 
repeated in legislation from health care to education to governance to the 
extent that it has been labeled ‘meaningless.’11 Even if human dignity is not 
entirely rejected as a useful concept how human dignity is being used and 
what it means in these various contexts is disputed. Despite the lack of 
agreement concerning meaning human dignity is beginning to be used in 
refugee cases, particularly in discussions of so-called third generation rights.12 
 
An in-depth exploration of the term is beyond the scope of this project but a 
few observations can be made. First, the vagueness of the concept of human 
dignity does not render it useless when applied in concrete circumstances, 
indeed a vague concept is more adaptable and remains useful as long as the 
parameters of the term are capable of delimitation. Secondly, here we are 
concerned with the meaning of human dignity in relation to human rights and 
the idea of human rights “depends on the vague but powerful notion of 
human dignity.”13  
 
Donnelly’s comments above reflect a general impression that the concept of 
human dignity is central to human rights law. Indeed it is often spoken of as 
synonymous with human rights. It is given prominent place in many human 
rights treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
                                                
11 See, for example, Macklin ‘Dignity is a Useless Concept’ (2003) British Medical 
Journal 327 1420. For the many uses of ‘human dignity’ see, Schultziner ‘Human 
Dignity: Functions and Meanings’ in Malpas and Lickiss Perspectives on Human 
Dignity: A Conversation (Springer 2007).  
12 For two of the few judicial considerations of human dignity in the refugee law 
context see, Begzatowski 278 F 3d (7th Circuit) (2002) and Refugee Appeal 71427/99 
RSAA (16 Aug 2000).  
13 Dworkin (n 21 introduction ) 99. 
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example, states unequivocally that the rights enumerated "derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person."14 The UN Charter of 1945 affirms a 
view of human dignity as a status stating the importance ‘in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’. The 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights then strengthened the idea of human 
dignity as basis for other rights in its Preamble, stating ‘recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’15 
Article 1 of the Declaration of 1948, as a central provision regarding human 
dignity in international documents, emphasizes: ‘All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.’ Article 22 and Article 23 also contain 
references to human dignity. The Preamble of the UNESCO Charter of 1945 
relates to human dignity, as does the ICECR (article 13), the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 28), to name a few.16  Article 1 of 
the European Charter on Fundamental Rights refers to human dignity as 
‘inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’ The preamble discusses it in 
terms of the first of the ‘indivisible, universal values’ the charter seeks to 
protect. That human dignity is relevant to, or indeed takes centre stage, in 
human rights law seems difficult to dispute. As Waldron notes, aside from the 
                                                
14 This not purely a Western ideal, Donnelly argues, quoting Abdul Aziz Said’s 
assertion that"[iln Islam as in other religious traditions, human rights are concerned 
with the dignity of the individual." Donnelly ‘Peace as a Human Right’ in Mertus et 
al Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links between Rights, Laws and Peacebuilding 
(US Institute for Peace Press 2000) 152.  
15 n 59 chapter one.  
16 There are also references to human dignity in the UN General Assembly 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination on the 
Basis of Religion or Conviction of 1981 (see Preamble and especially Article 3: ‘The 
discrimination between human beings on the basis of religion or conviction 
constitutes an insult to human dignity’.), the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 [CEDAW] 
(Preamble), the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women of 1993 (Preamble), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 [CAT] (Preamble). 
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numerous explicit mentions of human dignity there are many more implicit 
references to human dignity in human rights law.17 
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There are several different approaches one can take to the concept of human 
dignity. My brief account draws upon Christopher McCrudden’s helpful 
examination of dignity as a legal concept.18 It can be viewed as a protected 
good in and of itself, a theoretical concept providing the basis of other rights 
or as a moral status belonging to humans.19 Rao identifies three concepts of 
human dignity used in constitutional cases; human dignity as intrinsic human 
worth, human dignity as a communitarian concept and human dignity as 
recognition.20 The third version may well be reframed as human dignity as 
status and has been seen in US cases concerning right to marry for gay 
couples. The second concept will not be explored in greater detail below. This 
version of human dignity is not of particular use to refugee law as it focuses 
on violations of human dignity from the perspective of the community. This  
concept of human dignity was used to explain why a dwarf could not make a 
living participating in the sport of dwarf throwing in Wackehnehim v France.21   
 
In human rights law, human dignity might be said to do work in all of these 
capacities. Indeed for refugee law human dignity may be a useful concept 
                                                
17 "How Law Protects Dignity" (2012). New York University Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers. Paper 317. 
18 Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights (2008) The European 
Journal of International Law 19 (4) 655 and McCrudden Understanding Human 
Dignity (Oxford University Press 2013).  
19 See Waldron Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford University Press 2012). These are 
just a few concepts of human dignity it has also been identified as a religious concept 
stemming from the status humans have from being made in God’ 
20  Rao ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ Notre Dame Law Review 
86 (2011) 183. 
21 CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999. 
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particularly because of this capacity to mean different things in different 
contexts whilst retaining a core meaning. This may allow it to act as a 
bridging concept in bringing less established rights into the persecution 
criterion and therefore within the scope of refugee law. This section will first 
seek to set out this core meaning of human dignity before exploring how 
human dignity is and can be used in refugee law.  
!
For all of these mentions in international and national laws human dignity 
remains a contested notion. As Rao notes, “[w]ith the Universal Declaration’s 
emphasis on “dignity,” it became an internationally recognized legal term of 
value, even if the precise meaning of dignity remained unspecified.”22 This 
has led some to argue that human dignity is of little use as a concept in 
international law.23 It may well be for this reason that human dignity remains 
little used in refugee law. Heuss however suggests this might what makes 
human dignity a useful concept. Heuss refers to human dignity as a ‘non-
interpreted thesis’, a concept ‘that is not fixed in its meaning and can therefore 
marry otherwise opposing views.’24 Waldron similarly sees this ambiguity an 
important and positive feature of human dignity.25  
 
                                                
22 n 17 195. Spielberg similarly notes, “[H]uman dignity seems to be one of the few 
common values in our world of philosophical pluralism. But while our philosophies 
seem to agree on this conclusion, they display no agreement about its reasons” 
Spiegelberg Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy in Gotesky & 
Laszlo eds. Human Dignity (Gordon and Breach 1970) 62. 
23 McCrudden, for example, argues “does not provide a universalistic, principled 
basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there 
is little common under- standing of what dignity requires substantively within or 
across jurisdictions” n20 655. 
24 Cited in Schroeder, ‘Human rights and human dignity: an appeal to separate the 
conjoined twins’ (2012) 15 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 323, 326. 
25 Cited in McCrudden n 15 13. 
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The value of dignity is that is “functions as a concept around which we can 
meet and discuss.”26 When considering the boundaries of refugee law, or 
rather the boundaries of what refugee law should be used to protect, human 
dignity is a useful tool. This is particularly the case for refugee law as it is to 
be applied across borders. It might be identified as a common feature of all of 
the rights against the violation of which refugee law offers protection. This 
thesis argues that human dignity remains at the core of human rights law and, 
therefore, refugee law. It is impractical, as well as unhelpful, to ignore the 
concept, particularly when seeking to map the limits of refugee law.  An 
infringement of human dignity might not necessarily be sufficient to make out 
a claim to refugee status but it is difficult to envisage a violation of human 
dignity for which there was a lack of state protection that would not entitle 
the victim to refugee status.  Human dignity, it is argued here, has the 
potential to be of great use to refugee law. This is in particular because one 
element of human dignity around which there is some consensus is that it- 
whatever it is- demands protection. It also provides a vehicle for interpreting 
refugee law.  
 
For Schlink human dignity is pointless as it is sufficient to consider human 
rights on their own.27 Human dignity adds nothing to right to life. This is a 
persuasive argument for established rights. It is less so for emerging rights. 
When one wishes to determine if a right is capable of being recognized a 
human right one needs a foundational notion against which to consider the 
right in order to make a determination.  As McCrudden notes, despite his 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 ‘German Constitutional Culture in Transition’ [1993] 14 Cardozza Law Review 713, 
724.  
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reservations about the concept, human dignity “plays an important role in the 
development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed 
content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human 
rights interpretation and adjudication.”28  
 
Whilst the ambiguity of human dignity is a good feature, the common core 
must first be identified. Human dignity cannot be useful to refugee law 
without first identifying some common meaning. The search for meaning 
might be split into a few distinct yet overlapping enquiries. Firstly, what is 
meant by human dignity will be explored in terms of the development of the 
concept. The core minimum meaning of human dignity will be identified and 
this discussion will continue to a consideration of the meaning Secondly, the 
concept will be fleshed out by considering human rights law. This section will 
consider the link between choice, autonomy and human dignity. Finally, the 
uses of human dignity and human rights in refugee law will be considered. 
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A starting point for an understanding of human dignity is often the 
judgments of the German Constitutional Court. There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, Article 1 of the German Constitution is a statement of human 
dignity. This is an early legal expression of human dignity.29 Secondly, it could 
be said that human dignity has been transposed from a philosophical notion 
to a legal notion in response to the horrors of the Holocaust. It was included in 
                                                
28 n20 656. 
29 Although mention of human dignity had also been contained in the 1919 Weimar 
constitution and the 1917 Mexican constitution. These constitutions did not endur 
long enough to have significant judicial consideration. Similarly although human 
dignity was mentioned in the 1933 Portugese Constitution and the 1937 Irish 
Constitution this was very much a Catholic version of human dignity.   
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the German Constitution in response of the recent horrors and German 
jurisprudence necessarily engaged with the concept.30 As Habermas notes this 
notion of human dignity became solidified after the horrors of the Holocaust, 
“[o]nly during the past few decades has it also played a central role in 
international jurisdiction. By contrast, the notion of human dignity featured as 
a legal concept neither in the classical human rights declarations of the 
eighteenth century nor in the codifications of the nineteenth century.”31 
Thirdly, the philosophical foundation of human dignity may be traced to the 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant. 
 
Kant was not the first philosopher to consider the notion of human dignity. 
The concept is mentioned as far back as ancient Rome. Similarly to the ancient 
notions of human dignity Kant sees human dignity as a status. Kant however 
articulates the concept as separate to a person’s worth. Kant’s aim is to 
consider how a person should be treated in abstract he is therefore 
unconcerned with the person’s character or actions. There is no sense of a 
person unworthy of human dignity. Kant often asks one to consider how 
others should treat one on the basis that one will necessarily see oneself as 
worthy of value and protection.  An in-depth discussion of Kant is beyond the 
scope of this thesis and this thesis does not purport to examine Kant’s theory 
or theories itself. Only one element of Kant’s many philosophies is examined, 
the categorical imperative, and it is acknowledged that this is only a brief 
examination.   
                                                
30 It is also a useful expression of human dignity in that the framers of the 
Constitution specifically sought to avoid ‘a specific philosophical or ethical concept 
of human dignity’ in order to allow it to remain ‘open to different approaches’ Walter 
‘Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law’ in European Commission for 
Democracy through Law 24. 
31 ibid 465. 
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Kant’s articulation of human dignity is that people must be treated as ends in 
themselves rather than merely means; stating: ‘‘[E]verything has either a price 
or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its 
equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore 
admits of no equivalent has a dignity.’’32 Kant’s reformulation of his 
categorical imperative requires that one "[a]ct[s] in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at 
the same time as an end and never simply as a means." This places emphasis 
on the value of human life as in and being of itself deserving of moral respect.  
This demand for respect might be said to be core of the concept of human 
dignity.  In 1992 the German Constitutional Court in one of its multiple 
consideration of the term stated that the term ‘human dignity’ means that the 
human being has a right to ‘social value and respect’.33 This demand for 
respect stems from the fact that human dignity is not linked to any specific 
characteristic, achievement or feature of a human being. It is therefore not 
capacity dependent.34 Similarly Kant emphasizes that the categorical 
imperative is not context specific. It is in contrast to the hypothetical 
                                                
32 Kant (n 27 chapter two). Bognetti describes Kant as the father of the concept of 
human dignity see ‘The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. 
Constitutionalism’, in Nolte (ed.) European and US Constitutionalism, Science and 
Technique of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2005) 75. Although concern 
has been expressed at the Catholic theological underpinning of Kant’s theory 
Tasioulas and McCrudden both take the view that the religious underpinning is not 
problematic to the extent that, in Tasioulas’ terms, that they can be ‘cashed out’- or 
replaced- in terms of reason(s) see n 20 33.  
33 Decision of 20 October 1992, BVerfGE 87, 209 [Sammlung der Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts – Reports of the decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court. 
34 And has therefore been used to explain why the execution of those with mental 
retardation is an affront to their human dignity see Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 US 
304.  
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imperative; a conditional obligation to perform an obligation for the sake of a 
specific purpose or end.     
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Human dignity explains why we cannot will as universal law anything that 
does not respect persons as ends not means. The German Constitutional Court 
has expressed this as the ‘object-formula.’35 This enjoins other actors not to 
treat the individual as an object in such a way that challenges or questions the 
value of the individual. This returns to Kant’s notion that dignity has no 
equivalent and, therefore, no price. Dignity cannot be bargained away, traded 
or replaced. This view of human dignity also explains how human dignity can 
protect those who may be unaware of their own dignity.  It further links to the 
notion of individuals as right holders and not merely objects of rights. 
 
Violations of human dignity, Heyde suggests,  “brings into contempt the 
value which a human being has by his/her being a person. Measures of this 
kind would be humiliation, branding, outlawing or other behaviour which 
deprives the human person of the right to recognition as a human being.”36 
Sedmak similarly speaks of human dignity as an enjoinder not to treat people 
as objects and offers what might be termed the vulnerability test. Sedmak 
suggests “Vulnerability provides a litmus test: how we deal with the most 
vulnerable members of society tests our commitment to dignity.”37   
 
                                                
35 Judgment of 3 March 2004, BVerfGE 109, 279 (n 29).  
36  Commentary on the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Article 1: Human Dignity.  
37 In n 15 32. Sedmark considers relationality, rather than autonomy, as the important 
aspect of human flourishing.  This will be considered in more detail below. 
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ECJ has considered human dignity on many occasions and Judge Fitzmaurice 
in Ireland v United Kingdom noted human dignity is a broad one, in the context 
of Article 3 it can cover: 
‘something seriously humiliating, lowering as to human dignity, or 
disparaging, like having one’s head shaved, being tarred and feathered, 
smeared with filth, pelted with muck, paraded naked in front of strangers, 
forced to eat excreta, deface the portrait of one’s sovereign or head of State, or 
dress up in a way calculated to provoke ridicule or contempt ...’38    
The ‘humiliation’ conception of human rights is one rejected by McCrudden. 
The humiliation argues McCrudden is secondary to the harm. As McCrudden 
explains it ‘[d]ignity does not just protect people from the experience of a 
collapse of self-esteem or being ignored but from the actual harm itself.’ 39 It 
might however be argued that both humiliation and harm are capable of 
being violations of human dignity, depending on the circumstances. This 
explanation allows for mental torture to be recognized alongside physical 
torture and, it could be argued, is preferable for that reason alone.40   
 
The value of human dignity is that it can be used in different contexts. 
Although the ECHR does not contain an explicit expression of human dignity 
the concept has been discussed in several cases before the ECtHR. In the East 
African case the affront to human dignity was used to explain the wrong of 
                                                
38 2 EHRR 25, 27.  
39 Although this is sometimes seen as distinction between choice and relational theory 
there is a similar caveat in choice theory. It is not necessary to have the actual 
capacity to make choice, it is the general human capacity to take choices that is 
important. 
40 For an indepth discussion of human dignity as connected to humilation see Luban 
‘Human Dignity, Humilation and Torture’ (2009) 19 Kennedy Institute Ethics Journal 
211.  
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racial discrimination.41 Similarly human dignity was used to explain why 
corporal punishment was capable of being a breach of Article 3 prohibition on 
inhuman and degrading treatment.42 That human dignity is capable of 
responding to changing circumstances in which it may be violated can be seen 
in the variety of references to and cases before the ECtHR in which human 
dignity forms a key part of the legal argument.43 The need for international 
human rights law to ‘mature’ by expanding its normative content is identified 
by Philip Alston44 and human dignity might be said to be useful in providing 
direction for this maturing. 
 
It could be argued that instead of adopting either a rights or duty based view 
of human dignity one could adopt a view of human dignity as multi faceted. 
Human dignity could be said to include both a rights based notion, serving as 
the foundation of rights, and a duty creating element, in that violations of 
dignity and the connected rights, create reason to act. Further human dignity 
might be seen as a principle which stands behind other individual rights. In 
this way it may also provide a guide to interpretation of human rights.45 This 
                                                
41 East African Asians v. United Kingdom 3 EHRR (1981) 76 203–207. 
42 Tyrer v United Kingdom 2 EHRR 1 [33]. 
43 Bock v. Germany 12 EHRR (1990) 247 [48] SW v. UK; CR v. UK, 21 EHRR (1995) 363 
[44] Ribitsch v. Austria, 21 EHRR (1995) 573 [38] Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 EHRR 
(2002) 447 [90–91] Selmouni v. France 23 EHRR (1999) 403 (Article 3), Moldovan v. 
Romania 44 EHRR (2007) 16 (Article 14), Pretty v. United Kingdom, 24 EHRR (1997) 
423 (Article 3), in which it was stated that ‘[t]he very essence of the Convention is 
respect for human dignity and human freedom’ [65]. These cases cover issues as 
diverse as the right to a fair trial, the right not to be punished under a retrospective 
law and the right to a private life.   
44 Introduction to Human Rights Law (International Library of Essays in Law and 
Legal Theory 1996) xi, xii. 
45 For articulation of this multi faceted concept of human dignity see Dawood v. 
Minister of Home Affairs [2000] 5 Law Reports of the Commonwealth 147, 2000 (3) SA 
936 (CC). ‘Human dignity ... informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at 
a range of levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, 
other rights…. it is [also] a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected 
and protected. In many cases, however, where the value of human dignity is 
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echoes the Vienna Convention enjoinder to recall the principles and purposes 
behind a Convention when seeking to interpret terms of international law. 
This obligation to consider the specific purpose of the treaty reminds one that 
human rights law protects a range of interests and goods. It also suggests that 
as human dignity has been identified as a concept laying behind these many 
varied rights it must necessarily be a flexible concept.  
 
The flexibility of the concept of human dignity is reflected in the range of 
cases in which the European Court of Justice has considered human dignity to 
be engaged.46 This returns to Rao’s observation that human dignity has been 
used in number of ways in constitutional cases. That human dignity is capable 
of demanding the evolution of human rights law is shown in the judicial 
recognition of same sex marriages in several countries.47 It has also been used 
to explain a right to adequate housing48 and the right to safe public transport.49 
The English and Welsh House of Lords had begun to use this concept 
although infrequently50 and the Supreme Court has yet to substantively 
                                                
offended, the primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific 
right such as the right to bodily integrity, the right to equality or the right not to be 
subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour’ [35] (O’Regan J). 
46 This includes cases on more obvious issues such as sex discrimination (Case C–
168/91, Christos Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I–1191) but also less obvious violations of 
human dignity such as laser games which require simulation of death (Case C–36/02, 
Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs- GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I–9609). See also the cases of Case C–13/94, P v. S and 
Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I–2143, at para. 22, the opinion of Maduro AG 
in Case C–303/06, Coleman v. Law, Judgment of 31 Jan. 2008, at paras 8–10, 12–13, 
15, and 22 and Case C–377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council 
[2001] ECR I–7079.  
47 See, for example, Halpern v. Attorney General (2003) 65 OR (3d) 161, CA for Ontario or 
South African case of Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (3) BCLR 355 
(Constitutional Court).  
48 Khosa v. Minister of Social Development (2004) (6) SA 505 (CC). 
49 Rail Commuters Action Group v. Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail (2005) (2) SA 359 (CC).   
50 Ghaidan v. Godin Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, at 604 [130] (Baroness Hale); R v. 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ex parte Carson [2005] UKHL 3 [49] (Lord 
Walker). 
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engage with the concept. Carozza sees this use of human dignity across 
jurisdictions as the search for the universal.51 This means the concept is 
capable of meaning many things whilst retaining its core meaning.  Human 
dignity is a way of asking us what (rights) we consider most important and 
what we might need to protect and enjoy these things.  
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Human dignity can be useful as a starting point for reasoning about whether 
or not a feature of being human should be protected and to what extent. As 
McCrudden notes, inclusion of human dignity in the UDHR was “a vital 
attempt to articulate their understanding of the basis on which human rights 
could be said to exist” on the part of the drafters.52 Eleanor Roosevelt is said to 
have explained the inclusion of human dignity with the claim that “every 
human being is worthy of respect ... it was meant to explain why human 
beings have rights to begin with.”53 Thus “to attend to human dignity is to 
attend to the value or significance that belongs to human being (this alone is a 
reason why the concept of human dignity cannot be discarded.)”54 It is the 
value or significance which also creates an obligation of respect Kant 
explained, “[M]an regarded as a person . . . possesses, in other words, a 
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from 
all other rational beings in the world.”55 Similarly, Alan Gewirth explains that 
this universal dignity creates an obligation of “necessary respect” that 
                                                
51 Carozza, ‘My Friend is a Stranger: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune 
of Human Rights’ 81 Texas Law Review (2003) 1031. 
52 n20 677. 
53 Glendon A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Random House 2001) 146. 
54 ibid 20. 
55 Cited in Rao n 22 195. 
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“consists in an affirmative, rationally grounded recognition of and regard for 
a status that all human beings have by virtue of their inherent dignity.”56 
 
Human dignity operates as a “the moral principle [that] ought to inform how 
society and other individuals interact with them.”57 Human dignity grounds 
respect individual autonomy and justified claims to basic needs required to 
have a life of one’s own. Thus “to attend to human dignity is to attend to the 
value or significance that belongs to human being (this alone is a reason why 
the concept of human dignity cannot be discarded.)”58 Feinberg views human 
dignity as essentially synonymous with human rights stating “[t]o respect a 
person then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity simply is to 
think of him as a potential maker of claims.”59 Dignity however can be seen as 
the basis of human rights and not merely a synonym for the same. Habermas 
articulates this link between human rights and human dignity as “[h]uman 
rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can 
therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral 
source.”60 As McCrudden notes if you see human dignity as the basis of 
human rights then “dignity becomes an interpretive principle to assist the 
further explication of the catalogue of rights generated by the principle.”61  
 
Human dignity might then be defined as having two key elements, 
inviolability and universality which in turn generate a general demand for 
                                                
56 ‘Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights’ in Meyer & Parent (eds) The Constitution of 
Rights (1992) 17.  
57 Green ‘Human Dignity’ in ibid 151. 
58 Ibid 20. 
59 ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ [1970] Journal of Value Inquiry 243, 252. 
60 The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights (2010) 
Metaphilosphy 464 [464]. 
61 n 20 681. 
! $$$ 
respect and a specific obligation to respect and protect it on the state. Andrew 
Clapham expands on the duties that this concept of human dignity generates: 
(1) the prohibition of all types of inhuman treatment, humiliation, or 
degradation by one person over another;  
(2) the assurance of the possibility for individual choice and the 
conditions for ‘each individual’s self-fulfillment’, autonomy, or self-
realization;  
(3) the recognition that the protection of group identity and culture 
may be essential for the protection of personal dignity;  
(4) the creation of the necessary conditions for each individual to have 
their essential needs satisfied.62 
 
Human dignity might be summed up as the assertion that human beings have 
special value as such, is “closely related to the idea of human worth.”63  
Human dignity contains: 
1) an ontological claim that all human beings have this status of equal 
moral worth which is inherently held and not conferred upon 
individuals by anyone 
2) a normative principle that all human beings are entitled to have this 
status respected by others  
3) and, therefore, to have a duty to respect it in others. 
 
This discussion on human dignity might show that there are many different 
concepts of human dignity. It however also shows that there is consensus 
                                                
62 Clapham Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 
2006) 545-6.  
63 Malpas (n 9 chapter three) 19. 
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about the core of human dignity. The core might be said to comprise of four 
elements. Firstly, in all of these articulations of human dignity it is expressed 
as inviolable, a right that cannot legitimately be infringed, forfeited or 
renounced. Secondly, it is a right held on the basis of being human and 
nothing more or less. Thirdly, human dignity demands respect.  As 
McCrudden notes “human rights texts have gone further and supplemented 
the relational element of the minimum core by supplying a third element 
regarding the relationship between the state and the individual.”64 Hathaway 
summarizes the relationship between human rights and human dignity by 
viewing human rights as a project by states in articulating and defining 
unacceptable infringements of human dignity.65 This is the notion that the 
state is to operate for the benefit of the individual and not vice versa. These 
four elements are more than sufficient to allow human dignity to operate as a 
useful concept in refugee law. 
 
 Refugee law builds on this same concept. This can be seen in the protection 
afforded to persons whose right to religious beliefs or political views are being 
infringed. More recently this wider concept of human dignity has been 
recognised to encompass a right to express sexuality. This gives us a broader 
concept of human life beyond what is required merely to survive. It is argued 
here that this demand for a broader concept of living rather than merely 
existing stems from the concept of human dignity and the obligation to 
respect human dignity through refraining from infringing on another’s ability 
to form and carry out their own life plan. This, of course, is not a limitless 
                                                
64 Ibid. This element of human dignity will be considered in the following chapter. 
65 The Realities of Refugee Determination on the Eve of a New Millennium: The Role 
of the Judiciary (1998) International Journal of Refugee Law 80, 85. 
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concept. We can of course only carry out our own life plan to the extent that it 
does not unduly impact on another’s life plan following Kant’s categorical 
imperative requiring, in simple terms, that we treat others only as we could 
will others to treat us. 
 
Despite the many and varied usages of the term found in their detailed 
exploration of human dignity across disciplines, Malpas and Lickiss identify 
one common theme “the relation between dignity and autonomy.”66 The 
debate itself cannot concern us here, it suffices to say that this author comes 
down on the side of establishing a foundational link between dignity and 
autonomy and asserts that “dignity is not either respect for autonomy or 
equality but the ground for both concepts.”67 It is the answer to the question 
‘why should I respect people’s autonomy?’ not a reformulation of the 
question.68  
 
This link between dignity and autonomy renders human dignity of such 
value. The value of human dignity lies in the fact that it must be respected in 
order to allow individuals to form and carry out their own life plan. As Rao 
notes “[d]ignity as agency can have universal, or at least widespread, appeal 
because it does not require a specific concept of dignity.”69 It is useful, 
therefore, that human dignity is capable of being articulated in a different 
manner depending on the circumstances as it mutates to ensure that threats to 
one’s life plan are identified, prohibited or to provide a basis for punishment 
of the violators. As human dignity is the grounds for respecting individual 
                                                
66 Malpas and Lickiss (n16) 3.  
67 Sulmasy ‘Human Dignity and Human Worth’ in ibid 10. 
68 ibid. 
69 n22 200.  
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autonomy “how we think about the dignity that is ours (whoever ‘we’ may 
be) depends very much on our conception of ourselves.”70  
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There have been many different routes taken to explaining the existence of or 
justifying human rights; Alexy identifies eight different forms of foundational 
arguments, ranging from the religious to the instrumental, from biological to 
the existential.71 Alexy defends an explicative argument, specifically one based 
on discourse theory, which he combines with an existential argument to 
justify human rights. Human dignity is identified here as the underlying 
abstract value behind human rights providing the core of human rights. The 
principle of human dignity might be said to provide sufficient justification for 
the existence of human rights as it recognises the fundamental and inherent 
worth of a human being in all circumstances. 
 
Although there are many and varied justifications for human rights if one is 
seeking to rely on the existence of human rights as a foundation for other 
claims one theory need not be demonstrated to be persuasive to the detriment 
of all other theories. Indeed, to identify only one persuasive foundation of 
human rights might suggest a thinner basis for human rights than is actually 
the case. The various justifications for human rights set out above, and the 
others not mentioned, might be said to all to some extent to provide 
foundations for human rights but to rely on the existence of human rights for 
                                                
70 ‘Human Dignity and Human Being’ in ibid.  
71 ‘Menschenrechte ohne Metaphysik?’ (2004) 52 Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 15 
translated terms included.  
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the remainder of the thesis one only needs to accept one of the theories 
presented above as providing good reasons to act.  
 
A common feature of accounts of the special nature of human rights is 
recourse to the notion of agency used from Hobbes and, in parts, Kant 
through to Hart, Gewirth, Raz, Griffin and Tasioulas, to name a few.72 This 
builds on the observations as to the content of human dignity made above. 
Gewirth, for example, thinks of human rights are those rights necessary for 
purposive human action guided by free choice.73 Hart, in Are There Any 
Natural Rights? argues that if there can be said to be any moral right at all then 
the equal right of all to be free is it and he bases this assertion on the human 
capability of choice. The human capability of choice, for Hart, is what gives 
one the right to be free from interferences in our liberty (meaning if one 
wishes to interfere in the liberty of another special justification must be given). 
If we are capable of choice, argues Hart, then we have the right to be free from 
coercion or restraint in these choices and are at liberty to do any action that 
would not coerce or restrain others. In other words, all things being equal, we 
                                                
72 The relative merits of Interest/Benefit theories of rights and Will/Choice theories 
are beyond the scope of this thesis and are not, therefore, discussed here. For a 
overview of these debates, see Simmonds 'Rights at the Cutting Edge' in Kramer et al 
A Debate Over Rights (Clarendon Press 1998). The distinction between the theories 
might also be said to be far from clear cut, for example, Kramer, describes himself as 
an 'interest' theorist, but insists that every right must give rise to a correlative duty: 
'Rights Without Trimmings' in ibid.   
73 Gerwirth (n 90 in chapter one) Though this notion of human rights does not lead to 
recognition of all of the rights Gewirth seeks to justify, for example, as Raz 
demonstrates, a slave may be said to act purposively but they are not free, thus 
freedom would not appear to be a human right as is it not a precondition for acting 
purposively see Raz (n 13). However, the counter argument to Raz centres on the 
ability of an agent to act purposively or the capacity to choose one’s one life plan. If an 
agent has this capacity, and based on the assumption that all human beings have this 
capacity whether or not this is factually true, then this capacity ought to be respected 
and recognised, so the slave ought to have freedom because she can act purposively. 
Freedom is not a precondition for acting purposively but a right due to all who are 
capable of acting purposively.  
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have both a negative and positive right to make use of our capability of 
choice.   
 
This type of argument is often associated with Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen, although they do not refer to it as choice theory but rather the 
‘Capabilities Approach.’74 Their theories are centred on the value of individual 
choice. At the most basic level, the capabilities approach evaluates individual 
well-being based on the interrelated assumptions as to a) the value of 
individual choice and b) that without respect for core human rights one’s 
choices are limited or, even, non-existent. Well-being and development 
should be discussed in terms of people’s capabilities to function, that is, on 
their effective opportunities to form and carry out their own life plan. For Sen 
and Nussbaum, the range of capabilities needed to carry out one’s life plan 
effectively involves far more than just basic goods. Individuals need both the 
means and the freedom to achieve their ends. Human rights, then, are 
connected to the capacity to choose and the freedoms needed to make use of 
this capacity. This presupposes certain foundations for human rights, namely 
the individual as autonomous and, therefore, entitled to respect for this 
autonomy, in the guise of the right to be human dignity, which forms the 
basis of human rights.  
 
Griffin, similarly, focuses on agency, seeing human rights as those required to 
allow “deliberating, assessing, choosing and action to make what we see as a 
                                                
74 The Quality of Life (Oxford University Press 1993). Expanding on Sen’s arguments in 
Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford University Press 1985) and applied by 
Nussbaum further in Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
(Cambridge University Press 2000).  
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good life for ourselves.”75 The interest human rights protects, then, is human 
agency and the very fact that the individual in question is human (and it is 
assumed values her purposes) is what justifies protecting their agency. In 
Gewirth’s terms, being a human allows one to say ‘I at least have a prima facie 
claim right to generic features of agency.’76 Griffin links this directly to 
personhood, one’s status as a human being and the inherent dignity attached 
to this status. Personhood, a concept tied closely to human dignity, is a core 
element of the concept of human rights articulated throughout international 
human rights law; the UDHR, for example, declaring ‘[a]ll human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They all endowed with reason and 
conscience...[.]’77 Signatory states to the UDHR, and other UN Human Rights 
treaties including arguably the Refugee Convention, are to a certain extent 
committed to this concept of human rights. The foundations of this are, 
however, worth exploring.  
 
Despite the many and varied usages of the term found in their detailed 
exploration of human dignity across disciplines, Malpas and Lickiss identify 
one common theme “the relation between dignity and autonomy.”78 The 
debate itself cannot concern us here, it suffices to say that this author comes 
down on the side of establishing a foundational link between dignity and 
autonomy and asserts that “dignity is not either respect for autonomy or 
                                                
75 Griffin On Human Rights (Blackwell 2007). The phrase ‘the good life’ is discussed 
below. 
76  Gerwirth (n 90 in chapter 1) 109-10.  
77 Article 1 (1948). The Preamble also states “recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”  
78 Malpas and Lickiss (n 9 chapter three) 3.  
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equality but the ground for both concepts.”79 It is the answer to the question 
‘why should I respect people’s autonomy?’ not a reformulation of the 
question.80 This link between dignity and autonomy renders human dignity of 
such value. The value of human dignity lies in the fact that it must be 
respected in order to allow individuals to form and carry out their own life 
plan. It is useful, therefore, that human dignity is capable of being articulated 
in a different manner depending on the circumstances as it mutates to ensure 
that threats to one’s life plan are identified, prohibited or to provide a basis for 
punishment of the violators. As human dignity is the grounds for respecting 
individual autonomy “how we think about the dignity that is ours (whoever 
‘we’ may be) depends very much on our conception of ourselves.”81 Human 
dignity operates as a “the moral principle [that] ought to inform how society 
and other individuals interact with them.”82 Human dignity grounds respect 
individual autonomy and justified claims to basic needs required to have a life 
of one’s own. As Raz states: 
Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of 
planning and plotting their future. Thus, respecting people’s dignity includes 
respecting their autonomy, their right to control their future. 
This view of human dignity allows it to be of great use in refugee law as it 
begins with the assumption that individuals have a right to control their 
future and that this right is intimately connected with human dignity. As Raz 
notes any significant interference with right to control one’s future would 
constitute a violation of human dignity. This would seem to place significant 
restrictions on what states can do with those putting forward refugee claims. 
                                                
79 Sulmasy ‘Human Dignity and Human Worth’ in ibid 10. 
80 ibid. 
81 Sulmasy n 78 10.   
82 Green ‘Human Dignity’ in n78 151. 
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After all, those putting forward refugee claims are seeking to control their 
own future or rather seeking to regain control of their own future. This idea 
will be explored in greater detail in chapter five. It is necessary first to 
consider what versions of one’s future- or present- are protected by human 
dignity.  The following sections seeks to consider what sort of choices are or 
ought to be protected by human rights law by considering the notions of 
personhood and the good life. The argument is that it is necessary to consider 
these questions before human rights law and human dignity can guide 
refugee law. One needs to consider the foundations of these rights so that 
decision-makers can consider if the violation put forward by an applicant is a 
violation encompassed by the protective scope of refugee law. This project is 
particularly pertinent claims involving newly emerging rights or rights which 
have not yet been the subject of a refugee claim. This suggests a method for 
analysing these rights within refugee law, namely it enjoins the decision-
maker to consider whether there has been a violation of human dignity.  
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For Griffin, the notion of human dignity is connected to personhood. In turn 
personhood is underpinned by the twin concepts of autonomy and liberty, 
which are needed to enable an individual to choose one’s own life plan and to 
realise this plan.83 As noted above, and will be explored below, the value of 
this approach is that it does not dictate a certain concept of the good life. A 
human right is “an effective, socially manageable claim on others”84 to have 
one’s autonomy and liberty respected. Actions that significantly curtail one’s 
autonomy and liberty, thereby preventing one from forming or realising one’s 
                                                
83 Griffin 'First Steps in an Account of Human Rights' (2001) 9 European Journal of 
Philosophy 306 320-3.  
84 ibid. 
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own life plan, are failures to respect an individuals personhood and prima facie 
human rights violations. This view largely accords with Capps’ foundations 
of international human rights law, which, following Gewirth, he argues is to 
be found in human dignity understood in terms of freedom and autonomy. 
Freedom being defined as “absence of unjustified coercion or constraint by the 
actions of others”85 and autonomy meaning capacity to achieve one’s 
purposes. For Gewirth, freedom and well-being are ‘generic features of 
agency’ which are necessary for an agent to achieve any purpose and as such 
have a special role, requiring protection.86  They also justify restricting the 
actions of other agents and placing the burden of protection on these other 
agents.  
 
Raz, writing about Griffin’s concept of human rights, argues that the notion of 
personhood connected to one’s ability to form one’s own life plan is flawed.87 
Raz maintains that personhood cannot contain a requirement that, as Griffin 
puts it, ‘one must choose one’s own course through life- that is, not be 
dominated or controlled by someone or something else’88 as this suggests 
“someone who is dominated by his powerful mother, or controlled by his 
commitment to his employer (having signed a 10-year contract, on condition 
that the employer first pays for his education) is less of a person than someone 
who is not dominated or controlled.”89 Griffin’s concept of human rights is 
                                                
85 Capps Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
108.  
86 Gerwirth (n 90 in chapter 1) 13-15. See also, Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 27 in 
chapter two) 129-133. 
87 Raz The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 324-327.  
88 Griffin (n 69) 311. 
89  Raz (n 24) 325. This is not to say that Griffin necessarily intends his version of 
personhood to be read as such, indeed statements such as ‘what is needed for human 
status’ might suggest that Raz’ critique is well-founded but if one amends Griffin’s 
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open to another interpretation. Personhood stems from the human capacity for 
agency, it says that as a person is capable of forming one’s own life plans90 she 
ought to be allowed to do so; to say that personhood is based on human 
agency is not to say that an individual whose agency is being frustrated or 
denied is not a person.  
 
It could be argued that Griffin’s conditions for agency are ought not is; 
personhood ought to entail autonomy and liberty (freedoms to choose and 
realise), where it is does not, due to outside interference, then this is wrong. If 
a person ceased to be a person when unable to exercise a capacity to choose, 
personhood would not provide a foundation for human rights, it is precisely 
because an individual remains a person despite the denial of their personhood 
by another that personhood can underpin human rights. Capps notes this 
distinction in stating, that “(i)human beings have dignity when they can 
exercise freedom or, more specifically, autonomy and (ii) autonomy is 
protected by a series of rights which every human being has because they are 
human.”91 A denial of human dignity is not, however much the perpetrator 
may wish it to be, a denial of the victim’s humanity, rather it is a failure to 
respect the inherent dignity of the individual, which can be classified as a 
                                                
statement to ‘what is needed for recognition of human status’ then the problem of 
personhood dependent on actual capacity for agency (as opposed to theoretical 
capacity for agency given that the individual is a human) disappears, see footnote 
below.  
90 This assertion is based on the general concept of personhood applying to all 
persons, it need not be true of every particular person so a person who is unable to 
actually exercise intentional agency due to a severe stroke, for example, remains a 
person never the less, they need not actually possess the capacity for agency only be 
part of the human race which as a whole possess this capacity. They may in the 
future be able to exercise this capacity or, at least, would have been able to do so if 
circumstances were different.  
91 Capps (n 83 chapter three) 108. 
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wrong. As Donnelly notes, “[h]uman rights are but one way that has been 
devised to realize and to protect human dignity.”92     
 
The notion of personhood allows us to say it is wrong when a person is 
denied full personhood through frustration or denial of her human rights and 
is in this way linked to the notion of human dignity. Here personhood 
operates as a status, like refugeehood, which requires recognition to be 
effective but which is not constitutive but declaratory: a person is a person 
whether others recognise that or not and the lack of recognition of 
personhood, expressed by the frustration or denial of agency, is at the root of 
human rights violations.  To return to Raz’ objections, then, a person whose 
life plans are thwarted by a domineering mother might be the victim of human 
rights abuses (if the mother is sufficiently domineering so as to actually 
remove real choices from her child’s life) but in any event they remain a 
person, they are not “less of a person than someone who is not so dominated 
or controlled” but exactly as much as a person as anyone else, that is why the 
domination and control is wrong. This is precisely the point in human rights, 
to say that this individual, as a person, ought to enjoy the same rights as 
another person to allow them to formulate and realise their own life plan.93 
Raz accepts this, in noting a distinction between capacity and its exercise, 
human rights being then, “rights of those with the capacity for intentional 
agency to preserve that capacity.”94    
 
                                                
92 Donnelly (n 9) 303. 
93 As for the employee who has promised her employer 10 years of service in return 
for her education, her personhood is apparently fully recognised, she was able to 
choose her life plan which included entering into a contract, she has bound herself 
and any person is free to do that.  
94  Raz (n 24) 326.  
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Tasioulas, on the other hand, seeks to provide a pluralist account of human 
rights, with autonomy and liberty just two of the interests grounding human 
rights.95 Tasioulas instead proposes that rights are singled out as human rights 
“only if they are weighty enough to justify the imposition on others of duties 
to respect and further those interests in various ways.”96 This suggests that the 
question refugee status decision makers must ask themselves in determining 
whether there has been a human rights violation is, ‘did the home state have a 
duty to respect the right violated?’ This, however, could be said to lead to a 
circular argument, how might one determine whether or not a state (in this 
case) had a duty to respect the right in question without looking to justify the 
existence of the right in the first place? Put otherwise, how do we decide if the 
rights are ‘weighty enough’ to justify the imposition of a correlative duty 
without looking to the justification for the right itself? The grounds of human 
rights must precede arguments as to the content of human rights.   
 
Alexy similarly sees something beyond mere action or capacity for action, 
arguing that his correctness thesis is intrinsically connected with the concept 
of argument, which makes discourse theory preferable as the theoretical 
foundation of human rights. The distinction with action-orientated theories of 
justification resolves more around how we wish to conceive of human life 
than in identifying a justificatory theory that can be demonstrated to be 
persuasive to the detriment of all others. Alexy wishes us to see ourselves as 
“discursive and reasonable creatures”97 rather than just beings of action. As 
well as acknowledging the realm of action Alexy’s version of taking rights 
                                                
95 Tasiloulas (n 15 in introduction) 96. 
96 ibid 96. 
97 Alexy (n 46 in chapter 2) 12. 
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seriously involves “taking seriously the implications of the discursive 
capabilities in real life.”98 Discourse, as part of the political process and more 
generally, might also be seen as the bridge between moral rights and positive 
law as it gives real world legitimacy, via political debate, to the 
implementation of moral rights into positive law. Discursive theory might be 
viewed as an expansion of agency theory, the foundations of agency theory 
needs to be established first then regardless of whether this is considered 
ultimately sufficient.  
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Raz’ further concern is that having established human rights as those rights 
needed to preserve the human capacity for agency, Griffin’s conception of 
personhood and human rights goes further, looking to human rights to 
preserve not only the capacity for agency but also to ensure its successful 
exercise. This, Raz fears, is impossible as we lack criteria to say which rights 
are necessary to ensure the successful exercise of agency and in determining 
which choices people are likely to want to make (and ought to be protected 
therefore) we stray dangerously close to enforcing a particular view of the 
‘good life’.  For example, Raz takes Griffin’s requirement that everyone be 
allowed minimal education and information in order to be able to formulate 
their own life plan. As Raz notes, if this requirement is only minimal then it is 
easily met, “just by being alive (and non-comatose) we have some knowledge, 
resources and opportunities”99 but Griffin wishes to go further and here, Raz, 
argues he strays into formulating his conception of a good life rather than 
grounding human rights. However, minimal education and resources might 
                                                
98 ibid. 
99 Raz (n 24) 326. The comatosed would still be protected from violations of their 
human dignity via the humilation or harm conceptions of the notion.  
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be said to go beyond merely being alive without straying into one version of 
the good life. Indeed, this conception of human rights excludes very little 
from one’s concept of the good life.  
 
This is differs from Tasioulas’ pluralist account, which expressly includes 
“certain minimal conditions of a good life.”100 Griffin seems to intend to 
formulate some conception of the good life within his view of human rights, 
however this is not to say that such a view is a necessary component of a 
personhood-based explanation of human rights. If one bases human rights on 
personhood, within plausible limits, many different conceptions of the good 
life are available; indeed this is the purpose of having a choice based 
conception of human rights. People ought to be free to choose their own plan 
which will almost inevitably result in a myriad of different life choices but it 
is, however, the choice act which is protected rather than plurality in of itself. 
Thus, capacity rights, such as right to life and right to liberty are valued as 
necessary preconditions to being able to choose one’s own life path.  
 
This multifaceted view of the good life is expressed also in the variety of l 
human rights protected through a range of international treaties. Article 13 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ties 
education to dignity, stating: “education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity.” This ties 
the concept of choice to respect for human dignity implying that one way of 
ensuring respect for human dignity is to prevent interferences with a person’s 
ability to form and carry out their own life plan. This is consistent with Sen 
                                                
100 Tasiloulas (n 15 in introduction) 96.  
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and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to human rights, which places the 
choice act in the centre of concept of human rights. This view fleshes out what 
constitutes respect for human dignity by providing capabilities a person 
should be free to exercise.  
 
The link between human dignity and man’s ability to choose is not a new one. 
As Mc Crudden notes “in the Dignity of Man, published in 1486, Pico della 
Mirandola argued that at the root of Man’s dignity is the ability to choose to 
be what he wants to be.”101 This does not necessarily require a concept of 
human dignity centred on autonomy. In the most simple terms, this version 
broadly Libertarian concept of liberty can be countered by noting that a 
person might chose to be part of a community.  Rousseau, to name just one, 
builds a more communitarian concept of rights and as noted by Rao above 
this more communitarian concept of human dignity has been used in 
constitutional cases in terms of the dignity of the community. What these 
varied forms of human dignity demonstrate is that human rights law can be 
used to protect a variety of choices, including the choice to be in a community.  
 
Other human rights are protected choices, one might choose to place religion 
at the centre of one’s conception of the good life such that religious belief 
requires protection as a human right or one might choose to place political 
participation in a similar position. Human rights are attached to all persons so 
as to allow everyone the chance to choose to value these things that other 
humans’ value. This is more than justifying human rights purely on self-
                                                
101 n20 659. Although for Mirandola the significance of man’s ability to reason is that 
it is a gift from god, this element of his theory is not a conceptually necessary one. 
The value of choice can be in the choice act itself. 
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interest. These values are of intrinsic and instrumental value. Human rights are 
not justified by interest theory alone but also a form of will theory, placing the 
capacity for freedom at the centre of any justification of human rights.102 
 
Tasioulas, argues Griffin, must demonstrate the special importance of liberty 
and autonomy such that these interests ground human rights (whilst other 
interests also connected to the good life do not). It could be argued that the 
special importance of liberty and autonomy is connected to this choice act, it 
allows other interests to also be protected if they are also connected to a 
person’s capacity for or exercise of choice (agency). For Griffin, on the other 
hand, personhood (again understood in terms of autonomy and liberty) is not 
of ‘special importance’, indeed he concedes there might be values of greater 
importance, but ‘of a particular sort of importance.’103 Personhood forms the 
basis of human rights because it is a value in need of particular protection as 
“it is peculiarly vulnerable to threat from those in authority”.104 Human rights 
would be seen as “protections of human agency”105 even if it were not 
accepted that rights could be derived from the idea of normative agency. 
 
In this sense, liberty and autonomy are foundational. It is not that, as 
Tasioulas states, that right to freedom from torture needs to be explained in 
                                                
102 Will based theories can take a variety of different forms, from Hart’s weak 
assertion that if any moral right exists it is ‘equal right of all men to be free.’ (ʻThe 
Ascription of Responsibility and Rightsʼ 49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1955) 
171 177) to Gewirth’s more comprehensive claim that as freedom and well-being are 
necessary conditions for an agent’s rationally purposive action, I must logically 
accept the same claim to protection when asserted by other agents (1983). This, 
Gewirth terms as the ‘principle of generic consistency.’   
103 Griffin 'Human Rights and the Autonomy of International Law' in Tasioulas and  
Besson (eds) The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 347.  
104 ibid 347. 
105 ibid 346. 
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terms of autonomy and liberty. Tasioulas is correct in stating that the evil of 
pain itself is enough to justify this as a human right but it can be explained in 
terms of autonomy and liberty. The argument is that the common feature of 
human rights is that they can be explained by reference to protection of 
individual autonomy and liberty but they need not be explained solely on this 
account. This provides a more definite guide to interpretation than Tasioulas’ 
pluralist account for it gives us a underlying explanation of human rights and 
defining characteristics to seek when determining whether or not a right is a 
human right or not. Tasioulas also views human dignity as a foundational 
principle; one which can help us decide how to act.106 Tasioulas considers 
human dignity a basic moral status but as therefore insufficient alone to 
explain human rights. He combines human dignity with human interests to 
provide a rich theory of human rights.   
 
Griffin further suggests that the effect of giving determinacy to the term 
‘human rights’ might even be sufficient ground to accept personhood as 
grounding human rights, arguing “[t]his is not a derivation of human rights 
from normative agency; it is a proposal based on a hunch that this way of 
remedying the indeterminateness of the term will best suit its role.”107 This 
varied concepts of human dignity have variously been used to ground a 
variety of human rights. Indeed the flexibility of human dignity as a concept 
might be said to have allowed human rights law to expand and evolve.  This 
poses a particular problem for refugee law and raises the question of whether 
                                                
106 He also sees Kant’s version of human dignity as a act focused and his theory as 
one to be considered prior to acting. See Chapter 16 Understanding Dignity. This 
distinction is not however adopted here, in this author’s view both Kant and 
Tasioulas provide a guide to considerations prior to acting. This is what makes both 
theories useful to refugee law.  
107 ibid 346. 
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refugee law is limited to a specific type or generation of human rights or 
whether the expanding concept of human rights may also expand refugee 
law. This thesis has argued that as human rights law expands so to can the 
concept of refugeehood. This is not to say however that all human rights 
violations will automatically give rise to refugee status. 
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Refugee law may be criticised perhaps for being overly focused on first 
generation rights.108 This may be said to have been carried through from the 
concept of human rights and human dignity being established at the time of 
drafting the 1951 Convention. It may also be because of the link between these 
first generation rights and the notion of human dignity as demanding 
restraint on the part of the State. For paradigmatic refugees, of course, 
‘interferences’ from the state will most likely be the reason for their flight. As 
Rao notes “[t]he earliest “first-generation” rights stemming from inherent 
                                                
108 The notion of generations of rights was presented by Karel Vasak in 1979. The first 
generation of human rights miht be said to be roughly in line with those defined in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The second 
generation consists mainly of the human rights specified in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Although no third 
covenant was under consideration until 1981, Vasak argued that several new human 
rights, such as the rights to development, to a healthy environment, and to peace, 
were already beginning to emerge in international law. This teminology is so widely 
used now that the UK parliament used this terminology when considering a bill of 
rights, it defined third generation rights as “rights which have attained international 
recognition as human rights but which are not easily classified as either civil and 
political rights or economic and social rights. They include rights such as the right to 
self-determination, the right to natural resources, the right to economic and social 
development and the right to intergenerational equity and sustainability” see,  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/165/16509.ht
m. Whether this is a good analysis of human rights is beyond the scope of this thesis 
and the author does not seek to explictly adopt this scheme of human rights. The 
terminology is used, however, as this is the terminology often used by decision-
makers and courts when discussing human rights in refugee law. It is also a 
convenient short hand for different types of human rights claims.  
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dignity relate to negative liberty.”109 As refugee law has evolved beyond state 
persecution to recognise non-state agents of persecution, and human rights 
law has begun to consider positive conceptions of human dignity via the 
notion of choosing and maintain your own life plans, so refugee law has 
expanded to consider second and third generation rights. As Alston notes, 
second and third generation rights have often been described as goals rather 
than rights.110 Alexy’s principle theory explains how this objection is 
unnecessary. If human rights are principle (albeit concreticised principles) 
then they are goals in any event. This not only dissolves the distinction 
between rights and goals but Alexy’s theory also places a demand to 
maximise. Alexy’s theory then offers a guide to action as well as conceptual 
explanation. It shows that it is not the generation of the right that determines 
the action required but a case by case balancing act subject to the optimisation 
command (to reiterate this requires that both principles be optimised to the 
greatest degree legally and actually possible).   
 
In practical terms in refugee law the hierarchy of rights does not necessarily 
preclude a refugee claim on the basis of second or third generation rights but 
it is clear that where the violation is a first generation right the question of 
persecution is almost glossed over (or at least becomes merely one of fact.) In 
short, no one questions if torture is capable of constituting persecution. The 
same cannot be said of second or, to an even greater extent, third generation 
rights, as Foster has set out in regards to socio-economic rights.111  
 
                                                
109 n 20 204.  
110 Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005) 341. 
111 Foster (n 2 chapter one) n.  
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Instances of second and third generation rights in refugee law remain largely 
parasitic on establishing discrimination on a Convention ground. For 
example, it remains difficult to establish a violation of the right to education 
would be sufficient for refugee status. However if one can show that an 
individual was excluded from any form of education for discriminatory 
reasons this may well come within the scope of refugee law.112 Refugee law 
still largely adopts a hierarchical model of rights, considering more ‘minor’ 
violations of first generation rights as within the scope of refugee law whilst 
excluding, to a lesser or greater degree, second and third generation rights.113 
The English and Welsh courts acknowledged that any human rights violation 
could engage the Refugee Convention if the violation is extreme enough 
and/or if discrimination sits behind the violation.114  
 
This differs from the approach taken by the Inter American Court of Human 
Rights (hereafter Inter American Court) where so-called second and third 
generation are seen as stemming from first generation rights. The approach of 
the Inter American Court, it is argued, demonstrates how human dignity 
allows an analysis of rights away from rigid hierachisation. It suggests third 
generation rights are not more or less important but perhaps impacted in a 
different way. The approach taken by the Inter American Court is arguably 
                                                
112 see for example Krayem v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA 
649 concerning a Palestinian man who claimed refugee status on the basis of 
deprivation at a refugee camp in Lebanon.  
113 See for example, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ex p Ravichandram) 
[1996] IM Ar 97 or Demikaya [1999] Ar 498 for approval of the hierarchical model. 
The case of WRH (Re) Nos T97-05485 referred to third generation rights “as compared 
to the more serious harms of categories one and two.”  
114 See for example Gashi (n 5 in introduction) [1996] UKIAT 13695 in which it was 
stated “an entitlement to food, housing and medical care…can at an extreme level be 
tantamount to persecution if denied” 31. For a more in depth discussion see Foster 
(n2 chapter 1) and Hathaway (n 11 in introduction) 111. 
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leading to a bridge between negative and positive rights by demonstrating 
that non-interference is often not enough in regards to human rights. It asks 
one to consider not just an interference with a right but also instances where 
no action has been taken thereby resulting in an interference with the right to 
a dignified life. For example in The Street Child Case the court stated: 
[T]he fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of every human 
being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will 
not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a 
dignified existence.115  
Similarly, in Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil116 the Court used the right to life to ground 
a positive obligation to secure health care. This right was framed as an off 
shoot of the right to life. The reasoning of the decision could equally have 
been seen as establishing a positive right to healthcare.  
 
This bridging work has been via the concept of right to a dignified life. The 
Street Children case sought to establish that the right to a dignified life placed 
certain demands on states.  This notion of a dignified life may be set to fit well 
with a view of human rights as valuing freedom and autonomy. This view is 
also particularly suited to refugee law. If we recall discussion of 
conceptualising persecution in chapter one, Moore and Shellman argued that 
in viewing persecution as a push factor, we “[a]ssume that people are (1) 
                                                
115 Villagrán-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, 144 
(Nov. 19, 1999); see also Human Rights Commission General Comment 6 Art. 6, The 
Right to Life, 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (Apr. 30 1982) in which it is stated“[T]he 
right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. . . . [T]he protection of this right 
requires that States adopt positive measures. . . . States parties [should] take all 
possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, 
especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.?. 
116 06 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149 (July 4, 2006) suggested an obligation to 
monitor availability of health care.  
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purposive; (2) value their liberty, physical person, and life and (3) develop 
beliefs about the actors in society with respect to those values.”117 This 
explanation of why persecution serves as a boundary concept between 
‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ builds on an agent focused view of human rights. It 
looks to interferences with one’s capacity to act as an agent (or form and 
follow one’s own life plan) that either stem directly from the state or indirectly 
from a lack of effective state action. It is important for refugee law then to 
consider the scope of the state’s duty to protect its citizens in order to establish 
when this duty has not been fulfilled, giving rise to prima facie to a refugee 
claim.  The Inter American Court considers the right to a dignified life as 
generating specific duties on governments to secure the "minimum living 
conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person."118   
 
This suggests a right is a human right when closely tied to the core element of 
autonomy (which could be said to form the central element of recognition of 
personhood or, put otherwise, respect for human dignity) and the conditions 
needed to be able to use this autonomy. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has set out how the right to a dignified life can bridge the gap between 
generations of rights stating: 
[T]he right to life is restored to its original status as an opportunity to choose 
our destiny and develop our potential. It is more than just a right to subsist, 
but is rather a right to self-development, which requires appropriate 
conditions. In such framework, a single right with a double dimension is set, 
like the two-faced god Janus: one side, with a first-generation legal concept of 
                                                
117 Moore and Shellman (n 45 in chapter 1) 726.  
118 Indigenous Community Yakye Axa Case (Paraguay) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 125. 
Importantly it also places obligations on states to take positive states to act to protect 
individuals from violations by non-state agents.     162-4 (June 17, 2005) [hereinafter Yakye Axa]. 
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the right to life; the other side, with the concept of a requirement to provide 
conditions for a feasible and full existence.119 
This suggests that the concept of a dignified life asks us to consider more 
carefully not only what interferences must be avoided to allow a person to 
live their life but also what positive rights must be enforceable. This reasoning 
might be said to echo the work of Olivier de Schutter on the right to food.120  
 
This notion of a dignified life only infrequently raises its head in refugee law 
at present.121 It is not necessarily a new feature of refugee law but rather an 
occasional one. Whilst the phrase ‘dignified life’ does not appear to have been 
used in a refugee law decision this notion of persecution being a wrong that 
impacts on a person’s ability to lead and form their own life might be said to 
be alluded to at the very least.  The UNHCR asserts that racial discrimination 
can be a form of persecution where “a person’s human dignity is affected to 
such an extent as to be incompatible with the most elementary and inalienable 
human rights.”122 Similarly, Hathaway’s assertion that “refugee law ought to 
                                                
119 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community Case (Paraguay) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 
146, (Judge Garcia Ramirez, concurring at 18) (March 29, 2006). 
120 Although de Schutter is primarily concerned with the implementation of a right to 
food- logical in terms of his now former mandate as UN Special Rappator on the 
Right to Food- his discussion on the need to implement a right to food might be said 
to be similarly linked to other giths in that de Schutter sees this right as necessary 
precursor to the realisaiton of other rights, see for the most succient explanation of de 
Schutter’s arguments http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2013/mar/04/fao-food-basic-human-right (accessed 3 June 2014).    
121 The word ‘dignity’ is mentioned frequently but it is rarely considered 
substantively. Cases engaging, albeit often briefly, with dignity include Begzatowski 
278 F 3d, Refugee Appeal No 71427/99, R.A. No 711193/98 RSAA 9 Sep 1999, Ali v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (right to education considered), 
Freiberg v Canada (Secretary of State) 1994 18 FTR 283 (right to healthcare).  
122 UNHCR Handbook (1996) 69.  
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concern itself with actions which deny human dignity in any key way” has 
been approved and applied in several cases.123 
 
Following the UNHCR handbook, this reasoning has been applied in refugee 
cases.124 Recently perhaps the most prominent application of this concept has 
been in the field of sexuality based asylum claims but by no means 
exclusively. Most often human dignity has been mentioned more in passing 
than in any meaningful sense. In Re GJ the New Zealand Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority observed that “sexual orientation is either an innate or 
unchangeable characteristic or a characteristic so fundamental to identity or 
human dignity that it ought not be required to be changed.”125 Similarly in 
Win the Australian court remarked “the Convention aims at the protection of 
those whose human dignity is imperiled.”126 This built on the sentiment 
expressed in Chan, where McHugh J stated: “[m]easures ‘in disregard’ of 
human dignity may, in appropriate cases, constitute persecution .”127 Having 
regard to the concept of human dignity led the court to consider restrictions of 
access to employment and education as capable of constituting persecution. 
Although there was no explicit statement of the link between limited access to 
the job market and education and human dignity it might be reasonable to 
assume that it was considered an interference with the right to a dignified life 
to prevent a person from working or accessing education. This suggests again 
                                                
123 Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 203 
ALR 112 (HCA).   
124 X (Re) (2009) 90364 (IRB). 
125 [1998] (1995) INLR 387, 420.  
126 Win v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 132, [20].  
127 Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, 430–31.  
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a view of human dignity as connected with one’s right to form and carry out a 
life plan.  
 
As noted in chapter one, however, HJ (Iran)128 contained consideration of the 
type of life a person could be expected to leave as the UK House of Lords 
considered whether someone could be reasonably expected to avoid 
persecution by hiding their sexuality (or living discreetly). Whilst the decision 
contained reservations129, it also held that this duty to avoid persecution could 
not be enforced. The reasoning behind this might be said to link to the concept 
of a dignified life, namely that it asserts that a person must be allowed to 
enforce positive rights not merely ask for non-interference. Lord Dyson 
observed, “[t]he right to dignity underpins the protections afforded by the 
Refugee Convention.”130 The decision and judgment have been heralded as 
ground breaking, it might however be seen as long overdue. Indeed, the 
Court referred back to Lord Steyn’s judgment in Islam and Shah, which drew 
attention to the first preamble to the Declaration, which proclaims the inherent 
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all.131 It follows from human 
rights law that there can be no requirement to hide in order to avoid human 
rights violations.132 It is inconsistent with the view of a dignified life but it is 
                                                
128 n 26 chapter one. 
129 The court, for example, stated that if the applicant would have acted dsicreetly due 
to familial or social pressure this was not sufficient for refugee status, the reason for 
acting discreetly must be to avoid persecution to bring the claim within the ambit of 
refugee law.  
130 n26 [113]. 
131 n78 chapter one.  
132 The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Lawrence v 
Texas 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) and that of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 come to 
similar conclusions on the issues of “discretion”, “reasonableness” and “avoidance”.  
The decisions of the Human Rights Committee in Toonen v Australia (Comm No 
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certainly also contrary to the purpose of human rights, namely to be enjoyed 
and enforced not merely ignored.   
 
This discussion of a dignified life continued from HJ(Iran) to RT(Zimbabwe) 
where the right not to hold any (political) opinion was considered. Here Lord 
Dyson again considered the issues at hand in terms of the individual’s 
dignity, citing Sachs J opining that “the right to believe or not to believe is a 
key ingredient of a person's dignity.”133 These infrequent substantive 
considerations of human dignity in the field of refugee law nevertheless 
demonstrate that human dignity has much to offer refugee law. In particular 
human dignity suggests a prism through which to consider whether or not an 
act constitutes persecution. It confirms, indeed it might be said to provide, the 
inherent link between persecution and human rights standards. 
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The notion of a dignified life may also be of assistance in considering cases of 
cumulative persecution. At first glance the notion of cumulative persecution 
seems to sit ill with the assertion that persecution concerns the violation of 
core human rights. For this reason, perhaps, cumulative persecution has been 
rejected in some jurisdictions.134 This rejection rests on the failure of 
cumulative acts to pass a seriousness threshold and, following Foster, rests on 
                                                
488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/ 1992, 4 April 1994) (sodomy laws) and 
Joslin v New Zealand (Comm No 902/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/902/ 1999, 30 
July 2002) (same sex marriage) are of direct relevance as are a raft of decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights, including Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 
EHRR 149 (ECHR) (criminalising homosexual acts), Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United 
Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 601 (ECHR) and Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 
EHRR 493 (ECHR) (ban on homosexuals in the military). 
133 n26 chapter one.  
134 For example Germany, as was discussed in the case of Gashi. R v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, Ex parte Gashi (1998), Gashi [2002] EWCA 227 and in the 
UNHCR intervention in Gashi and Nikshiqir (n 5 introduction).  
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an unnecessary distinction between generations of rights. This distinction in 
turn creates the notion of a hierarchy of rights. For refugee law it suggests that 
as we move ‘down’ the hierarchy the claim is more difficult to make out as it 
will require either a more serious violation or (or possibly and) violation of a 
number of rights. This clearly misunderstands the meaning of ‘serious’. There 
is nothing in the word serious which necessarily excludes the cumulative 
impact of individually minor acts. If one considers these cases through the 
prism of human dignity this may provide an alternative and a move away 
from this notion of seriousness. The New Zealand Tribunal has usefully 
explained the wrong of cumulative persecution in terms of human dignity 
noting: 
[i]t is recognized that various threats to human rights, in their 
cumulative effect, can deny human dignity in key ways and should 
properly be recognized as persecution.135 
This dictum arguably posits an understanding of human dignity based on the 
autonomy and choice. It looks at the cumulative effect of acts as becoming 
persecutory at the point at which the acts, as a whole, interfere with an 
individual’s human dignity or right to a dignified life. This might, put 
otherwise, be said to be the point at which a person’s ability to form and carry 
out their own life plan become significantly compromised.  
 
In US, UK, Irish, Belgian and Canadian jurisprudence, to name a few, 
cumulative persecution has been recognised as capable of forming the basis 
for refugee status.136 In Re (Hoxha) Baroness Hale explained how the 
                                                
135 Appeal No. 71404/99 RSAA.  
136 Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding persecution where 
applicant witnessed violent attacks, and suffered extortion 9/2003 A-2 harassment, 
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discriminatory treatment of rape victims could constitute persecution by 
invoking human dignity stating: 
To suffer the insult and indignity of being regarded by one’s own community 
. . . as “dirty like contaminated” because one has suffered the gross ill-
treatment of a particularly brutal and dehumanizing rape . . . is the very sort 
of cumulative denial of human dignity which to my mind is capable of 
amounting to persecution.137 
The UNHCR handbook instructs contracting states to consider cumulative 
persecution, stating: 
an applicant may have been subjected to various measures not in themselves 
amounting to persecution (e.g. discrimination in different forms), in some 
cases combined with other adverse factors (e.g. general atmosphere of 
insecurity in the country of origin). In such situations, the various elements 
involved may, if taken together, produce an effect on the mind of the 
applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to well-founded fear of 
persecution on “cumulative grounds”.138 
Just as the expansion of persecution to cover socio-economic rights has been 
underpinned by the concept of discrimination so has the notion of cumulative 
persecution.  Human dignity, and the notion of a dignified life, it is argued are 
pointing the way towards a fuller understanding of persecution; one that 
                                                
and threats); see also Baballah v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2003) (cumulative 
effect of severe harassment, threats, violence and discrimination against Israeli Arab 
and his family amounted to persecution); Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that harassment, wiretapping, staged car crashes, detention, and 
interrogation constituted persecution); Popova v. INS, 273 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(applicant was harassed, fired, interrogated, threatened, assaulted and arrested); 
Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353 (9th Cir. 1996). The reasoning was also approved in the 
seminal Canadian case of Ward. For discussion by the Irish tribunal see G.V & I.V. 
[2011] IEHC 262. The Belgian case of Nr. 8.259 reflects the same reasoning, the court 
stating: “the various grounds given in the applicant’s asylum account are in 
themselves insufficiently serious; however, cumulatively and in connection with the 
situation in Iran they can justify the benefit of doubt. It is therefore, in the case at 
hand, appropriate to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.” 
137 R v. Special Adjudicator (ex parte Hoxha)[2005] UKHL 19 [87]. 
138 UNHCR Handbook (.  
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includes different generations of rights and types of persecutions. The concept 
of discrimination remains key to this evolution, providing a form of bridging 
concept between the right and persecution.  
 
The notion of cumulative persecution reminds us that harm can take various 
forms. Counsel for one claimant reminded the Canadian tribunal that “there 
are many more subtle ways of persecution people other than beating them up. 
Many refugees would probably rather suffer an occasional beating than face a 
life of repression, poverty and disadvantage because of their ethnic or 
religious background.”139 This recalls that persecution can take different form. 
One form might be an individual act of such gravity to violate a human right. 
Torture is a clear example of this. One instance or threat of torture would be 
sufficient to constitute an act of persecution. However, human rights law and 
refugee law are beginning to evolve so as to recognise that individual acts 
falling short of persecution may accumulate so as to result in or cause serious 
harm. A danger in this approach, Foster has identified, is that it if 
misinterpreted it can be taken to require extreme harm to the individual’s 
health, educational or economic prospects.  This hierarchical approach has 
been adopted in several cases.140 Most notably the court in Gashi whilst 
recognising the notion of cumulative persecution also accepted the argument 
of the UNHCR intervener that “some human rights have greater pre-
eminence than others and it may be necessary to identify them through a 
hierarchy of relative importance.” 
 
                                                
139 SWE (RE) T99-04041 (2000) cited in Foster (n2 chapter one) 87.  
140 See for example, R v SSHD ex parte Ravichandran [1996] Imm aR 97, Demirkaya 
[1999] Imm Ar 498  and R (on the application of Okere) [2000] All ER (D) 1770. 
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This notion may be said to stem from the laws of harassment and 
discrimination that recognise the same.  
 
It is conceivable then that sexual harassment at work could give rise to a 
refugee claim if, for example, the state failed to provide any mechanism of 
redress and this harassment stemmed from societal attitudes to women. 
Similarly, if additional requirements were set for one section of the population 
across a number of field it might be sufficient to constitute persecution. For 
example, the imposition of religious requirements for entry into professions, 
education and health care could accumulate to constitute persecution.141 The 
concept of cumulative persecution might be said to be recognition not only of 
the multiple forms of persecution but also recognition of the importance the 
emerging concept of a dignified life. 
 
The Inter-American Court discussion of a dignified life shows also that 
consideration of the foundations of human rights, and human dignity, 
provide a guide for interpretation. In other words, the content of specific 
human rights are derived from these concepts, with personhood (or 
normative agency in Griffin’s terms) providing a threshold term142 for 
interpretation. For example, it might be difficult to see how content for right 
to liberty can be found.  However if one looks to the notion of human dignity 
                                                
141 See for example the case of Desir 840 F2d 723 (9th Circuit 1988) 727 in which the 
claim of an Israeli Arab to refugee status was accepted on appeal. The court found 
that being excluded from working as an accountant and a life guard, the two 
professions for which he held qualfications, along with harassment whilst working as 
a fisherman could constiute persecution. This contrasts with the New Zeland case of 
an Iranian women whose claim to refugee status on the basis of socio-ecomic rights 
was rejected as she was excluded from her profession as a hairdresser but not 
necessarily from other professions (70863/98).   
142 This would operate, according to Griffin, in a similar way other threshold concepts 
such as consent or mens rea ibid 349.   
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and autonomy, the right to liberty can be explained as necessary to protect 
human capacity for autonomy and its exercise so that an individual can live a 
dignified life.143  This is very much how human dignity has been used in the 
Inter American Court. Secondly, human dignity can provide some guide to 
behaviour by establishing when interferences with a human right can be 
justified by reference to the rights of others.  This again returns to Alexy’s 
balancing exercise, which demands that we determine either concrete priority 
of one right over the other in the circumstances. This may be done either by 
reference to the importance of the value the specific right is protecting or by 
considering which right is being infringed to the greatest degree. 
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As the normative significance of human rights has grown, the use of human 
rights arguments is more often used to justify legal decisions, in particular, 
Carozza argues: 
appealing to the principle of human dignity, courts establish the basic ground 
of commonality and comparability of their decisions with those of courts in 
other jurisdictions, despite whatever other differences may exist in their 
positive law or political and historical context…[r]eliance on the idea of 
human dignity as a source of justification[…]simply does not make sense 
unless it is regarded, at least implicitly, as something the meaning and value 
                                                
143 Similarly, Griffin gives the example of a right to minimum welfare and beginning 
with the concept of human dignity (defined as “valuable status of being a normative 
agent”) he is able to flesh out the right to minimum welfare and state that it is the 
level required to live as a normative agent i.e. more than mere subsistence. Rawls’ 
theory, Griffin persuasively argues, is unable to provide content in a similar manner- 
the question ‘at what level of welfare would its neglect start to provide a prima facie 
justification for intervention?’ is unanswerable (without recourse to some other 
theory or concept to provide content for the term welfare it is simply circular- at what 
level is answered with ‘at the level states find unacceptable’ followed by the question 
‘at what level would states find welfare provision unacceptable?’) Griffin (n 39) 346. 
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of which transcend local context and constitute a commonality across the 
differences of time and place.144  
Human dignity might seen as a ‘bedrock truth’ as a “fact[..] of recognition, of 
acknowledgment, constituting the very beings we are, and that we take for 
granted in what we do”145 without reflection. Human dignity might then be 
said to have achieved a level of universality and acknowledgment beyond the 
theoretical justifications set out above. Thus, whether or not one accepts the 
moral justifications set out above, human rights exist as a social fact in our 
world as we believe and, more importantly, act as if they do. Human rights 
also have the status of positive (international) law as Nickel states, “’[h]uman 
rights’ is not just another label for historic ideas of natural rights.”146  
 
That is not to say that there are not issues in “the ‘working out of the practical 
implications of human dignity in varying concrete contexts’”147, indeed this is 
considered further in relation to refugee law below.  Yet it can be stated that 
human rights are morally justified (indeed morally obligatory), universally 
accepted as a social fact, demand special protection and results in primacy 
over other categories of rights. 148  
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The claim constructed here is as follows: where an interest is worth protecting 
(as human dignity is) then this interest produces a right to have that interest 
                                                
144 ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A reply’ European 
Journal of International Law  (2008) 19(5) 930 933. 
145 Iglesias ‘Bedrock Truths and Human Dignity’ Logos: A Journal of Catholic 
Thought and Culture (2001) 4.1  114, 114.  
146  7 
147 Ibid. 
148 For this reason, those committing human rights violations rarely, if ever, admit to 
doing so but instead seek to explain why the act is not in fact a human rights 
violation.  
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protected either by non-interference or through positive action depending on 
the interest and circumstances. As Sen states, “[a] pronouncement of human 
rights is an assertion of the importance of the corresponding freedoms- the 
freedoms that are identified and privileged in the formulation of the right in 
question.”149  
 
This suggests that we consider human rights to have a special claim to 
protection, which we expect other agents to recognise, regardless of their 
position. As Nickel states, “as minimal standards they can hope to be 
supported by very strong reasons of universal appeal, to be of high priority, 
and to resist claims of national and cultural autonomy.”150 If these claims take 
priority then even “extreme scarcity of resources will not extinguish one’s 
claim”151 If human rights failed to take priority over other principles they 
would be virtually useless as “one of the basic purposes of rights would seem 
to be to insulate right-holders from claims based on such principles, which 
otherwise would be not only appropriate but decisive reasons for political and 
even individual action.”152 The claim is built on the assertion that human 
dignity is worth protecting, for any of reasons set out above, and that human 
rights protect human dignity and, as such, deserve special respect not least 
because “in the absence of an alternative solution to the very real problems of 
protecting the individual and human dignity” human rights are the best 
method for ensuring the protection of what all human value for themselves 
                                                
149 Sen Human rights and the limits of law (2006) Cardozo Law Review 27 2921. 
150 ibid 3. 
151 Nickel (n 4) 68. 
152 Donnelly (n 9) 305. 
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and ought to value for others.153 This returns to the assertion made in section 
one that human rights include a bundle of different right positions. Which 
position is used depends what would best protect the right-holder, “to confer 
dominion upon the right holder”154 over the core of human dignity. Thus, at 
least to the extent that the core of human dignity is at risk, human rights must 
operate to protect it.  
 
This moral claim to priority also explains why positive (institutionalized) 
human rights have a ‘suprapositivity’155 as reflections of moral rights held to 
be external to any positive law. Unlike other laws they cannot be overridden 
merely by the enacted of subsequent implicitly or explicitly repealing law. It 
explains also why principles such as right to a fair trial were applied in 
common law jurisdictions before any formalisation of the right. Human rights 
might be said to require transformation into positive law not only on their 
own account but also for the sake of legal certainty. If human rights even as 
‘only’ moral rights are capable of entering legal deliberation, as asserted by 
principles theory, and, of binding legal decision makers, as asserted by the 
correctness thesis, then transformation into positive law not only follows from 
these claims but also renders the legal decision making more transparent than 
appeal to unwritten principles might. For the purposes of thesis, human rights 
do not necessarily need to have undergone the transformation into legal 
rights; it is sufficient to state that human rights are included in the legal 
                                                
153 As Donnelly notes “[i]f we are to try to assess whether human rights is a better 
way to approach human dignity and organize a society, we need to ask, "Better for 
what?" This is a question of means, not ends. Human rights are not ends in 
themselves; or rather they are not entirely ends in themselves. Among other things, 
as we have seen, they are means to realize human dignity” (ibid 314).   
154 Wellman (n 6) 107. 
155 As expressed by Neuman ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony 
and Dissonance’ (2003) Stanford Law Review 55 1863.  
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decision making process and are capable of taking priority over even positive 
rights. This is a moral claim but one with impact on the legal process. In short, 
the claim is that human rights are to be given priority in the legal process due 
to their moral priority.156   
 
Why is it that these human rights can be said to have a higher priority than 
other rights or, put otherwise, special claim to protection? There are 
competing versions of the protection rights confer upon individuals and 
hence competing accounts of the relationship between conflicting rights and 
collective interest (‘the public interest’).157  The strong account affords human 
rights lexical priority as expressed in Dworkin’s notion of rights as ‘trumps.’ 
Even weaker accounts, such as Alexy’s, gives rights prima facie priority over 
competing claims.158 At its root, this claim is contained in the characterisation 
of human rights as holding a high priority as a matter of definition. Alexy sees a 
                                                
156 This claim will be expanded in the subsequent chapter where the limitations 
human rights can place on state sovereignty are set out. Chapter four will 
demonstrate how the moral priority of human rights is capable of producing legal 
affects, in the form of judicial reasoning based on the moral priority of human rights 
which results in human rights being given priority over other interests (e.g. state 
sovereignty).   
157 The terms collective interest and the public interest are used here to refer to the 
rights and interests of a potential host state’s population as a whole: what might 
otherwise be termed ‘goods’. It is not intended to convey collective rights in the sense 
of group rights e.g. minority rights but rather to signify the types of rights that might 
conflict with the human rights of refugees, for example, the notion of national 
security. It is also acknowledged that some collective goods contain bundles of 
individual rights. The good of "public health", for example, might be said to be 
realised to a great extent if and when individual rights to health are respected and 
fulfilled. The analysis here is not, however, concerned with the construction of 
collective goods but rather with how these collective goods come into conflict with 
individual rights as asserted by a claim to refugee status.    
158 Raz also might be said to put forward a weak account which affords no greater 
weight to fundamental rights than other rights per se claiming only that these 
fundamental rights signify particularly important interests. The rights themselves are 
given no greater weight than the underlying interests. This distinction is not, 
however, of great importance here as if the interests underlying fundamental (or 
human) rights can be shown to be of greater importance- which it has been argued 
they must be to be called fundamental rights- than the interests protected by other 
rights then the fundamental right take precedence. See, Raz, The Morality of Freedom 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pp186-192, 254-255.  
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special connection between justice and human rights, from which stem 
human rights special claim to protection. This Alexy terms the ‘core thesis’, 
which states: 
Every violation of human rights is unjust, but not every injustice is a violation of 
human rights If this is true, human rights represent the core of justice, whereas 
justice comprises more than human rights.159  
Human rights are linked to justice in their assertion of universality such that it 
might be asserted that “[t]he principal philosophical foundation of human 
rights is a belief in the existence of a form of justice valid for all peoples, 
everywhere.”160 
 
This core thesis underpins Alexy’s claim that “human rights are norms that 
essentially claim priority with respect to all other norms.161 If justice is a 
defining feature of any law or legal system, as asserted in the claim to 
correctness, then a right connected so intimately with justice162, and the 
realisation of justice, must be given priority.  Alexy asserts, “[i]f human rights 
                                                
159 Alexy (n 1) 9. As the bracketed reference in the quote shows, this is not the first or 
only place Alexy has put forward this claim, it is made also in ‘Die 
Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat’ 
(1998) in Philosophie der Menschenrechte Gosepath and Lohmann (eds) (Suhrkamp, 
1998)  244–64, and in the articles “Discourse Theory and Human Rights” (Alexy 1996 
209–35) and, in ‘Menschenrechte ohne Metaphysik?’ (2004) 52 Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie 15). The alternative, as Alexy notes, is found in the ‘equivalence thesis’ 
which claims that human rights and justice are coextensive. This distinction need not 
concern us here, however, as the principles of justice are taken up in more detail in 
the subsequent chapter and “in both cases, the violation of human rights would be, at 
the same time, a violation of justice. For this reason the existence of human rights 
implies the existence of principles of justice” (Ibid).  
160 Fagan (2005) ‘Philosophical analysis of the concept of human rights’ in Human 
Rights: Essex Internet Encyclopaedia of Human Rights (Fagen ed, University of Essex) 
available online http://www.essex.ac.uk/hrc/research/publications/EIEHR/#h 
(accessed on 12.10.2012).  
161 Alexy (n 1) 18. 
162 That human rights can be violated to an extreme degree means that the Radbruch 
formula is applicable, i.e. in the case of human rights violations the law must yield to 
justice (See Alexy (n 1) 13.)  
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are justifiable, their priority claim is, therefore, also justifiable. “163 This claim 
to prima facie priority is put forward more strongly by Dworkin’s notion of 
‘rights as trumps’164, which claims that rights ought to be given lexical priority 
over other interests. Dworkin claims also, in an echo of Alexy, that these 
rights are to be protected and promoted to the greatest extent possible.165 
Waldron similarly views rights as a strict restriction on action.166 Yet rights 
that have not received formal legal recognition are often conceived of as, at 
best, high priority goals (similar to Dworkin’s policies). Human rights might 
perhaps, then, be better characterised as “strong considerations that generally 
prevail in competition with other concerns such as national prosperity or 
administrative convenience.”167 Human rights are rights in more than just 
linguistic terms, they carry with them the normative significance of rights. The 
basis of these assertions is that human rights even when not legal rights are 
not merely moral rights as they put forward a special claim to protection and 
that this has some weight in the legal process. In Donnelly’s terms, “if rights, 
in general, are trumps then human rights are the honor cards in the suit.”168  
                                                
163 ibid. 
164 Dworkin (n 16 introduction) 367. Rights act as ‘trumps’ on Dworkin’s account over 
“background justification that appeal to the collective welfare” ibid. This is the case 
even where the background justification is such that it would usually be decisive 
(ibid 364). Thus although the “political force” of rights might depend on the political 
system in which the right is asserted, the moral- and arguably legal- force of the right 
is not dependent on which political system it which it is inserted.  
165 ibid. This rejects Raz’ claim that rights, whilst particularly important interests, do 
not have greater weight than other interests and can, in principle, be outweighed by 
other important considerations, such as collective goods The Morality of Freedom, 1986. 
This is a stronger version of Alexy’s prima facie claim to priority, claiming that human 
rights do have a greater weight than other interests. This does not rule out collective 
goods outweighing the human rights of an individual in a specific case but the 
circumstances would need to be such that the collective good was asserting the 
human rights of a collective. Human rights could not, therefore, be outweighed by 
non-human rights claim but could, however, be outweighed by a collective good if 
this good is constructed from a bundle of individual rights.   
166 Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press 1984). 
167 Nickel (n 4) 24. 
168 Donnelly (n 9) 303.  
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This claim for special protection stems from the value of what is to be 
protected. The assertion is that human rights protected human dignity and 
that human dignity is of value. The reasons for this have been set out above.  
 
The primacy of human rights over other categories of rights has been 
established above. It may seem as if no counterargument may be found to the 
human dignity being, at the very least, a key concern in any discussion of 
obligations whether at a national or international level. The claim I wish to 
make is that the order of values used in forming a value-judgment is centred 
on human dignity. If this is the case then to prevail any other competing 
values would need to be explained as of greater value of human dignity.  
 
The starting presumption has been set out above, namely that the principle of 
human dignity is the foundation and justification for human rights and duties 
to respect and protect these rights. The frequent mention of human dignity in 
international conventions and domestic constitutions might be said to reflect a 
consensus that human dignity is a fundamental value and one worth 
protecting. It might be justifiable to restrict the freedom of, and place the 
burden of protection on, other agents, on the basis of human dignity for at 
least one, if not all, of the follow reasons: because a violation interrupts 
ongoing projects, constitutes grievous harm, robs an individual of freedom 
and well-being and causes secondary harm to others.169  
 
                                                
169 A form of this argument is put forward by Wellman (n 6). 
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The chapter so far has set out the moral claims that stem from human dignity 
might be said to underpin the human rights claims of refugees. The concept of 
a dignified life evolving from the notions of autonomy and choice and 
expanded by the Inter American Court of Human Rights has been set out as 
showing the way for the obligation of states in regards to human rights. This 
is a low standard and is not requiring states to agree to even the standards of 
protection guaranteed in the UDHR.170 It has also be set out as an 
interpretational guide in refugee law. Distilling what has been said above, for 
the purpose of this thesis Nickel’s starting assumptions in ‘Making Sense of 
Human Rights’ are adopted, namely that people have secure, but abstract, 
moral claims to: 
1) have a life 
2) to lead one’s life 
3) against severely cruel or degrading treatment 
4) against severely unfair treatment171 
A more extensive concept of human rights could certainly be put forward but 
this is sufficient for refugee law. This concept of human rights, it is argued, is 
based on human dignity and The thesis will proceed on Nickel’s assumption 
                                                
170 Although it could be argued that the second right- to lead one’s life- may be 
demanding, the right to lead one’s life does not necessarily denote the most robust 
notion of one’s life. It might, instead, be interpreted along the lines of Nussbaum and 
Sen’s capabilities approach where rights are intended to allow an individual to 
choose and attempt to carry out their life plan in some basic way. This requires that 
rights are in place to protect an individual’s functionings (‘beings and doings’ Sen, 
Inequalities Reexamined (Harvard University Press 1992) 4) and opportunity freedom 
(freedom to choose between alternative functioning combinations- Sen Development 
as Freedom (Oxford University Press 1999) 12. The claim is that to secure these 
capabilities ought to be goal of domestic and international society.  
171 Nickel (n 4) 61. 
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that “[t]he four secure claims have roughly equal weight or priority.”172 
Competition between these principles would come down to the degree of 
infringement, following the proportionality test but these claims, or 
principles, would take precedence over other rights. Collective rights, or 
national interest, have not yet entered the picture thus individual rights take 
conditional precedence.  
 
When determining whether human dignity is capable of providing a supreme 
principle of refugee law (and, therefore, the foundation of the imposition of 
obligations) we must consider whether there are any competing claims. In 
order to operate as the underlying principle human dignity must be of such 
importance so as to outweigh all other principles thereby taking on the 
characteristics of a rule in that in cannot be violated.173   As noted in the 
introduction, despite rhetoric on the human rights of refugees, in the case of 
refugees, the primacy of human rights seems to be largely ignored. Indeed, 
the opposite starting proposition seems to hold, namely that it is the rights of 
states that take priority. This necessarily implies that even in the case of so 
called absolute rights national interest can take precedence. This section will 
first explore the claims of national interest. It will then consider the concept of 
absolute and non-derogable rights. 
                                                
172 Sen (ibid 1999) 7. 
173 The identification of one underlying principle would not, however, prevent 
conflicts per se, it is possible to envisage situations where both parties put forward 
arguments connected to human dignity. The most common manifestation of this is 
played out by the criminal justice system daily: the individual accused of a crime 
puts forward their right to liberty and this must be weighed against, what are usually 
seen as the rights of society but may be alternatively framed as, the rights of all other 
individuals to security. The question, then, becomes a factual one, with both 
principles operating as underlying principles (i.e. principles no one questions are 
relevant to the determination of the case). It is clear neither principle may be set aside 
entirely, the issue is only the weight to be given to each principle. 
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The most oft used claim to counter those of refugees concerns the notion of 
‘public interest.’ Public interest, a concept arguably even more nebulous and 
undetermined than human dignity, is often viewed as being an effective 
counter to the claims of refugees. Yet, as McHarg notes, “it is central to our 
understanding of rights….that in situations of conflict they protect 
individuals’ interests or choices from being overridden by considerations of 
collective utility.”174 The question arises as to why this general presumption 
that rights protect individuals against the collective is rebutted in the case of 
refugees. How does the public or collective interest of the potential host state 
operate to outweigh the rights of refugees in the abstract such that conditional 
priority is given to the rights of states rather than vice versa? We noted above 
that in discussing human dignity collective rights have yet to enter the 
framework. In human rights terms the primacy of individual rights over 
collective rights is assumed but in refugee law, and policy, the opposite might 
be said. These starting assumptions cannot both be used simultaneously; 
either refugees’ rights take conditional priority or the rights of states do. 
Following Alexy’s framework to resolve this conflict, and to determine which 
starting assumption is correct, which right(s) is of greater value must be 
determined.  
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The notion of public interest, or collective good, is based on a value-judgment. 
First, ‘collective good’ asserts that the proposition in question is a good- or at 
                                                
174 ‘Reconciling Human Rights and Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and 
Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Modern Law Review 62(5) 672. 
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least not an evil. Secondly, ‘public interest’ asserts that this is more than a 
classificatory value judgment, merely to assign the label ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but is 
also a comparative value-judgment175 in that public interest is used to override 
other interests.176 It has been claimed that public interest can never be weighed 
against rights effectively as the notion of public interest is elusive to define.177 
It is, however, necessary to engage with the notion when considering refugee 
law as it is oft cited in asylum cases and must, therefore, have some content.  
 
Refugee law currently contains a conditional priority for national interest. 
Consider Article32 on Expulsion of Refugees, which states: 
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their 
territory save on grounds of national security or public order. 
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a 
decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where 
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee 
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to 
and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a 
person or persons specially designated by the competent authority. 
Although the article contains procedural safe guards for protecting a refugee 
from being expelled for less than compelling national security reasons, it does 
allow still expulsion. Public interest is being considered primary, albeit only 
in extreme situations. Balancing can assist with this situation, where public 
                                                
175 See Alexy TCR (n 10 in chapter 2)86-91 for more on the distinction between 
classificatory and comparative value-judgments. 
176 Only this questions is of concern now, the content of public interest will be 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.   
177 See Virginia Held for discussion of the competing views of public interest which 
he identifies as ‘preponderance (or aggregative) theories, unitary theories or common 
interest theories’ (The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970). 
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interest clashes with individual interest. The discussion here attempts to 
resolve the issue of whether the interests begin the balancing exercise with 
equal weight. It argues that they do not, namely individual interest has 
conditional priority. This argument will be set out below however first the 
opposing argument of the conditional priority of public interests will be set 
out below. 
 
There are several different theories of public interest. Held identifies three 
main schools, the preponderance or aggregative theories, unitary theories and 
common interest theories.178 Preponderance theories rely on a subjective 
definition of interests, claiming that individuals are the best judge of their 
own interests. Following this, the notion of public interest cannot have 
independent content but must simply be an aggregate of individuals’ 
interests. There are many objections to theories of this school179 but the most 
significant perhaps is related to Alexy’s claim to correctness, namely that if it 
is a principle to be used in the law it must stand up to moral judgment and 
cannot, therefore, be value-neutral judgment. If we adopt whatever happens 
to be in the interest of a preponderance of people (even assuming we have a 
mechanism for determining this) without measuring the merits of these 
interests against moral standards then there is a risk of extreme injustice. The 
unitary theories are seen as a counter to the ‘(human) rights as trumps’ school 
in that public interest is treated as an overriding interest. It is, however, an 
objective theory of interest arguing that collective interest is derived from 
                                                
178 ibid.  
179 Other objections include the practical claim that it is impossible to find a 
mechanism capable of determining what is in the interest of a preponderance of 
people and the rational objection that allowing individuals to pursue their own 
interests, with no limits, may lead to irrational outcomes. 
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what individuals ought to want. The question, then, is ‘what is (objectively) 
good for people?’ rather ‘what do people (subjectively) believe is good for 
them?’ This typology does contain an objective standard of judgment for the 
public interest and could succeed if some interests are removed from any 
determination of public interest by defining them as a priori illegitimate. 
However, this paradigm is ultimately rejected here as incompatible with the 
view of human rights, and in particular of human dignity, presented above. 
Although the notion of objective good is more appealing than subjective good 
it is still open to the same criticism that privileging collective good over 
individual good runs the risk of sacrificing the interests of the few to those of 
the many. This is fundamentally incompatible with an individual-centred 
theory of human rights where human rights also claim special protection.  
 
Finally, common interest theories focus on the interests that all members of 
public can be said to have in common as distinct from those of particular 
individuals or groups. This is based on a form of categorical imperative, 
individuals are only able to will for themselves what they could reasonably 
will for all. A form of this theory is presented by Barry who argues that, in 
line with a view of human rights focused on autonomy, specification of goals 
may be individual (and, thus, subjective) but how best to achieve these goals 
must be determined objectively. The notion of ‘net interests’ is used which 
allows people to have different interests in respect to the same situation 
insofar as they simultaneously occupy different roles in relation to the 
situation so does not require an unrealistic convergence of individual interests 
on each issue. This also does not conflate individual interests with moral 
justifiability an individual’s interests might be overridden by other interests if 
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they are not morally justifiable or cannot be achieved without unjustifiable 
infringement of the rights of others. This maps exactly onto the claims that 
individual autonomy, or the right to choose one’s own life plan, is limited 
only by the extent to which this plan infringes on the life plans of others. In 
other words, one is free to set one’s own goals but how you may seek to 
realise these goals is limited by other people’s rights.  
 
What is key here is that public interest is not set up as the sole criterion for 
legitimate public action but, in line with views positing the primacy of human 
rights, it is presented as merely one element in decision-making. Where public 
interest (the objective standard of what is good as defined by the categorical 
imperative) conflicts with individual rights, balancing operates to resolve this 
conflict and involves a comparative value-judgment. An individual interest 
may be deemed more valuable as an end in and of itself regardless of the 
instrumental benefits to the public of denying this interest. For the purposes 
of this thesis the notion of common interest adopted is as follows: a distinct 
set of collective interests, which must be balanced against one another and 
against other relevant decisions in concrete situations.180  
 
How does public interest relate to individual interest then? Alexy posits four 
conceivable conceptual conjunctions between individual rights and collective 
goods: 
1) individual rights are means to collective goods 
2) collective goods are means to individual rights 
3) collective good consists of the existence and satisfaction of individual rights 
                                                
180 McHarg (n 86) 678. 
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4) individual rights and collective goods exist independently of any means-
end relationship or relationship of identity.181 
Which conjunction one accepts impacts on the starting assumption for 
balancing. If we recall the discussion of ‘rights as trumps’ above, we can see 
that whether or not public interest is seen as a mere interest or as rights in 
some form has an immediate impact on whether or not our starting 
assumption that individual rights outweigh collective goods, or public, 
interest, must be defended. If collective goods are interests then following the 
(albeit differently phrased and weighted) assertions of Alexy, Dworkin, 
Waldon and Donnelly, rights outweigh interests, at least prima facie, and have 
conditional priority. The issue is where one sets the limits of the priority given 
to rights. On the other hand, if collective goods are a form of rights (either 
aggregated rights of individuals or as a means to securing individual rights) 
then neither automatically takes conditional priority and to assert conditional 
priority would require a construction of why the particular rights in question 
(rights of refugees) take conditional priority over collective goods.  
 
The simplest form of this argument merely states that collective goods are not 
a form of rights. This argument cannot be sustained; a collective good is often 
a composite of individual rights such as the notion of ‘pubic health’. The 
notion of human rights being given priority also demands a more robust 
protection of refugees’ rights. At the very least, it sets a much higher threshold 
for the outweighing of these rights by collective goods. This represents a 
reversal of the traditional position which grants collective goods of the 
potential host state de facto priority by presenting state sovereignty as 
                                                
181 Alexy ‘Individual Rights and Collective Goods’ in Nino (ed) Rights (New York 
University Press 1992) 169-174. 
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absolute. The traditional view did not require any examination of the relative 
weight of the collective goods raised by the potential host state against the 
rights of the refugees. It left (leaves) the potential host state free to decide 
whether or not to take into account the human rights of refugees. In this view, 
as Gilbert notes, the Refugee Convention would represent a voluntary 
concession182 rather than an expression of the inherent limitation on 
sovereignty human rights represent. It is argued here that the claim that 
human rights have moral priority has legal impact. It demands that where 
these rights are raised they are considered and considered as having priority 
over other forms of rights. The human rights of a refugee can only be 
outweighed, therefore, by the human rights of (an)other individual(s) and 
only if, and when, these human rights would be either more severely 
infringed than the rights of the refugee. This constructs a conditional priority 
for the rights of refugees based on the higher value of human rights. In 
essence, the claim is to a hierarchy of norms in which human rights represents 
the pinnacle.  
  
As asserted in chapter one, asylum is a mechanism for protecting human 
rights, thus the value of refugees’ rights might be said to be coextensive with 
the value of human rights. Refugee claims can be split into two categories. The 
first category comprises of claims based on danger the so-called absolute 
rights (which we recall refers to rights that include balancing in the 
characterisation so that they have been determined to have such great value 
that they are to be given priority in all circumstances we have yet 
encountered), for example right to freedom from torture. These rights it is 
                                                
182 ‘Human Rights, Refugees and Other Displaced Persons’ in De Wet and Vidmar 
(eds) Hierarchies in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (2010) 177.   
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asserted are not capable of being outweighed unless public interest can be 
said to be of equal value coupled with a more severe violation than denial of 
refugee status would represent. If public interest cannot be said to have equal 
comparative value, these rights might be said to have definitive priority. The 
second category encompasses claims concerning rights, which are capable of 
being outweighed, such as the right to liberty and freedom of expression. 
Here only conditional priority could be established for refugees asserting 
these claims. This assertion that establishing priority for human rights 
establishes at least conditional priority for refugees’ rights is based on the 
assumption that no claim to public interest is capable of outweighing a claim 
to human rights protection. This assertion is not one that will go 
unchallenged; a claim that public interest is capable of being of greater value 
will be addressed below.   
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This discussion begins with the claim that for all balancing, the principle of 
proportionality and impartiality (or equality) operate as underlying (or 
background) criteria.  Not only Alexy but also Rawls make the claim that 
principles of equality specify how conflicts of principles (or conflict of 
interests in Rawls’ terms) are to be resolved. Impartiality, as Miller notes, “has 
to do with even-handed application of the rules183- rules which may 
themselves require us to treat different categories of people differently. It is, 
therefore, possible to act impartially without giving equal weight to the claims 
of everyone affected by your actions.”184 The argument put forward by the 
priority to compatriots thesis is that nationality creates relevantly different 
                                                
183 Although Miller talks of rules, this applies also to principle, here. Miller Principles 
of Social Justice (Harvard University Press 1999). 
184 Miller ibid 165. 
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categories of people (compatriots and ‘others’); as Tan notes, patriotic 
partiality, as he terms it, is “a form of permission or…the right of people to 
favour compatriots in spite of demands of others.”185 Thus, if ‘patriotic 
partiality’ is followed, we are required to treat compatriots differently to 
outsiders and may, therefore, be said to act impartially whilst giving greater 
weight to the claims of compatriots. The implication of this it that ‘lesser 
claims’ by compatriots will outweigh greater claims of non-citizens. In other 
words, the public interest or collective good is defined in purely national 
terms.  
 
In the case of refugees this means that even if the refugee’s claim is to the 
most basic human right (the right to life) it can be outweighed by the claims of 
the host state’s citizen to, for example, the right to education. Nationality, 
then, is allowed to weigh the scales in a manner obviously immaterial in 
national disputes- where the right to life would always outweigh the right to 
education. You cannot, for example, remove a human obstacle in your way to 
securing a place for your child in a school even if there is no other school for 
your child to go to. However, if we change the circumstances and child A is a 
non-national and child B is a national, the rights of child B are given extra 
weighting thus whilst murder might still be seen as too far, the removal of 
child A to another country would not. Admittedly this is not the scenario in 
refugee law, child A here is asking for entry into child B’s country, entry, 
which according to patriotic partialitists, can be rightly- and ought to be- 
denied by the claims of child B with no further justification than that child B is 
a national and child A is not. This might sound a flippant example, and to an 
                                                
185 ‘Cosmopolitan Impartiality and Patriotic Partiality’  in Weinstock, (ed.) Global 
Justice, Global Institutions (2005) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 165 187. 
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extent it is, however it reveals the underlying issue when discussing if priority 
can be granted to compatriots: it is based on a normative assumption as to the 
value of compatriot ties. It comes down to the question ‘can compatriot ties be 
said to give public interest priority (conditional or definitive) over outsiders’ 
rights?’ If this is so, then conditional priority for refugees’ rights is impossible.    
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The first question to be resolved is the primacy of states’ powers. This 
question, states Gilbert, needs to be resolved before one can consider the 
secondary issue of the source and extent of protection provided by 
international (refugee) law.186 In the context of the rights of refugees the 
sticking point in establishing priority even where absolute rights are 
threatened is the so-called ‘priority to compatriots’ thesis, which claims a 
primary duty to compatriots that must be at least substantially discharged 
before any duties to outsiders can be considered. It is not that claims of 
refugees are denied but these claims are not recognised as being capable of 
outweighing the claims of the host society and of the individuals in the host 
society.    
 
The underlying premise of patriotic partiality is an assumption that there is 
something morally significant about borders. This presumption can be 
effectively countered187 but it is not necessary to engage directly in this debate 
                                                
186 Gilbert ‘Human Rights, Refugees, and Other Displaced Persons in International 
Law’ in De Witt and Vidmar Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights 
176. 
187 See, for example, Carens  ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’ Review 
of Politics (1987) 49(2) 251. One of the most consistent and contentious battles over 
the extent of moral obligations to outsiders can be found in the conflict between 
cosmopolitan theories of global justice (such as Beitz, 1979 Pogge, 1989, Nussbaum, 
1996) and communitarian theories of national justice. Two of the most persuasive and 
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in order to establish conditional priority for the rights of refugees. Even if one 
were to accept that there is something morally significant about borders, that 
is to say there is something morally significant about individual political 
communities, which are delineated (even protected) by borders, the issue here 
is the extent of the moral significance of borders- how much weight is this to 
be given? Can priority justifiably be given to compatriots in every case? There 
is no need to consider here whether the existence of patriotic ties is morally 
significant or if it can provide a basis for action, the only issue is whether 
these ties outweigh the claims of refugees to human rights protection.   
 
If we return to principles theory, for every refugee case a balancing act is to be 
engaged in, as noted also in chapter two, principles theory itself tells us 
nothing about the weighting to be given to each principle. This is determined 
at the normative level. The question is, then, what justifies this heavy 
weighting given to the rights of the host society? On a basic level, it is clear 
that the danger posed by the individual accused of a crime (quite apart from 
arguments that, in a functioning criminal justice system, the individual 
accused is assumed to have been aware that their behaviour constituted a 
crime) might justify deprivation of liberty. Here public interest outweighs 
individual claims with the proviso that the deprivation of liberty must be 
proportionate to the crime, in that it must be necessary to deprive the 
                                                
persistent supporters of the national community and opponents to cosmopolitan 
demands of global justice are Michael Walzer (1977, 1983,1994) and David Miller 
(1995, 2000, 2007). Within this debate, however, there is little focus on refugees. In 
Miller’s latest book, for example, the question of specific obligations to refugees is 
granted only 3 pages (2007 225-227). Walzer’s Spheres of Justice also dedicated only 4 
pages to the question (1983 48-51).  Pogge (2002) does not mention refugees at all, 
neither does Beitz (1979). This is, of course, because they were not attempting to 
address the issue of refugee admittance but seeking posit more generally applicable 
theories of justice. It does, however, illustrate the lack of focus on the specific 
obligations to outsiders who are involuntarily in our midst. 
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individual of her liberty to punish the crime, the deprivation must be suitable 
punishment and the punishment must proportionate in the strictest sense. The 
question before us is ‘can the needs of the host society operate similarly in 
refugee law?’ Or to return to our original question: is nationality relevant? 
According to patriotic partiality, as noted above, patriotic ties not only could 
operate as a principle but must.  
 
The question of refugee rights crystallise the problem of how to define 
obligations to outsiders in a world of states, particularly when these 
obligations appear to be in conflict with duties to the state itself. If one 
believes that states are under a primary duty to their own citizens (or even if 
one only views this as a practical and political reality that cannot be avoided), 
if one wishes to posit any duties to refugees (by definition outsiders to the 
political community), a conflict of duties is bound to arise. Patriotic partiality 
argues this can only be resolved in favour of the host state. This would leave 
states with only ‘residual duties’ to refugees’188 and the argument for 
conditional priority of refugees’ rights over public interest claims can proceed 
no further.  
 
Where priority is given to compatriots, the protection of refugees can only be 
secondary. In particular, when admission and exclusion are viewed as 
necessary to preserve communal independence189 or where obligations are 
viewed as growing weaker with distance then claims to priority of human 
                                                
188 Such, for example, is Robert Goodin’s argument even as he seeks to urge states to 
offer more protection to refugees. See, ‘Globalising Justice’ in Reshaping Globalization: 
A Progressive Agenda, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Oxford: Polity 
Press 2003). Further discussion below. 
189 Walzer Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books 1983) 62.  
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rights are perceived as weaker when asserted from outside the political 
community. Following these arguments, the obligation to refugees is weaker 
than the positive obligations of the government to provide for its citizens and 
of each citizen to their compatriots and the negative obligation not to inflict 
harm oneself.190 In a priority to compatriots thesis, human rights might still be 
given conditional priority but this priority operates only where the individual 
asserting her human rights is a compatriot. In other circumstances the priority 
is reversed and the claims of the host society are given priority. In his 
distinction between thin and thick morality Walzer accepts the need for a 
universal “moral minimum”191, including the principle of asylum which is 
capable of giving refugees’ claims some traction and renders the claims of 
some value. Similarly, Miller speaks of an obligation to provide refuge, which 
is shared by all those capable of providing it192 but it is relegated, firstly, 
behind national obligations, thus becoming an obligation to be discharged 
once more pressing local obligations have been fulfilled, and secondly, to the 
realm of ideal theory, deemed not applicable to the current situation.193  
 
In no circumstances, according to the patriotic partiality thesis, can refugees’ 
rights be given priority over the rights of the host state to control entry. The 
perceived conflict of principles between rights of refugees and public interest 
claims is, according to the priority to compatriots thesis, not a conflict at all as 
it is always to be resolved in favour of citizens over outsiders. This is also one 
of the principal objections to a more robust system of duties to refugees. Each 
                                                
190 Miller ‘Nationalism’ (2007) in Drysek, Honig and Phillips (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford University Press 2007) 227. 
191 Miller On Nationality (Oxford University Press 1994) 9-10. 
192 Miller (n 102) 226. 
193 ibid 225. 
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state is free- and ought to be free- to decide the extent of their obligation to 
refugees independently.194 The right to asylum, whilst existing in theory, is 
“not a right that can be enforced against particular host states.”195 The 
implications of this view are not refuted by Miller, who concedes that without 
a guarantee of asylum, many refugees will not find a state willing to take 
them,196 despite the human cost a more robust duty to refugees is 
incompatible with a state’s duties to its own citizens. It follows that if priority 
to compatriots is not able to establish a greater moral value for political 
communities than for individual human rights then Miller’s conclusion is 
turned on its head and states willing to take refugees must be found as 
refugees’ rights take conditional priority over the right of states to regulate 
entry. The right to determine membership in the political community or the 
right to determine entry need not be challenged directly in order to secure 
conditional priority for rights of refugees; they only need to be shown to be of 
lesser comparative value than individual human rights. Conditional priority 
for the rights of refugees would also form the basis of an assertion of a duty to 
admit refugees when this priority becomes definitive on the facts.  
 
Connected to the priority to compatriots thesis is the issue of limited 
resources. It is argued that in a world of limited resources duties to the near-
by needy, defined not only geographically but also politically, are to be 
discharged first. Any other duties are merely discretionary. This, as Shue 
notes, provides a ‘conceptual straightjacket’ when it comes to possible ‘distant 
strangers’ that appears to allow duty holder free discretion on who to help, 
                                                
194 Walzer (n 101) 51, Miller (n 102) 227. 
195 Walzer (n 101) 150. 
196 (n 102) 227. 
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where resources are outstripped by demand. As eluded to in the opening 
quotation, the idea that no one country could house all the world’s refugees 
leads many to suggest no country is under a concrete obligation to house any 
refugees at all. There are two interrelated claims here, the first is that where a 
duty cannot be entirely fulfilled by an agent, the agent is relieved from the 
obligatory force of the duty. Secondly, there is the claim to priority of the 
near-by needy over the so-called ‘distant strangers’, as mapped out above.  
 
The first claim may be set aside immediately. It is a claim concerning the 
structural nature of duties- that the obligatory force of a duty is tied to 
whether or not an agent is able to entirely fulfil the content of the duty (or 
not). This claim is defeated by the explanation of duties as principles as 
reconstructed by Alexy in his principles theory: what is required of the agent 
is that this duty is fulfilled to the greatest extent legally and factually possible. 
The circumstances might, therefore, render a state only able to make a 
minimal contribution but the obligation to make this minimal contribution is 
definitive. The only counter, then, to definitive obligations to refugees is the 
assumption explored briefly above that priority ought to be given to the needs 
of compatriots, first, and, secondly, near-by needy (anyone with whom a state 
has existing ties) and, finally, to ‘distant needy’ (anyone with whom a state 
has no special tie). In other words, in order to strengthen the otherwise weak 
obligation of potential host states, a refugee must demonstrate some specific 
tie to the host state. This alone is capable of ‘moving’ the obligation up the 
scale towards a more definitive obligation, otherwise all things being equal 
there is no definitive obligation to refugees and the duty to admit is merely 
one of charity. This assertion is denied and will be shown to be as flawed as 
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the construction of duties as definitive only where entirely achievable posited 
directly above. 
 
What will be argued here is that there is no case for priority to compatriots 
and, as such, it cannot be said to outweigh prima facie the needs of refugees. 
This grounds the claim that priority to compatriots cannot be an underlying 
principle in refugee law. The needs of the host society are more properly 
viewed as secondary principles to be considered at the ‘factual’ stage (what 
might be described as ‘yes, we ought to take the refugee, is there any reason 
why we cannot on these circumstances?’ If the right to be granted asylum is 
characterised as a principle, as an optimisation command, refugees ought to 
be guaranteed a place of refuge in all but the most dire of circumstances yet 
states would not have to cede all discretion to international bodies as it would 
be for domestic courts to engage in the balancing of the principles of the right 
to asylum and the duties of states to their own citizens.197  
 
This creates quite a different picture than that put forward by most states, 
namely that they are entitled to weigh up their own needs with equal weighting 
to those of refugees. Such claims rests on two misapprehensions, firstly that 
priority to compatriots can be justified and secondly, that, even if it can be 
justified, that this presents a conflict of duties which must always be resolved 
in favour of compatriots and citizens. The first misapprehension requires 
broader discussion and can only be briefly addressed below. The second is 
                                                
197 That is not to say that no international scrutiny would be required but rather that 
the rule of an international body such as the UNHCR would be clear; to determine 
whether the principle of refuge had been optimised. If there had been a 
demonstrative failure by a government or domestic court to optimise this principle 
sanctions could be imposed on this basis.  
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fundamentally flawed and must be set aside if there is to be any meaningful 
notion of refugee protection.  
 
The notion that one set of obligations is owed to nationals and another to non-
nationals is built also on the assumption of two separate moral spheres: each 
with contained spheres of justice; one universal field of international relations, 
and another particularlist world of the domestic community. Walzer strives to 
maintain this separation, even as refugees, crossing between the two 
involuntarily and suddenly, reveal it to be untenable. If people cross between 
the two, why do our obligations remain static? Walzer gives no reason why 
the moral distinction between the national and international must be 
maintained if the actual distinction does not exist. It could be argued that with 
this movement refugees reveal the limits of communitarian accounts on 
rights, which can be morally and empirically challenged.198  
 
There are a number of different routes one might take to countering any claim 
that nationality is relevant in access to protection from human rights 
violations. One of the leading paradigms is so-called, “luck egalitarianism.”199 
                                                
198 The assumptions about the nature of refuge flows are, it could be argued, largely 
the result of suppositions about the character of the modern nation-state. Miller’s 
latest book (n 102) refers to a world made up of self-determining national 
communities. Walzer presumes political communities to be akin to “neighbourhoods, 
clubs and families” (n101 35). These assertions rest on the Hobbesian assumption of 
an intimate connection between the interests of the government and the people. 
Communitarian theory defines rights along the lines of Walzer’s sphere’s of justice; 
internationally-against foreigners- individuals have a right to their own state; only 
domestically- against the state – may political and civil rights be claimed. In doing so 
it assumes an empirically unsubstantiated reality in which the emotional attachment 
and civic loyalty inherent in communities protect the members from mistreatment. If 
one does not consider states to be culturally homogenous entities nor democratic 
political communities-and states that fulfil both criteria are rare- then the moral and 
ethical legitimacy of an exclusionary ‘right to self-determination’ must be called into 
question. 
199 Ronald Dworkin ‘Equality of Resources’ (1981) Philosophy and Public Affairs 10. 
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Luck egalitarianism states, simply put, that people’s success in life should 
reflect their choices, but not their unchosen circumstances. This is a key theory 
in suggesting that global redistribution is required as the better-off owe 
‘compensation’ to the less well off. Robust counter-arguments are to be found 
also in Cosmopolitanism. Following the Kantian enjoinder that individuals be 
treated “Zweck an sich”- as ends not means- it is maintained that individuals 
have equal status as objects of moral concerns200 and arbitrary factors, 
including nationality and ethnicity, should not be determinants of moral 
worth.201 This is a key claim of the notion of human dignity that individuals 
have equal moral worth and, therefore, the right to have human dignity 
respected. This is a universal claim not one concerned with borders or 
political community. The universal nature of human rights presents one 
immediate challenge to the notion of priority to compatriots: if human rights 
are universal, why is nationality a relevant factor in determining the 
availability of protection against human rights violations?202 If this cannot be 
                                                
200 Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms 
(Polity Press 2002) 169; Caney (2005) ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility and 
Global Climate Change’ in The Global Justice Reader Brooks (ed) (Blackwell 2007) 3 
201 Nussbaum Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge 
University Press 2000).  
202 This debate is perhaps most vociferous in the area of economic inequality. 
Discussions of duties to eliminate, or at least alleviate, global poverty are also 
concerned with the issue of whether distributive duties, if they can be said to exist, 
are limited by borders (and/or special ties). Just as in discussions of duties to 
refugees, it has long been assumed- without challenge- that no definitive duties could 
be owed to those outside our borders as Weistock notes: 
Until fairly recently, it could be thought that our gut-level moral reaction to the 
extent of human suffering in many parts of the world could best be cashed out under 
the rubric of “duties of charity.” According to this view of things, it speaks well of us 
that we take it upon ourselves to contribute to the alleviation of suffering in distant 
parts of the world, but it is not something that is strictly speaking required of us. 
Because we are not causally responsible for the creation and maintenance of 
conditions of abject poverty, any help that we do proffer is supererogatory – that is, 
admirable, but not obligatory…globalization makes it the case that our obligations 
toward the global poor are obligations of justice rather than of charity (ppviii-ix). 
This has now been challenged by many legal and political theorists. This debate is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but can be followed, to name a few, in the works of 
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justified then the priority given to compatriots is, at least, legally defective if 
not in fact legally invalid. The claim to universality of human rights in all 
circumstances is asserted robustly by Cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism 
contends that fundamental allegiance lies with the moral realm of humanity203 
and that this allegiance is above, but not necessarily to the exclusion of, 
national allegiances.204 Pogge labels this “moral cosmopolitanism.”205 Legal 
cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, calls for the institutionalisation of this to 
give each person equal legal status.206 Pogge, Caney and Nussbaum, for 
example, suggest cosmopolitanism requires a global system of justice.  Pogge 
envisages a global agreement on a list of human rights- including the right to 
emigrate, which would foster more robust obligations to others, 
encompassing economic obligations to redistribute wealth.207 This more 
extensive version of cosmopolitanism aside, the basic proposition is that all 
human beings have equal moral worth coextensive with the scope of human 
dignity.  
                                                
Thomas Pogge in World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity Press 2002), David Held 
Democracy and the Global Order (Polity Press 1995); and Peter Singer One World (Yale 
University Press 2002) (on the side of universal obligations) and David Miller On 
Nationality (Oxford University Press 1995) and Michael Walzer (n 101) on the side of 
limited obligations. 
203 Held ‘Principles of Cosmopolitan Order’ in Held et al Cosmopolitanism (Polity press 
2010) 229. 
204 See Nussbaum (1996) for detailed discussion of the compatibility of national and 
global allegiances based on Stoic cosmopolitanism, which sees allegiances as 
concentric with the fundamental allegiance resting with the outer circle- of humanity- 
but not diminishing the personal or inner value of the inner circles of regional, local 
and family allegiances. See also Tan (2005) 174-175. Cosmopolitanism is not, as a 
theory, opposed to any form of national sentiment or diversity, as charged by some 
(Putnam, 1996, Himmelfarb, 1996), it allows for both allowed for local and familial 
ties. Will Kymlicka’s assertion in Multicultural Citizenship that some minorities have 
special rights to protect their cultures (Claredon Press, 1995), for example, would not 
clash with Cosmopolitanism assuming that these special rights do not apply to 
distribution of social goods but only to cultural rights, such as the right to speak your 
own language at home or wear traditional dress. 
205 ʻCosmopolitanism and Sovereigntyʼ  (1992) 102 Ethics 48, 48.  
206 (1992) 49 
207 Realizing Rawls (Cornell University Press 1989) 72. 
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This is a debate concerning the extent to which compatriots can be given 
priority with the conclusion that compatriots cannot be given definitive or 
conditional priority where individual rights are threatened. If nationality is 
irrelevant to balancing then the claim to human rights protection is of (at least 
prima facie) greater value than public interest. The principle of human dignity, 
it is asserted, does not recognise borders. This is accepted implicitly by the 
international community by the notion of jus cogens, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. It is also explicitly asserted in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. There are no grounds then to reject this assertion where 
refugees are concerned, indeed the justifying grounds of human rights 
demand that equal application. It is asserted that claims made as to the 
primacy of individual rights in the national setting can be extended to 
international sphere. Thus as Alexy asserts that the proportionality principle 
demands that the core of human rights remain untouched, this assertion 
applies also to cases where protection of the core of the human right is being 
claimed by outsiders. Thus, even weighty public interests cannot outweigh 
category one claims (where the threat is to a right containing balancing in the 
characterisation such as right to life) and public interest does not have 
conditional priority in any case. The abstract conditional priority given to 
individual rights in domestic cases, which, as Alexy argues, “expresses a basic 
preference in favour of those principles which are directed towards 
individual…liberties”208, operates also in the case of a refugee seeking 
admission. 
 
                                                
208 Alexy (n 10 chapter 2) 81. 
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If nationality were rejected as an operative principle in determining access to 
human rights protection then greater weight may only be given to the claims 
of nationals if the rights of the nationals in question can be said to be more 
valuable in the circumstances than those of the refugee. It is not impossible for 
this to be the case but in most potential host states it is difficult to think of 
circumstances in which either the right being claimed by the host society is of 
greater significance than the rights asserted by most refugee claims or where 
the rights of individuals in the host society will be infringed to a greater 
degree than the equally valued right of a refugee. In most cases, although of 
course not all, the non-national is the person in immediate danger; the 
national is not. To return to the demands of impartiality, and Miller’s 
observation above, if nationality does not create a rule that requires us to treat 
people differently yet individuals are treated differently due to their 
respective nationalities then the balancing may not be said to be impartial. In 
terms of principles theory, if nationality cannot justify any greater weight (or 
lesser weight) being given to host states’ claims then the abstract weight of 
refugees’ rights and host state claims must be at the best equal. Indeed in 
cases where the public interest asserted has no human rights element then 
refugees rights would take priority and in cases where the human rights 
claims asserted by the states involve lesser degrees of infringement than those 
asserted by refugees, priority again can be established for refugees’ rights. 
 
It was asserted above that public interest is not the sole criterion for 
determining legitimate public action but forms only one element in any 
decision-making calculus which may or may not prevail depending on the 
circumstances. Indeed, public interest may have to be sacrificed in pursuit of 
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other ideals which are valued as ends in themselves. Public interest, then, is 
not only capable of balancing against rights but indeed, following Alexy, as it 
has the characteristic of a principle it must be subject to balancing against the 
right at stake and whichever is stronger should prevail. In this sense, 
determining which of the competing interests prevails will reflect a value 
judgment. Without the notion of priority to compatriots, then, public interest 
can only be given the weight it objectively deserves in relation to the specific 
circumstances before the court. Importantly in interpreting the Convention 
national courts are already bound by international human rights norms. That 
is to say the range of plausible interpretations is limited by international 
human rights norms. It could be argued that the important yet secondary place 
of national interpretations is recognised in international law. For example, 
Article 38 1(c) of the statute of the ICJ was intended to provide a route by 
which domestic legal traditions could influence international law but the 
influence is limited to the extent that it relates to ‘general principles of law 
recognised by civilized nations.’209  
 
This must be so, again following Alexy, for the principle of proportionality 
applies to all balancing exercises not only to prevent the judge substituting 
their own view for ‘the public interest’ but also to demand that any 
infringement of one principle by another be necessary, appropriate to achieve 
the aim and proportional in the strictest sense. Thus, courts are not merely 
asking whether acts serve legitimate collective goals (the interests of host 
states’ citizens could certainly be defined as prima facie legitimate collective 
                                                
209 For the argument that the principles recognised by civilized nations refers to the 
principles of international law see Karlshoven et al Essays on the Development of the 
International Legal Order: In Memory of Van Panhuys (Martin Njihoff 1980) 66-70.   
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goals) but also whether it is proportionate (as defined above) to encroach on 
the right(s) at stake to such a degree to achieve the goal. If it cannot be 
deemed to be proportionate then the argument of public interest fails. 
Although the outcome of individual cases cannot be established in the 
abstract, we can state prima facie conclusions. This is justified in particular, it is 
argued, as the priority to compatriots thesis resolves this balancing prima facie 
in favour of the host state. The argument here is that the principle of human 
dignity resolves this balancing prima facie in favour of the refugee.    
 
>FU %/1=73!@0?!%;<41;;3!
It has been argued here that the starting point for refugee law is the 
conditional priority of refugees’ rights over the claims of states. This creates, it 
is posited, a prima facie right of admittance for refugees. This claim will be 
fleshed out further in subsequent chapters to consider the content of states’ 
duties to their own citizens which further explains how the refugees’ claim is 
a claim to human rights protection and strengthens the claim to the primacy 
of refugees’ rights.  
>FUF* ?%&7*)@*+&'!-/1=73!
It might be thought that prima facie rights would do nothing to further the 
position of refugees but prima facie rights can be useful. Although they cannot 
be absolute rights, as by definition these rights are required to shift in priority 
depending on circumstances, they are genuine rights and are they do dictate 
action where there are no competing principles or, in Nickel’s terms, 
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“substantial competing considerations.”210 In such cases the lack of other 
operative considerations renders the prima facie definitive and the weight of 
the right become fully specified. Secondly, even prima facie rights can be 
defined in details and principles for ranking can be determined. A prima facie 
right, as Nickel argues, “implies not that this sort of work cannot be done but 
that we recognise that the work will always remain partially unfinished.”211 
Thus, to assert that the rights of refugees are prima facie rights is not 
meaningless rhetoric.  Conditional priority can still be claimed for refugee 
rights and the circumstances in which these rights are capable of taking 
definitive priority can still be discussed and elaborated. As Alexy notes, 
“[c]onditional statements of preference give rise via the Law of Competing 
Principles to rules which require the consequences of the principle taking 
precedence whenever the conditions are satisfied.”212  
>FUF8 2M3,H47;!%/1=73K!
In a simplistic version of balancing there cannot be any concept of absolute 
rights having priority over other considerations. It would seem then that 
Alexy’s balancing theory cannot accommodate absolute rights. This would 
suggest also that refugee law cannot accommodate absolute rights. In chapter 
two213, however, it was argued that certain rights have the exercise of 
balancing inherent in their characterisation so as to have the effect of being 
absolute rights. In the context of refugee law this is a controversial concept as 
states assert that refugee status may be granted but cannot be demanded. It is 
then an act of charity rather than fulfilment of an international obligation. The 
                                                
210 Nickel (n 4) 43. 
211 ibid 44. 
212 (n 10 chapter 2) 101. 
213 p65-66. 
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existence of absolute human rights is not the focus here.214 Here the question is 
if it is possible to envisage an absolute right how could refugee law cope with 
this? How the duty to protect refugees can be constructed a demand of 
refugee law will be constructed below. This section will examine if the case for 
certain rights to be considered absolute rights can be made out. If this 
argument can be made out, this goes to the absolute (as opposed to 
conditional) priority of certain individual rights over state rights.  
 
It is clear that when we speak of absolute rights we are speaking of a 
particular species of human rights from which no derogation is permitted. 
Although the notion of absolute human rights has proved difficult to maintain 
in practice there is remarkable consensus over which rights one might 
consider absolute. The right to life and the right to be free from torture are the 
first two rights that might be identified. This is not to say these rights are 
universally respected. The death penalty is an obvious affront to the right to 
life. It explicitly attempts to balance the right to life of an individual over, 
variously, the rights of the victim (and the victim’s family) or the good of the 
community.  The American attempts to redefine torture as ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’ demonstrate that torture is more widely seen as 
right from which no derogation is permitted. Judicial mentions of absolute 
rights are bolstered further by mentions of derogable rights, suggesting a 
                                                
214 For discussion of this see, for example, the discussion between Gewirth and 
Levinson: Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’ (1981) 31 The Philosophical 
Quarterly 1; Levinson, ‘Gewirth on Absolute Rights’ (1982) 32 The Philosophical 
Quarterly 73; and Gewirth, ‘There are Absolute Rights’ (1982) 32 The Philosophical 
Quarterly 348. 
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contrast between these rights and others.215 There is often, however, a lack of 
discussion as to why a particular right is absolute or otherwise. 
 
Human dignity is identified in the German Basic Law as being an absolute 
right. As noted above, human dignity has many uses. One of these is as a right 
in and of itself. When it is used in the sense it might be considered absolute. It 
is clear however that when it is used in other senses, as a foundation for 
human rights for example, it is able to give rise to both absolute and 
derogable rights. In other words some rights will be part of Kant’s categorical 
imperative, actions which we cannot will as universal law and must therefore 
oppose. Other rights could be seen to fall with Kant’s alternative version of 
the hypothetical imperative, which might be said to give rise to context-
specific rights. In simple terms Kant is contrasting actions that we could never 
will to be universal (to be identified as actions treating others as means not 
ends) and those for which context is relevant. Rainbolt argues Kant’s notion of 
perfect and imperfect obligations arising from the categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives can be seen as creating obligations with latitude and 
obligations without latitude.216 In other words, absolute and derogable rights.  
 
This, it is argued, is the most robust argument against the death penalty and 
torture. It is simply impossible to will either the death penalty or torture as 
universal law. If we were to do so we would have to accept that we may be a 
victim of torture or be put to death.  This would be a self-defeating argument 
                                                
215 The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights refers to ‘absolute 
rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention’ in Ilascu v 
Moldova and Russia 2004-VII; 40 EHRR 46. The UK Supreme Court has found ‘[t]he 
privilege against self-incrimination is not an absolute right’: see Ambrose v Harris 
[2011] UKSC 43 at [34] and [56] (per Lord Hope).  
216 Rainbolt,‘Perfect and Imperfect Obligations’ (2000) 98 Philosophical Studies 233. 
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with most persons.  This suggests then that these rights should be seen as 
absolute. In Alexy’s terms the balancing has already taken place and the 
principles have been determined to be of such priority that nothing we can 
envisage will outweigh them. Gerwirth puts forward a similar view, stating; 
‘[a] right is absolute when it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, so 
that it can never be justifiably infringed and it must be fulfilled without any 
exceptions.’217 As such these ‘absolute principles’ take on the character of a 
rule. On the other hand, whilst one might not will as universal a blanket ban 
on practicing religion, one can easily will as universal some limits on the 
practice of religion. Limits on the practice of religion that would endanger 
lives, for example, would usually be seen as a reasonable limit. As 
Mavronicola notes, if we label a right absolute, its ‘absoluteness’ is usually at 
least a starting point even if it is later challenged.218  
 
A key challenge to absolute rights is that if absolute rights exist how would 
one resolve a clash of these rights. What is one person’s right to life is set 
against another’s right to be free from torture? Mavronicola notes, this 
question is a distraction. It is raised most often in hypotheticals but should it 
be raised in reality Mavronicola suggests a rule that ‘there is no positive duty 
to act in a way that constitutes a violation of the negative duty encompassed 
by an absolute right.’219 Thus, one does not need to consider whether it can be 
justified to torture someone in order to save another’s life as one cannot have 
a positive duty to act in a way that constitutes a violation of a negative duty of 
non-interference with an absolute right. Mavronicola reminds us that in these 
                                                
217 n 178 2.  
218 ‘Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights' (2012) Human Rights Law Review 12 723, 758. 
219 n 178 732. 
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hypothetical examples one is not looking at one action which violates two 
absolute rights but one action which will violate an absolute right and another 
action which constitutes a violation of an absolute right whilst seeking to 
prevent violation of another.220  
 
Rainbolt notes that whilst negative obligations in relation to absolute rights 
can only be fulfilled in one manner (through one ‘act-token’ as Rainbolt 
frames it), namely non-interferences, positive obligations in relation to 
absolute rights can be fulfilled through a number of acts. There is then an 
element of choice and an element of limitation (in the sense of the limited 
effectiveness) in fulfilling the positive obligations that necessarily renders it an 
imperfect obligation.  Mavronicola reminds us that this does not allow actors 
(be that individuals or states) to ignore positive obligations, noting ‘[t]he fact 
that the positive obligations encompassed by an absolute right may involve a 
degree of variability and uncertainty in the action required to fulfill them does 
not entail that they are displaceable.’221 Another important qualification 
Mavronicola points us to is the confusion between legal inviolability and 
physical inviolability.222 In other words lack of enforcement, or the fact of 
                                                
220 This appears to be the approach taken by the ECtHR in Gaefgen v Germany 52 
EHRR 1 in which it was stated that even in a ‘ticking time bomb’ situation, where the 
kidnapper of a child is caught but the child’s wherabout remain unknown- so as to 
create a real danger to the child’s life- torture cannot be used. The court further found 
that not even threats of torture could be used. In relation to extradition the same 
reasoning been used in Chahal v United Kingdom [1996] -V; 23 EHRR 413. See also, Z 
v United Kingdom 2001-V; 34 EHRR 3. The approach was also followed in German 
Federal Constitutional Court in the Aviation Security Act case, where the Court held 
that shooting down an airplane which was likely to be used as a terrorist weapon 
was a violation of the right to life in conjunction with the human dignity of the 
innocent passengers aboard. For discussion see, Möller, ‘On Treating Persons as 
Ends: The German Aviation Security Act, Human Dignity, and the Federal 
Constitutional Court’ (2006) 51 Public Law 457. 
221 n178 734.  
222 Ibid. 
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violations, does not render a right any less absolute. This recalls the ‘is’-
‘ought’ fallacy.   
 
For refugee law, the duty of non-interference with absolute rights remains 
primary. If a refugee is asserting a claim to refugee status on the basis of 
(feared) violation of an absolute right the negative duty of non-interference is 
a perfect one. Namely a state may not take any action that constitutes 
interference with the refugees right to, for example, not to be tortured. It can 
be argued recognition of this underpins the additional non-refoulement 
obligation on contracting states. This approach is taken also in relation to 
Article 3 extradition or deportation cases in ECHR contracting states. This will 
be discussed below. In terms of refugee law it further suggests a split between 
cases where it will be necessary to consider the reason for the violation (as 
seen for example in the distinction between prosecution and persecution in 
relation to right to freedom) and those in which the reason is irrelevant. This 
is not to say that absolute rights will never need to be considered in depth in 
refugee cases. Firstly, there will always be the question of fact or, better 
phrased, the establishment of reasonable likelihood of risk. This task however 
is not under discussion here. Secondly, the framing of a right as an absolute 
right does not end the task. Absolute rights still require considerations of 
scope. The question of whether the behaviour in question does or does not fall 
within the scope of the absolute right will also turn on the facts of the specific 
case.  
 
The UNHCR recognises the different types of rights and the interplay 
between these rights and refugee law. The UNHCR guidance was also 
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discussed in the UK case of Gashi.223 The UNHCR states that there are three 
categories of rights: $] /A2(;:0+!8] )".=02!J="*=!/;;(J!;"E"0+,!,+)(./0"(1!^5()!+M/EB;+!(1;7!"1!0"E+2!(5!B:A;"*!+E+).+1*7]!&] A"1,"1.! )".=02! J="*=! [)+5;+*0! .(/;2! 5()! 2(*"/;_! +*(1(E"*! /1,! *:;0:)/;!,+#+;(BE+10P%!
The third category of right, it is noted, is contingent on state resources. It not 
then that it is permitted to violate these rights but that violations of these 
rights may not necessarily give rise to a protection claim. This would be the 
case, for example, in a situation of mass hunger caused by a natural disaster 
which the government sought to address, however ineffectively. These rights 
however are subject, the UNHCR and court in Gashi note, to the principle of 
non-discrimination.  This leads back to the discussion of human dignity and 
the generations of rights at section 3.1.4 and we recall that where 
discrimination can be shown individually ‘minor’ human rights infringements 
can be elevated to persecution.   
 
>FUF> $=;!(0?;3;-R/01!%;<41;;!
Following on from the observations concerning absolute rights above the 
notion of limiting refugee status to those potential victims of human rights 
abuses who deserve refugee status is perhaps surprising. This however 
remains the legal position in refugee law. The exclusion clause – Article 1(f) – 
                                                
223 n 5 introduction.  
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has been seen as creating the notion of a worthy refugee.224 Article 1(f) 
suggests “under the legal definition a refugee must not just face potential 
persecution, but must be worthy of being a refugee.”225 This assertion is 
confirmed by UNHCR guidance.226   
 
The notion of excluding a person from refugee status runs contrary to the 
notion that refugee status is declaratory and not constitutive. As Zargor notes, 
the impact of Article 1(f) is compounded by the requirement of recognition for 
refugee status. Although one might be a refugee without recognition, without 
being declared a holder of refugee status protection is not afforded to the 
individual. A refugee must demonstrate that refugee status ought to be 
granted not only pursuant to Article 1(2) but also that status is not precluded 
under Article 1(f).   
 
This is a problematic notion given the assertion that refugee status is not 
constitutive but more fundamentally in light of the more extensive assertions 
concerning the inviolability of human rights. This raises the question of how if 
human rights apply to all simply by virtue of being human, an individual can 
                                                
224 Although as Zagor notes “article 1(F) does not technically exclude refugees; it 
defines them in ethical terms on the basis of their past conduct and affiliations” 
'Uncertainty and Exclusion: Detention of Aliens and the High Court' (2006) 34 FLR 
127-160. This has not prevented Article 1(F) being referred to as ‘the exclusion clause’ 
for undeserving refugees in UNHCR documents and by the judiciary, see for 
example UNHCR, 2003 Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the 
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (2003) HCR/GIP/03/05, paragraph 2 (‘The rationale for the exclusion 
clauses, which should be borne in mind when considering their application, is that 
certain acts are so grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of international 
protection as refugees.’) This view has been endorsed in judicial decisions, for 
instance Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 1222. 
225 Recognition and Narrative Identities: the Legal Creation, Alienation and Liberation of the 
Refugee (2011) ANU Research Paper.  
226 UNHCR’s Handbook (n 27 chapter three)147.  
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be passed over for protection of those human rights. Can we forfeit our 
human rights? Refugeehood is based on human rights from which one cannot 
be ousted.  
 
There is an evident overlap between the exceptions in Article 33(2) and the 
exclusion clause which forms part of the definition of a refugee in Article 1F of 
the 1951 Convention. Article 1(f) provides: 
[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect 
to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes; 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge 
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
Article 33(2) states: 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a 
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country 
Article 1(F) might be seen as backward looking with Article 33(2) looking 
forward requiring that the person to be a current or continued threat to the 
potential host state. Similarly Article 1(F) is outward looking, referring to 
crimes committed outside the host state and Article 33(2) referring to potential 
crimes conducted within the host state (although this is not explicitly stated 
! $>D 
and arguably Article 33(2) can be engaged with a threat of commission of a 
crime outside the host state territory).227  
 
Article 1(f) creates a greater conceptual issue than Article 33(2). It is not a 
matter of the right of the refugee having been weighed against the rights of 
the potential host community and found lesser. Instead Article 1(f) seems to 
purport that certain individuals can justifiably be excluded from international 
protection due to their actions. The individual might be sent to have forfeited 
their rights.  The UNHCR approach, however, suggests that balancing is 
appropriate here also.228 The approach adopted has been to balance the crime 
committed against the risk on return.229 Goodwin-Gill however suggests that 
because the crimes referred to in Article 1(f), namely crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, are necessarily extremely serious, 
states have assumed that for the very nature and circumstances of the crime  
can make the principle of balancing crime against consequences redundant.230 
The United States, Australia United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada do 
not recognise any requirement under Article 1(f) to balance the nature of the 
crime with the degree of persecution feared. In Canada v. Malouf the Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal stated that the decision-maker was not required to 
balance the seriousness of the claimant’s conduct against the alleged fear of 
                                                
227 Grahl-Madsen notes that the Swedish Delegate asked for the removal of that 
country from the provision ‘to cover such cases as, for example, that of a Polish 
refugee who had been allowed to enter Sweden and who, in passing through 
Denmark, had committed a crime in that country’. Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on 
the Refugee Convention 1951 237. See also Weis, The Refugee Convention (1951) 343. 
228 UNHCR Handbook (n 27 chapter three) 149 and 156. 
229 See 
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/refugee/convention2002/05_exclusi
on.pdf. 
230 (n 83 chapter one) 97. However at 105- 7 Goodwin-Gill seems to suggest he would 
support balancing. 
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persecution.231  
 
Conceptually this is deeply problematic. Refugee law can accommodate an 
exclusion from refugee law where balancing has taken place. It cannot 
however accommodate blanket exclusion. As set out in chapters two and three 
balancing allows for other rights to supersede those of the refugee if the rights 
of the refugee can be said to have been outweighed. This is instinctively 
correct. Human rights law always contains a recognition that rights must be 
balanced as rights will necessarily clash. However it could be argued that this 
merely demonstrates that the interpretation of Article 1(f) as not requiring 
balancing is incorrect. It should also be noted that generally defences to 
Article 1(f) crimes are accepted.232 This does not detract however from the 
incompatibility of the notion of exclusion from human rights protection with 
the development of human rights law, which has focused on the inviolability 
of human rights. In the post-9/11 world Article 1(f) may be more widely used. 
JS (Sri Lanka) [2010] for example saw build on the UNHCR declaration that 
being involved in a terrorist organisation might be sufficient to allow 
exclusion.233  
 
After the initial keenness to broaden Article 1(f) a more cautious approach 
might be said to be emerging. In the UK an initial attempt to link Article 1(f) 
to the much broader terrorism provisions of s54 of the Immigration, Asylum 
                                                
231 [1995] 190 N.R. 230 (F.C.A.). An Australian court made a similar finding in 
Dhayakpa v MIEA (1995) 62 FCR 556. 
232 R v Keogh [1964] VR 400 accepted autonomism as a defence and Zecevic v DPP 
(Victoria) (1987) 12 CLR 645 allowed necessary use of force as a defence. Ramirez v 
Canada [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.) accepted durress also a defence. Acting on the orders 
is not an accepted defence, this is only to be expected as this is similarly no defence to 
trial for the crimes listed in Article 1(f).   
233 UKSC 15. See also UNHCR Guidelines (2010) (n 223) 26.! 
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and Nationality Act 2005 was eventually halted in the Supreme Court. In Al-
Sirri the Supreme Court found: 
16. The article should be interpreted restrictively and applied with caution. 
There should be a high threshold “defined in terms of the gravity of the act in 
question, the manner in which the act is organised, its international impact and 
long-term objectives, and the implications for international peace and security”. 
And there should be serious reasons for considering that the person concerned 
bore individual responsibility for acts of that character.234 
The court in built on UNHCR guidance to limit the applicability of Article 1(f) 
to acts which were directly contrary to the purposes of international law and 
the international community.235 The English and Welsh courts have 
recognised that Article 1(f) should be narrowly interpreted when considering 
if an Algerian male could be returned to France under the safe third country 
policy. It was held in Kerrouche v Home Secretary that Mr Kerrouche could not 
be removed to France as the French interpretation was too broad.236 Although 
this insistence on excluding such persons from refugee status does not sit with 
the universality of human rights and human dignity it is perhaps, as 
Hathaway stated, a practical concession. It might be seen as a concession 
made in order to secure protection for those who had no part in the human 
rights violations.  
 
                                                
234 Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department; DD (Afghanistan) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54. 
235 The Court stated, at parapraph 17:  
Article 1F(c) is only triggered in extreme circumstances by activity which attacks the very 
basis of the international community’s coexistence. Such activity must have an international 
dimension. Crimes capable of affecting international peace, security and peaceful relations 
between states, as well as serious and sustained violations of human rights would fall under 
this category. 
236 [1997] Imm AR 610. It was not required for Mr Kerrouche to demonstrate that the 
French interpretation was unsupportable but only that a more generous approach 
was applied in the UK.  
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In practical terms, however, this question is often less pressing, as noted in the 
introduction refugee status is not the only form of protection. As Hathaway 
notes Article 1(f) was most likely introduced for practical reasons, as it 
represents  ‘a pragmatic recognition that states are unlikely to agree to be 
bound by a regime that requires them to protect undesirable refugees...’ even 
if they are genuinely at risk of persecution in their state of origin.237 We might 
argue that we can exclude a person from refugee status for the reasons in 
Article 1(f) but this does not mean that the excluded ‘refugee’ can be refouled. 
It could be argue the Refugee Convention recognizes this by making 
refoulement a separate prohibition in the Convention. The development of the 
interpretation of Article 33 has operate so as to prevent refoulement of 
individuals who arguably fall within Article 1(f).238  
 
Although previously relatively unchallenged Lauterpacht notes: 
The interpretation of Article 33(2) must also take account of other factors. 
Particularly important is the trend, evident in other textual formulations of 
the principle of non-refoulement and in practice more generally since 1951, 
against exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement.239 
The Declaration on Territorial Asylum contains a similar exclusion clause but 
states:  
should a State decide in any case that exception to the principle [of non-
refoulement] stated in paragraph 1 of this article would be justified, it shall 
consider the possibility of granting the person concerned, under such 
                                                
237 (n 91) 214.  
238 The concern here is not, however, what conduct constitutes conduct under Article 
1(F) and/or Article 33(2) but rather if, with the assertions previously as to the human 
rights nature of the 1951 Convention, the exclusion of a refugee from the protection 
afforded by the Convention can be justified explained.  
239 (n 91) 44. 
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conditions as it may deem appropriate, an opportunity, whether by way of 
provisional asylum or otherwise, of going to another State.240 
Similarly although the OAU indicates grounds on which the Convention will 
not apply it does not allow exceptions from the principle of non-
refoulement.241 Lauterpacht argues this is a general trend in accepting that 
non-refoulement is an absolute principle, stating: 
Non-refoulement in a human rights context allows of no limitation or 
derogation. The principle simply requires that States ‘must not expose 
individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, 
expulsion or refoulement’.242  
The more pressing issue therefore is how exclusions from refugee status may 
be justified where it is accepted that human rights attach to every person by 
virtue of being human. This formulation of human rights does not allow for 
the justified violation of absolute human rights due to the person’s conduct.  
 
For absolute human rights the notion of being exempt due to conduct- no 
matter how heinous the conduct- is anachronistic.  Article 3 of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which provides that ‘no State Party shall . . . 
extradite a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture’. If the impact of refusal of 
                                                
240 14 December 1967, A/RES/2312(XXII).  
241 See Art. I(4)–(5) of the Organisation of African Union Refugee Convention 10 
September 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. See also UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and the Protection of People fleeing Armed 
Conflict and Other Situations of Violence in the Context of Individual Refugee Status 
Determination, January 2013, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/50fd3edb2.html [accessed 15 August 2014] 
242 As per General Comment No. 20 (1992) of the Human Rights Committee 
(HRI/HEN/1/Rev.1, 28 July 1994). 
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refugee status due the engagement of Article 1(F) is that there is no place of 
safety for the person this would result in de facto derogation from absolute 
rights.  
 
This suggests that similar to the obligation not to extradite where there is a 
real risk of torture Article 1(F) can only be acted upon where implementation of 
the removal following a refusal of refugee status would not result in the 
violation of an absolute human right. Thus refugee status might be refused on 
the basis of Article 1(F) but that does not mean that the person can be refouled.  
Although the protection of the refugee Convention might be denied to 
someone the protection of international law may not be.  This reasoning might 
be said to be confirmed in General Comment No. 20 (1992) on the 
interpretation of Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibiting torture or cruel or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Human Rights 
Committee which states: 
2. The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental 
integrity of the individual. It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone 
protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against 
the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their 
official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity . . . 
3. The text of article 7 allows of no limitation. The Committee also reaffirms 
that, even in situations of public emergency such as those referred to in article 4 
of the Covenant, no derogation from the provision of article 7 is allowed and its 
provisions must remain in force. The Committee likewise observes that no 
justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation 
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of article 7 for any reasons, including those based on an order from a superior 
officer or public authority. 
  
Thus Lauterpacht argues that the Article 33(2) exception does not apply where 
to treatment feared would amount to violation of an absolute right. He states: 
Overriding reasons of national security or public safety will permit a State to 
derogate from the principle expressed in paragraph 1 in circumstances in 
which the threat does not equate to and would not be regarded as being on a 
par with a danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment and would not come within the scope of other non-derogable 
customary principles of human rights. The application of these exceptions is 
conditional on strict compliance with due process of law and the requirement 
that all reasonable steps must first be taken to secure the admission of the 
individual concerned to a safe third country. 
The same could be said to the application of Article 1(F).  
Weis clarifies: 
The words ‘where their life or freedom was threatened’ [in Article 31(1)] may 
give the impression that another standard is required than for refugee status in 
Article 1. This is, however, not the case. The Secretariat draft referred to 
refugees ‘escaping from persecution’ and to the obligation not to turn back 
refugees ‘to the frontier of their country of origin, or to territories where their 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion’. In the course of drafting these words, ‘country 
of origin’, ‘territories where their life or freedom was threatened’ and ‘country 
in which he is persecuted’ were used interchangeably. 
... 
The words ‘to the frontiers where his life or freedom would be threatened’ [in 
Article 33(1)] have the same meaning as in Article 31 paragraph 1, that is, the 
! $U$ 
same meaning as ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ in Article 1A(2) of the 
Convention. It applies to the refugee’s country of origin and any other country 
where he also has a well-founded fear of persecution or risks being sent to his 
country of origin.243 
The same conclusion is reached by Grahl-Madsen: 
[T]he reference to ‘territories where his life or freedom would be threatened’ 
does not lend itself to a more restrictive interpretation than the concept of 
‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’; that is to say that any kind of 
persecution which entitles a person to the status of a Convention refugee 
must be considered a threat to life or freedom as envisaged in Article 33.244 
As Grahl-Madsen seeks to demonstrate it is, above all else, illogical to apply a 
more restrictive interpretation to the refoulement clause than to the 
qualification clause. It cannot be that person must show a great risk to prevent 
refoulement than is required to qualify as a refugee in the first instance. 
Indeed the refoulement clause far from being narrower may be considered 
broader than Article 1(2). It can be said to cover situation where the refugee 
convention does not apply but a threat to the individual’s life and liberty still 
exists. Most likely this is situations where a Convention ground for 
persecution cannot be established. As Lauterpacht argues: 
The Article must therefore be construed to include circumstances of 
generalized violence which pose a threat to life or freedom whether or not 
this arises from persecution[….]Adopting the language of the Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in respect of non-
refoulement in a human rights context, the appropriate test will be whether it 
                                                
243 Weis (n2) 303and 341. 
244 A.Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951:Articles2–11,13–
37(UNHCR Division of International Protection, Geneva, 1997) 231–2.  
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can be shown that the per- son concerned would be exposed to a ‘real risk’ of 
persecution or other pertinent threat.245 
Case law has broadly supported the assertions above that although Article 1(f) 
and Article 33(2) may seem to condone the concept of an undeserving refugee 
this concept does not allow the person to be removed to a country of danger 
however undeserving of refugee status they may be found to be.   
 
In ECHR member states Article 1(f) has been used to exclude individuals from 
refugee status but has rarely been effective at allowing actual expulsion of the 
‘undeserving refugee.’ The ECHR, in particular Article 3, has been successful 
at operating as a fail safe to prevent abuse of Article 1(f). The UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT) includes a similar provision, also at Article 3, on the 
expulsion, return ("refoulement”) or extradition of a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture.246 Although use of other human rights 
instruments to prevent Article 1(f) operating so as to place individuals in 
danger is reassuring it is also conceptually unsatisfactory. Refugee law might 
be said to include its own safety mechanism is the shape of article 33 but with 
33(2) this is not a sufficiently robust protection mechanism. Refugee law needs 
to acknowledge that the concept of the undeserving refugee has no place 
alongside the universality of human rights.  
 
                                                
245 (n 53) 39-40. 
246 [1984] Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 #entry into force 26 June 1987, in 
accordance with article 27 (1).  
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This chapter has sought to build on the foundations laid down in chapter two. 
If we recall Alexy’s key claim that values inevitably enter into the legal system 
as one cannot satisfy the claim to correctness if decisions made are not 
justifiable and justified. Moral rights provide good justifications and it is this 
interest in correctness that justifies human rights. This chapter has 
demonstrated that human rights, as special moral rights, are justified and of 
high priority. Thus, human rights provide strong reasons to make a decision, 
have heavy weighting in balancing and have conditional priority over other 
rights. If we consider what Raz terms ‘exclusionary reasons’, a second-order 
reason not to act on a first order reason, we might state as our starting point 
that human rights are capable of outweighing other rights in that they provide 
good exclusionary reasons not to act on other reasons. In other words, human 
rights are capable of ‘trumping’ other rights because they provide either better 
reasons to act than other principles, such as priority to compatriots. In order 
to determine the strength of a human right claim in refugee law, in terms of 
conclusive reasons, we must ask ourselves what reasons might be conclusive 
in which circumstances. This is the task of the subsequent chapters, to 
consider firstly the circumstances of a human rights claim unfulfilled by the 
primary addressee and, secondly, the specific circumstances of addressing a 
human rights claim to the international community but the guiding principle 
set out here is that refugees’ rights have conditional priority over public 
interest. This chapter begins with the claim that the principle of human 
dignity and principles of human rights are always at stake in refugee law cases 
and sets out why this is the case. This chapter recalls that, following Alexy, 
competing principles must be shown to be a greater abstract importance or 
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value to be ranked higher in conditional preference. It has been argued here, 
in relation to human rights, that conditional preference can be given to the 
principle of human rights protection. This excludes greater weight being 
given to the claims of host states than to the claims of refugees unless, on the 
facts, greater weight can be given to the competing principle in arguing either 
the infringement of human rights is minimal or the importance of satisfying 
the competing principle is so great so as to outweigh the infringement. 
Further more, it has been demonstrated that some fundamental rights are 
capable of containing balancing in the characterisation of the right such that 
they take on the characteristics of a rule and become absolute. In these cases, it 
is argued, definitive preference can be given to absolute fundamental rights 
which definitively excludes greater weight being given to the claims of host 
states when the refugee’s claim concerns these absolute rights. These claims 
provide the background standards for interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention and places limits on plausible interpretations of the Convention.  
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This chapter considers a background principle of refugee law, namely the 
presumption that the primary duty to protect human rights falls on the home 
state. The content of this primary duty, based on notions of political and 
sovereign legitimacy and the concept of collective violence, is significant in 
determining the content of the persecution criterion and the protective scope 
of article 1(2). Closer examination of the notion of ‘the political’, in particular, 
suggests a broader interpretative scope of article 1(2) than is often applied in 
refugee status determination cases. The claim here is that the notion of 
refugeehood is tied to the idea of political legitimacy in that the refugee is the 
victim, either directly or by omission, of illegitimate state violence. Chapter one 
noted lack of national protection under the Refugee Convention could be seen 
as a secondary element of the persecution criterion, namely that persecution 
inherently denotes a lack of national protection.1   
 
This chapter argues that the state, under the current conception of 
international law, is presumed to be the primary guarantor of the rights of its 
citizens. This requires not only that the state respects the negative duty of 
non-interference but also that it satisfies the positive duty of protecting 
human rights. The argument put forward in chapter one was that 
international protection under the Refugee Convention is extended to 
refugees, in contradistinction to migrants, without inevitably demanding 
                                                
1 For discussion on the shifting meaning of persecution within in refugee law see 
Fortin ‘The Meaning of Protection in the Refugee Definition’ (2000) 12 International 
Journal Refugee Law 548.  
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restrictive interpretations of article 1(2).  Goodwin-Gill has argued that in 
interpreting persecution requires an examination of reasons, interests and 
means.2 Reasons refer to illegitimate ends, interests to the human right 
threatened or violated and measures denotes the means by the agent seeks to 
achieve the illegitimate ends. Interpreting persecution, then, involves 
analysing these three elements, which, in turn, depends on an understanding 
of what constitutes illegitimate ends, which threatened interests are relevant 
and which measures constitute illegitimate violence. This chapter explores the 
three elements of the definition by examining the notions of illegitimate 
violence, the content of the concept of human rights and types of action that 
constitute illegitimate violence.3 The 7th circuit court observed that the concept 
of legitimacy necessarily enters into considerations of treatment constituting 
persecution, stating: 
Although there is no statutory definition of persecution, we have 
described it as punishment or the infliction of harm for political, 
religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize as 
legitimate.4 
 
 
The previous chapter sought to demonstrate the primacy of claims to human 
rights protection. It has been argued that this gives the rights of refugees’ 
conditional priority over competing claims. This claim is further strengthened 
when one considers the nature of the claim to human rights protection made 
                                                
2 Goodwin Gill The Refugee in International Law (Clarendon Press 1996) 78. See also 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University 
Press 3rd ed 2010). 
3 The concept of illegitimate violence used here would include legitimate end that is 
pursued too far so as to fall foul of the principle of proportionality. 
4 Ambati v. Reno 233 F3d. 1054 (2000) (emphasis added).   
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by refugees. The claim to human rights protection is not being made in a 
vacuum but within the current system of international law. As set out in 
chapter one, this system operates as protection against illegitimate or 
wrongfully exercised authority. This assertion forms the basis of the claim that 
asylum is a political institution with refugee status to be awarded only to 
those who have suffered political wrongs. This view is not rejected here. What 
is rejected, as alluded to in chapter one, is that a restrictive interpretation of 
refugeehood follows from this claim that asylum is a political institution. 
Whether or not certain people, situations or types of human rights violations 
are included, or excluded, from refugee status depends on the notion of 
‘political’ employed. If a refugee is a victim of a political wrong then the 
question ‘what constitutes a political wrong?’ must be examined. It is now 
widely accepted that persecution is not concerned only with officially 
sanctioned political acts but the limits of the term ‘political’ are still hotly 
contested. Refugee status is now routinely recognised for victims of human 
rights violations inflicted by non-state actors refugee status yet claims made 
by victims of economic mismanagement by state officials are routinely 
rejected.5  Without further examination of the concept of ‘political’ this cannot 
be explained or, indeed, critiqued. 
 
The chapter will first consider the claim to human rights protection made in 
refugee law. It will then proceed to consider the content of the notion of 
human rights, addressing briefly which type of rights might be said to be 
                                                
5 Although there has been considerable controversy over non-state agents of 
persecution the jurisprudence on the matter has become so settled that Germany was 
heavily criticised for maintaining the requirement of government linked persecution 
and in 2006 was forced to amend the domestic interpretation in line with EU 
Qualification Directive (n 18 introduction) which stipulates that the agent of 
persecution is not a determinative factor in refugee status.  
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human rights. The remainder of the chapter will examine facets of political 
legitimacy, firstly, the concept of political legitimacy itself will be considered, 
then the related notions of ‘the political’ and political acts will be explored 
and, finally, the argument that collective violence is a type of violence relevant 
to refugee law will be put forward. It will be argued that viewing the 
persecution criterion through the lens of collective violence will throw new 
light on the protective scope of article 1(2).  
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Having explored the foundations of human rights the question remains as to 
how human rights operate in refugee law. Human rights operate at two levels 
in international refugee law. Human rights violations underpin the 
persecution criterion. Human rights also operate as the justification for the 
denial of state sovereignty of the home state inherent in granting protection to 
its citizen. The latter function requires further enquiry into human rights; state 
practice cannot be criticised on the grounds that it does not meet current 
human rights standards without first explaining why human rights standards 
ought to be adhered to and what these human rights standards are.  
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Before proceeding to examine the notion of a ‘political wrong’ this chapter 
will say something further about why any notion of ‘politics’ plays a role in 
refugee law. Some reasons for this have been given in chapter one, from the 
point of view of the receiving state. It was argued that it is the treatment by 
the country of origin, or home state, that allows the host state to deny the 
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usual rights of sovereignty of a state over its citizens. This view of refugee law 
is predicated on the assumption that states have rights over, or a claim to, 
their citizens. This is a foundational assumption of Westphalian sovereignty 
and, as such, a foundational claim of international law. It is, however, now a 
double-edged sword for states. The notion that states have a claim over their 
citizens is the flip side to the far more important claim that states have 
responsibilities towards their citizens.6 The importance of this claim to 
international law is reflected in refugee law, namely in the extension of 
protection to those whose country has either directly violated the negative 
duty of non-interference or failed to fulfil the protective duty. In other words, 
the notion of political legitimacy, as setting the boundaries of sovereignty, is 
key to refugee law as refugee status can only be extended to those in need of 
secondary (or surrogate) protection. The content of the duty of the home state 
is, then, key to determining whether there is persecution (and lack of national 
protection) that transforms the traveller from a migrant, asking for entry, to a 
refugee, asserting their claim to protection.7 The concept of political 
legitimacy, it is argued, patrols the border between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ 
and the content of this concept is determined by the content human rights. 
Human rights, it is argued, are now the benchmark for legitimacy, as Risse 
notes “[w]hen organized power is criticized for harming those whom it ought 
to benefit, appeals to human rights tend to be used.”8  
                                                
6 Indeed, as Gilbert argues, in an increasingly globalised world, territorial borders are 
the “strongest reminders of the Westphalian paradigm” n 184 (chapter 3) 176. 
7 This claim to protection is set out further in chapter five, here we are concerned only 
with the issue of domestic legitimacy- how the home state’s duty to its citizens can be 
framed in order to identify violations of this primary duty. The secondary duty on 
the international community, what might be termed as ‘international legitimacy’ 
occupies the following chapter. 
8 ‘What are Human Rights? Human Rights as Membership Rights in the Global 
Order’ (2008) Kennedy School of Government Working Paper RWP07-033, 1.  
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As Vernant notes, there is always “a certain element of relativity” in the 
classification of acts as ‘persecution’ as “a mere finding that certain 
circumstances exists in the country of origin is not in itself sufficient; the facts 
must be appraised in the light of certain standards.”9 Persecution, it could be 
argued, is not verifiable as an objective (absolute) truth in the manner claimed 
by those advocating the use of persecution as demonstrative of forced 
migration; it is capable only of relative truth. Thus, labelling an action as 
persecution and a ‘political wrong’ is dependant on a notion of (political) 
legitimacy against which to judge the actions of the state.10 For Weber the 
definition of ‘state’ itself has a close connection to legitimacy; a state is a 
community that “(successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory”11 and there is no state unless power is wielded 
legitimately.  
 
Weber does not give the concept of legitimacy specific content but it is enough 
for the present purpose to apply the definition of a state posited by Weber to 
the situation of refugeehood. If a state can only be said to be a state if power is 
wielded legitimately then all those subject to illegitimate ‘use of physical force’ 
                                                
9 Vernant (n 7 introduction) 7.   
10 There is a similar view advanced by Sternberg in relation to interpretation of 
refugee law in North America. Sternberg argues, “the grounds of refugee protection 
are not fixed but parallel discriminatory social and political attitudes towards defined 
groups” The Grounds of Refugee Protection in the Context of International Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law Canadian and United States Case Law Compared (2002 Martin 
Nijhoff) 1.  
11 Weber ‘I Politics as a Vocation: II Economy and Society’ in David Held (ed), States 
and Society (Blackwells 1919). See also Lewis ‘Power, Legitimacy and the State’ in D. 
Held et al (eds) States and Societies (Blackwell Publishers 1983). As Lewis notes 
Machiavelli puts forward a similar definition of the state, arguing, “there are two 
ways to rule by law [i.e. legitimately] or by force. The first way is natural to men, and 
the second to beasts” (cited 414).   
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are living in, to borrow Rawls’ terminology, ‘out-law states’12 and, under the 
classic view of international law, must be considered refugees. These are 
people whose ‘assigned protector’13 has failed them and who can legitimately 
be seen as beyond the jurisdiction of their home state because it no longer 
constitutes a state.14 A ‘political wrong’ could be seen as any action within a 
given territory that could be deemed as illegitimate. The claim of a refugee, 
then, is to protection from this political wrong, which, by definition, cannot be 
sought from the home state.  
 
It has been argued by Anker, amongst others, that more expansive 
interpretations of persecution reflect a new human rights paradigm emerging 
in refugee law15, with an emphasis on a broader understanding of conduct 
constituting persecution, so as to include the acts, in particular, of rape and 
                                                
12 I have not used the terminology of ‘failed states’, although this is how illegitimate 
states could be described in Weberian terms, to avoid confusion. I have used Rawls’ 
term ‘out-law states’ as it conveys a similar sense of judgment of the legitimacy of the 
state through the actions of the government. Rawls also makes a useful distinction 
between ‘out-law states’ and ‘burdened societies’, where circumstances beyond the 
control of the Government render it difficult or impossible for a Government to meet 
the basic needs of citizens, even if they aspire to do so Law of Peoples (Harvard 
University Press 1999). Price also employs this distinction, see n 3 introduction 72-75. 
13 A notion borrowed from Goodin ‘What’s so Special about our Fellow Countrymen’ 
(1998) 98 Ethics 663.  
14 And international law is based on states not territories. As Benyani argues “the 
theory of State responsibility rests on a simplistic but complex practical proposition. 
It is that every state must be held responsible for the performance of its international 
obligations under the rules of international law” prevention of refugee flows could be 
seen as one such international obligation see Benyani 'State Responsibility for the 
Prevention and Resolution of Forced Population Displacements’ (1995) 7 
International Journal of Refugee Law 130, 130. 
15 Price speaks of the trend in Commonwealth countries towards recognition of 
gender-targeted violence as persecution but this shift can also be identified in US 
jurisprudence on persecution see ʻPersecution Complex: Justifying Aslyum Law's 
Preference for Persecuted Peopleʼ (2011) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 413.  The 
trend towards recognition of gender persecution as is acknowledged by the UNHCR 
in  ‘Guideline on Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2)’ 
HCR/GIP/02/01 in which the UNHCR state the evolution of interpretation of 
persecution have “run parallel to, and have been assisted by, developments in 
international human rights law and standards” 3.   
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genital mutilation.16 Price, on the other hand, argues that this shift away from 
the paradigmatic examples of persecution to a broader interpretation is 
evidence that the humanitarian concept of asylum (asylum as catering for 
those in need) a model of refuge incompatible with the foundations of 
international refugee law. For Price, and others such as Martin, the idea of ‘the 
political’ restrains refugee law, limiting the granting of refugee status to those 
who have suffered ‘political wrongs.’ The scope of the persecution criterion, 
then, becomes coextensive with the scope of political legitimacy and human 
rights. Restrictive notions of human rights, tied almost inevitably with 
restrictive notions of the political, have the impact of limiting the scope of 
article 1(2). Even those thought of as champions of progressive notions of 
global justice, such as Pogge, have continued to cling to restrictive notions of 
human rights. Pogge states: 
[h]uman rights violations, to count as such, must be in some sense official (...) 
[H]uman rights thus protect persons only against violations from certain 
sources. Human rights can be violated by governments, certainly, and by 
government agencies and officials, by the general staff of an army at war, and 
probably also by the leaders of a guerilla movement or of a large corporation 
– but not by a petty criminal or by a violent husband.17 
Thus although human rights have been used to set limits to political 
legitimacy, the notion of ‘the political’ seems also to be used to limit the 
                                                
16 See Anker who argues “states are interpreting key criteria of the refugee definition 
in light of human rights principles”, Anker (n 83 chapter 1) 134 135. Anker refers to 
these acts as gender-specific which, definitionally, they are not- and men can be 
victims of both- but it is clear that in the context of a discussion on persecution, rape 
as a weapon is more prevalent as a male perpetrated crime against women. Genital-
mutilation as a custom is centred on female genital mutilation. This discussion is 
expanded in chapter six. 
17 World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Polity 
Press 2002) 57. See also Roth Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 1999).  
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concept, or at least the use of, human rights. This might be seen as a 
formulation of a practical conception of human rights, which “ define a 
boundary of legitimate political action.”18  
 
However an expansive notion of human rights in refugee law (and with it a 
broader understanding of conduct constituting persecution) can be explained 
whilst retaining the notion of ‘political wrongs’ and whilst maintaining an 
expansive concept of human rights. This claim is not based on a broader 
humanitarian concept of asylum but rather on something quite similar to 
Price’s preferred political concept of asylum. The notion of human rights, 
similarly, can retain a political character without the implications Pogge 
insists upon. Although the broader concept of asylum can be seen as 
responding to need, as Price charges, the justification for responding is not the 
need of the refugee19 but in the cause of the need, namely that the home state 
has failed in its duty. It is this failure that explains a break from the norm in 
international law of each state being responsible for its’ own citizens and, as 
noted above, justifies one state denying the claims of another state to its’ 
citizens. It follows logically from the premise that each state is viewed as 
responsible for their own citizens that the citizens of failed states are singled 
out for refugee status. The question of the scope of the persecution criterion 
                                                
18 Wenar ‘The Nature of Human Rights’ in Real World Justice A. Føllesdal and T. 
Pogge (eds) (Kluwer 2005) 285. Although it is a conception still justified by and based 
on what Wenar calls ‘the orthodox conception’ of human rights, namely one that 
defines human rights as rights held by virtue of humanity. The distinction between 
the two conceptions of human rights, then, is perhaps best summed up as one of 
context, with the orthodox conception applying in all contexts but the practical 
conception being used for a practical end in a specific context, that of state 
sovereignty. 
19 Although the need of the refugee could form the basis of a separate argument with 
need as a reason for acting. This argument is not considered here but in moral terms, 
at least, it could be deemed persuasive. The justification for international action to 
assist refugees is explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. 
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comes down to the scope of the concepts of human rights, sovereignty, 
legitimacy and ‘the political.’  
 
The claim that human rights is a political concept is entirely compatible with 
the traditional view of refugee law as providing ‘substitute protection’, 
refugee status could still be seen, as was envisaged by the drafters, as “a 
response to disfranchisement from the usual benefits of nationality.”20 In 
chapter one it was claimed that in order for persecution to operate as evidence 
of forced migration, “we need to…assign a value to p [persecution].” It could 
be argued, the value we ascribe to ‘p’ has changed but the task we are 
undertaking is the same- determining the content of persecution based on 
notions of legitimacy-the traditional statist view of international law and its 
corresponding political model of asylum need not require, therefore, a 
restrictive notion of refugeehood.  
 
The broader concept of refugeehood is, of course, already widely supported 
by those who view refugee law as a branch of Human Rights law and 
advocate a more rights-based approach to asylum adjudication. As Bhabha 
notes “the field of human rights has undergone significant transformation 
since the mid twentieth century, when the principle normative framework for 
refugee law was established”21 and it would be quite surprising if refugee law 
did not reflect this transformation. Refugee law, then, is, or ought to be, 
response to shifting notions of human rights and ‘the political.’ The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, for example, contains an 
                                                
20 Memo from the S-G, U.N. Doc.E/AC.32/2, 13 Jan 3 1950 cited Weis (n 47 chapter 1) 
12. 
21 Bhahba ʻThe Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rightsʼ 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 167 169.  
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expansive definition of persecution, which it could be argued reflects the 
shifting notion of illegitimate violence from the 1951 Convention to the 1998 
Statute of the ICC.22 In the first attempt to define persecution under 
international law, Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute defines persecution as: 
“the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.” This 
allows for shifting notions of fundamental rights and violations of these rights 
as international law evolves.23   
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The country of origin is central to international refugee law, without an 
illegitimate act of that state against its own citizen no need for refuge would 
arise. As Tomuschat notes, if “[the country of origin] behaved in consonance 
with current human rights standards, the whole problem would simply 
disappear.”24 Here the evaluative function of international human rights 
norms and laws are key; it is against these standards that the country of origin 
is judged and how it is determined if the act is persecutory. This also suggests 
that the view of international refugee law as neutral in regards to the country 
of origin is misplaced; granting refuge is inevitably a judgment against the 
                                                
22 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1 2002). Further, crimes against humanity 
under Article 7(1)(h) includes: “persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender..., or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph (Article 7) or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court” (emphasis added).   
23 See also Robinson  ‘Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, 
Legal Precision and the Dictates of the Public Conscience’ in Lattanzi and Schabas 
(eds) Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 (Il Serente 
1999). 
24 Tomuschat  ʻState Responsibility and the Country of Originʼ in Gowlland- Debbas 
V (ed) The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law Issues 
(Kluwer International 1996).  
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country of origin.25 There is simply no way to determine refugee status 
without making a judgment on whether the home state has violated the 
human rights of one its own citizens (or failed to act to prevent a violation by 
a non-state agent). This determination cannot be made without some element 
of judgment, the awarding of refugee status is a statement that the country of 
origin has acted illegitimately vis a vis that individual. Refugee law is, as Price 
argues, expressive in character, “asylum is intertwined with the evaluation 
and condemnation of other states’ internal practices.”26 In the case of those 
whose human rights cannot be respected or protected at home, international 
refugee law is designed to provide “prospect of legitimate disengagement from 
the community in favour of surrogate protection elsewhere.”27  
 
The evaluative function of human rights norms and law results in both 
international documents such as UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR, and domestic 
documents such as constitutions28, playing an important role in guiding 
judicial interpretations of key criteria in article 1(2). There can be little 
understanding of concepts such as persecution, refugeehood and forced 
migration without reference to human rights standards. In the Australian case 
of Wang, Merkel J stated the term ‘refugee’ is “in turn, to be understood as 
written against the background of international human rights law …”29. There 
is, then, a link between refugee law and human rights law in the 
                                                
25 See for further elaboration of this argument see discussion of Price (n 73 chapter 1). 
Granting asylum, Price argues, “entails the expression of condemnation” of the home 
state behaviour 71. This argument is expanded in chapter six, p1. 
26 ibid. 
27  ʻReconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protectionʼ (1991) 4 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 113 (emphasis added). 
28 Particularly in the case of Germany where the Basic Law guarantees a right to 
asylum for the political persecuted (article 17). 
29 Wang v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1599 para 73. 
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determination of the persecution criterion of article 1(2). Goodwin-Gill argues 
persuasively that the persecution criterion “lock[s] the refugee firmly into the 
human rights spectrum”30 by placing human rights violations at the centre of 
refugee status. Human rights are being claimed (respected and/or violated) in 
the first place in domestic political sphere. In this way, human rights 
violations in refugee law are ‘political wrongs.’   
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As elucidated above, outlaw states are those states that “flout the 
requirements for international legitimacy by violating basic human rights.”31  
The key to explaining and justifying restrictive, or expansive, concepts of 
refugeehood and persecution lies in the model of human rights used to give 
content to these concepts. The boundaries of political legitimacy are set, it is 
argued, by the notion of human rights. If we claim that sovereignty does not 
entitle a state to illegitimately interfere with the human rights of its citizens 
we must also be clear on what rights constitute human rights. In the previous 
chapter the justification for human rights was established and a view of 
human rights as rights designed to protect an individual’s capacity to form 
and carry out their own life plan was put forward. The notion of a dignified 
life was also considered. Refugee status decisions, then, centre on whether 
there has been act which has prevented, or will prevent, the applicant from 
choosing and/or realising their own life plan (with the proviso that the life 
                                                
30 Goodwin-Gill Refugees and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2003) 34. See 
also Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed, 2010). 
 
31 Cited in Price (n 73 chapter 1) 73. 
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plan must be ‘socially manageable’32, if it is not, interference might be justified 
on this basis.)  
 
In order to constitute a human rights violation, the act must prevent the 
individual from forming or realising their own life plan, it cannot merely 
minimally interfere with this plan. Take, for example, the right to education: if 
one accepts that everyone has a right to education, as to be deprived of any 
education would seriously limit one’s ability to formulate a life plan33, it 
follows that this requires some educational opportunities to be made available 
to everyone. It does not follow that everyone be entitled to be educated 
wherever and in whatever subject they wish. A policy by a government to 
exclude a certain section of the population from formal education would be, 
therefore, a human rights violation but university entry requirements would 
not. And, as Raz notes, whether the right was enforceable against a specific 
government at a specific moment might well depend on political, social and 
economic conditions at that time and as such the response of the international 
community to a denial of the right to education might vary.34 Similarly, Griffin 
maintains that the right to work is not a human right but that the right to be 
provided with opportunities to work may well be a human right for all adults 
depending on socio-economic conditions.35  
                                                
32 i.e. the life plan cannot contain significant infringement of other’s human rights. 
33 Griffin expresses this as “one must have at least a certain minimum education and 
information and the chance to learn what other’s think” to render the choice of one’s 
own course through life real. Griffin (n 20 chapter 3) 311. 
34 Raz ‘Human Rights without Foundationsʼ in Tasioulas and  Besson (ed) The 
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2010) 336. 
35 Cited in Tasiloulas (n 15 in introduction)(n 13 introduction) 79. The argument is 
that as work is not the only method of securing resources, the right to work is not a 
human right. Tasioulas persuasively disputes this, arguing that even if this were the 
case (which it presently is not), the opportunity to work could be seen as a vital part 
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This view of human rights creates a basic list of requirements for justifying a 
right as a human right. Nickel suggests that in determining whether a right is a 
human right we must ask, and satisfy, six questions. An adapted version of 
this list is proposed here, to determine whether a right is a human right we 
must ask ourselves: 
1) does the norm respond to a severe threat?36 
2) Does it protect something of great importance? 
3) Can it be formulated as a right of all people today?37 
4) Is it a specific political right rather than some weaker norm?38 
 
How does this view of human rights fit with the notion of political legitimacy? 
Nickel’s list suggests a strong link between human rights and ‘the political’ by 
requiring that the right claimed as a human right be political in nature. 
Conceptions of human rights as political are not, therefore, linked only to 
                                                
of one’s life plan, see ibid 90. The connection between human rights and current 
conditions is explored in more detail below.  
36 Nickel requires the threat to be both severe and widespread in ʻHow Human Rights 
Produce Duties to Protect and Provide’ 15 (1993) Human Rights Quarterly 77. 
However, it is argued this appears to conflate the definition of human rights with 
issues of violation and enforcement. The definition of a human right is logically prior 
to the question of violation or enforcement, a right may therefore never be actually 
threatened with violation (or be the threat may be widespread and violations 
frequent) and still be a human right. It is sufficient, then, that the any threat to this 
right would be severe even if we cannot at this point conceive of how this right might 
actually be threatened. Sadly, most of the rights we claim as human rights have 
already been threatened but in the case of so-called emerging human rights this 
requirement of ‘widespread’ threat might prove problematic.  
37 This might seem to suggest an historically limited concept of human rights but it 
requires only that it the right is reliable “in the sense that rational, reflective, and 
morally sensitive people continue over time to find them appealing and do not 
discover good reasons for rejecting them” (Griffin n 17 in chapter 3 61). 
38 Nickel (n 35) 91. This list is truncated, the original list included also requirement 
that “the normative burdens imposed by the right are tolerable and capable of being 
equitably distributed” and that the right is feasible in “an ample majority of 
countries.” This requirements, it is argued, are requirements of enforcement and 
feasibility, which are, as stated above, logically subsequent to the definition of human 
rights. This issue has been addressed also in the introduction.    
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refugee law but also seen widely in the characterisation of human rights in 
general.39 The question is then raised as to the impact of characterising human 
rights as political. Is Pogge’s assertion that this limits human rights to rights 
against the state well founded? The answer to this can be found in examining 
the scope of political legitimacy. 
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A political conception of human rights might be defined as one where human 
rights are tied to the conditions of legitimate government. It can be seen, for 
example, in Rawls’ theory of human rights. For Rawls the impact of asserting 
that human rights are political is the claim that human rights violations are 
capable of generating a justification for intervention.40 There seems to be few 
solid reasons for limiting human rights to those justifying intervention alone. 
If one views human rights as merely triggers for intervention, argues Griffin, 
this overlooks a more foundational (and individual) purpose, namely the 
protection of human dignity.41 There is, as Griffin remarks, some 
implausibility in attempts to entirely disconnect human rights from how they 
have been and continue to be used, namely to protect human dignity against 
                                                
39 Indeed, as Nickel’s inclusion, along with Pogge above, in this debate shows, the 
idea of human rights as inherently political in nature is put forward not only by those 
who might be thought of sceptical of human rights or the claims of human rights to 
special protection but also by those who champion more expansive notions of justice.   
40 Raz (n 33) assumes the moral importance of state sovereignty as requiring special 
justification for any intervention, this is not a view the author follows, however, it is 
accepted that even without assigning special moral importance to sovereignty, as 
sovereignty is politically (and indeed legally) recognised, it requires justification to 
go against the norm of non-intervention which, it is argued, can be provided by 
human rights violations just as Raz states.  
41 Griffin ‘Human Rights and Autonomy of International Law’ in Tasioulas and 
Besson The Philosophy of International law (Oxford University Press 2010) 346. 
! 8$$ 
abuse by those with power.42 Human rights are simply not used, nor have 
they ever been, only to justify intervention, if so the International Criminal 
Court would not exist, nor would the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (whose role is to 
seek protection of the human rights of refugees and internally displaced 
persons). Alternatively, Griffin suggests:  
the function of human rights in international law is (1) to make international 
relations go further than they otherwise would,  
and (2) to promote human rights….their purpose is to regulate the behaviour 
of those in power.43 
This suggests refugee law has a soft law function as well as real world 
application.  
 
Human rights, according to Beitz, should be treated as sui generis norms 
designed to protect individual’s most basic interests from standard threats. 
This is an overtly political conception where the standard threat is posed by 
the government, either through direct actions or inaction that allows non-state 
agents to violate human rights. Rawls’ human rights stem from, and form a 
part of, his theory of political justice between peoples, focusing on justifications 
for external interference in domestic politics, and as such the list produced is 
more limited than many conceptions of human rights, excluding, for example, 
freedoms of expression and associations.44 Yet, as Griffin notes, Rawls’ theory 
contains no internal justification for truncating the list of human rights so 
severely. The explanation, often given, that these are rights which states might 
                                                
42 This is a point made also by Griffin in response to Raz’ political conception of 
human rights, see ibid 347. 
43 ibid 353. 
44 Rawls (n 11). 
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feel justify intervention cannot explain why these rights are ‘urgent rights’45 
by relying solely on the likelihood of political agreement, this not only 
removes a traditional function of human rights in holding governments to 
account (internationally if not domestically), but also fails to provide content 
for the concept of human rights against which a right can be analysed to 
determine if it is indeed a human right. 
 
For Raz, as well, the link between sovereignty and human rights is strong, 
although he does not see such an exact overlap between legitimate authority 
and respect for human rights as Rawls, he does develop a link between state 
sovereignty and human rights46, relevant in particular for explaining the 
international function of human rights.47 Raz defines human rights as “rights 
which set limits to the sovereignty of states, in that their actual or anticipated 
violation is a (defeasible) reason for taking action against the violator in the 
international arena.”48 In order to be human right, a right must contain three 
features, it must be a) an individually held moral right, b) capable of imposing 
a duty on states to respect and promote this right49 and c) failure to respect 
and promote this right must remove the usual immunity from intervention 
enjoyed by sovereign states.  
                                                
45 ibid. 
46 Raz quite rightly argues that the limits to legitimate authority can be set by factors 
other than human rights. If we take the example of a constitutional democracy, we 
can see that limits to legitimate authority are set by the constitution (such as the 
structure of government, which is not connected necessarily to human rights but to a 
concept of politics) and the voters (in principle at the very least).  
47 Raz (n 23 in chapter 3) 23-109.  
48 Raz (n 33) 328. 
49 Although Raz does concede that b) may leap frogged in cases where multinationals 
or supra-state organisations can be said to have primary responsibility to fulfilling 
this duty ibid 327. 
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Before proceeding to examine the impact of the link between political 
legitimacy and human rights, we pause to address a key concern in 
emphasising such a link, namely that this produces an historically relative 
concept of human rights. A political conception of human rights might be 
seen as (too) intimately connected with prevailing international conditions 
and as such the types of rights we consider human rights, rights capable of 
imposing duties on states and as justifying pro tanto intervention might be 
seen as too dependent on global conditions. This might run the risk of 
removing the ahistoricity of human rights and transforming these rights from 
the universal foundations set out in chapter three into historically and 
politically relative rights. Yet as Tasioulas remarks, whilst an increase in 
instability might lower the standard of human rights norms, “the emergence 
of more stable geo-political environment…might justify significant reduced 
levels of state immunity and a corresponding increase in the number and 
demandingness of human rights norms.”50  
 
Whilst it is important, particularly for refugee law, that human rights norms 
shift in line with social conditions, it is also important that the conception of 
human rights norms contain some core elements to measure newly emerging 
rights against. As such, a two level definition of human rights might be 
offered, with core elements contained in the notion of personhood but an ‘in-
practice’ notion of human rights more closely tied to geo-political conditions 
as an additional layer. Just as Tasioulas suggests, in discussion of Raz’s 
                                                
50 Tasioulas ‘Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for International Intervention?’ 4 
(2009) Philosophy Compass 938 944. 
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human rights theory, that ‘in-principle’ judgments regarding intervention 
justified on human rights grounds must “be keyed to certain geo-political 
conditions”51, in-principle decision as to the awarding of refugee status for 
victims of certain types of human rights violations must respond to changing 
conditions but whilst bearing in the mind the core notion of personhood.  
 
But how does one judge whether a state has violated an individual’s human 
rights when there are such varied circumstances across the globe? It is often 
argued that if one adopts the same standard for human rights around the 
world, the result is a rush to the lowest common denominator.52 One can 
concede some link between historical circumstances and the content of human 
rights whilst maintaining that the idea of human rights as individual moral 
rights connected to human capacity for autonomy is an immutable part of our 
understanding of human rights.  
 
In Griffin’s view this suggests human rights as having two features: 
personhood and, what he terms, practicalities (whether right in question is or 
ought to be relevant in current geo-political conditions with reference to 
historical role of human rights.)53 The shifting geo-political conditions might, 
optimistically, result in a reduced recourse to the notion of human rights, if 
rights were generally secured but it might also throw up new rights (in 
response to new violations or wrongs) which need to be assessed as human 
rights or not and provided with some content. Gewirth’s generic features of 
                                                
51 ibid 946. 
52 In particular this is a criticism levelled at Rawls’ truncated list of human rights, 
which in an effort to be applicable in all societies fails to mention some rights which 
might be considered foundational, such as the right to freedom of expression and 
freedom of association. 
53 Griffin (n 40) 346. 
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agency do not produce a static list of goods one requires to achieve one’s 
purpose, instead the generic features are used as a standard to measure goods 
against to see if a particular good is necessary in a particular society, at a 
particular time for an agent to achieve her purpose. Personhood can serve the 
same role as the generic features of agency here and provide a test against 
which, for refugee law, state behaviour can be measured. As Capps explains, 
this means an agent can rightfully claim “Z is a non-subtractive good relative 
at the time (Y) to the place (X) in which I live.”54 In practical terms, this might 
mean, when assessing a human right, that different levels of protection for, or 
fulfilment of the right are required, an agent in one society might be able to 
claim successfully that her human right to education has been violated 
through a denial of access to university education (although it most likely will 
also be a violation of right to be free from discrimination), whereas in another 
society the same right would be violated only if the individual had been 
denied access to basic education. The key is that a right to some education is 
established as human right and the variation in standards does not mean that 
it is not a necessary good for forming and realising one’s own life plan nor 
that denial of the right is not a failure to fully recognise and respect an 
individual’s personhood.  
 
Human rights are both intimately connected with prevailing historical 
conditions and contain non-contingent factors. These are required to separate 
out human rights from other rights to provide adequate philosophical 
coherence and a usable concept that could be transferred into the legal sphere. 
This, it is argued, can be adequately provided by the notion of personhood. 
                                                
54 Capps (n 83 chapter three) 112. 
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The notion of personhood might be summed up as: a) stemming from the 
value of individual autonomy and liberty as necessary conditions for human 
agency and b) a status held by all humans by virtue of being human, which 
demands recognition by others. This can provide determinate content to act as 
guide to interpretation for those working with human rights laws. For refugee 
law it provides content against which to measure claims to ‘new’ human 
rights, the violation of which prima facie would satisfy the persecution 
criterion. International refugee law is concerned with violations of individual 
autonomy and liberty that amount to a denial of, or failure recognise, 
personhood. The exact content of human rights might vary in response to 
shifting geo-political norms, or prevailing conditions of international 
legitimacy but the core notion of human rights remains and it is against this 
backdrop that the persecution criterion is to be interpreted.     
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The political concept of human rights maps on to the claim in refugee law that 
international protection is extended to those victims of illegitimate violence. 
In this conception of international human rights law, refugee law must take its 
place in the general schema, the function of refugee status is to offer 
protection to those victims of power and by doing so to recognise and respect 
personhood where it is most threatened. Shifting interpretation of persecution 
can be seen as a reflection of changing concepts of state legitimacy (even if not 
always expressed as such) rather than a new paradigm for refugeehood. In 
order to be persuasive, Price, Martin and those advocating a political model of 
asylum must be able to link the concept of persecution as a political wrong to 
a doctrine of rights that explains why the relevant state obligations (in 
determining state legitimacy) are confined to civil and political rights and 
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cannot be extended to social and economic rights. To be a coherent 
explanation for limiting refugeehood the claim must be, when excluding 
certain experiences from refugeehood, that these experiences are not 
experiences of a political wrong and therefore do not constitute persecution.  
 
Carlier, citing gender persecution as an example, observes, “just as standards 
concerning the content and level of protection of human rights have evolved, 
equally the causes of exile included in the concept of persecution within the 
meaning of the Convention can change and still be included within this 
definition.”55 It is not the theoretical foundations of the concept of asylum or 
refugeehood that have changed but the view of what constitutes a legitimate 
state- of what amounts to persecution and when national protection can be 
said to be lacking- that has evolved. Hathaway argues that the plurality of 
systems “restricts any attempt to define in absolute terms the nature of the 
duty of protection which a state owes to its people”56 but the notion of 
persecution could be seen to represent the minimum threshold- the point after 
which the duty could no longer be said to be fulfilled without becoming a 
completely empty duty. This would be the point where, in Dworkian terms, 
we start ‘taking rights seriously.’57  
 
Sen, who also argues that the link between human rights violation and politics 
is strong, sees this link as expanding rather than retracting the notion of 
human rights. Sen notes that it could equally be said of those who starve that 
                                                
55 Carlier ‘The Geneva Refugee Definition and the Theory of Three Scales’ in 
Nicholson and Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International 
Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge University Press 1999) 48-9. 
56 Hathaway (n 48 in chapter 1) 113. 
57 Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977).  
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they have “insufficient entitlement to food” (a political issue) rather than 
simply that there is insufficient food available.58 Those facing starvation could, 
on this reading, be encompassed by refugeehood and article 1(2). 
Conceptually the key feature of refugeehood could be as easily identified as 
vulnerability due to lack of state protection59, only one expression of which is 
violation of civil and political rights. As Suhrke notes, it does not matter then 
if the threat is economic or physical violence the existence of circumstances 
demonstrating that “immediate protective measures are necessary” is 
sufficient.60 The claim being made, then, is that a political notion of human 
rights does not inevitably or necessarily lead to a restrictive notion of 
persecution. This can be seen when examining the notion of political violence 
in refugee law through the lens of collective violence.  
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An overlooked fact is that international refugee law involves the application 
of the concept of violence, both in relation to human rights violations needed 
to ground the application and in the sense of mapped out in chapter one, of 
illegitimate violence by the state, which is needed to deny the home state’s 
jurisdiction over the applicant. Refugee law needs to be clear on what concept 
of violence undergirds the persecution criterion, recalling that persecution can 
                                                
58 Sen, Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford University 
Press 1981. See also Turnton (n 3 in chapter 1) 3.  
59 Vulnerability in terms of human security has been explored in some detail by 
Suhrke ‘Human Security’ (1999) 30 Security Dialogue 3.  
60 ibid 271. 
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be seen also as demonstrative of a lack of national protection.61 The concept of 
violence, like that of refugee, can be interpreted narrowly or broadly to refer 
to a range of acts but to select the relevant definition for the context, it is 
argued, the definition must be relative to particular interests. It is not simply a 
matter of determining whether a violent act took place but to ask if it is 
relevant violence. In the case of international refugee law, the interests are (in 
principle) to provide surrogate protection for the refugee, who is a victim of 
persecution and cannot rely on the home state for protection.62 The concept of 
violence employed in international refugee law must reflect this interest in 
protecting those who have suffered or fear human rights violations in line 
with the function of refugee law.  
 
The concept of violence in international refugee law is in the first instance 
connected to human rights violations. The breadth of the concept of violence 
employed will determine the breadth, or otherwise, of the notion of 
persecution and, correspondingly, that of article 1(2) by reducing or 
expanding the types of human rights violations included under the term 
‘persecution’ and article 1(2).  At present the concept violence employed in 
refugee law lags behind evolving human rights norms, which suggest that the 
concept of violence ought to be able to encompass newly recognised forms of 
harm alongside the traditional forms of violent harm, such as murder or 
torture. It will be argued here that the concept of violence underpinning 
international refugee law is that of collective violence and that this operates at 
                                                
61 As argued in chapter one and proposed by Hathaway (n 48 in chapter 1).  
62 This is a wildly held judicial view- see the UK case of Horvath (n 11 in chapter 1) the 
Canadian case of Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733 or the Australian case of Wang v. 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1599. As discussed above 
in section one, to provide surrogate protection could be described as the overriding 
function of refugee law. 
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once to underline the expansive character of refugeehood and as a limiting 
factor on the scope of article 1(2). First we must consider what is meant by the 
concept of violence. 
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Violence is a word with a broad spectrum of meanings, many context specific, 
others highly generalised. The different shades of meaning, and differing 
possible applications, allow ‘violence’ to be used in contradictory ways, often 
simultaneously. Despite the potential vagueness of the concept, refugee law 
cannot avoid using ‘violence’ as it is behind the notion of persecution, and the 
condition of refugeehood in general. As refugee law unavoidably involves the 
application of the concept of violence it needs to be clear about which 
meaning of violence is being applied, yet this issue has rarely been explored in 
relation to refugee law.  
 
In its most basic sense ‘violence’ is often used to connote anything forceful. 
This incredibly broad concept of violence includes metaphorical uses, such as 
a ‘violent storm’. It is possible, therefore, to define violence amorally but “to 
call something ‘violent’ is often to give at least a prima facie reason why it is 
morally wrong”.63 In particular, the pejorative connotations of the term are 
connected with the notion of ‘harm’, that violence can often cause harm and 
almost always results in, at the least, fear, is what gives it this negative shade. 
This is related to violence as a form of intentional (in the broadest sense to 
include recklessness) human action which, as Bäck states, include a “moral 
component associated with choosing to engage in actions that harm another 
                                                
63 Bäck ‘Thinking Clearly about Violence’ 117 Philosophical Studies 219 224. 
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person and attempting to force that person to act as you want.”64 Bäck offers a 
definition of a violent act, when violence is used in the pejorative sense, 
requiring 1) the attempted action is aggressive, 2) the agent is morally 
responsible for that attempt to cause harm (defined as pain or injury), 3) the 
agent ought not to will to inflict that harm, 4) the patient should not want to 
suffer that harm (i.e. the action unjustly violates the rights of the victim).65  
 
This definition of violence is relevant to ‘refugeehood.’ In general 
international refugee law concerns itself with moral agents; the refugee (here 
the ‘patient’ who did not want to suffer that harm and whose rights have been 
unjustly violated by the violent act), and the perpetrator of the human rights 
violation grounding the application (who committed the aggressive act, 
causing harm she ought not to willed to cause and is, thus morally 
responsible). In refugee law, the moral judgment element of violence is, in a 
sense, left aside, that is to say whilst negative moral judgment clearly attaches 
to the perpetrator of the violence against the refugee she is not the concern of 
refugee law.66 It is perhaps for this reason that the importance of the concept 
of violence in refugee law is often overlooked; it is considered merely a factual 
enquiry ‘did the applicant suffer a human rights violation?’ This is not a 
closed question to which the answer is merely ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ The ‘yes’ must be 
accompanied by a statement of what treatment (or part of the treatment) 
                                                
64 ibid. 
65 ibid 225. 
66 There is a widespread mistaken belief that the Convention requires further 
discussion of the perpetrator in regards to motive for the treatment, see below. The 
perpetrator may, however, be marginally relevant to the extent that if a justification 
for the violence exists it may operate to determine whether the violence is legitimate 
or illegitimate certain cases. The distinction between persecution and prosecution 
rests on this difference. It will not be relevant in cases where the right is absolute e.g. 
torture, see chapter six p10-11.  
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suffered by applicant is recognised as a human rights violation amounting to 
persecution and the ‘no’ is a statement that the applicant did not suffer a 
human rights violation or did not suffer a violation of the type covered by 
article 1(2). For example, in the UK case of Sepet67, the applications failed as 
‘conscientious objection’ was not considered to be a core human right by the 
majority of the court and there was, then, no violation to form the basis of a 
successful refugee status claim under article 1(2).   
 
The concept of violence employed in refugee status determination cases goes 
beyond attaching a moral judgment to the perpetrator’s act and is still 
relevant even though the perpetrator is not the concern of the case. The 
concept of violence is part of what is required to form a clear picture of 
whether the treatment the applicant suffered is, or is not, persecution, as well 
as being related to the determination of lack or presence of national 
protection. The persecution criterion is another way of asking ‘did the 
applicant suffer relevant violence?’ The notion of violence, if left unexamined 
or unquestioned, can cause severe problems for certain types of applicants 
whose harm may be linked to newly emerging human rights norms, not yet 
recognised as violence relevant to article 1(2). As Garver argues, “what is 
fundamental about violence is that a person is violated…violence in human 
affairs amounts to violating persons.”68 It is important that this central 
function of violence in refugee law, in drawing attention to the person whose 
has suffered or fears violence, is not overlooked. Refugee law, however 
abstractly worded, is about individual cases and specific contexts, violence is 
                                                
67 Yasin Sepet, Erdem Bulbul v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 
15. This case is discussed in more detail chapter 6 p20. 
68 ‘What Violence is’ in Rose (ed) Violence in America, (New York 1969) 6-7. 
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there as a ‘mediator concept’, that is one against which other concepts can be 
understood and the facts of the individual case can be measured.69 
 
As yet nothing has been said about the content of the concept of violence in 
international refugee law, only that it contains some moral element, in that it 
is related to moral agents, and, more importantly for refugee status 
determination cases, it is closely linked to the concept of ‘harm’ as expressing 
a human rights violation. What of the concept of violence more specifically? A 
narrow concept of violence might include only direct personal violence i.e. an 
act of aggression by one individual directed against another individual in the 
immediate vicinity. This concept cannot be employed in refugee law as it says 
nothing about the response to the act or the identity of the victim, which are 
both requirements of the persecution criterion (for example, for conditional 
rights such as imprisonment the response must be disproportionate to 
transform prosecution to persecution) and the identity of the victim must not 
be arbitrary in the sense that it was entirely irrelevant who the victim was. This 
kind of micro violence is not the subject of refugee law but more properly 
concerns domestic actors.70  
 
It would be more accurate to say that refugee law employs a notion of 
collective political violence. This is not to say that every act of collective 
                                                
69 This phrase has been borrowed from Patrick Capps (n 83 chapter three). The 
mediator concept contains all of the features necessary, other related concepts can 
then be mediated through this central concept. For violence in refugee law, it is 
argued, collective violence is the mediator concept. The case for this is set out below. 
70 That is not to say that a refugee claim could not be grounded on one level could be 
described as an instance of direct personal violence but additional elements would be 
required for a successful application under article 1A(2) such as a failure to respond 
appropriately to individual violence by a public authority but this, it is argued later, 
might be said to transform the act of direct personal violence into a quite different 
sort of violence discussed below- what is referred to as collective violence. 
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violence would give rise to a good case for refugee status but rather that it 
would not be possible to have a good case for refugee status without an act of 
collective violence, as it is collective violence, it is argued below, that grounds 
the notion of human rights violations as persecution under article 1(2).    
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Collective violence is often conflated with wartime or conflict violence71 but 
although collective violence is frequently an indicator of a conflict it is 
conceptually distinct and does not necessarily require mass or widespread 
violence.72 It is not about scale but concerns “infringement of norms and the 
evaluation of these.”73 Collective violence, defined by Imbusch, refers to 
violence, which “cannot be seen as an isolated act”74 but rather is based on 
political, religious or social discord.75 This does not mean that a violent act 
carried out by an individual acting alone cannot constitute persecution, as 
noted above collective violence is not mass violence, but the question to ask 
                                                
71 For example, Reiss and Roth include only war, state violence, riots and activities 
connected to organised crime in collective violence (n 16). This, it is argued, would be 
better described as mass violence or ‘violence by a collective’ rather than collective 
violence.  
72 Although the debate about the distinction and importance of individual and 
collective rights is important; in terms of refugee rights it is not being considered in 
this thesis. The debate is of course relevant in terms of the rights of the people of the 
host country, these may be an assertion of collective rights, but refugees are not 
asserting collective rights. Refugee status is always based on individual evaluation 
even in cases where the claim is that one is a member of a group, ethnic, religious or 
otherwise, that is being targeted. There may, therefore, be overlap between an 
individual claim for refugee status, on the grounds of being a member of a 
persecuted minority, and the collective assertion of the rights of that same persecuted 
minority. Refugee law is however only concerned with the former claim, the latter 
merely providing context. Further refugee status would be unlikely to be an 
appropriate mechanism of human rights protection for those asserting collective 
rights. If one is using collective rights to refer to the rights of peoples a key element of 
the claim will be to assert the rights in a specific territory or country to which the 
people have ties.  
73 Imbusch ʻThe Concept of Violenceʼ in Heitmayer and Hagan (eds) International 
Handbook on Violence Research (vol 2 Springer 2003) 22.  
74 ibid 27.  
75 These areas of discord map exactly on to the Convention grounds for persecution 
under article 1A(2). 
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when evaluating if the act represents collective violence (and persecution) is 
whether the violent act represents conformist behaviour. Direct individual 
violence differs conceptually from collective violence as “unlike deviant 
individual perpetrators who have a lower attachment to norms”76, collective 
perpetrators act in conformance with (perceived) political, social or religious 
norms (in the country of origin or residence) rather than in rejection or 
misunderstanding of these norms.  
 
Imbusch constructs the perpetrator of individual violence as such; she does 
not welcome public attention (as revulsion, outrage and official sanction are 
likely to follow) and any justification of the violent act is subsequent only.77 
Collective violence, on the other hand, is identifiable by a “predominance of 
superindividual motives for causing injury and harm to designated groups: 
people are ascribed particular characteristics or are identified as belonging to 
a group and then made victims.”78 Here public attention is not necessarily 
avoided, although it may not be sought. It may be semi-public e.g. state 
condoned but ‘hidden’ from the general public but collective violence is 
“public or semi-public because…the injury and killing is itself dependent on 
particular conditions and circumstances” in society.79 The public/private 
                                                
76 n 71 27.  
77 With the limited exception of self-defence but this need not concern us here see 
ibid. The subsequent justification is an attempt to explain how the act was, in fact, in 
accordance with societal norms- for example, the thief who argues that he was forced 
to steal due to bankruptcy still accepts that stealing is wrong so if asked before the 
theft he would not have admitted it was his intention to carry out a theft at all. He is 
merely now offering a justification for his action now he has been apprehended. 
Whether or not the justification is accepted, rejected or relabelled as an excuse, is then 
based on societal norms.  
78 n 71 30. Here motive is not used to refer to the actual motive of the perpetrator, as 
will be discussed below, instead it is referring to the general or root cause, motive is 
used in the general rather than in the specific sense of intent.  
79 ibid 27. For example, ‘disappearances’, torture of political prisoners or, indeed, 
domestic violence, where it cannot be said that the violence is hidden because of fear 
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distinction here melts away. The motive is also superindividual such that 
justification of the violence is inherent in the act. This is expressed in the 
notion that where the violence is collective violence, societal norms and 
standards have impacted on the perpetrators sense of justice such that the 
perpetrator believes themselves to be acting legitimately where objectively she 
may be said to be acting illegitimately. Collective violence is exercised more 
functionally than individual violence and “in most cases has a strong political 
component.”80 Refugees are victims of this type of violence; victims made 
from the assignment of political, ethnic, religious or social characteristics, 
which are, in and of themselves, used by the perpetrator, and the society in 
which the perpetrator acts, to justify the violent act. Acts of persecution can be 
seen as individual manifestations of collective violence.   
 
The notion of collective violence maps exactly onto the concept of violence 
underpinning the persecution criterion in article 1(2) where violence is 
relevant as an indicator of broken bond between state and citizen and not just 
as a human rights violation in and of itself. Collective violence is, by 
definition, not being dealt with sufficiently by the (home) state as it either 
directly sanction, condoned or appeased by the state (or at least a sufficient 
enough section of society to render any state opposition ineffective). The 
reason the refugee requires surrogate protection via the Refugee Convention 
is because the human rights violation is a product of collective violence and, 
as such, cannot be dealt with in country. The classification as collective 
                                                
of sanction and/or public revulsion might all be described as collective violence. This 
type of violence is not ‘behind the scenes’ even if it takes place behind closed doors.   
80 n 71 27.  
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violence, then, can transform an act from a human rights violation, which 
after all may take place in host countries as well, to article 1(2) persecution.   
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The need to maintain a distinction between migrant and refugee, as noted in 
chapter one, has been used to exclude those whose claims do not seem at first 
glance to be political from refugee status by asserting that these violations do 
not constitute political wrongs. As such, those claiming socio-economic rights 
have traditionally been excluded from refugee status. An attempt to define 
‘political’ as excluding any socio-economic notions is not only conceptually 
unnecessary but also is contradicted by closer examination of the notion of 
political legitimacy. A similar statement can be made about the notion of 
collective violence, which it is argued, engages with the concept of ‘the 
political.’ Thus fears that acknowledging the notion of ‘collective violence’ in 
refugee law would result in a collapse of the distinction between ‘refugee’ and 
‘migrant’ are based on a misunderstanding of the distinction between 
collective and structural violence.  
 
Part of the reason for this fear of acknowledging the centrality of concept of 
violence to refugee law is a fear of creating an ‘over-inclusive’ definition.81  
Refugee law does require some distinction between ‘refugee’ and ‘victim of 
human rights abuses’ or ‘victim of social inequality.’ Structural violence, as 
defined by Galtung82, refers to social inequality and might well include those 
who are hungry or living in severe poverty alongside those who are subjected 
to direct violence. Social inequality might rightly be described as secondary 
                                                
81 It is this fear, for example, that motivates Price (n 14) to press for ‘political asylum’ 
with a narrowly defined concept of the political.  
82 Galtung ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ 6 Journal of Peace Research 168. 
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violence, and it is not outside of every definition of violence by any means, 
but it is not the applicable concept of violence in refugee law.83 That is not to 
say that all of these victims are not of international concern but merely that 
international refugee law is concerned with those whose lack national 
protection (or put otherwise for whom surrogate protection is necessary.)  
 
However, those in need of surrogate protection are not limited to political 
activists or arbitrary victims of intolerance and it may well be that collective 
violence is built upon the foundations of long-standing structural violence. It 
is argued here that surrogate protection is need for victims of collective 
violence as by definition the violence is in conformity with societal norms, 
thus the victim cannot be expected to return to the country of origin whilst 
such conditions persist. This is not to say, either, that all victims of poverty, 
hunger or even natural disasters would be excluded from refugee status. 
Poverty or hunger deliberately inflicted or exacerbated, or relief after a natural 
disaster withheld or delayed, due to political, social, religious or racial 
discrimination would be within article 1(2). Poverty, hunger or devastation 
after a natural disaster would not be included, however, where the 
government seeks to remedy the situation (however unsuccessfully), this 
requires humanitarian aid undoubtedly but it is not the remit of international 
refugee law. 
                                                
83 In a similar manner, phenomenon as diverse as mislabelling refugees as migrants 
and the pay divide between men and women can be seen as acts of violence. This is, 
however, another use of the term violent and is as useful to refugee law as the notion 
of a ‘violent storm.’ It is simply not the topic under discussion but attempts to make 
it so do not increase the scope of article 1A(2) but instead tend to have the opposite 
effect of causing a narrowing of the scope in order to ‘protect’ potential host states. 
The argument here is that article 1A(2) is already much broader than acknowledged, 
it is merely a matter of interpreting it in line with international human rights norms 
and applying the concept of collective violence.  
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As elucidated above, outlaw states are those states that “flout the 
requirements for international legitimacy by violating basic human rights.”84  
Political violence, however, provides a broader and less government focused 
concept than that of outlaw states. Collective violence could include practices 
that are not officially sanctioned (indeed they might be legally prohibited) but 
are widely practiced in a state. It could also include acts taking place in 
‘burdened societies’, those societies according to Rawls that ‘aspire to meet 
their citizens’ basic needs but historical, social, and economic circumstances’ 
prevent realisation of this goal.85  If the historical, social and/or economic 
circumstances expressly permit or foster acts, which contravene international 
human rights norms, such acts might rightly be considered collective violence.  
 
The impact of the proposition is considerable. It suggests that the concept of 
‘political wrong’ (in the sense of being a violation of human rights in breach of 
the state’s duty to protect) can evolve so as to include violence such as human 
trafficking, rape and female genital mutilation, for example, alongside more 
paradigmatic forms of persecution.  The claim is that if interpreted in this light 
article 1(2) provides a dynamic definition, capable of evolving to reflect 
evolving notions of political legitimacy to include new experiences of 
refugeehood. It suggests that even if persecution is considered to be an 
inescapable feature of refugeehood it need not necessarily narrow the 
parameters of the term ‘refugee’. Further discussion would then be necessary 
before accepting a restrictive interpretation of article 1(2) and a narrow 
concept of refugeehood as the interpretational explanations offered do not 
                                                
84 Cited in Price (n 14) 73. 
85 Rawls (n 11) 103.  
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demonstrate an inherent limitation on the concept. Although it is not possible 
to address all of the relevant issues here, illumination of the areas in need of 
discussion is necessary not only explain the conceptual confusion in refugee 
law but also if any attempt is to be made to resolve it. As noted above, the 
political model of asylum used by many to advocate, and indeed justify, a 
limited notion of refugeehood and a restrictive concept of persecution does 
not inherently demand such restrictions; refugeehood is not ‘conceptually 
limited’ and the political model of asylum could equally be used to justify an 
expansive concept of refugeehood and a multi-faceted definition of 
persecution. The key to explaining and justifying restrictive, or expansive, 
concepts of refugeehood and persecution lies in the model of human rights 
used to give content to these concepts.  
 
Political violence provides a broader and less government focused concept 
than that of outlaw states. As the New Zealand court noted political opinion is 
context based thus when considering female refugees it: 
must be oriented to reflect the reality of women’s experiences and the way in 
which gender is constructed in the specific geographical, historical, political 
and socio-cultural context of the country of origin. In the particular context, a 
woman's actual or implied assertion of her right to autonomy and the right to 
control her own life may be seen as a challenge to the unequal distribution of 
power in her society and the structures which underpin that inequality. Such a 
situation is properly characterised as "political"… [as it] was seen by the 
respective families as a direct challenge to her role and duties and to their 
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authority to control her behaviour for the benefit of their collective communal 
identity and status.86 
This case served to demonstrate that collective identities, particularly social 
roles such as ‘wife’ or ‘husband’, in this context are capable of underpinning 
collective violence such that it may amount to persecution on the Convention 
ground of political opinion. The reasoning by the New Zealand case expresses 
this notion persuasively as will be expanded in chapter six.  
 
Collective violence contains political elements, in that it implies either direct 
infliction of violence by the state or imputed involvement by the state in 
supporting, or at least not actively discouraging, the social, political, religious 
or cultural norms which allow the violence to take place in that particular 
society at that particular point in time. The role of international human rights 
law is to define international norms of behaviour to allow evaluation of the 
way states treat their citizens (or allow their citizens to treat each other). It was 
argued that the norms devolved and emerging in international human rights 
law are directly linked to the determination of whether harm amounts to 
persecution in international refugee law. It follows then that shifting human 
rights norms impact on, or ought to be reflected in, international refugee law. 
It could be argued, then, that what is required to satisfy article 1(2) is a 
identification of a) a human rights violation and b) collective violence. 
Collective violence could include practices that are not officially sanctioned 
(indeed they might be legally prohibited) but are widely practiced in a state. It 
could also include acts taking place in ‘burdened societies.’87  If the historical, 
                                                
86 Refugee Appeal No. 76044 (11 September 2008).  
87 Rawls (n 11) 106.  
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social and/or economic circumstances expressly permit or foster acts, which 
contravene international human rights norms, such acts might rightly be 
considered collective violence.  
 
A functional fusion between persecution and the requirement that the 
claimant be unable or unwilling to access state protection has been suggested 
in chapter one and is expanded here. The fusion is functional in the sense that 
in many cases, particularly where the Convention ground is political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group, in fulfilling the persecution 
criterion (and the Convention ground) via the concept of collective violence 
the state protection element has necessarily been fulfilled.  The concept of 
collective violence is of use in cases where the claim is not what might called a 
traditional or paradigmatic refugee claim. The reason for considering non-
paradigmatic claims is that these claims are the claims that most often result 
in judicial scrutiny. Where paradigmatic claims go to appeal it is often on the 
grounds of factual dispute not legal scope. For example, it might be disputed 
that the person is not a prominent political activist as claimed or is not in 
actuality an adherent of a particular religion.  Any appeal would not be 
concerned with the scope of refugee law or what type of claim is included 
within Article 1(2).  
 
On the other hand when seeking to establish that domestic violence could 
constitute persecution the concern was over the scope of refugee law. In 
particular the issue often raised was whether domestic violence as so-called 
private violence could come within the scope of persecution and refugee law. 
Here collective violence offers a concept for determining when domestic 
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violence could constitute persecution and when it might rightly be described 
as another form of human rights violation, as will be explored in detail in 
chapter six.  Collective violence does not require a state actor but rather 
societal acquiescence.  
 
This is distinction from a requirement of state persecution. The suggestion 
here is that collective violence is used as a transformative concept capable of 
moving a human rights violation to persecution. The concept of collective 
violence does not require state action. It encompasses persecution by non-
state actors as collective violence requires only that the violence be in 
conformance with societal norms. This need not be the norms adhered to or 
favoured by the government. This would conceptually explain how claims by 
those targeted by gang member in Jamaica88 or subject to domestic violence in 
Trinidad were successful refugee status claims. In both cases the initial 
rejection of the claimants’ refugee status application was based on the fact that 
in both cases the government could not be said to support or allow the 
violence in question and laws existed to punish the perpetrators of such 
violence. It was reasoned by the Secretary of State that the existence of laws, 
which were enforced, was sufficient to render the violence general violence 
rather than persecution.  
 
Collective violence explains how this is incorrect. The government may fully 
intend to enforce the law in question or to prevent the violence in question but 
                                                
88 Althea Sonia Britton v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 
227. The Court said: “The fact that the law enforcement and security forces in Jamaica 
are overzealous does not mean that they exert effective control. Nor does the fact that 
they use armed response when apprehending criminal suspects. The CIPU report 
which we have seen does refer to gang violence in Jamaica, particularly in Kingston 
and the police's ability to control it.”   
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if this protection is ineffectual it may still be persecution. The persecutory, and 
political element, of the violence in both the above examples lies in the general 
societal attitude to the violence not the governmental attitude.  In both cases 
the societal attitude was shown to be generally dismissive of or unwilling to 
engage with such violence.  In the case of gang violence in Jamaica, it is 
argued, the violence was so prevalent in certain sections of society that it was 
either condoned or accepted as regrettably commonplace and as such not 
something that could be combated or opposed. This, I would argue, is 
collective violence.  
 
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection states that the “causal link” 
or “nexus” is satisfied in the case of non-state actors (1) whether or not the 
failure of the State to protect the claimant is Convention related or (2) where 
the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a 
Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to offer 
protection is for a Convention reason. 89 This reminds us that a Convention 
ground is required, of course, but it need not motivate the lack of state 
protection.  The state may fully intend to protect the victim against 
persecution on a Convention ground but if it is unable to do so this is 
sufficient.  
 
What makes collective violence relevant for refugee law is where the norms 
the perpetrator of the collective violence is adhering to contravene 
international human rights standards, that is they are not conforming to an 
                                                
89 No. 2: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1 May 2002  [23].  
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international norm but to a local or regional standard which cannot be 
supported internationally. Thus, the one off denial of access to health care for 
a woman in a society, which provides health care to women on a regular basis 
represents a clear human rights violation but not an instance of collective 
violence. The same denial in a society, which explicitly or implicitly attempts 
to deny women access to health care is both a human rights violation and an 
instance of collective violence. The latter scenario would give rise to a good 
case for refugee status, whilst the former would not.    
 
Collective violence might also be of use in cases of cumulative persecution, in 
explaining why these cumulative acts may become persecution (as opposed to 
harassment). Clearly states would be resistant to a view of persecution which 
encompasses forms of harassment. The functional fusion of persecution and 
state protection is also of use here as it reminds that cumulative acts become 
persecution and not harassment if the state is involved either directly or 
indirectly. Collective violence similarly stipulates that where the cumulative 
acts are as a result of societal attitudes, which the government cannot or will 
not combat this too can give rise to refugee status. When considering 
cumulative persecution the question of motive for the actions will most likely 
be raised, namely is there a nefarious motive for these individual acts which 
tie them together so as to constitute harassment or discrimination. When 
considering this in the context of refugee law the notion of collective violence 
again becomes relevant. Collective violence sets out how to consider motive in 
the context of refugee law.90  
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The argument here is four-fold, it is claimed 1) labelling as collective violence 
renders the act a relevant human rights violation under article 1(2), 2) 
collective violence always denotes persecution for a Convention reason and 3), 
persecution is demonstrative of a lack of national protection, therefore, no 
further enquiry into national protection is required, and 4) it is posited that 
article 1(2) can support such a reading.  
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The case law on ‘political opinion’ remains fragmented, whilst it is clear it 
does include acts beyond partisan politics, it is unclear when and where the 
‘political opinion’ ground can apply. There has been a steady broadening of 
the category of ‘political opinion’ (and therefore in the type of acts which 
constitute expression of a political opinion) since the late 1980s. This can be 
said to reflect the development of, and the increased level of attention paid to, 
international human rights norms. As a few examples, in Sagaydak v. 
Gonzales91, exposing corruption was accepted as a political act and retaliation 
for this was, therefore, persecution on a Convention ground. In Chang v. INS92, 
the refusal to report persons who violate China’s security rules was deemed a 
political act. In Osorio v. INS93, labour activities, such as membership in a trade 
union, were accepted as expressing a political opinion and the Fatin case94 saw 
feminism accepted as a political opinion per se.  
 
                                                
91 405 F.3d 1035, 1041-45 (9th Cir. 2005) 
92 119 F.3d 1055, 1062 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) 
93 18 F.3d 1017, 1031 (2d Cir. 1994) 
94 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993) 
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Yet the Fatin case also reveals the limits of the political opinion ground, 
although feminism was accepted as a political opinion (that is political 
opinion was broadened beyond partisan politics), it was not discussed in 
detail what might constitute a manifestation of feminist views, in particular 
the issue of whether refusal to wear religious dress was sufficient, was left 
undetermined. Similarly, in the Sepet case, the majority in both the Court of 
Appeal and House of Lords rejected the view that refusal to complete 
compulsory military service could constitute a political opinion (explicit or 
implicit).95  It could be argued that, evolving human rights norms have created 
a greater range of topics on which a citizen can legitimately disagree with the 
state, as acknowledged by courts in cases such as Sagaydak, mentioned above. 
With this broader base for legitimate disagreement with the state, there ought 
to be corresponding acknowledgment that this disagreement can be voiced or 
exhibited in many ways. However political disagreement is manifested, 
underlying it is the assertion by the citizen of the limit of state power and, 
often, the assertion of a human right. In the case of refugees, the denial by the 
state of these human rights is what gives rise to a good case for refugee status. 
Although the concept of human rights has evolved to encompass more than 
‘basic human rights’ amongst ‘core entitlements’, this is not always reflected 
in refugee law and there continues to be resistance to recognising assertion of 
these rights as expression of political opinion. 
 
                                                
95 n 66. Although Laws LJ was eager that partial conscientious objectors were to be 
considered on the same footing as absolute objectors, so argued that the Convention 
must be read sufficiently broadly to equate secular and religious pacifism, in order to 
avoid an arbitrary distinction between the two and in order to achieve this ‘a political 
quality’ was to be attributed to secular pacifism. However, to Laws LJ, this did not 
render refusal to complete military service a political act sufficient to conclude that 
the perpetrator imputed a political opinion on to the draft evader n 66 [160]. 
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The traditional interpretation of the ‘political opinion’ ground for persecution 
under article 1(2) is to restrict it to explicitly expressed political opinions, e.g. 
membership in a political party, political activism which has gained the 
attention of the state, and to falsely ascribed political opinions, or imputed 
political opinion, that is where the individual did not hold a particular 
political opinion but was believed by the perpetrator to hold a political view. 
This was often confused with implied political opinion. Imputed political 
opinion says nothing as to the victim, other than that they were unfortunate 
enough to be mistaken for someone with beliefs they do not actually hold. 
This suggests that had the perpetrator of the persecutory treatment realised 
her mistake she would have ceased.  
 
Implied political opinion is quite different, it covers situations where the 
victim’s act, behaviour or lifestyle are (perceived to be) demonstrative of a 
political opinion. Here political opinion does not refer to conservatism, 
liberalism or communism, for example, it is not about pro-Government or 
anti-Government activism but concerns acts which have a political nature 
regardless of the intentions of the actor.96 Examples range from the deliberate 
acts of a conscientious objector to the woman who refuses to wear religious 
dress or an individual who happens to be homosexual. The victim in such 
cases has denied the authority of the government, and/or society, to control, 
influence or prevent that area of their life, whether they do so publicly or in 
private. In Sepet, regrettably in the dissenting opinion, Waller LJ concluded 
that implied political opinion should be recognised as a Convention ground 
for persecution. Using the example before him, Waller LJ opined that 
                                                
96 Which further emphasises the irrelevance of the motive of the perpetrator in such 
cases. 
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objection to military service ought to be seen as demonstrative of a political 
opinion. For example, the partial objectors refuses to serve in that particular 
military at that particular point in time, whatever the reason for refusing to 
serve the individual is also denying the right of the state to force her to do so- 
this is a political opinion whether the individual means it as such or not. 
Likewise, for the absolute objector “the political opinion expressed is that 
there ought to be an exception [to military service] for conscientious 
objectors.”97 This is a political opinion even if it is based on religious 
conviction (although here the individual may also have the additional 
violation of freedom of belief alongside freedom of conscience/right to 
conscientious objection).   
 
The Refugee Convention offers an internal justification for including a greater 
range of manifestations within article 1(2) under the ‘political opinion’ ground 
of persecution with reference to the purpose of the Convention to offer 
surrogate protection, the notion of what constitutes a political act must shift in 
line evolution of the trigger factors sufficient to allow a denial of state 
jurisdiction over an individual by both the individual in question and the 
international community. To return to chapter one, the persecution criterion 
functions in refugee law as justification for the denial of jurisdiction of a state 
over its citizen. The act resulting in persecution, or fear of persecution, is also 
in many cases intimately connected with the notion of a denial of authority, 
the act is often a statement by the individual that the state cannot legitimately 
prevent them acting in this way. Thus, the homosexual who is imprisoned for 
her sexuality is making a political as well as personal statement through her 
                                                
97 n 66 [160].  
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sexuality, she is denying that the state has a right to dictate ‘appropriate’ and 
‘inappropriate’ types of sexuality to its citizens, and a woman refusing to wear 
religious dress is making a similarly political statement in denying the right of 
the state to prevent her from doing so. This does not require conscious 
political thought from the individual, the political nature of the act is inherent. 
To return to Sepet, Professor Goodwin-Gill’s expert opinion accorded with 
Waller LJ’s view, stating, 
The refusal to do military service, however motivated, can be a political act, 
reflecting an essentially political opinion regarding the permissible limits of 
State authority.98 
 
This can be seen also in relation to other areas of political disagreement. Even 
whilst the official policy of European countries, the US, Australia and Canada 
was to deny refugee applications made on the basis of the one child policy, 
lower courts did attempt (unsuccessfully) to present a broader interpretation 
of ‘political opinion’, for example, two district courts in the US awarded 
refugee status to victims of the one child policy. Although these decisions 
were reversed on appeal, the judgment in Xin-Chang Zhang makes a key point, 
“there can be little doubt that the phrase ‘political opinion’ encompasses an 
individual’s views regarding procreation.”99 This is particularly the case 
where the individual lives in a country with a strict set of laws on procreation, 
against which individual opinion may well be aligned. This US case shows an 
almost complete reversal of logic from previous one-child policy cases. In The 
Matter of Chang the claim of a man facing forcible sterilisation if returned to 
China was rejected on the basis that there was no evidence that the policy was 
                                                
98 cited ibid [151]. 
99 Xin-Chang Zhang v Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 1994 US District. 
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“a subterfuge for some other persecutive purpose.”100 In 1989, then, forcible 
sterilisation was not considered persecutory by US officials, whereas by Zhang 
in 1994, the same law was capable of being persecutory, and on Convention 
grounds. Similarly, in a never-repeated statement before the US court, the 
Ninth Circuit court characterised the gender persecution suffered by Olympia 
Lazo-Majano as such: 
His [the perpetrator] statement reflects a much more generalized animosity to 
the opposite sex….Olympia was not permitted…to hold an opinion to the 
contrary. When by flight, she asserted one, she became exposed to 
persecution for her assertion. Persecution threatened her because of her 
political opinion. 
Here it seems a political opinion may be as broad as view that women are 
entitled to their own opinions and/or to disagree with men and it need not be 
expressed in words, indeed any action to evade male domination might be 
seen as manifesting a political opinion.    
 
This suggests a more expansive notion of human rights and political 
legitimacy and, by extension, a more expansive notion of persecution.  For 
example, in Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs an 
Australian court recognized that denial of access to food, shelter, medical 
treatment as well as education for children “involve such a significant 
departure from the standards of the civilized world as to constitute 
persecution”.101 This could be seen as reflecting a shrinking concept of 
domestic jurisdiction reflecting that the standards of treatment expected of 
states in relation to their own citizens are ever higher. Whereas previously, 
                                                
100 20 I. & N. Dec 38 (1989).  
101 [2000] HCA 19 [29] (Austl.) available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/2000/19.html 
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even when the UDHR was drafted, areas such as food, shelter, medical 
treatment and education were almost universally accepted as being for the 
state to decide without external interference or judgment i.e. these were not areas 
in which international law was relevant or applicable.  
 
This was also mirrored in international refugee law, for example, victims of 
China’s ‘one child policy’ were routinely denied refugee status on the grounds 
that as the policy was enforced through a law of general application (that is a 
law applied to everyone), punishment for contravening the law was merely 
prosecution and not persecution.102 Central to this was the opinion that China 
could legitimately restrict the private lives of its citizens in this manner under 
the banner of protecting provision of public services (i.e. to control the 
population was to ensure proper provision of public services to all citizens in 
a country where the population was so vast). This view would be unlikely to 
be repeated today.103 The entrenchment of the ECHR, with Article 8 right to 
private and family life, into domestic law across Europe would make it 
difficult to maintain that a core human right had not been violated by such a 
policy as China’s one child policy.  
 
                                                
102 see Spikerboer Gender and Refugee Status (Ashgate Publishing 2000) for example 
The Matter of Chang, discussed by Price (n 3 in introduction) 120-1 and Sepet (n 67).  
103 Although the issue of laws of general application remain (see below), the 
entrenchment of the ECHR, with the article 8 right to private and family life, into 
domestic law across Europe would make it difficult to maintain that a core human 
right had not been violated by such a policy as China’s one child policy. Indeed, even 
whilst the official policy of European countries, the US, Australia and Canada was to 
deny refugee applications made on the basis of the one child policy, lower courts did 
attempt (unsuccessfully) to push against this interpretation, for example, two district 
courts in the US awarded refugee status to victims of the one child policy, although 
they were reversed on appeal, the judgment in Xin-Chang Zhang makes a key point, 
“there can be little doubt that the phrase ‘political opinion’ encompasses an 
individual’s views regarding procreation.’ 
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Although the scope of human rights violations within article 1(2) could be 
said to have widened, many rights continue to have only marginal or 
ambiguous status within article 1(2), for example the right to conscientious 
objection. In the United Kingdom, the case of Sepet, mentioned above in 
relation to law of general application, brought this issue to forefront. Mr 
Sepet, and Mr Bulbul, both Kurdish Turks, had applied for asylum in the 
United Kingdom on the ground that, if required to return to Turkey, they 
would suffer persecution for refusal to undertake compulsory military service 
and as such should be considered refugees. The appellants’ arguments 
centred on the existence of a fundamental right to refuse to perform military 
service on grounds of conscience. Mr Sepet and Mr Bulbul contented that this 
right of conscientious objection ought to be considered internationally 
recognised as all of the European states, with the exceptions of Albania, 
Turkey, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, recognised it as 
such and that this right was included under article 9 of the ECHR. This 
argument was supported in principle by the UNHCR as an intervening party 
and by expert opinions presented by Professors Goodwin-Gill and Hathaway. 
It was not an argument that found favour with either the Court of Appeal104 or 
the House of Lords.105  
 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that a right to conscientious 
objection was not considered a legally recognised and guaranteed right under 
international law and could not be established by recourse to the general right 
of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, expressed, for example, in 
Article 9 of the ECHR. Waller LJ dissented but the majority opinion was 
                                                
104 n 66.  
105 ibid.  
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affirmed in the House of Lords, where Lord Hoffmann opined that whilst the 
right to freedom of conscience was absolute, manifesting personal belief was a 
conditional right.106 Key to the Court of Appeal and House of Lords reasoning 
was that whilst conscientious objection might be said to be an emerging right, 
it was not an established right. Great weight was given to the lack of formal 
recognition of the right to conscientious objection and in particular, to Article 
4(3)(b) of the ECHR, which states that ‘forced labour’ does not include 
compulsory military service.  The expert opinions, provided by Professor 
Goodwin-Gill and Professor Hathaway, expressly contradicted this view, 
arguing that this approach failed to consider other rights potentially impacted 
by compulsory military service. In both his expert opinion and in a talk given 
subsequently, Professor Goodwin-Gill was adamant that the court was 
making a fundamental error in interpreting article 1(2) as requiring formal 
legal recognition of the specific right in question before violation of this right 
can ground refugee status. This approach overlooked the manner in which 
human rights gain legal recognition- by analogy to already existing rights. 
There would not be any legal human rights if rights were not given 
recognition in the legal sphere for a first time. Professor Goodwin-Gill 
explained: 
The confusion of the Court arises from the perceived need to establish that the 
right of conscientious objection to military service exists and is recognized as a 
fundamental human right or ‘core entitlement’, before it can form the basis for a 
refugee claim and a well- founded fear of persecution within the meaning of 
the 1951 Convention. This is incorrect and is not required by the terms of the 
1951 Convention or impliedly by reference to its object and purpose. The right 
to freedom of conscience is the central right at issue, and it is freedom of 
                                                
106 ibid [46]. 
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conscience which is violated in the public political sphere when a person is 
compelled to do military service contrary to their sincerely held belief.107  
 
The key, opined Goodwin-Gill, is the purpose of the Convention. Just as the 
concept of violence sketched above is only persuasive in relation to the 
interests the Convention is designed to protect, so to the concept of human 
rights employed by the Convention can only be sculpted in relation to the 
interest of the Convention. The purpose of the Convention, as mentioned 
above, is widely considered to be to provide surrogate protection to those 
who have suffered human rights violations. Relevant human rights violations 
for the purpose of the Convention must, then, be any human rights violations, 
with collective violence providing the limiting factor.  
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What then would be a relevant human rights violation for international 
refugee law? It is argued here that any human rights violation ought prima 
facie to give rise to a good case for refugee status. That is to say if a right has 
been recognised elsewhere, or is emerging as a human rights norm, this 
should be sufficient footing for the court to at least consider the right as one 
being capable of grounding a case of persecution. Whether or not the case 
succeeds depends on then on the facts before the court rather than on 
disputation of the type of violations included. The collective violence element 
would then focus the discussion as to whether, on the facts before the court, 
the application for refugee status would be successful.   
 
                                                
107 Goodwin-Gill Refugees and their Human Rights RSC Working Paper 17 (August 
2004) available at www.rsc.ox.ac.uk. 
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This would prevent blanket statements such as those seen in Sepet, in regards 
to conscientious objection, and as were previously seen in Campos-Guardando, 
where rape was excluded from the definition of persecution and before HJ, in 
relation to discrimination against homosexuals. Instead it would allow a more 
flexible approach to defining persecution in line with shifting human rights 
norms. It is simply too late for the applicants in question when attitudes 
finally change. Rape was considered human rights violations before Campos-
Guardando but was excluded from scope of international law by being labelled 
‘private violence’ in most jurisdictions before Kunarac. The change in attitude 
could not lead to re-examination of previous cases and it must be 
acknowledged that many cases were denied solely on the basis that rape 
could never constitute persecution.  
 
Although this lag between law and ‘the real world’ cannot be entirely 
avoided, using collective violence as the filter rather than type of human 
rights violation avoids blanket ‘bans’ being issued by governments or courts 
on cases involving certain types of human rights violations. This will demand 
individual examination of all cases, rather than a cursory glance at the case to 
see if it fits exactly within existing case law. It is often said by courts that 
refugee law requires individual examination, and that the case before the 
decision maker has been turned down on individual merits but the case 
cannot receive sufficient individual attention where the type of violation is 
held to not constitute persecution regardless of the particular circumstances.  
 
As Goodwin-Gill argued in Sepet, there is absolutely no requirement under 
article 1(2), or the Convention as a whole, that the human rights violation 
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under discussion has been previously recognised as giving rise to refugee 
status. This would result in a stagnation of international refugee law, if the 
purpose of the Convention is to provide surrogate protection it must respond 
to new forms of human rights violations and it would be preferable if this did 
not require years of activism first with the law lagging lamentably behind 
reality. The path to recognition for rape victims, for example, was lengthened 
considerably by fears of creating a huge number of new refugees. This kind of 
concern cannot shape interpretations of international refugee law (it belongs 
to the realm of politics and policy, if anywhere all).  
 
The Refugee Convention requires self-referential interpretation, that is to say 
guides to interpretation can be found in the Convention purposes, which are 
linked to international human rights law, and thus demand a fluid approach 
to interpretation rather than rigid categorisation. As Higgins states 
“[r]eference to “the correct legal view” or “rules” can never avoid the element 
of choice (though it can seek to disguise it), nor can it provide guidance to the 
preferable decision. In making this choice one must inevitably have 
consideration for the humanitarian, moral, and social purpose of the law.”108 It 
is not enough, then, for refugee status decisions to be guided by reference to 
the Convention alone, they must also consider the purpose of the Convention 
and that this is a general purpose (protection of refugees), which by its nature 
shifts and evolves in line with human rights norms. 
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It has been claimed that, “the Convention is legally and linguistically limited” 
reducing its applicability109 and that, therefore, the Refugee Convention needs 
to be scrapped rather than merely reinterpreted. This kind of concern has led 
to calls for a new system of international refugee law, Hathaway, for example, 
proposing a system where by refugee status “become[s] the entitlement of all 
persons whose basic human rights are at risk.”110 Of particular concern to 
Hathaway is the additional requirement of “some differential impact based on 
civil or political status [i.e. a Convention reason].”111  
 
Whilst it is accepted that the Convention is in one sense limiting, such as 
“[o]ne may have fear for all sorts of reasons but the fear must fall within the 
convention because of one of the reasons in the categories”112,  it  has been 
argued in the thesis so far that it is not the case that article 1(2) cannot 
accommodate new fears or experiences of persecution. Although 
interpretations of the Convention are limited with reference to its purpose (for 
example, it is accepted that it applies only to forced migrants not voluntary 
migrants), this is a broad purpose and thus allows the Convention to respond 
to shifting human rights norms and for Convention grounds to be interpreted 
broadly as well.   
 
In order to take into account the concerns of those who fear an unworkably 
broad category, if for example refugee status applied to all those whose basic 
                                                
109Edwards, ‘Case Commentary: Female Genital Mutlilation- Violence against Girls 
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111 ibid. 
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and Women as a Particular Social Group’ 19 Denning Law Journal 271, 271. 
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human rights were unmet or threatened, whilst not creating an artificially 
limited refugee status, it has been proposed that all human rights violations 
ought to be within the scope of article 1(2) with the notion of collective 
violence to limit the category of ‘refugee.’ This is firmly a human rights 
approach, it demands that international human rights norms are recognised 
and applied, it does, for the reason Price decries, namely to “expand the scope 
of the anti-brutality principle for the core of basic human rights….to the full 
roster of rights listed under international instruments.”113 It does not, 
however, move away from the notion of legitimacy as the core to determining 
the persecution criterion, nor does it, necessarily, produce “a large class of 
harms that cannot be inflicted for any reason.”114 These fears, voiced here by 
Price but often repeated by governments and refugee status determination 
bodies, are not well founded. It is possible to retain refugeehood as distinct 
from other instances of human rights abuse whilst expanding it sufficiently to 
reflect shifting human rights norms. In fact, it must be possible for 
international refugee law to meaningful and it cannot be done without a focus 
on human rights. Without reference to international human rights norms, 
however expansive these may well become, international refugee law loses it 
purpose and conceptual foundations, as it will no longer offer protection to 
those whose state has targeted or failed to protect.  
 
Collective violence is proposed as the limiting factor to maintain ‘refugee’ as a 
distinct category of victims of human rights violations. It is of paramount 
importance though, that collective violence is not interpreted as mass violence 
or as having any requirement of frequency or being widespread, to repeat 
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collective violence only requires that the violence be said to be in some way 
accepted or condoned by societal norms in the country of origin. This also 
allows determination of the lack of national protection element, it would not 
rely on superficial factors such as the existence of a national law to deal with 
the human rights violation in question but on whether it could actually be 
said that someone committing such a human rights violation acted contrary to 
societal norms. This demands effective national protection of human rights 
rather than just legal lip-service. Such determinations are already made in 
Country of Origin reports, briefing documents produced by embassies, the 
UN, the World Bank and indeed many NGOs.  
 
Collective violence retains the notion of national protection but demands 
enquiry more broadly than merely in to government or state measures and is 
heavily influenced by international human rights law as it reflects a judgment 
that the collective behaviour or attitude in the country of origin is rightly 
described as violent. To label something ‘violence’ conveys a judgment as to 
the legitimacy of the act, as violence is prima facie wrongdoing it requires 
special justification if it is to be deemed legitimate; as Imbusch state, “it is the 
criteria of legality/illegality and legitimacy/illegitimacy which make 
institutional violence appeal either as relatively unproblematic or as 
injustice.”115 This judgment as to the legitimacy of the act purported to be 
persecution is made in reference to international human rights law. If one has 
established a human rights violation has taken place or is feared, the collective 
violence element asks a) if there is any special justification which can make 
the violation legitimate (i.e. is the human right violate absolute or conditional) 
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and b) if the right violated is conditional then is the justification offered 
sufficient (i.e. does it map onto the justifications for violating conditional 
human rights accepted under international human rights law). If there is no 
special justification for the violence and if controlling social norms are present 
so render the violence ‘collective’, then the victim of this violence is a refugee. 
The concept of collective violence, it is argued, demonstrates how a human 
rights violation may be a political wrong with little or no state involvement if 
the practice or conduct constituting a human rights violation may be 
considered a cultural or societal norm. Here there is not even a requirement to 
show state inaction or acquiesce, it is sufficient to show that the state is unable 
to prevent the violation whatever its intentions.   
 
To repeat, this does not require a new refugee law but rather than article 1(2) 
is interpreted with these ideas in mind and using the Convention grounds as a 
guide to the type of grounds on which a person might be exposed to 
persecution as a refugee. It is not meant, it is argued here, as a narrow or 
exhaustive list but to emphasise the types of grounds collective violence is 
inflicted on i.e. civil and political disagreement. It has been argued here that, 
in particular, the ‘political opinion’ ground is capable of encompassing many 
acts that may not appear overtly political at first glance. Although Convention 
grounds such as race, nationality and religion are linguistically narrower, 
political opinion or social group can be interpreted broadly without straining 
against linguistic barriers. As such, political opinion quickly moved beyond 
its narrowest meaning of ‘partisan politics’ but still resists, in many 
jurisdictions, a broad enough interpretation so as to include objection to 
military service or refusal to obey discriminatory laws and/or restrictive 
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social practices. This is a category that is ever evolving and ought to reflect 
shifting human rights norms and notions of political legitimacy. Social group 
has also been narrowly interpreted in the past so as to exclude, for example, 
gender. The Fornah case points towards a new interpretation where it is 
acknowledged that gender, as a social constructed concept, must be included 
in the category of ‘membership in a particular social group.’   
 
In particular, it has been stressed that it is vital that refugee status 
determination cases do not rest on the motive, actual, purported or implied, of 
the perpetrator. Is it virtually impossible to imagine how one might prove the 
actual motive of a perpetrator who by the very circumstances of refugeehood 
is not present and may not be called before the body determining refugee 
status.  A focus on motive, it has been noted, causes considerable problems, 
such as excluding subjected to cultural rituals, ‘private violence’ and those 
who can be said to have been punished for evading a law of general 
application even where the law itself is persecutory.  Lord Justice Waller in Sepet 
aptly demonstrated the danger of this distinction on the basis of general 
application, it would not allow an individual to refuse to serve in a military 
committing human rights violations.116 The solider who refused to be serve at 
a concentration camp during the Holocaust or attempted to escape 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Sierra Leone during the genocides would not be a 
refugee according to the ‘motive’ interpretation of article 1(2), punished for 
evading a law of general application these individuals would merely be 
prosecuted not persecuted and would, according to this interpretation, not 
have been expressing a political opinion of any kind. It simply cannot be the 
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case for a Convention designed to protect those whose human rights have 
been violated that it does not extend its protection to those who refuse to 
participate in human rights violations.117 To demand an individual to inflict 
human rights violations, or suffer any type of punishment must constitute 
persecution. This is just one instance where a focus on motive renders the 
Refugee Convention inapplicable to those whose human rights have been 
violated or are at risk. Such logic has also been used to exclude almost all 
instances of sexual violence, where an overriding ‘purely sexual motive’ can 
always be claimed and never disproved. 
 
It has also been demonstrated that underlying all discussions of gendered 
violence within refugee law is a fatal tendency to overlook the importance of, 
and potential for, a new concept of political within article 1(2). At present, 
progress made in improving the rate of recognition for female refugees, in line 
with male counterparts, is inevitably halted when it comes up against the 
concept of ‘political.’ This chapter has demonstrated that reform is not only 
necessary but possible within existing conceptual framework of article 1(2) 
and the Refugee Convention. A new notion of political, which dispenses with 
the private/public dichotomy to acknowledge the pervasive and fluid nature 
of politics, would allow article 1(2) to continue operating and more accurately 
reflect the varied experiences of female refugees. In such refugee-producing 
situations women may suffer from diminished agency but they do not entirely 
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illegitimate war, to which no individual responsibility can be attached under 
international law, jus ad bellum governs only state behaviour in resorting to war. See 
Price (n 3 introduction). 
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lack agency- a concept of agency that does not recognise defiance of a spouse 
or community as significant demonstrations of political agency is an 
impoverished concept and causes considerable injury to female refugees. 
 
 
In addition, this chapter has demonstrated the danger in governments, courts 
and tribunals seeking to provide blanket statements in relation to human 
rights violations. The ‘this one is on our list, that one is not’ approach to 
defining the scope of the persecution criterion is illogical and the antithesis of 
the purpose of the Convention, which again is to provide protection to those 
who have suffered or fear human rights violations. This deliberately broad 
purpose is to allow the Convention to respond to ‘new’ types of human rights 
violations, in line with evolving human rights standards. The idea that there 
exists somewhere a list of relevant human rights violations to refugee law, 
and that one must first try to show that your particular type of harm either is 
already recognised or can be ‘added’ is unnecessarily restricting the 
application of article 1(2). This led to the exclusion of rape, now immediately 
recognised as a paradigmatic example of a human rights violation, from 
article 1(2) in the past and was applied to exclude freedom of conscience 
(conscientious objection) in Sepet. These blanket bans risk stagnating 
international refugee law and making it, as its critics often charge, unable to 
respond to new refugee experiences. 
 
For these reasons an alternative guide to interpretation has been proposed, 
which concerns, in particular, the notion of collective violence. Identification 
as an instance of collective violence, it is argued, is the transformative factor 
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turning a human rights violation into persecution. This would allow any 
human right violation to prima facie form the basis of a refugee status 
application but to still retain refugeehood as a distinct category human rights 
abuse victims. Collective violence already underpins the concept of 
refugeehood; the refugee is someone who cannot turn to their own country 
for protection from or redress after human rights violations, it follows that the 
refugee is resident in a country where acting in accordance with societal 
norms could allow a human rights violation (a society where collective 
violence takes place). Examination of the human rights violation to see if it 
could be described as in accordance with societal norms, and therefore 
collective violence, will allow the persecution criterion to continue to operate 
as the defining factor separating refugeehood from other forms of human 
rights abuse. It is the element of collective violence that makes the rape victim 
in a society where rape is justified by the inferior position of women a refugee 
but the rape victim in a country where rape is condemned ineligible for 
refugee status.  Human rights violations are present in both cases but what 
renders the former case one of relevance to refugee law is not the type of 
human rights violation but the underlying societal conditions, summed up in 
the notion of collective violence. This provides an expansive definition of 
‘refugee’, flexible enough to respond to shifting human rights norms but 
limited enough to retain a distinctive character.  
 
NFU ),0:H43/,03!<,-!%;<41;;!C@S!
It has been argued, firstly, that the notions of human rights and political 
legitimacy set the boundaries of the persecution criterion. Secondly, these 
boundaries have been shown to be far less restrictive than is often claimed. 
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Human rights and political legitimacy, it has been demonstrated, are not only 
capable of sustaining broader interpretations but refugee law demands more 
expansive definitions. This claim is made in order to satisfy the underlying 
purpose of refugee law, namely to protect victims of illegitimate violence. This 
purpose, it is claimed in an argument to be taken up in the next chapter, 
requires that refugee status is extended to all victims of political collective 
violence who seek international protection. It was argued in chapter three that 
human rights have a special claim to protection and in this chapter has 
considered the content of the notion of human rights. The claims made in 
these chapters are, then, interlinked and special protection, and priority, is 
claimed by all rights than can be classed as human rights as understood 
above. This is not a notion of human rights as limited by the concept of ‘the 
political’ but one expanded by this concept.  
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The previous chapter argued that in seeking refugee status, refugees are 
asserting a claim to human rights protection. The contours of this claim have 
been considered, in order to establish what types of treatment and actions can 
be said to constitute a human rights violation. Chapter four also considered in 
which circumstances human rights violations can be said to reflect a failure of 
state protection, which, it was argued, can be assessed through the concept of 
collective violence. This chapter proceeds from the assertions in chapter four 
to examine the impact of this failure by the home state to fulfil their duty to 
their citizens to argue that the international community has an obligation to 
promote, protect and enforce human rights to a minimum standard where the 
primary duty holder fails to do so.   
 
This chapter seeks to extend the conception of human rights put forward in 
chapters three and four. As Risse notes, “[a] conception of human rights 
consists of four elements: First, an actual list of rights classified as human 
rights; second, an account of the basis on which individuals have them (an 
account of what features turn individuals into rights holders); third, an 
account of why that list has that particular composition, that is, a principle or 
a process that generates that list; and fourth, an account of who has to do 
what to realize these rights, that is, an account of corresponding obligations.”1 
Chapter four considered the rights classified as human rights and briefly put 
                                                
1 Risse (n 7 chapter 4) 5. 
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forward a process to assess whether a right is a human right. Chapter three put 
forward justifications for human rights and why all humans are rights 
holders. This chapter will examine Risse’s fourth element and put forward an 
account of ‘who has to do what to realize these rights’ in relation to refugees 
in circumstances where the primary duty holder- the state- has failed to 
secure an individual’s human rights.  
 
This chapter will reconstruct the claim that a secondary duty to protect 
human rights falls on the international community if, and when, the primary 
duty holder (the state) fails to fulfil their duty. This builds on the concept of 
responsibility to protect, applying this to refugee law. As by definition, 
refugees are unable to enforce primary duties (either the negative duty of non-
interference or positive duty to protect and promote human rights) the 
secondary duty must be engaged, and enforceable, in order to provide any 
possibility of protection from persecution. It will be argued that this 
secondary duty is not merely discretionary but also includes concrete duties 
in certain circumstances. In particular, the circumstances of emergency are 
considered in relation to a duty to rescue by admittance. This chapter returns, 
therefore, to consider the claim to conditional priority for human rights claims 
set out as a framework in chapter two and fleshed out in theoretical terms in 
chapter three. Here, the impact of this claim of human rights to conditional 
priority is considered in relation to the specific circumstances of refugeehood. 
In particular, the notion of a secondary duty to protect refugees, engaged in 
the event of the failure of the primary duty-holder, is considered and put 
forward as providing the conceptual foundations for concrete obligations to 
refugees that fall on the international community and are, in certain 
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circumstances, capable of being addressed to specific members of the 
international community.  
 
The aim is to provide a clearer account of why, and with what impact, specific 
obligations are owed to refugees by the international community. Without 
this, it is argued, it is very difficult to provide a justified criticism of the 
treatment of refugees by potential host states. In order to be able to assess 
whether a potential host state has violated its obligations to refugees under 
the Refugee Convention, we need to be clear not only on who is a refugee but 
on the obligations generated by the circumstances of refugeehood. At present, 
even in relation to signatories of the Refugee Convention, there is often 
considered to be no concrete obligations to refugees. This chapter argues that 
this assertion cannot be maintained if the importance of human rights, set out 
in chapter three, and the framework for assessing refugee claims, set out in 
chapter two, hold. As argued in these chapters, both the importance of human 
rights and the framework for assessing the claims of refugees are not put 
forward as a new understanding of refugee law but as an elucidation of the 
current system. This chapter does not propose a reform of refugee law, then, 
but a reform of the interpretation of refugee law, in line with the reform of 
interpretation of the persecution criterion set out in chapter four. Here, a 
reform of the interpretation of international obligations to refugees is set out 
and it will be argued, these obligations are already placed on members of the 
international community.  
 
In order to examine the content, concept and nature of the secondary duty to 
refugees, which it will be argued falls on the international community, this 
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chapter will begin by considering the interaction of human rights law and 
refugee law and the claims of humanitarian law with the aim of clarifying the 
position of refugee law within the schema of international law. It will then go 
on to set out the justification for, and content of, a secondary duty to protect 
human rights falling on members of the international community. This duty, 
it will be argued, stems initially from the assertions of the previous chapter as 
to the contours of political legitimacy when considered in the context of the 
current international system. How human rights trigger not only domestic 
duties but also international concern will be set out.  
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Before commencing a discussion of the nature of obligations to refugees 
within international law, it is necessary to explore a few contentious issues. 
Although it is now customary for protection issues surrounding refugees to be 
viewed as part and parcel of international human rights law, it is far from 
uncontested that refugee law is accurately, or even best, classified as part of 
human rights law. Garvey maintains, to the contrary, “international refugee 
law rests on an humanitarian premise.”2 Yet Goodwin-Gill argues, “[t]he 
protection of refugees has its origins in a human rights context.”3 There is, 
however, a third alternative, one advocated by Hathaway and Anker amongst 
others, which is to maintain the unique and separate function of international 
refugee law, whilst drawing upon international human rights law. It will be 
argued here that international refugee law might be seen as straddling the 
                                                
2 Garvey 'Towards a Reformulation of International Refugee Law' (1985) 26 Harvard 
International Legal Journal 483 484.  
3 Goodwin Gill ‘The Language of Protection’ (1989) 1 (1) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 6. 
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international human rights law and international humanitarian law and 
drawing inspiration from the former but with conceptual footing in the latter.  
It does, however, also have unique features, which distance it from both. Most 
obviously, the purpose of the Convention is comparatively narrow, dealing as 
it does only with refugees. This section will explore the interactions between 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law and 
international refugee law and will begin by defining each briefly.4 
UF*F* "07;-0@7/,0@H!Q45@0/7@-/@0!C@S!
International Humanitarian law is often thought of as the modern version of 
jus in bello, the traditional international laws of war, which governed 
interaction between civilians and enemy forces during formal states of war. 
These laws of war were designed to protect non-citizens who came into 
contact with state authority being exercised extra-territorially. The most 
obvious instance of an exercise of state authority extra-territorially is that of 
an invading army, hence the notion that humanitarian law is exclusively a law 
of war governing such things as the rights of prisoners and civilians against 
the invading army. Humanitarian law is a relatively recent term; it does not 
appear in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, although these conventions form 
the legal foundations of modern humanitarian law. Humanitarian law goes 
beyond a mere reaffirmation of jus in bello as it is now considered to cover all 
armed conflicts, whether exercises of state authority or non-governmental 
forces. Thus, international humanitarian law continues to apply to formal, 
declared, inter-state wars but also includes the relatively new concepts of 
collective humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations, which 
                                                
4 For discussion of how international humanitarian and international human rights 
law have influenced the development of refugee law see, for example, Sternberg (n 9 
chapter 4). 
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although military conflicts (to varying degrees5) would not usually be 
described as ‘war’.  Yet, humanitarian law is not law of universal application; 
its operation is limited to specific circumstances, which must be present before 
it becomes applicable. The debate over whether Refugee Law is best classified 
as humanitarian or human rights is law is, therefore, far from academic. The 
labelling of refugee law as humanitarian law clearly limits its application and 
denies the element of universality afforded, in principle, to human rights law.  
UF*F8 $=;!%;H@7/,03=/6!M;7S;;0!Q45@0/7@-/@0!C@S!@0?!Q45@0!%/1=73!C@S!
The relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law was often 
simplified to the statement that humanitarian law applies in times of war and 
human rights law applies at all other times. This simplification is clearly 
inaccurate; in principle human rights law applies always, therefore is as 
applicable in wartime as in peacetime.6 Yet humanitarian law is still limited to 
armed conflicts, although, as noted above, the emergence of peacekeeping and 
humanitarian intervention has blurred this line. The notion of obligations 
owed to an individual by a state is key to both humanitarian and human 
rights law. As Garvey notes, humanitarian law rests on the recognition of 
immunity obligations of the state exercising authority extra-territorially 
towards non-citizens.7 Yet as Dieter Fleck observes, it has been “denied so far 
that international humanitarian law also offers rights to individuals 
                                                
5 Humanitarian intervention can closely resemble a war, differing from traditional 
inter-state war by the collective nature of the action and UN authorisation, for 
example as enforcement action under Article 42 of the UN Charter but still represent 
an ‘invading army’. Peacekeepers, on the other hand, are not intended to engage in 
any military conflict and peacekeeping operations are often by consent. 
6 As confirmed by the ICJ in it advisory opinions on Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 
1996 226 [25].  
7 Garvey (n 2) 485. 
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corresponding to the duties of states.”8 International humanitarian law, then, 
does not create directly enforceable rights for individuals, who remain 
dependent on other states and international organisations to enforce 
international humanitarian law. To this end, Edwards argues, “keeping 
international refugee law distinct from international human rights law has 
played into the hands of governments choosing to flout minimum 
standards.”9 The issue of the interaction between human dignity and state 
responsibility is one, which remains unclear. Although there is some 
consensus that human dignity ought to be protected from and by the state.  
There is also consensus that human dignity is universal. The logical 
conclusion from these two positions is that states have an obligation to protect 
human dignity universally not just in its own jurisdiction. This is not however 
a position recognised in international law. The ICJ has notably failed to 
mention human dignity- preferring instead the dignity of states. Human 
dignity has however been mentioned in dissenting judgments showing 
perhaps movement towards a more human rights centred approach to 
international law.10 Carozza argues “The idea of "universal" or "fundamental" 
rights, in sum, does not contradict in principle or practice the reasonableness 
                                                
8 Fleck The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press 2008).  
9 Edwards 'Refugees, Human Rights and the Right to 'enjoy' Asylum' (2005) 17 
International Journal of Refugee Law 293.  
10 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa Case, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge de Castro in Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal [1973] ICJ Rep 166, at 29, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at 383 , Separate Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
Preliminary Objections [1996] ICJ Rep 595, at 641: ‘[o]ne of the principal concerns of 
the contemporary international legal system is the protection of the human rights and 
dignity of every individual.’ 
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and recognition of pluralism in the specification of a conception of the human 
good to which human rights refer.”11 
 
UF8 $=;!&6;-@7/,0!,<!"07;-0@7/,0@H!%;<41;;!C@S!
This, argues Garvey, prevents international refugee law from being rightly 
labelled as ‘human rights law.’ Garvey’s argument is that the operation of 
international refugee law as an international treaty to which states only are 
signatories places it firmly in the humanitarian law box. This is a claim 
supported by Hathaway, whilst campaigning for a reconceived notion of 
refugee law within the human rights paradigm; Hathaway argues that current 
refugee law “is fundamentally a means of reconciling the national self-interest 
of powerful states to the inevitability of involuntary migration.”12 As such, 
refugee law operates as an international agreement on how to manage forced 
migration rather than a rights enhancing convention.  
 
In line with Hathaway’s argument, according to Garvey, the 1951 treaty was 
an inter-state agreement to manage a specific problem. The initial time 
constraint placed on those wishing to apply for refugee status (‘events prior to 
1951’) confirms Garvey’s analysis, however, the removal of this time bar 
suggests that the Convention now has some element of universality. 
However, unlike human rights law, in principle, applicable all of the time; 
humanitarian Law and refugee law are context specific; there are certain 
triggering circumstances, which determine whether or not the law can be 
                                                
11 Subsidiarity as a structural principle in International human rights law The 
American Journal of International Law (2003) 73. 
12 Hathaway (n 8 introduction) 113. 
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applied.  International refugee law refers to law concerning both the definition 
and admittance of refugees and treatment of refugees after recognition of 
refugee status. International Refugee law does not, however, cover treatment 
of those denied refugee status and only on certain interpretations does it 
apply to those seeking refugee status beyond the definitional article 1(2) of the 
1951 Convention.  
 
Those who subscribe to the notion of prima facie refugee status (that is where 
refugee status is presumed until proved inapplicable) might argue that 
refugee law applies to all those seeking recognition of refugee status. 
Conceptually, this may be a sound argument; if refugee status is declaratory 
not constitutive, then a person is a refugee whether or not they have yet to 
have this status officially recognised. Refugee law ought, therefore, to have 
been applied from the moment of entry into the host country. However, 
practically (and indeed logically) this is impossible, refugee law can only 
apply after a determination of refugee status, otherwise it would apply to 
everyone.  Therefore, asylum law applies to those seeking asylum (via 
recognition of refugee status) and migration law applies to those who are 
seeking to enter another country until or unless the individual declares an 
intention to seek asylum. Refugee law, then, is in reality, applied only 
narrowly to those who are seeking refugee status, that is the definitional 
article 1(2) of the 1951 Convention is applied to determine if refugee status is 
appropriate. Except in this narrow exception, refugee law is then applied only 
to those already recognised as refugees.13   
                                                
13 This does not mean, however, that human rights law more generally does not 
apply to anyone entering another country. Asylum seekers, awaiting for refugee 
status decision, ought still to have their human rights respected, be that the right to 
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Garvey’s argument, however, goes beyond the circumstances of drafting to 
the heart of refugee law. The link between refugee law and humanitarian law 
is foundational, namely that both types of law are based on the protection of 
individuals who cannot enforce rights directly but instead rely on the 
international system for protection. Both humanitarian law and refugee law 
operate, according to Garvey, on what J.D Singer calls ‘the non-human level’, 
that is the international sphere where the only entities14 with legal personality 
are states. International refugee law is for the use of states in deciding refugee 
status applications (to determine who is in need of substitute protection) and 
is not a rights giving document for those seeking asylum.15 Thus, refugee law 
does not afford the right to asylum but instead provides the criteria for states 
that are willing to allow individuals to exercise their right to seek asylum. Just 
as Fleck observed in relation to humanitarian law, international refugee law 
does not afford asylum seekers (i.e. those seeking recognition under the 
convention) rights corresponding to state duties and affords a refugee (i.e. a 
person with refugee status under the convention) only limited rights.  A 
refugee is as Goodwin-Gill states, “a beneficiary, beholden to the State with a 
status to which certain standards of treatment and certain guarantees 
                                                
be free from arbitrary detention or the right to access to food, shelter, education or 
work.   
14 With limited exceptions, for example, the laws governing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity allow for individuals to be agents under international law. 
15 International Refugee Law may, of course, be of use to asylum seekers if the 
applicant can argue that it has been misapplied and it may also be called upon by 
refugees with Convention status. For example, if the standards of treatment to be 
afforded to those with refugee status are breached the Convention could be used to 
compel the host state to meets its obligations. Thus, article 33, which prohibits the 
return of those with refugee status to the country of origin or residence whilst a 
danger of persecution remains, is often used directly by those with refugee status.  
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attach.”16 Refugees awaiting status decisions are not, then, rights-holders, in 
the strictest sense, in the potential host state. This suggests that human rights 
law is not useful in understanding the operation of international refugee law, 
where the refugees are merely the right-less beneficiaries of another’s 
obligation.17  
UF8F* %;74-0/01!7,!/07;-0@7/,0@H!=45@0!-/1=73!H@S!
The points presented above certainly seem to show a mismatch between 
refugee law and human rights law, however, is this the only meaning of 
‘human rights law’? Does human rights law always give rise to a claim-right? 
The duty-model approach to human rights, which requires a corresponding 
duty for each right, is often seen as the best, or indeed only, explanation 
which will afford human rights any enforceability. The objection to a 
conception of rights, which stands free from the notion of duty, it is argued, 
would be meaningless. Beitz and Goodin, echoing Shue, argue, “If public 
officials proclaim that everybody has a right to X but do nothing to ensure 
that people can in fact have or do X if they so wish, then the so-called ‘right’ 
can hardly have much value; indeed people then can hardly be said to ‘have’ 
the right at all.”18 But is this in fact the case? Must rights have a corresponding 
duty to be called rights at all? There are two issues at stake, firstly, does the 
duty-model of human rights accord with the actual operation of international 
human rights law? Secondly, is it an existence condition of a (human) right that 
a corresponding duty be identified? The latter question has been addressed in 
chapter three, the former issue will be considered now.  
                                                
16 n 29 (chapter 4) 
17 See Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University 
Press 2003) 9.  
18 Beitz Global Basic Rights  (Oxford University Press 2009) ix. 
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If we return to discussion of international human rights we can see that these 
rights become justicable only through national implementing measures of 
international standards and/or through domestic legislation, be that a 
constitution or an act of parliament. Thus, they are not generally enforceable, 
but are directly enforceable against the home state, and then only if some 
human rights legislation or constitution to protect these rights exists. Human 
rights law could include domestic laws, such as the US Bill of Rights, regional 
laws, such as the ECHR, which do produce directly enforceable rights. 
International human rights law refers instead to international treaties such as 
the UDHR or the ICCPR. Whilst human rights law, in general, has a long 
tradition, international human rights law is largely a twentieth century 
project, focused on the recognition of universal human rights rather than with 
the purpose of creating automatically justicable rights. Here rights have not 
been transferred into the legal sphere within the meaning of rights set out 
above, an international human rights does not follow the pattern X has a right 
where Y has a duty. This is simply not the case for the UDHR, which describes 
rights which “ought to be cherished” by states.19 As Donnelly reminds us, “we 
should be careful not to confuse possessing a right with the respect it receives 
or the ease or frequency with which it is enforced.”20 What Donnelly refers to 
as the ‘possession paradox’, whereby ‘having the right’ is most important 
when one does not ‘have the right’ is key in international refugee law, when 
one does not ‘have the right’ (i.e. human rights have been violated and/or are 
                                                
19 For further discussion of this distinction see Chinkin ‘International law and human 
rights’, in Evans (ed) Human Rights Fifty Years On: A reappraisal (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 1998) 115.   
20 Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press 
2003) 8. 
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unenforceable) is exactly when surrogate protection is necessary and the 
awarding of refugee status is recognition as the individual always posed the 
right denied or infringed and, as such, ‘had the right’ to expect it to be 
respected.     
 
International human rights law does not have the remedial function of 
domestic human rights law, it does not automatically produce rights that 
individuals can enforce in domestic courts. Without national implementing 
measures the UDHR or the ICCPR are just statements of an ideal. Only rarely 
are individual entitlements produced under international law. It is for this 
reason that Hart, Austin and others have argued that international law does 
not constitute a form of law at all. This debate does not concern us here, 
although it is an important one, but it is noteworthy that there is a clear 
conceptual distinction between international and domestic human rights law, 
present even if one does consider international law as law right called. This is 
not to say, however, that international human rights law is mere rhetoric or 
lip-service to the idea of universal rights. Hart does acknowledge that 
international treaties could gain legal status as binding even non-signatory 
states through the rule of recognition.21  Patrick Capps sees international law 
as “an attempt to subject the complex social relations which compromise 
international relations, and which are often damaging to human dignity, to 
regulation.”22 The result of this attempt, when finally complete, would be 
“that international legal institutions are the ultimate authority for how states 
                                                
21 see Hart (n 39 chapter 2).    
22 Capps (n 83 chapter three) 6. 
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should act”.23 This is the concept of international law meant here, one that is 
part of an ideal project that has been only partially achieved at present but 
still has enormous normative value.  
 
Instead, international human rights may be said to follow a broader notion of 
rights, for example, Gewirth defines as rights following the structure A has a 
right to X by virtue of Y.24 In the case of human rights in the simplest form: A 
has a right to have right X respected by virtue of being human. This makes no 
comment as to the existence or otherwise of a correlative duty- the right exists 
by virtue of being human irrespective of the acknowledgment of a duty. 
However, international human rights law does go beyond abstract values 
which suggests that there ought to be mechanisms to protect and realise these 
values and as such is intimately connected with the idea of political 
legitimacy, as was discussed in chapter one and will be explored in more 
detail below. This is not to say that international human rights law is merely 
‘a manifesto for political change’, as Donnelly notes, “claiming a human right, 
in addition to suggesting that one ought to have or enjoy a parallel legal right, 
involves exercising a (human) right one already has…[H]uman rights rest on 
a prior moral (and international legal) entitlement.”25 International refugee 
law is part of this process of claiming a human right, a citizen stating that as 
their human rights are not protected at home they will seek protection 
elsewhere is implicitly asserting that they are a right holder, that they possess 
                                                
23 ibid. See also, Pogge 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty' (1992) 102  Ethic 48. Here 
Pogge refers to ‘legal cosmopolitanism’, which represents this view of international 
law based upon the concept of human dignity and a commitment to international 
legal institutions that seek to ensure a respect for human dignity from states.   
24 Gewirth Human Rights: Essays on justification and application (University of Chicago 
Press 1982) 65. 
25 Donnelly (n 18) 10.   
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the human right in question and that, therefore, the fact that this right has not 
been respected is of international concern.  
 
Refugee law also has the dual nature of being both domestic and 
international, with domestic legislation incorporating, supplementing or in 
some case detracting from international refugee law (the Refugee 
Convention). Domestic refugee law, then, may interact with any number of 
domestic and regional human rights statutes and conventions, in its 
application as domestic law international refugee law might be aided by local 
human rights law. But international refugee law is not directly concerned with 
these national measures (other than to provide a standard for national 
measures of signatory states). International refugee law is, instead, concerned 
with defining factors in the country of origin, which can give rise to a good 
case for refuge and, as such, might be said to trigger a duty on the 
international community to provide a place of refuge. Just as with 
international human rights law, international refugee law can be seen as an 
ideal, an attempt to subject state decision-making in relation to refugees to 
some kind of international regulation and scrutiny. As yet, this not directly 
enforceable, thus the UNHCR cannot take a signatory state to court for failure 
to live up to international obligations, but in principle the UN could take 
measures of sanction and in practice, the state can be subject to rebuke from 
the international community which in an era of international legitimacy is a 
form of sanction, albeit a weak one.26   
 
                                                
26 For further discussion on the ways in which international human rights norms can 
shape state behaviour see, Pogge 'The International Significance of Human Rights' 
(2000) 4 The Journal of Ethics 45. 
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A focus on only on international human rights law and international refugee 
law narrows, then, the types of rights under discussion. Rights here signify 
“the morally ideal set of entitlements”27 that an individual ought to be able to 
enjoy by virtue of being human. These are the rights, which might be 
described as ‘moral trump cards’, as Dworkin does, which ought to allow 
them to outrank other interests. Broadly speaking, this is the type of 
aspirational human rights law intertwined with international refugee law. It is 
a violation of these rights that provides the trigger factor for a good case to 
refugee status, or more broadly refugee flows are created by human rights 
violations. In addition, human rights operate also a legal trump card, for 
example, the principle of non-refoulement, contained in article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, states that a person cannot be returned to a country 
where her human rights would be violated or endangered.  
 
In addition, if the aim of the Refugee Convention is to provide protection 
when and where human rights cannot be protected at home, it implies the 
recognition and application of international human rights standards.28 
International human rights law has a very specific relationship with 
international refugee law, in particular the UDHR, which was framed only 
shortly before the Refugee Convention. As such, these are very much part of 
the same post-War legacy, in which the world attempted to protect in the 
future rights that had been so grievously violated just a short time before. 
Refugee law was an acknowledgment that in many countries the rights 
contained in the UDHR would remain only ideal and that the international 
                                                
27 Bäck (n 62 chapter 4) 369.  
28 This argument is taken up again in chapter six Female Genital Mutilation and the 
challenge posed by cultural relativism. 
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community required a method to deal with this. Although the refugee may 
not be able to enforce her human rights in her country of origin, she may leave 
this country and seek refuge elsewhere. This might be described as the 
conceptual origins of international refugee law, the notion that human rights 
violations give rise to a right to seek refuge.29  
 
This points towards the central function of international human rights law, 
which does not produce directly enforceable rights necessarily, but instead 
provides a valuable standard against which to evaluate state treatment of its 
own citizens. This represents the normative value of international human 
rights law, even where it is not respected or enforceable it can be used to 
identify illegitimate violence and to justify condemnation of such violence. As 
Deborah Anker explains, “[t]he function of the international human rights 
regime is to judge whether states are fulfilling their duties under 
internationally agreed upon human rights norms and, through monitoring 
and publicizing, to deter future abuse: in short, to change the behavior of 
states.”30 The focus then in human rights law is dual, on the individual to 
whom rights attach, and on the state, on whom the duty to respect and protect 
these rights is placed. In this way international refugee law is firmly 
underpinned by international human rights norms and laws as it uses 
international human rights law to identify state behaviour below the 
                                                
29 This may sound a weak right and in many ways it is, the right to seek refuge does 
not guarantee refuge (it is no right to a place of refuge, or right to asylum) but it is a 
considerable shift from the traditional view that a state was entitled to treats its 
citizens how it wished, a view which denied the international community any right 
to judge or interfere with domestic decisions, even to the extent of granting refuge to 
refugees.  
30 Anker (n 83 chapter 1) 134. 
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internationally required standards which amount to human rights violations 
giving rise to a good case for refugee status.  
 
UF8F8 $=;!6H@:;!,<!"07;-0@7/,0@H!%;<41;;!C@S!
The connections, then, between international human rights law and 
international refugee law are not to be overlooked but Hathaway, drawing on 
the work of Gervase Cole is quick to point out that “refugee law, intended to 
serve a strictly remedial or palliative function, has its own claim to legitimacy, 
distinct from the interventionist or facilitative mandate of international 
human rights law.”31 Refugee law provides ‘substitute protection’32 in the 
sense that it is “a response to disfranchisement from the usual benefits of 
nationality.”33 The notion of ‘substitute protection’ was confirmed a leading 
asylum case from the British House of Lords, Horvath, in which Lord Hope 
stated that the purpose of the refugee convention “is to enable the person who 
no longer has the benefit of protection against persecution for a convention 
reason in his own country to turn for protection to the international community.”34 
The host state, then, is fulfilling a duty on behalf of the international 
community to offer substitute protection to ‘victims of sovereignty’ whose 
                                                
31 ‘Approaching the Refugee problem today’ in Loescher, G and Monahan, L (eds) 
Refugees and International Relations (Oxford University Press 1990). Though Price 
disagrees with the characterisation of asylum as ‘palliative’, arguing it is not 
addressed at the refugees’ immediate needs but at an interim solution to alienation. 
The work of the UNHCR in providing aid directly to refugees is, for Price, the 
palliative element to the international communities ‘tool-kit (Price n 14 chapter 1). 
However, it could be argued that refuge is still palliative, it is merely less immediate 
than direct aid. In addition, direct aid is rarely given to those who succeed in having 
Convention refugee status awarded (as they are the ones who have managed to 
leave), aid is given to internally displaced persons or to those living in a zone of 
severe deprivation.  
32 Hathaway (n 46 chapter 1) 117. 
33 ibid 124. Citing a memo from the Secretary-General of the U.N., U.N 
Doc.E/AC.32/2 [13] (Jan 3 1950).  
34 Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 3 All ER 577 HL 
(emphasis added). 
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assigned protector has failed to fulfil the primary duty to the citizen. Thus, 
although refugee law is conceptually linked to international human rights 
law, as it determines (or ought to determine) key concepts such as persecution 
relative to human rights norms, it does serve a separate function to 
international human rights law; international refugee law is designed to offer 
some remedy to the persecuted. This is the practical function of international 
refugee law, one that is executed alongside the expressive function of 
condemnation of the country of origin.35   
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The primary duty has been set out in chapter four. This chapter concerns the 
secondary duties generated by the notion of human rights, in particular the 
notion of surrogate protection. In British asylum law, the seminal case of 
Horvath, considered the relationship between the notion of protection and 
persecution in the Refugee Convention in depth.  Lord Hope of Craighead 
stated the purpose of the convention “is to enable the person who no longer 
has the benefit of protection against persecution for a convention reason in his 
own country to turn for protection to the International Community.”36 Lord 
Lloyd built the holistic approach on the principle of surrogacy – that the ‘host’ 
state is acting in lieu of the ‘home’ state where state protection is unavailable 
which he argued underpins the whole convention.37  Lord Clyde further 
emphasised the ‘purposive approach’ to interpretation with reference to the 
Preamble, which he emphasised;  
                                                
35 The idea of refugee status as condemnation is considered also in chapter six, p1. 
36 ibid [385]. 
37 ibid. 
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The notion that refugee status is a mechanism of surrogate protection is, then, 
well established and is echoed in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of 
Canada in Ward expressed similar sentiments, stating that, ”the international 
community was meant to be a forum of second resort for the persecuted, a 
“surrogate”, approachable upon failure of local protection”, and that “[t]he 
international community intended that persecuted individuals be required to 
approach their home state for protection before the responsibility of other 
states becomes engaged.”39 Although the discussion in Ward concerned denial 
of protection on grounds of existing national protection, the implication is that 
if national protection is not available there is a duty on other states to provide 
surrogate protection. The justification for this eluded to in such judgments as 
those expressed above, namely the importance of ‘those rights and freedoms.’  
 
The scope of this surrogate protection and what causes it to be extended, or 
denied, is not discussed. Indeed such discussion would, in a signatory state, 
be unnecessary in order to establish the authority to extend such protection, in 
law this authority stems from the Convention. The concern here is whether 
there is not only authority to extend protection (at the discretion of the state) 
but also an obligation to do so. The argument put forward here is that 
international law has evolved, or at least is currently in the process of 
                                                
38 ibid [396]. 
39 Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. [689]. 
! 8RR 
evolving, such that the traditional notion of the state as the only unit of 
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Surrogate protection, then, merely substitutes the host state for home state 
and, thereby, allows the statist version of international law to sustain. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the notion of the state in international, and 
indeed domestic, law has undergone significant changes from the 
Westphalian model of absolute sovereignty and now might be said to contain 
conditions of (international) legitimacy. This shift, it was claimed, stems from 
the increasing recognition of the importance of, and claims stemming from, 
human rights. The notion of conditional sovereignty, it is argued, 
acknowledges that human rights do not have borders in that these rights are to 
be respected by every state in order to be recognised as a legitimate member of 
the international community. This development of newly emerging rights and 
new interpretations of existing rights might be said to be a reaction, or a 
natural consequence of, the inclusion of more states and traditions within the 
international sphere.41 These developments in human rights law are relevant 
to international refugee law not only in terms of interpreting the persecution 
criterion but also in terms of redefining the notion of state sovereignty and 
                                                
40 A Modern Law of Nations (Macmillan 1968) 9. 
41 The differing legal traditions and the influence of these on human rights and 
human rights law are beyond the scope of this project. Chapter four and Chapter 
considers what might be said to be the flip side of this, namely cultural relativism or 
relativity.    
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third state responsibility. The UN speaks more substantively in terms of 
shared responsibility and is beginning the task of concretising a substantive 
obligation to protect and in particular a shared responsibility to protect.42  
 
Linklater notes “[m]odern international law can be regarded as representing 
an advance in promoting “humaneness” by expressing commitments to a 
global version of the harm principle.”43 The aim of Linklater’s harm principle 
is to protect what he dubs ‘welfare interests’44 humans have in common. As 
Barry notes different concepts of the good life do not preclude agreement that 
basic forms of harm need to be eliminated45 or, reformulated, that people are 
entitled to protection from basic forms of harm as even basic forms of harm 
have not successfully been eliminated. Linklater also notes that injustice 
constitutes a form of harm as, in Smith’s terms, “real and positive hurt to 
some particular persons.”46 Linklater posits a more expansive concept of 
positive responsibilities to protect those in danger of being harmed:  
                                                
42 See, for example, HRC Res 8/5 (June 2008) ʻPromotion of a democratic and 
equitable international orderʼ, which speaks of a shared responsibility for managing 
economic and social issues. Consider also the Right to Development which speaks of 
an obligation placed on all human beings. See also Obina Okere ʻThe Protection of 
Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peopleʼs Rights: A 
comparative Analysis of the African and European Systemsʼ (1984) 6 Human Rights 
Quarterly 141. This sets out how the African system focuses more on responsibilities 
than rights.   Indepth discussion of this development is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The right to development might be seen as a facet of a dignified life and in this 
way it may enter into consideration in a refugee claim, as set out in chapter three 
3.2.1.   
43 ‘The problem of harm in world politics: implications for the sociology of states’ 
(2002) International Affairs 319, 330.  
44 For Linklater the origins of these welfare interest may be traced back ‘at least to 
Stoic philosophers’ including Cicero who wrote of ‘nature, which might be defined as 
international law […] the particular laws by which individual peoples are 
governed…ordain that no one is justified in harming another for his own advantage.’ 
This principle argues Linklater forms the bedrock of later philosophies such as Mill, 
Kant and Smith ibid 331 .  
45 Barry Justice as Impartiality (Oxford University Press 1998) 87–88.  
46 Smith Moral Sentiments (Penguin 2010) 79.  
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Complex responsibility is more demanding of moral agents since it requires 
them to be reflective about the ways in which conduct may unintentionally 
harm other human beings, whether now or in the future. In consequence, 
moral agents take their complex responsibilities seriously when they try to 
understand how their actions affect other persons, and when they change 
their behaviour to avoid harm, even though there is no legal obligation or 
social directive to do so.  
The Refugee Convention need not then specifically state that signatory states 
to act to protect refugees, although in any case it arguably does, to place an 
obligation on states to act.  Further states need not necessarily be signatories 
to the Convention to be obligated to undertake some actions to protect 
refugees. Albeit considering more direct bystanders Elie Wiesel’s discussion 
of bystanders47 reminds us that not acting in the face of violence can be seen as 
contributing to the harm in refusing to recognise entitlement to advance 
human rights claims.48   Nelson Mandela argued that “[o]ver- coming poverty 
is not a gesture of charity. It is as act of justice. It is the protection of a 
fundamental human rights, the right to dignity and a decent life.”49 The same 
could be said of offering refuge, although often seen as a gesture of charity to 
provide protection against human rights violations might better be framed as 
an act of justice. The Preambles to the Geneva Conventions all assert that 
‘[r]espect for the personality and dignity of human beings constitutes a 
                                                
47 See Brown “The Holocaust as a Problem in Moral Choice” in Wiesel et al. (eds.), 
Dimensions of the Holocaust (Northwestern University Press 1990) 54–55. Hannah 
Arendt makes a similar argument in her study of Eichmann, Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
The Banality of Evil (Penguin, 2006 ed) when considering the actions of one person in 
the context of genocide.   
48 What Gay referred to as “mortal indifference to ... human dignity” see Gay My 
German Question: Growing Up in Nazi Germany (Yale University Press 1998) 185. 
49 3 Feb 2005 cited in McCrudden (n 20 in chapter three) 663. 
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universal principle which is binding even in the absence of any contractual 
undertaking.’  
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As noted in chapter three, the first question to be resolved is the primacy of 
states’ powers. This question, suggests Gilbert, needs to be resolved before 
one can consider the secondary issue of the source and extent of protection 
provided by international (refugee) law.50 Gilbert argues international law 
now represents limitations on state’s power to control entry to or expulsion 
from its territory. This rejects the notion that state sovereignty is an 
established rule all international law is subject to and instead affirms Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of the state as an ‘imagined community’.51 As an 
‘imagined community’ it is (presumably) capable of being re-imagined in line 
with shifting standards of legitimacy. In terms of international refugee law, it 
might be said to be by necessity a limitation on state sovereignty. It is, in the 
first place, a limitation on the home state’s sovereignty by denying their 
jurisdiction over a citizen. More importantly here refugee law might be said to 
also represent a limitation on the sovereignty of the receiving state. Although 
a state is defined by reference to its population, from which state’s powers to 
control entry and expulsion might be said to flow, this control it is argued is 
not unlimited. Both in reference to its own population and those on their 
territory states are bound by the principles of human rights expressed formally 
in reference to refugees in the Refugee Convention. Although the definition of 
                                                
50 n 184 chapter 3 176. 
51 Anderson Imagined Communities (3rd ed Verso Books 1991) 5-7.   
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refugee status is not in and of itself a limitation on a receiving state’s power to 
expel the individual as refugee status is declaratory and not constitutive in 
theoretical and practical terms it represents a significant limitation. This 
limitation is expressed in the principle of non-refoulement. A refugee cannot be 
returned. In practical terms then a refugee may not be expelled. The Refugee 
Convention might be said to represent a voluntary concession, in the sense 
that it formally binds a signatory state. However, it might also be seen as an 
unavoidable concession in the sense that the Refugee Convention is merely a 
formal expression of the theoretical and practical implications of the 
universality of human rights and the notion of secondary duty-holders.  In 
this sense, Gilbert argues, “[i]nternational refugee law and international 
human rights law act in parallel to limit the state’s power.”52   
 
The notion of conditional sovereignty necessarily impacts on our 
understanding not only of domestic sovereignty but also of the international 
community. If members of the international community must adhere to 
notions of legitimacy at the domestic level, it seems untenable to continue to 
argue that responsibility of the international community is not engaged when 
these conditions of legitimacy are violated. This notion of international 
responsibility can be seen, for example, in the emerging notions of 
responsibility to protect and human security. It can be seen also, it is argued, 
as underpinning the refugee convention. This is not to argue that this was the 
intention of the drafters, indeed states were eager to establish the contrary, 
but that it is an inescapable responsibility stemming from the importance of 
                                                
52 n 42 177. 
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human rights and the shifting notion of domestic legitimacy coupled with the 
emerging notion of international responsibility.  
 
Refugee law is necessarily part of this shift as it is concerned not only with 
home state legitimacy, as encompassed in the persecution criterion, but also 
with the protection element, expressed in the requirement of a lack of national 
protection. These elements are intertwined, as argued in chapter one, the 
persecution criterion might be characterised as an expression of, and a 
symptom of, lack of national protection. The notion of protection is, therefore, 
inherent in the concept of refugeehood and as the concept of protection shifts 
so too must the concept of protective obligations to refugees. It is argued, 
then, that refugee law is intended to provide surrogate protection to those 
whose state, the primary duty holder, has failed to provide protection. This is 
a fairly uncontroversial position. However, what is argued here is that this 
notion of surrogate protection is not one, which the potential host state may 
choose to extend, at its own discretion, but one which is to be extended when 
required. The international community, it is argued, has a duty to extend 
surrogate protection as the secondary addressee of the duty to protect human 
rights. Further, it is argued, this duty may attach to specific states and become 
concrete rather than merely abstract duties addressed to all, and therefore no 
one. This argument will be reconstructed below.  
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Following Ramcharan, the international protection of human rights may be 
either direct or indirect. Direct international protection refers “the intercession 
of an international entity either at the behest of a victim or victims concerned, 
or by persons on their behalf, or on the volition of the international protecting 
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agency itself to halt a violation of human rights.”53 Included in this direct 
protection, it is argued, is the granting of refugee status. On the other hand, 
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This indirect protection may form part of the way in which the international 
community fulfils the general duty to promote and protect human rights but 
it is far vaguer and less effective than the granting of refugee status. Refugee 
status ought, therefore, to form part of the mechanisms of the international 
community for protecting human rights.  
 
Nickel calls for us to view human rights as creating different categories or 
levels of duties that ought to combine to ensure adequate protection from 
violation. The claim-to-freedom from torture, for example, would create, 
according to Nickel, four duties, which are addressed simultaneously to 
everyone and specific agents/institutions where appropriate. The duties 
created would be: 
1) duty to refrain from torture, addressed to 
everyone, 
                                                
53 The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Human Rights Forty 
years After the Universal Declaration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 17. 
54 ibid 20. 
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2)  duty to prevent torture, addressed to each 
government in reference to all persons within 
the territory and jurisdiction of that country, 
3) duty to create and maintain a political system 
which does not engage in and seeks to prevent 
torture, addressed to the people of a country, 
4) a duty, addressed to international institutions, 
to assist and encourage governments to 
prevent torture, and, where necessary, to 
sanction, punish and prevent those 
governments that fail to do so.55 
 
If we consider refugee law we can see the problems that arise if a split 
between specific duties addressed to perpetrators and general duties 
addressed to all others is maintained. Persecution, by definition an unjustified 
human rights violation, is a failure to fulfil a negative duty of non-interference 
(category 1 in Nickel’s model) and the positive duty to protect human rights 
placed on the home state (category 2). The reason, however, for refugee law is 
the lack of any effective mechanism for enforcing these duties either against 
individual perpetrators or the home state. These primary duties to respect and 
protect human rights, whilst grounding the notion of persecution, cannot be 
the only duties under international refugee law or it would not constitute an 
effective method of protecting human rights at all. The secondary duties must 
then become engaged (categories 3 and 4) and are, to borrow Shue’s 
                                                
55 Nickel (n 4 in chapter 3) 80. Although Nickel does not identify it, arguably there is 
a fifth duty placed on members of the international community to create and 
maintain an international system which does not engage in and seeks to prevent 
torture.  
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terminology, ‘positive indirect duties.’56  As Nickel argues “a morally justified 
right does not just disappear, or cease to direct behavior, when it is 
systematically violated. In such a case, the right’s capacity to generate 
obligations may shift so as to increase responsibilities of the secondary 
addressees.”57 This is particularly applicable to refugee law, where it is the 
failure of the first two, and most probably three, levels of duties that has 
pushed the refugee into flight. The refugee, then, is dependent on secondary 
addressees recognising this concept of shifting or split duties to acknowledge 
when they might become the relevant addressee of a duty to protect human 
rights. The Refugee Convention positively encourages burden sharing, with 
the proviso that the refugee’s human rights are protected and respected.   
 
Ferreira, building on Griffin’s work, similarly argues that rights need not 
equate directly to one specific duty but may create a plethora of duties 
attached to different actors depending on the context. Ferreira takes as his 
example a right to peace and security. Assuming this is a right, we can 
formulate this right starting with the assumption that there is an interest in 
international peace and security (or international peace and security is an 
interest worth protecting). If we say this is an interest worth protecting, there 
is a right to international peace and security (or we might say, everyone across 
the globe has a right to individual security). If there is a right to international 
peace and security, then following a simple right-duty model there must be a 
duty to secure international peace and security. This type of argument is then 
used by ‘pragmatists’ to suggest that there cannot be such a right as it is 
                                                
56 Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd edn Princeton 
University Press 1996) 697. 
57 Nickel (n 17 in introduction) 85. 
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obviously unenforceable, utopian and so broad as to be virtually contentless. 
A similar argument is made to counter a right to asylum; if no one could take 
all of world’s refugees then, as the opening quotation stated, no one can be 
forced to take any. Following Nickel, if the interest is worth protecting we 
cannot simply say that the duty is too onerous but must look for different 
ways of imposing the duty.  
 
If only a broad duty were created, the duty to protect victims of human rights, 
even if limited only to those who have fled their home country might seem to 
onerous to justifiable be addressed to any specific actor. However, if we take 
what we might label ‘the multi-duty model’ there need not be only one duty 
or one addressee arising from human rights violations. Instead we might 
suggest a range of duties, created from the general right to security (to 
continue Ferreira’s example), which vary in their obligatory force and content. 
This might make a general requirement to all actors who have some control 
over this interest to act with the interest(s) in mind but make specific demands 
of political leaders that peace and security is actively sought and protected 
where possible.  
 
Ferreira uses this argument to defeat claims that all rights that seem to create 
unfeasible duties cannot be rights at all and at best may only be progressive 
goals. If a right to asylum, based on the general interest in protecting human 
rights, gave rise to many different duties some of those duties could be 
enforceable even if the general duty is infeasible. .58 In certain cases, it is 
argued, refuge might be the only available or viable protection from human 
                                                
58 Ferreira ‘The Expanding Realm of Human Rights' (2008) 14 Res Publica 57 62-3. 
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rights violations.  Nickel’s model suggests that a duty to provide refuge, to be 
fulfilled through intersecting levels of duties, would then arise.  As noted 
above, following Nickel’s levels of duty, if levels 1-3 have failed, international 
obligations are engaged as the only method of protecting human rights under 
these circumstances. These international obligations are, in these 
circumstances, binding and addressed to all members of the international 
community. Although these duties might require different things of different 
actors within this community.  
 
If we recall Nickel’s model of claim-to rights generating duties then it could be 
argued that, built on his claim that the people of individual countries have a 
duty to create and maintain political institutions that secure and protect 
human rights, a corresponding duty is placed on members of the individual 
community to create a similar system at the international level. This would 
create a fifth category of duty. This would demand that individuals, through 
their governments most likely, would have a duty to maintain effective 
international institutions for protecting human rights. If these institutions 
were unable to effectively protect human rights, the duty would return to the 
individuals, and their home states, who are able to provide protection from 
human rights violations.  
 
This returns to Nickel’s argument that as the right always exists, a duty to 
protect this right must also exist and will become attached to the most 
appropriate addressee in the circumstances, moving from category 1 to 5. For 
international wrongs, Nickel argues, “the responsibility will fall on those 
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countries with the capacity to make a difference.”59 This capacity to make a 
difference might be determined by location, “[f]or example, Mexico has often 
been in a good position to provide refuge and assistance to those fleeing 
Guatemala.”60 It might, alternatively, be determined by available resources 
and power or special ties with the country or people in need of assistance. For 
refugees, there is an additional element; the addressee of the duty, it could be 
argued, is partly determined by the country in which refuge is applied for. 
That is to say that the country receiving the application for acknowledgment 
of refugee status (and therefore a right to international protection and to 
remain in the host country) would need to demonstrate an inability to house 
or protect the refugee in question before refugee status could be determined 
elsewhere.61 This argument is reflected in a position paper from the European 
Parliament concerning the Common Asylum Policy which states:  
[i]n all these different contexts, Member States may need to accept that 
asylum within the EU is the only viable option if international 
obligations are to be upheld.62 
 
To recall the argument put forward in chapter three; where an interest is 
worth protecting (as human rights as undoubtedly are) then this interest 
produces a right to have that interest protected either by non-interference or 
through positive action depending on the interest and circumstances. This 
right, in turn, is capable of generating duties, the purpose of which is to 
                                                
59 Nickel (n 17 in introduction) 85. 
60 ibid. 
61 This incidentally explains the illegality in the proposed plan by the Australian 
government for ‘outsourcing’ the processing of those seeking recognition as refugees 
to Malaysia.   
62 Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433711/EXPO-
DROI_NT(2013)433711_EN.pdf (accessed 2 March 2014). 
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protect the right and it is this purpose that determines the content of the duty. 
Our first question as to what duties are created by various rights is to ask 
‘what is the most effective method of protecting the right in question?’ For this 
reason, states Nickel, claim-to rights cannot create only discretionary duties. 
Where an adequate response cannot be secured through discretionary duties, 
argues Nickel, a better alternative is called for, which may require non-
discretionary duties be imposed.63 The right may require different duties 
and/or different addressees of a duty depending on the circumstances.  
 
The first objection made be said to concern the enforceability of onerous, 
discretionary duties. As noted above, the starting assumption, for many, is 
that where a duty is onerous it cannot be assigned to any specific agent as 
they would be unable to fulfil this duty, placing them in a catch-22 situation 
where however they act they have failed.64 To address this objection, Shue 
suggests a ‘division of labour.’65 Shue’s duty sharing, however, differs 
significantly from other proposals of burden sharing as it frames discretionary 
duties as discretionary only in their mode of fulfilment. These duties are to be 
fulfilled by each agent even if only indirectly. Shue’s argument is that “it is 
not necessary for everyone else to have all the duties to fulfil a right, it is 
necessary only for some other to have each of the duties required. On the side 
of duties there can be a division of labor.”66 This division of labour is to 
                                                
63 Or alternatively, as will be argued below, that discretionary duties are understood 
as duties which allow discretion on how they are fulfilled rather than allowing the 
addressee to opt in or out of the duty at will, see p4. 
64 This is similar to the tragic choice model, where an agent has two competing duties 
and is unable to fulfil both simultaneously. It has been argued that in such cases, the 
agent is released from both duties and is free to make a choice as to which duty, if 
either, he is to fulfil. This argument is dealt with below. 
65 Shue (n 48) 688. 
66 ibid 689. 
! 8UC 
address, in particular, ‘burdensome duties’, those which Shue defines as 
“require the expenditure of some resource I control, like time, money, energy 
or emotional involvement.”67 It is vital, however, that addressees of these 
‘burdensome’ duties are aware that they are under concrete obligations to 
fulfil these duties however burdensome they may be. As Shue notes, “[W]hat I 
give up in, say, time or money in fulfilling a positive right is not genuinely 
mine to retain if I truly have a duty to use that resource on behalf of someone 
else’s right…[n]o more than in the case of a negative duty, then, do I…give up 
anything I am entitled to keep.”68 Similarly, Nickel argues “the claim-to-
freedom from torture may be universal without all of the corresponding 
duties being universal in the sense of being against everyone…[a]ll that is 
required is that for every rightholder, there is at least one agent or agency with 
duties to protect that person from torture.”69 This model does not require all 
levels of duties to be engaged simultaneously, if category 1 is fulfilled then 
none of the addressees of later duties need act at all.  
 
Discretionary duties cannot be entirely ignored even if there are limited 
resources: if I am under a duty to someone (by virtue of a right he or she 
holds) I must fulfil it. However, I may choose an indirect method of fulfilling 
the duty i.e. I may assign the duty to an international organisation or my 
national government. This assignment, however, creates a new positive 
indirect duty “to create, maintain and enhance institutions that directly fulfil 
rights”70 akin to Nickel’s third category of duties outlined above. This 
operates in a similar manner to in domestic settings, where I might assign my 
                                                
67 Ibid 690. 
68 ibid. 
69 Nickel (n 17 in introduction) 80 (emphasis added). 
70 Shue (n 48) 697. 
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duty to secure the physical security of others to the state (who in turn 
commission the police to fulfil this duty). I cannot, however, simply assign my 
duty to the state and walk away, I must pay taxes to maintain the police force. 
The content of the duty is then determined by the arrangement I make to fulfil 
it, before the decision to assign my duty to the state and the police to fulfil it 
still existed, and was robust, even if it were highly indeterminate. Even if 
individuals have discretionary duties to refugees, these must be fulfilled and 
if individuals commission the state to do this for them and states commission 
the UNHCR this merely creates a second duty to maintain and enhance the 
institution commissioned to fulfil the duty. It can be argued, therefore, that if 
we have chosen to task the UNHCR, or another host country, with protecting 
refugees, we have a duty to maintain the UNHCR and to support the other 
host country.   
 
The model proposed here builds on Nickel’s categories of duties to suggest 
that duties towards refugees become engaged upon the failure of home states, 
and fellow citizens, to fulfil their duties. These duties, it has been argued, are 
addressed to many different actors in the international sphere, which 
following Shue may be fulfilled directly or indirectly depending on the 
circumstances and resources of the potential host country. Human rights, in 
turn, are capable of generating duties, the purpose of which is to protect the 
right under threat and it is this purpose that determines the content of the 
duty. This might be reduced to a claim as to what having human rights means.  
 
Firstly, the general duty arising out of human rights violations requires 
anyone in a position to help “to consider what he or she can reasonably do in 
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the matter involved.”71  It is not an obligation of all to ‘drop everything’ to aid 
the victim of the human rights violation but rather “an acknowledgment that 
if one is in a plausible position to do something effective to prevent the 
violation…then one does have an obligation to consider doing that.”72 This is 
the obligation which any potential host states might be said to be under and, 
following Shue, it is a duty which must be fulfilled even if only indirectly or 
minimally. If this general duty to consider assisting the victim of a human 
rights violation is recognised as a principle, as such, there is a requirement 
that potential host state seek to protect the human rights of the victim to the 
greatest degree possible given the actual and legal conditions. It may be that 
the actual possibilities leave no room for the host state to assist the refugee but 
such a claim would need to be subjected to the balancing process and could 
not simply be made by a potential host state with little or no scrutiny. As a 
principle, of course, it may also collide with another principle (or obligation), 
which might result in the other being given conditional priority but the duty 
could not simply be dismissed. Having established that duties to refugees 
could be fulfilled alongside duties to citizens, states cannot now avoid the 
question of duties to refugees merely by claiming ‘priority to compatriots.’ 
The routine denial of applicants from certain countries, the introduction of 
laws creating bureaucratic hurdles to asylum applications and the detention 
of asylum seekers would have to be subjected to a balancing process whereby 
decision-makers determined whether or not conditional priority ought to be 
given to diplomatic and security concerns over duties to refugees. 
                                                
71 Sen !Human Rights and the Limits of Law" (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 2913 
2922 
72 ibid.  
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The claim that the international community has an obligation to protect 
refugees, it is argued, is reflected in the purpose of asylum. This purpose is to 
provide temporary protection to those whose human rights are in danger and 
are unable to seek protection from their home states. This purpose is 
recognised in the international community and has been expressed in 
numerous cases. The UK Court of Appeal, for example, stating “the very 
purpose of the Refugee Convention…is to impose on states parties a duty to 
protect persons within their borders who cannot return to their country of 
nationality for fear of being persecuted there.”73 In short, the purpose is to 
provide substitute protection, which follows logically from the fact that, as 
Goodwin-Gill states, “the lack or denial of protection is a principle feature of 
the refugee character.”74 In the simplest terms, refugees require legal and 
political protection because this is what they lack. This is coupled with the 
assumption that there are secondary duty holders, namely the international 
community as set out above. This reminds us, Hathaway argues, that “refugee 
protection is not about immigration. It is intended to be a situation-specific 
human rights remedy.”75 
 
It is argued that to extend protection to those in danger and without state 
protection is the logical extension of the bedrock assumptions of international 
                                                
73 AA v Sec. State for Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 401; [2007] LK v Sec. of State 1 
W.L.R 3134 [79]. 
74 Goodwin-Gill ‘The Language of Protection’ (1989) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 6(1) 6.  
75 Hathaway ‘Refugee status arising from generalised oppression’, in Alfredsson & 
MacAlister-Smith (eds) The Living Law of Nations (Engel 1996) 61-67. 
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law, expressed by Nathwani as “[t]he implicit line of thought can be 
characterised as follows: refugees are human rights victims; we should assist 
human rights victims because we believe in human rights and profess to 
protect them.”76  We might recall now, as established in chapter one, asylum is 
a mechanism for protecting human rights and this mechanism is triggered 
when the home state fails to protect, or endangers, the human rights of the 
refugee. As noted above, put otherwise, the home state fails to fulfil its 
primary duty, this triggers the secondary duty held by international 
community.   
 
The duty to protect human rights is, then, engaged and, as established above, 
it rests on all those capable of helping to provide protection with a definitive 
obligation that they fulfil this duty to the greatest extent legally and factually 
possible. All of these claims are based on the assertion that a) human rights 
are universal, b) the universality signifies not only that human rights are held 
universally but that duties to protect them are universal also and c) following 
the reconstruction of duties offered above, human rights are capable of 
generating definitive duties, which it is the obligation of all to fulfil to the 
greatest extent legally and factually possible. This rests on a normative claim 
not only as to the value of human rights but also as to the duties they are 
capable of generating. This might be reduced to a claim as to what having 
human rights means. Following Bohman it is claimed: 
                                                
76 Nathwani ‘The Purpose of Asylum’ (2000) 12 International Journal Refugee Law 
354 634 -5. See also  Hathaway, 'New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The 
Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection' (1995) 8 Journal of Refugee 
Studies 281.  
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Having human rights… comes with the normative power to have rights: the 
power to make claims upon all those who also have human rights (and to be 
responsive to their claims).77 
In terms of refugee law, Goodwin-Gill asserts that refugee status is merely one 
form of protection for “the right of every human being to life, liberty and 
security, which may be jeopardized by breach of the principle of refuge.”78  
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It is argued here that this is a logical corollary of the recognition and 
guarantee of human rights by the international community in the post-war 
period. It is the logical extension of the assertion that human rights are the 
entitlement of every human being by virtue of their humanity alone. The post-
war context of the Refugee Convention, and indeed international human 
rights law, makes it clear that the intention of internationally guaranteed 
rights was, and remains, to move rights away from the national context. The 
tethering of the entitlement to human rights in the national sphere, thereby 
leaving a vacuum in which the stateless and de facto stateless refugees exist, is 
defeated by the assertion that human rights belong to everyone, in every 
context, by virtue of humanity alone. If human rights exist prior to, and 
independent from, a political community, as is asserted, then these rights 
cannot cease to exist when one is alienated from the political community.79 
                                                
77 Bohman ‘Constituting Humanity: Democracy, Human Rights, and Political 
Community’ in Weinstock, (ed.) ‘Global Justice, Global Institutions’ Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 233, 233. 
78 Goodwin-Gill (n 65) 15. 
79 If I am wrong about this assertion, then those individuals living under regimes, 
where human rights are not recognised, have no human rights and no redress, 
therefore, for what might be deemed human rights violations elsewhere. It would 
follow from this that, for example, the Jews of Nazi Germany, stripped of nationality 
and citizenship, had no human rights to be violated and the post-war human rights 
movement has achieved no change in position on the nature of human rights. Plainly, 
given the impetus for the UN foundation, treaties, laws and institutional structure, 
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This is not to say states no longer play a role in securing human rights, this is 
certainly the case and indeed the rationale for admonishment and sanction of 
states that fail to do so, but that the Refugee Convention, and as above 
international human rights law, is intended as a method of protection for 
those whose state’s have failed in the primary duty. Otherwise, as Arendt 
noted, human rights would again prove powerless when needed the most.80  
 
Arendt, in her consideration of how totalitarian regimes were able to reduce 
human beings to ‘superfluous beings’81, sought to prevent the repetition of the 
situation in Nazi Germany where the status of ‘a human being in general’82 
carried with it no rights or, Arendt’s terms, resulted in a loss of the right to 
have rights. Great progress has certainly been made in the recognition and 
concretisation of human rights in both the international and national sphere; 
we can now assert that ‘human rights’ is more than an empty term. Yet in the 
context of refugees, if the post-war human rights movement is to mean 
anything, we must be able to say we have moved beyond the position Arendt 
spoke of where ‘the only ‘country’ the world had to offer the stateless was the 
internment camp.”83 The rightless are, as Arendt sought to have recognised, 
most often refugees. As Bohman notes: 
                                                
this cannot be the case. Human rights must exist outside of the political community 
and independent from legal recognition and enforceability.  
80 Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace, New York 1973) 302. 
81 ibid 297. 
82 ibid. For Arendt, the best way to guarantee that the position of Jews in Nazi 
Germany would not be repeated was to establish a right to membership of political 
community, and a right not to be excluded from the rights guaranteed by 
membership in this political community. If these rights could be effectively 
established, refugees would not exist but until this is the case then the right to have 
rights must be tethered instead to an individual’s humanity, otherwise, as Benhabib 
states, Arendt’s concept “is philosophically and normatively ungrounded”. Benhabib 
The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000) 82.   
83 Kesby The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity and International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 2. 
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To arrive at such a “bare” human status, such a person is usually a victim of 
political violence, such as genocide and other crimes that deprive her of all 
rights, statuses, and powers that together enable her to have a place in the 
world as a participant in speech and action. Such persons are the victims of 
tyranny, where the absence of civil authority and laws leave them without 
normative powers; they can then in Locke’s memorable phrase only “appeal 
to heaven.”84   
To repeat the assertions of chapter three, human rights are the entitlement of 
all human beings by virtue of individual and collective humanity. 
International law, it is argued, is based on this assertion, to make it, as 
Lauterpacht claimed, “universal law of mankind” such that “international law 
is under an obligation to the notion of inherent human rights.”85 As Kesby 
notes, “the principles of human rights would maintain that being human is 
the right to have rights…that has displaced citizenship as legal status for 
entitlement to rights within states.”86 This was expressed by Judge Cancado 
Trindade of the ICJ who held in Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, relating 
the duty to protect those deprived of consular protection, that international 
human rights law represented “the historical rescue of the human person as 
[a] subject of contemporary international law.”87 This, it is argued, holds as 
well for rights outside of states, as was echoed by the IACtHR on the Juridical 
                                                
84 Bohman (n 68) 233. 
85 Lauterpacht and Lauterpacht International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch 
Lauterpacht (Cambridge University Press 1970) 166. 
86 Kesby (n 74) 92. This is a foundational claim to recognised human rights law, but 
could also ground a claim in seeking to establish new human rights, it disputes, 
therefore, the claim by some that human rights are limited to rights expressed and 
positivised in international human rights law.  
87 Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo (Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio 
Diallo)  [judgment of 30th Nov. 2010] found at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/ICJsummaries/documents/english/182_e.pdf 
(accessed on 28/06/2012). 
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Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants88, leading Cancado Trindade to 
conclude “This jurisprudential construction pointed in a clear direction: 
consular assistance and protection became much closer to human rights 
protection.”89 The same could easily be said of international refugee law.  
 
This is in part due to the drive for human rights law to become more effective. 
For international human rights law to be effective, and not merely abstract or 
illusory, the guarantees must attach to the individual irrespective of their 
nationality, citizenship or immigration status. For refugees, they could be said 
to be travelling with their human rights. If these rights are not left at the 
border upon flight but instead go with the refugee, then the right to have 
these human rights acknowledged effectively protected is what is at stake and 
must be guaranteed in order to untether the right to have rights from the 
state. The refugee, moving across borders, challenges the notion of universal 
rights by virtue of humanity alone. The question is whether this challenge is 
to defeat the universal nature of human rights or not? If we wish to continue 
to maintain that human beings hold human rights by virtue of humanity 
alone, we cannot strip people of these rights at the border nor keep people in a 
‘legal vacuum’ whereby these rights cannot be regained until they are allowed 
to cross another border.   The basic proposition asserted here ought to be 
relatively uncontroversial, it is asserted that refugees have human rights. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is the humanity of refugees that gives rise 
to their claims for human rights, their humanity which makes moral demands 
of others that human dignity is respected. For refugees, their human rights 
                                                
88 Advisory Opinion No. 18 of 17.09.2003. 
89 n 78 [20]. 
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have been denied at home, the obligation falls, therefore, on the international 
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The role of international law, argues Bohman, is “the recognition and 
enforcement of claims to membership in humanity.”91 
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A key element of establishing human rights as a trigger for international 
action is in establishing human rights as rights violations of which are 
relevant to all of us, as erga omnes - obligations to the international 
community as a whole. 92 This can be contrasted with ordinary two-party 
norms. The basis for erga omnes norms can be seen in the various treaties of 
the UN but also in the draft articles of the International Commission.93 The 
notion of erga omnes is closely linked to that of jus cogens – preemptory 
norms which states must comply with and do not have a basis in consent. 
Certainly jus cogens norms are also erga omnes norms.  
 
                                                
90 Bohmann (n 68) 236. 
91 ibid. 
92 See, e.g., Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes 
(Oxford 1997); Karl Zemanek New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes 
Obligations (2000) 4 Max Planck UNYB 1. 
93 See in particular articles 24, 48 and 54 for references to obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole which can justify third party state action 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf 
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There is some debate as to whether human rights are erga omnes obligations. 
As Posner notes, at the very least, “[h]uman rights norms provide a strong 
case for erga omnes status.”94 The accepted erga omnes norms of aggression, 
genocide, slavery and racial discrimination might be said to necessarily 
recognise human rights as erga omnes obligations. All of these erga omnes 
norms are based on the universality of the rights of those injured by 
aggression, threatened by genocide, imprisoned or treated differently because 
of their race. In the case of the norms of genocide and racial discrimination a 
clear commonality between the violations is an element of serious harm and 
discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics. Similarly, the wrong 
of slavery is in denying to some freedom belonging to all.  
 
The over lap with human rights law is self-evident in that the justification for 
identifying certain norms as erga omnes norms seems to rest on the same 
basis as human rights: that there are certain rights held by everyone simply by 
virtue of being human and, therefore, certain acts which cannot be allowed as 
they violate these important rights.  It is the acknowledgment that certain acts 
cannot be allowed that gives rises to the notion of erga omnes, namely that 
violation of these norms give third party states (or perhaps in the age of 
NGOs also individuals) legal claims against any state violating them. Judge 
Cançado Trindade has noted in his judicial expansion of erga omnes that 
human rights treaties might be seen as method of monitoring erga omnes 
obligations stating: 
there could hardly be better examples of mechanism for application of the 
obligations erga omnes of protection (…) than the methods of supervision 
                                                
94 Posner ‘Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization and Constitutionalism in 
International Law’ (2008) Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 224.  
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foreseen in the human rights treaties themselves (...) for the exercise of the 
collective guarantee of the protected rights. (...) the mechanisms for 
application of the obligations erga omnes partes of protection already exist, and 
what is urgently need is to develop their legal regime, with special attention 
to the positive obligations and the juridical consequences of the violations of such 
obligations. 95 
Refugee law, it is argued, can provide one forum in which erga omnes 
obligations can be fulfilled and erga omnes rights, namely human rights, can 
be protected. 
 
The Barcelona Traction case confirmed that all states have a legal interest in 
the protection of basic human rights. Although the ICJ in the Barcelona 
Traction case stated that this did not allow states to intervene regardless of 
nationality, the concepts of Responsibility to Protect and erga omnes are being 
used to enforce the idea of universal jurisdiction.  This shift has arguably been 
recognised by the ICJ in the Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case in which it was held that a party could 
establish standing via the concept of erga omnes. For example, the South 
African government has recently launched an investigation into sexual 
violence perpetrated by the government in Zimbabwe.96 A Dutch Court also 
tried a Rwandan woman, by then a Dutch citizen, for inciting genocide.97 An 
American circuit court similarly upheld jurisdiction over the perpetrator of 
torture even where both the perpetrator and victim were Paraguayan.98  This 
                                                
95 Concurring Opinion in the Case of Las Palmeras para 14. 
96 See, http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/2013/02/26/investigating-reports-
of-zimbabwe-rapes-under-universal-jurisdiction/.  
97 See, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/rwanda-genocide-dutch-
idUSL6N0BT8JM20130301.  
98 Filartiga v Pena-Irala 6,30F.2d876 (2dCir.1980). 
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case further showed the historical roots of the concept of erga omnes as it relied 
on a 1789 law, the Alien Tort Claims Act, which gave foreign nationals the 
right to sue in an American court for wrongful actions that violate 
international law.  
 
The above cases suggest that basic human rights are considered erga omnes. 
This might be said to follow logically from the assertion that human rights are 
universal and held simply by the virtue of being human. It has been argued, 
however, that even if one accepts that human rights are universally held, it 
does not necessarily demand recognition of universal jurisdiction (or, in the 
case refugees, responsibility) over human rights violations. This, however, is 
exactly what is asserted here. It is asserted that the universality and 
importance of human rights automatically demand universal respect. As 
universal respect has not yet been achieved, a universal obligation of 
protection might be said to be required.   
 
Although the link between erga omnes and refugee law is more obtuse it 
might be said to be found in the individuals affected by erga omnes 
violations. Erga omnes obligations arguably focus less on the individual and 
more on the collective. Erga omnes obligations are concerned with preventing 
and, if the former is unsuccessful, punishing violations of universal norms. 
Refugee law is arguably there as a stopgap. Refugee law is intended to offer 
protection to individuals who are subject to human rights violations. Whilst 
the scope of refugee law is much wider than erga omnes and jus cogens 
norms, violations of these norms are clearly covered by refugee law.  
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Individuals who flee genocide, slavery or racial discrimination are 
paradigmatic refugees.  
 
This however concerns the adjudication of specific refugee claims. Erga omnes 
might also be said to underlay refugee law more generally in that refugee law 
is a facet of the acknowledgment begun with the concept of erga omnes and 
built on in the concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Human Security, 
namely the international obligation to protect those at risk of serious human 
rights violations. This frames refugee law as a facet of obligations owed by 
states to the international community as a whole and not merely an act of 
charity or individual action. This argument is taken up below. 
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The demand for respect set out in terms of human dignity and human rights 
in chapter three might be said to also underlay the notion that human rights 
violations are of international concern. The concept of erga omnes focuses on 
when violations of certain rights can give rise to either a direct legal claim- in 
the case of prosecuting war criminals and crimes against humanity- or a 
justification for intervention. Human rights however might be said to also 
give rise to more opaque obligations to protect individuals. That international 
law now dictates action rather than just reaction has been acknowledged 
judicially in the Inter-American Court, Judge Cançado Trindade remarking: 
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[w]ith the transition from civil procedural law into the International Law of 
Human Rights, they moved out of the strictly precautionary realm and into the 
sphere of protection.99 
 
Henkin identifies two features of human rights as they evolved post-World 
War Two; firstly ‘universalisation’, the acceptance, in principle at least, of 
individual human rights. Secondly, ‘internationalisation’, the agreement, 
again in principle, that individual human rights are of international concern 
(that is to say that human rights are proper subjects for diplomacy, 
international law and international institutions).100 Universalisation was the 
process by which it became widely claimed that human rights ought to be 
respected by national governments and, ideally, reflected in national laws 
such as constitutions or basic laws. International human rights, argues 
Henkin, are designed as additional protection where national law fails or is 
not in place and to encourage national governments to recognise and respect 
individual human rights.101  
 
This has the effect that although the primary obligation is between state and 
citizen102, this does not mean that another state cannot enforce the right of 
‘true beneficiary’ (i.e. the individual). Indeed, not only can another state 
enforce the human rights of another country’s citizen(s) but the other state 
might indeed be obliged to do so. This statement is premised, at root, on the a 
                                                
99 Kankuamo Indigenous People Case 4. 
100 Henkin ‘International Human Rights as Rights' (1979) 1 Cardozo Law Review 425 
430 -433. 
101 ibid 428. 
102 A term used loosely throughout such discussions, only rarely does it refer to legal 
citizenship but usually is used instead to refer to anyone subject to the jurisdiction of 
the country. This would probably be better as expressed as in refugee law as ‘country 
of origin or habitual residence’ but citizen is a commonly used shorthand here. 
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priori nature of human rights. If human rights are rights that attach to 
individual simply by virtue of being human these rights must pre-exist the 
state and the international community. Similarly, these rights continue to be 
rights held by all even where and when they are ignored. Thus, although in 
domestic, regional and even international law, human rights claims are often 
framed as appeals to positive law (as an ‘article X violation’), the ultimate 
justification, as Vincent notes, “is not an appeal to positive law but [is an 
appeal] to what ought to prevail a moral/rational justification.”103 Although 
this is often overlooked, this notion of universal personhood is, ultimately, the 
justification for any action based on a human rights violation. It also grounds 
the claim that these are rights that ought to be legally recognised.  
 
If one believes that states are under a primary duty to their own citizens (or 
even if one only views this as a practical and political reality one cannot 
avoid), if one wishes to posit any duties to refugees (by definition outsiders to 
the political community), so the argument goes, a conflict of duties is bound 
to arise, which can only be resolved in favour of the host states’ duties to 
themselves. This would leave states with only ‘residual duties’ to refugees.104 
This argument seems at first glance to be a strong one for providing 
protection to refugees, Goodin argues: 
Whatever may be the ordinary priority of your duty to render positive 
assistance first and foremost to your own…if there are people who for 
whatever reason stand outside this ordinary system of protection — people 
                                                
103 Vincent Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge University Press 
1986) 11. 
104 Such, for example, is Robert Goodin’s argument even as he seeks to urge states to 
offer more protection to refugees. See, ‘Globalising Justice’ in Reshaping Globalization: 
A Progressive Agenda, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Polity Press 2003). 
Further discussion below. 
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without a country; or people whose fellow country folk cannot or will not 
help them, or actively threaten to harm them — then a residual duty falls to 
the moral community at large to assist such persons as if they were one of our 
own.105 
However, Goodin immediately concedes that if this residual duty attaches 
only in the moral sphere and to no particular agent: “the situation naturally 
invites attempts at buck-passing and free-riding. (Contemporary history is full 
of examples of that.)”106 This creates the situation Shue referred to above, 
whereby positive duties are only general and imperfect and so appear to be 
left to the complete discretion of the addressees.  
 
Although the argument of assigning duties is not one that rejects all 
obligations to refugees, it does render any obligations effectively meaningless 
if it does not fully explain the nature of residual duty. In the international 
arena, some argue that human rights also control justifiable interventions. For 
Rawls, human rights regimes (as part of the liberal conception of justice) 
govern ‘forceful interventions.’107 Indeed, the distinguishing feature of human 
rights, as compared to other types of rights, is that severe violation can 
provide grounds for intervention. Rawls does not specify if forceful 
intervention can only be military (as Tasioulas reads his argument108) or could 
take other forms (as Hinsch and Stepanians109 or Beitz110 follow Rawls). This 
                                                
105 Goodin, 'Globalizing Justice' in Held, Koenig-Archibugi (ed) Reshaping 
Globalization: A Progressive Agenda (Polity Press, Oxford 2003) 11. 
106 ibid. 
107 Rawls Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press 1999) 14.  
108 Tasioulas 'Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for International Intervention?' 
(2009) 4 Philosophy Compass 938 940, 
109 Hinsch 'Human Rights as Moral Claim Rights' in R. Martin, D.A. Reidy (ed) Rawls' 
Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2006) 127.  
110 Beitz and Goodin ‘Introduction: Basic Rights and Beyond' in Charles R. Beitz, 
Robert E. Goodin (ed) Global Basic Rights (Oxford University Press 2009).  
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political conception of human rights sees them ‘set the bench mark for internal 
legitimacy of societies.’111 As discussed in chapter two112, Raz, similarly, argues 
that the conceptual link between state sovereignty and human rights must 
mean “that their actual and anticipated violation is a (defeasible) reason for 
taking action against the violator in the international arena.”113 Primary duties 
to fulfil human rights are addressed, then, to states. These duties might also 
be addressed to others (Raz certainly believes so114) so as to certainly bind 
individuals and other institutions within a state. Cançado Trindade see this as 
the “gradual establishment of a genuine right to humanitarian assistance.”115It 
might also be said to be pointing towards the gradual establishment of a right 
to refuge, in the case where humanitarian assistance is not being offered or is 
not appropriate.  
 
The failure of these primary duty-holders is, then, the trigger for international 
action, which may be framed as not only a response to the primary failure (to 
enforce either international law or more generally international norms) but 
also as fulfilment of a secondary duty (to protect human rights addressed to 
all members of humanity).   
UFUFU Q45@0!9;:4-/7G!
There is, however, an additional account of the way in which human rights 
violations can trigger international concern and responsibility connected to 
the emerging concept of ‘human security.’ The notion of human security is 
                                                
111 Tasioulas (n 91) 942. 
112 See chapter 2 p9. 
113 Raz !Human Rights without Foundations" in Tasioulas and Samantha Besson (ed) 
The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2010) 336. 
114 ibid. 
115 Matter of The Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó (paras. 6-8). This term is 
specifically preferred to that of humaniatrian intervention.  
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now taking centre stage in much of the UN’s work. In 1994, the UN 
Development Programme Report116 suggested that the concept of security 
could be, and ought to be, applied not only to countries and borders but to 
people as well. The notion was intended to provide a concept against which to 
measure the individual impact of disruptive events both man-made and 
natural. As such, the UNDP identified two main branches of human security: 
First, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And, 
second…protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life.117  
Human security was further identified as having four main features: 
universality, interdependence (with other security concerns), more easily 
guaranteed through early prevention and people-centred.118 Human security 
applied, then, far more broadly than refugee situations but clearly the 
experiences of refugeehood are intended to be included within circumstances 
that would constitute a abuse of, or in rights-terms a violation of, human 
security.  
 
Refugees lack human security. Asylum could be seen as a good in and of itself 
as it provides, or reinstates, human security to individuals deprived of this 
basic good. The severe violation of an individual’s human rights, inherent in 
refugeehood, seen within the context of human security, could be said to 
automatically trigger international responsibility to address the lack of human 
security. The application of the refugee for asylum is what separates the 
                                                
116 UNDP, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, 1994, 
particularly Chapter 2. 
117 ibid 25. 
118 UNDP (n 97) 22-3. 
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refugee from others lacking human security, the refugee may not be any more 
or less in need of a greater degree of human security than others in analogous 
positions but they are separated by their articulated request for their human 
security to be protected by the provision of security by a host state. The lack of 
human security can, then, be assessed within the traditional framework, to 
argue that the home state has failed in its primary duty to provide security to 
its citizen(s). Human security can, however, also provide a non-state focus, in 
which international responsibility is triggered directly by the lack of human 
security. This would allow refugeehood to reflect also so-called ‘non-citizens’ 
whose state membership is under question or disputed as well as those who 
claim for asylum is clearly linked to fault on the part of a specific state. Such a 
concern is increasingly relevant as shifting borders and changing 
governments often make it unclear which state, if any, could be said in 
traditional parlance to have had original responsibility for the person seeking 
refuge.119 As Edwards and Ferstman note, “ [u]nder the national security 
paradigm…in which notions of sovereignty, border controls and citizenship 
are of primary importance, the non-citizen is usually the first to be 
excluded.”120  
 
                                                
119 In addition, it would prevent the almost complete breakdown of the system when 
faced with a person who cannot prove (or chooses not to do so) his or her country of 
origin. Such individuals are often left in limbo whilst the potential host-state seeks to 
ascertain the country of origin, most often within a state to which repatriation would 
be possible. This occurs, for example, with Zimbabweans who enter on South African 
visas (as there are severe difficulties obtaining visas from Zimbabwe and South 
Africa is often the first point of entry) and only after point of entry to a potential host 
state, the UK for example, claim Zimbabwean nationality. Individuals in such a 
position faced deportation either to South African (HS [2008] EWCA Civ 915) or to 
Zimbabwe, on the grounds of having misled border officials (RN (Returnees) 
Zimbabwe CG [2008] UKAIT 00083). See also,Parliamentary Briefing ‘Asylum 
Seekers from Zimbabwe’ (13 March 2009)  www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN03391.pdf.  
120 Edwards and Festerman Human Secrity and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy and 
International Affairs (Cambridge University Press 2010) xxiv. 
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This is not to say that the bond between state and citizen is not relevant, it 
may be that a refugee’s case can be clearly analysed in such terms, the political 
activist or excluded minority are called to mind. However, this does suggest 
that international responsibility could be triggered automatically by a lack of 
human security with refugeehood seen as one example of circumstances in 
which human security is severely threatened. This is reiterated in the doctrine 
of responsibility to protect, which could be seen as the flip side to the concept 
of human security. Refugee protection, therefore, becomes intertwined with 
issues of humanitarian intervention, or more specifically with the issue of 
when intervention can be justified, or ought to be undertaken, on 
humanitarian grounds. Whilst debates rage on whether or not to intervene in 
a humanitarian crisis, refugee flows have usually already begun. These issues 
are very much context specific, with it being difficult to predict in advance 
whether a crisis might be best alleviated by humanitarian intervention 
(assuming the political will is there to make this a realistic possibility) or one 
that cannot be tackled with intervention. But for refugee law, issue of 
humanitarian intervention ought not to intrude too much. Refugee law is set 
up to respond to specific requests from specific individuals who ask for 
refuge. It is, therefore, formally immaterial whether humanitarian 
intervention is already underway, being contemplated or has been entirely 
ruled out in the applicants’ country of origin.121  
                                                
121 Although, of course, this might have a bearing on return of refugees and would be 
relevant to general country of origin reports, it should not impact on the initial 
individual assessment of refugee status. However, determination of refugee status 
ought to be kept quite separate from issues of humanitarian intervention. 
Humanitarian intervention and refugee status overlap only in the cause of refugee 
flows and the assessment of security in the country of origin; where a country is so 
instable so as to attract calls for, or debates over, humanitarian intervention, human 
security has clearly been threatened and refugee flows ought to be considered likely.  
Although individual, many people from the same area or background can be 
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Refugee status ought to be seen as another method of protecting individuals 
whose human security has been threatened, one which can be viewed 
alongside humanitarian intervention and other tools to combat violations of 
human security, such as diplomatic pressure or sanctions. This purpose is 
reflected in the cessation of refugee status once the situation resulting in the 
need for a refugee claim ceases to exist.122 This cessation clause can only be 
applied, however, once it has been properly confirmed the human rights 
situation has altered considerably.123 UNHCR guidance reminds decision 
makers that refugee status further may only cease if the situation has changed 
                                                
experienced refugee status simultaneously. Mass violations of human rights are the 
subject of refugee status if refuge is applied for by these victims. These distinctions 
have been overlooked in the past with disastrous results, one need only think of 
Srebrenica to see that ruling out refugee status for individuals in areas where 
humanitarian intervention is being considered or even taking place may result in 
tragedy and a contradiction to the purpose of the Refugee Convention. See also 
Helton The Price of Indifference (Oxford University Press 2002). 
122 Article 1C(5) and (6) provides that the 1951 Convention shall cease to apply to any person 
falling under the terms of Article 1(A) if: 
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the 
protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a 
refugee falling under section A(1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons 
arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the 
country of nationality; 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connexion with 
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country 
of his former habitual residence; Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee 
falling under section A(1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out 
of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence. 
123 The UNHCR provides guidance to states as to when it is appropriate to seek 
voluntary return following cessastion of refugee status, See, for example, UNHCR’s 
formal declarations of general cessation: “Applicability of the Cessation Clauses to 
Refugees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary”, 15 Nov. 1991, “Applicability 
of Cessation Clauses to Refugees from Chile”, 28 March 1994, “Applicability of the 
Cessation Clauses to Refugees from the Republics of Malawi and Mozambique”, 31 
Dec. 1996, “Applicability of the Cessation Clauses to Refugees from Bulgaria and 
Romania”, 1 Oct. 1997, “Applicability of the Ceased Circumstances; Cessation 
Clauses to pre-1991 refugees from Ethiopia”, 23 Sept. 1999, and “Declaration of 
Cessation – Timor Leste”, 20 December 2002. 
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in relation to the specific Convention ground upon which the refugee’s claim 
succeeded.124 
 
In particular, the granting of refugee status might be pertinent where direct 
intervention would be unlikely to significantly prevent violence and would, 
therefore, be likely fail any proportionality test. If the threshold for 
humanitarian intervention remains high, with, for example, factors such as the 
chance of short-term prevention of violence, long-term stability and probable 
casualties for the interveners having all to be taken into account, some 
alternative must be presented. There are cases where the threshold for 
intervention is arguably not met and other measures such as sanctions have 
little or only very slow impact in which people will be forced to leave their 
homes. In addition, there may be cases where intervention would be entirely 
disproportionate, for example, where the target of violence is a small minority 
in the country with no forces for interveners to support or where this violence 
takes place in private homes. In these cases, international responsibility is not 
limited to making appeals to the home state. Refugee status, and the ensuing 
protection from the host state, are then, a “situation specific human rights 
remedy.”125  
 
The argument for refugee status being seen as a human rights remedy is 
backed up by article 35, which governs the cessation of refugee status. 
Refugee status can be revoked when, and only when, the threat of persecution  
(the violation of human rights) ceases. It must, then, be an option for those 
                                                
124 See, amongst others, UNHCR Handbook, para. 116.  
125 Hathaway The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) 143. Again this view is confirmed by cessation of refugee status once the 
situation has also ceased.  
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who seek it whilst the threat of persecution remains. Refugee status, to repeat, 
is a reflexive process, it is triggered by the application for refuge and responds 
to the violation of an individual’s human rights. At the very least, 
responsibility is engaged when an application for refugee is made.  
 
The concepts of human security and responsibility to protect, however, 
suggest that members of the international community who can provide 
security may in fact have a broader responsibility to refugees so triggered by 
the violation of human rights (and human security) inherent in refugeehood, 
which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. Refugee status, as 
briefly explored in chapter one, was intended to provide surrogate protection 
where national protection had failed. As Fortin underlines, “the whole reason 
the refugee convention was introduced was to combat the inferior position of 
individuals who are stateless or de facto stateless find themselves in, in a world 
where nationality provides access to enforceable rights.”126 If the Refugee 
Convention, and not only refugee status, was designed to provide enforceable 
rights without recourse to the home state then the international community, 
and the individual states that make up this community, arguably have a 
specific obligation to provide a place of refuge either directly or indirectly in 
order to fulfil their duty to protect human rights. Without such a system, 
human rights remain effective only within a political community and would 
not, then, in any real sense be universal.  The claim to be constructed here is as 
follows: where an interest is worth protecting (as human dignity is for the 
reasons set out above) then this interest produces a right to have that interest 
                                                
126  Fortin (n 1 chapter 4) 562. This is also the thrust of Hannah Arendt’s claim that 
with a loss of effective nationality, refugees have lost ‘the right to have rights’ (n 71). 
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protected either by non-interference or through positive action depending on 
the interest and circumstances.  
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There can be said to be a de facto duty to rescue by admittance for all refugees 
seeking recognition whether in country, at the border or, in international 
waters, seeking to reach a border. This duty to rescue by admittance, it is 
argued, is based on the assertion made in the previous chapter that 
international human rights are intended, and ought to, protect human dignity 
as an entitlement of every human being. The practical need for a duty to 
rescue was taken up also in the Council of Europe Report into the ‘Lives Lost 
in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is Responsible?’ The title alone makes it clear 
that it is possible for a state, or several states, to be responsible for the deaths of 
individuals who they fail to rescue at sea and that, indeed, someone must be 
responsible.  In the report, the authors accused many of the ECHR signatory 
states of ‘double standards in valuing human life’127, which created an 
unacceptable ‘vacuum of responsibility.’128 Nowhere is the failure of a duty to 
rescue in relation to refugees clearer than at sea, although brought again into 
the limelight by the Hirsi case, the practice of ignoring refugees at sea is 
nothing new.129 It is, however, becoming ever more frequent and deadly; the 
                                                
127 [12] 3 available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329_mig_RPT.EN.pdf 
(accessed on 20/4/2012). 
128 ibid [13.1] 3. 
129 Similar fates were suffered by Vietnamese refugees, so-called ‘boat refugees’, 
Haitian refugees attempting to reach Florida dubbed ‘boat people’ by the US Media 
from the late 1970s throughout the 1980s and 1990s, see, Goodwin-Gill ‘The Haitian 
Refoulment Case: A Comment' (1994) 6 International Journal of Refugee Law 103 and 
Hathaway ‘Labelling the 'Boat People': The Failure of the Human Rights Mandate of 
the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees"(1993) 15 Human 
Rights Quarterly 686 or Tsamenyi The Vietnamese boat people and international law 
(Griffith University Press 1981).     
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Council report estimated that 1,500 people had lost their lives attempting to 
seek asylum in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean sea in 2011 alone and 
that the majority of these victims were not lost at sea but instead were left to 
die by passing ships and aircraft including many military carriers.130  These 
raised the question, explored in some depth by the Council report but still 
largely unaddressed by governments, as to who is responsible in such cases 
and how this responsibility intersects with international refugee law. Given 
that the established purpose of the Refugee Convention is to provide 
surrogate protection, it seems surprising, as well as horrifying, that those 
seeking refuge are not afforded any protection. 
 
If the Refugee Convention is expressly to provide surrogate protection, 
coupled with the responsibility of the entire international community for 
protecting and respecting human rights, some remedy for a lack of available 
protection must be supplied. Of particular note is the ruling in M.S.S v 
Belgium and Greece131 in which the court found that not only could particular 
articles of the ECHR be violated in relation to the treatment feared or suffered 
in the applicant’s home country but also that the article 13 right to an effective 
remedy in respect of these rights could be violated by states returning 
individuals without first ascertaining refugee status.  This again characterises 
refugee status as a remedy available to those in need of international 
protection from human rights abuses and that the failure to provide this 
remedy, in certain circumstances, could be a breach of international law. A 
duty to rescue by admittance could be seen as logically connected to this right 
to an effective remedy; for refugees, without states being obliged to allow 
                                                
130 n 106 [5]. 
131 Appeal no. 30696/09 (2012). 
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entry, any right to an effective remedy would be toothless. This points 
towards the need for an acknowledged duty to rescue by admittance for 
refugees to be expressed in international law as a duty under the Refugee 
Convention and international human rights treaties.  
 
In addition, it is argued that the refugee, fleeing in order to find somewhere 
that recognises his or her inherent human rights, has particular call on 
international protection. As Hathaway notes, “the special ethical 
responsibility towards refugees follows not just from the gravity of their 
predicament, but also from the fact that it is always possible to address their 
plight in ways that, sadly, we still cannot for those who remain inside their 
own country.”132 Not only is the refugee fleeing persecution, which triggers 
international protection, but there is an additional element when considering 
a duty to rescue refugees, the refugee is in danger whilst in flight. Judge 
Cancado Trindade at the ICJ reminded the court that “[h]umaneness comes to 
the fore even more forcefully in the treatment of persons in situation of 
vulnerability.”133 A particular element of the duty to rescue is the strength of 
this obligation in cases of emergency. The duty to rescue is said to stem from 
the duty of beneficence, which is derived from the concept of personhood, 
and is not, therefore a form of charity because performance of this duty is “no 
reason for self- congratulation.”134 It has been argued that this is not an 
                                                
132 'Is Refugee Status Really Elitist? An Answer to the Ethical Challenge' in Carlier 
and Vanheul (eds) Europe and Refugees: A Challenge? (Kluwer 1997) 79,  see also 87-8. 
133 Separate Opinion (No. 88) [12]. Judge Cancado Trindade went on to remark that, 
“under human rights treaties and instruments, which conform a Law of protection (a 
droit de protection), oriented towards the safeguard of the ostensibly weaker party, 
the victim” (para 13.) See also Cancado-Trindade, The Access of Individuals to 
International Justice (Oxford University Press 2011). 
134 Cited in L Weinreb Natural Law and Justice (Harvard University Press 1987) 1 43. 
See also EJ Weinreb, 'The Case for a Duty to Rescue' (1980) 90 Yale Law Journal 247 
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absolute duty in the Kantian sense as there is room for the actions taken to 
fulfil the duty to be more or less ‘helpful’.  
 
Locke’s insistence that we have certain rights to do as we like which exclude 
certain demands being placed upon us is often cited in support of these views.  
Locke argued that there is only a duty of charity (an imperfect obligation) to 
others. However, some support for a duty to rescue, based on consequential 
arguments, can be seen in the so-called Lockean proviso ‘one can acquire 
previously unowned things only if the acquisition does not worsen anyone’s 
overall condition.’ Weinrib, however, argues that the emergency situation 
negates the ‘play room’ otherwise inherent in the duty of beneficence, but this 
is only because “an emergency marks a particular person as physically 
endangered in a way that is no general or routine throughout society.”135 The 
emergency situation is what justifies the infringement of the rescuer’s right to 
liberty, usually used to defeat imposition of a general duty to rescue. This is 
the basis of good Samaritan laws in France and Germany and can be used to 
impose a duty to rescue by admission in the circumstances of refugeehood.  
 
Further, to counter Lockean decriers of duties to rescue, Michael Menlowe 
transfers the Lockean proviso from property rights to rights more generally to 
contend that the rescuer can be seen as a monopoly provider of a service- the 
service of a rescue. If the Lockean proviso applies, argues Mennlowe, a 
potential rescuer can only refuse to perform the rescue if it would not worsen 
anyone’s overall condition (which in a rescue scenario would be highly 
improbable). Further opposition to the denying a duty to rescue based on the 
                                                
135 L Weinreb ibid 143. 
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value of liberty can be found in J.S Mill’s argument that the liberty of another 
is as fundamental a value as one’s own liberty. If this is so then the extent to 
which the other’s liberty is threatened, relative to the rescuers is relevant. If 
liberty- in the general sense- is a fundamental value then there is a moral 
requirement to rescue because it greatly increases the liberty of the person 
rescued (whilst only momentarily infringing the rescuers liberty). Following 
this line of argument, the duty to rescue refugees could be seen to be a strong 
one- the fact that the appeal for rescue is made in life and death circumstances 
means not only that the rescuer cannot claim that no one’s overall condition is 
worsened by a failure to rescue but also that the infringement of liberty for the 
rescuer is negligible in contrast with the great(est) infringement of liberty 
suffered by the refugee. If the relative threat to liberty is relevant, as 
Consequentialists argue, then the case for a duty to rescue refugees must 
surely be one of the strongest.  
 
Menlowe also points to Grotius’ view that a shortage of necessities resurrects 
primitive property right(s) of all persons to own all things- which he transfers 
to talk of rights more generally to argue against the view that there is no duty 
to rescue. Both these views suggest that when the situation is desperate- life 
and death for one party- then considerations of the rescuer’s liberty ought to 
be set aside or, at the very least, have less value attached to them. In terms of 
refugees it is clear that the situation is a life and death one- or at least the 
claim is being made that it is so. It would be difficult to maintain, therefore, 
that the right of the rescuer to not have his liberty infringed- in the case of 
asylum, the right of potential host states avoid the burden if they so wish- 
detracts from any duty to rescue. A duty of charity would not suffice to 
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protect the majority of refugees. Menlowe gives the example of a person in a 
boat and states that on this logic the person in the boat would have no right to 
refuse a drowning person a space in the boat but they could, however, refuse 
to throw them a rope to climb aboard. Similarly, for refugees, the duty to 
protect is equally elusive if there is no duty to admit. 
 
Although the peril is perhaps more immediately obvious for those at sea, it 
could be argued all refugees presenting themselves at a border are in an 
analogous situation in that they are in danger. This assertion has rarely been 
tested in court but can be gleaned from cases, for example, concerning 
enforcement visa, in which it has been held that denial of a visa in 
circumstances where an individual is seeking to asylum could amount to 
refoulement.136  The denial of visas to those seeking entry (for the purpose of 
seeking asylum) could be seen as part of what Kesby terms ‘the exportation of 
borders’ such that “the experience of seeking entry into a third state may arise 
for some people while they are still at home. Although they are physically 
absent from the state into which they are seeking entry, they are legally 
present to the extent that immigration law is applied extra-territorially to 
deny their admission.”137 If we follow the logic from the Hirsi case then if 
effective control is exercised then the state can be said to exercise control over 
the individual and is bound, therefore, by the refugee convention including 
article 33. As W.M. v Denmark138 recognised article 33 is violated if the denial 
                                                
136 The case establishing this principle W.M v Denmark (1992) Ap. No. 17392/90 
(14/10/1992) concerned 17 citizens of East Germany who had entered the Danish 
embassy to request visas to travel to West Germany. The visa applications were 
denied and the individuals were forced to return to East Germany, here held the 
ECtHR, visa denial amounted to refoulement.  
137 Kesby (n 74) 110. 
138 n 114. 
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of a visa results in the individual either being forcibly removed to the home 
state or having no option but to return where there is a risk of serious human 
rights violations upon return. There is no significant conceptual or legal 
distinction between refugees at sea, those denied visas to enter, those denied a 
means to travel to safety139, and those denied entry upon presentation at the 
border.  These measures not only make illegal entry more appealing, leaving 
genuine refugees at the mercy of those willing to provide false documents and 
passage to a secure country, contributing to the problem of human trafficking 
but also, in the case of genuine refugees, amount to violations of article 33.  
 
This must be the case if refugee status is declaratory. As Goodwin-Gill argues, 
“the duty to protect refugees arises as soon as the individuals or group 
concerned satisfy the criteria for refugee status set out in the definition.”140 
Thus, irrespective of whether the status is formally acknowledged, once the 
circumstances of refugeehood are present the duty to protect is triggered. The 
duty falls most certainly on the international community as a whole, and 
states may be required to act as part of the international community, but it 
may also become attached to a specific state if the refugee(s) can be said to be 
within the jurisdiction of the potential host state. Aside from the specific duty 
attaching where states already exercise control over an individual, this general 
duty may be also be strong where the state is able to assist the refugee, as 
Gibney states, the duty falls on states “as they control what refugees seek, 
namely access to secure territory.”141 Benyani argues “the theory of State 
responsibility rests on a simplistic but complex practical proposition. It is that 
                                                
139 Such as those who are unable to travel due to legal restrictions placed on airlines.  
140 Goodwin-Gill (n 108) 103. 
141 Gibney Open Borders Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues (Greenwood 
Press, 1988) 155. 
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every state must be held responsible for the performance of its international 
obligations under the rules of international law, whether such rules derive 
from custom, treaty or other sources of international law.”142  
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This chapter has argued that each member state of the international 
community has a duty not only to observe their international obligations in 
respect of their own citizens but also in relation to the citizens of other states. 
This requires states to act positively to protect the human rights of those in 
danger. Refugees pose a particular challenge to the notion of generalised 
obligations in that refugees assert their claim to human rights protection in 
asking to be granted refugee status by a specific member state. It has been 
argued that at this point, the generalised obligation to protect human rights 
becomes a specific obligation addressed to the state in which the claim to 
refugee status is made. It has also been argued that the general obligation to 
protect human rights demands also that states act to ensure refugees have a 
place in which they can claim refugee status and receive protection. This 
requires collective action to ensure that states adhere to their international 
obligations to provide protection through the notion of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’.  This chapter has sought also to bring the duty to rescue via the 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect into the sphere of refugee law and to 
recognise that refugee status operates as a method of fulfilling both the 
general duty to rescue and responsibility to protect those in danger that may 
                                                
142 Benyani ‘State Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of Forced 
Population Displacements" International Journal of Refugee Law 130, 130.  
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become addressed to specific individuals- or countries- where refugee status 
is sought.     
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The chapter addresses the issue of gender-related persecution and the 
interplay between concepts of gender, violence and, above all, ‘the political’ 
within international refugee law. It considers the extent to which the 
challenges facing female refugees may be overcome by a creative 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, consistent with correct principles of 
international treaty interpretation. It seeks to link many of the arguments and 
observations made in the previous chapters to some of the issues raised by 
applications for status from female refugees, focusing specifically on those 
putting forward so-called ‘new’ claims to refugee status such as the victims of 
domestic violence and sexual violence. Chapter three looked at the right to a 
dignified life and the notion of human dignity as capable of breaking down 
some of the barriers to human rights claims. In particular the notion of a 
dignified life was said to create a bridge between negative and positive rights 
and explaining why cumulative persecution is rightly covered by the Refugee 
Convention. The notion of human dignity was also set out as breaking down 
the distinctions between generations of rights, especially when analysed 
through the notion of discrimination.  
 
These observations are of particular relevance to female refugees who, as a 
victim of gender discrimination, for example, may seek to rely on cumulative 
persecution or the infringement of second and third generation rights. Female 
refugees however may well also be relying on first generation rights. 
However this chapter will demonstrate that whilst the observation made in 
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chapter three that violation of first generation rights are rarely questioned as 
forms of persecution this is not always the case when it comes to female 
refugees. In particular the notion of private violence will set out as excluding 
many otherwise clearly persecutory acts. Chapter four argued broader 
concept of ‘the political’ lies behind article 1(2) than traditional interpretations 
of refugee law might suggest. This assertion, it is argued here, will help break 
down many of the assumptions clung to in refugee law that are especially 
damaging to female refugees, who continue to fall the wrong side of an 
untenable public/private divide. By examining the claims put forward by 
female refugees, in particular, one can see not only the impact of the 
restrictive definition of ‘the political’ but also the usefulness of the concept of 
collective violence in demonstrating how previously excluded experiences 
may be included within the definition of refugee without sacrificing 
conceptual clarity.  
 
It is further argued that the plight of female refugees shows that this widened 
interpretative scope is not only conceptually possible but practically necessary 
not only to protect individuals in danger but also to send clear signals about 
the types of violence that give rise to international protection. This places 
refugee status firmly in the ‘condemnatory’ camp, rejecting the view that the 
granting of refugee status does not pass any judgment on the home state.1 In 
                                                
1 In some cases, condemnation of the home state may not be fore-grounded. For 
example, the state concerned may be found to be unable to provide effective 
protection despite best efforts to do so. This does not necessarily imply any 
condemnation but may be a mere finding of fact. However, for other cases, 
particularly those involving a finding of lack of effective protection against societal 
attitudes, condemnation may seem to form part of the reasoning. The judgments in 
the case of Shah and Islam (n 78 chapter one)v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah [1999] UKHL 20 demonstrate 
how difficult it is to avoid condemnation in cases involving findings as to general 
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doing so this engages refugee law also in the struggle between cultural 
relativism and cultural imperialism. Refugee status, in addressing violence 
against women inflicted as a form of collective violence, becomes also a 
statement about types of behaviour that international society deems 
unacceptable. It has the potential to move gender violence into the category of 
internationally condemned prejudice along with violence underpinned by 
racial, religious and politically prejudice.2 In exploring the treatment of female 
refugees this chapter seeks to examine these issues in the context of refugee 
law.  This follows Buss in advocating recognition of “the ‘messaging’ work of 
law, in which trials, verdict and punishment communicate legal and social 
meaning about the rule of law, for example, and help build normative 
consensus.”3  
 
                                                
societal attitudes in the home country. If refugee status is to be granted, there must be 
some judgment as to the unacceptability of the attitudes of many in the home society. 
The decision here turned on whether the applicants, both Pakistani women who were 
victims of domestic violence, were subject to persecution on a Convention ground. 
This involved evidence as to the prevalence of domestic violence in Pakistan as well 
consideration of the attitudes of Pakistani society, religious leaders and government 
to this violence. As Lord Hoffman’s judgment noted, findings of fact “cannot be 
ignored merely on the ground that this would imply criticism of the legal or social 
arrangements in another country.” It is trite to say it implies criticism to find that the 
attitudes of society such so as to allow and even encourage violence against one 
section of society yet it is often stated that “[t]he role of the international 
community… is not to condemn the country of origin” (Carlier (n 54 chapter 4) 705.)   
2 The same can also be said of cases where discrimination and violence are suffered 
on grounds of sexuality.  
3 Buss ‘Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist thoughts on International Criminal 
Law’ (2011) International Criminal Law Review 11 409 413. Buss argues, “Criminal 
law… can be read discursively for the ideas and legal subjects called into service in 
its operation, and it can be examined in terms of its material effects, for example, on 
particular communities” ibid 411. Although refugee law does not have the extensive 
reach and direct societal impact of domestic criminal law, decisions on refugee status 
can still send clear signals as to the types of violence that are recognised as attracting 
international protection. Here deterrence of such violence may be far more indirect 
than criminal law but bringing such violence within the protective scope of 
international law is a considerable step forward in and of itself. 
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The chapter will explore the concept of gendered-persecution, focusing 
particularly on rape and domestic violence as acts constituting persecution, 
and trace the development of gender-persecution as a recognised legal 
category. It will also highlight the problems still facing victims of gender-
persecution seeking recognition as refugees today. It will consider first the 
main hurdles facing female refugees seeking to establish refugee status, in 
particular the so-called ‘public/private divide’, before going on to consider 
how the concept of collective violence might move refugee law away from 
such dichotomies and towards a more inclusive definition of refugeehood. 
The chapter will begin by considering the marginalisation of female 
experiences within the refugee definition caused by restrictive interpretations 
of key concepts, in particular ‘persecution’ and ‘political opinion’.       
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Women, in particular, can face considerable hurdles in establishing refugee 
status. This, it could be argued, is because refugeehood is traditionally 
associated with young men and the conceptualisation of refugee within 
international refugee law has often sidelined, if not entirely overlooked, 
women’s experiences of refugeehood in anything but the most exceptional 
circumstances. There is an overriding practical reason for this; women are less 
mobile than men in many refugee-producing countries. This section seeks to 
address the issues female refugees face in being recognised as refugee but it 
should be noted that for most persecuted women the biggest issue is one of 
mobility, they are simply unable to cross borders or travel far enough to reach 
a potential host country, which means that the Refugee Convention and 
article 1(2) is simply never engaged. Thus, the majority of inhabitants of so-
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called ‘refugee camps’, in places like Sudan, are women and children yet the 
majority of asylum applications in host countries come from (young) men.4  
 
For those women who do manage to cross a border to submit a claim there are 
two main barriers preventing successful refugee status applications.5 Firstly, 
forms of persecution suffered disproportionately or solely by women, such as 
rape, FGM and domestic violence, were traditionally excluded from the legal 
concept of persecution on the basis that they represented private violence. The 
significance of labelling violence as private was the exclusion of the acts from 
the concept of ‘political persecution’, a core notion in defining refugeehood. 
The traditional approach to persecution argued that in order to constitute 
persecution, as opposed to ‘mere violence’, the act must be public in nature.   
 
Secondly, if the woman succeeded in establishing that the treatment she had 
suffered amounted to persecution, applications were rejected on the basis that 
she could not demonstrate a ‘Convention ground’ for this persecution. That is 
to say, the asylum adjudicators and appeal courts, argued that violence, even 
                                                
4 See Ceneda (February 2003) Women asylum seekers in the UK: A gender perspective -
some facts and figures, London: Refugee Women’s Resource Project at Asylum Aid 
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/New%20R WRP/R WRP_RRP_Pu 
bicationsdownload. Htm and Refugee Women’s Resource Project (November 2005) 
Gender issues in assessing asylum claims: spreading good practice across the European 
Union, briefing by the Refugee Women’s Resource Project, tabled by the UK 
Government at the Intergovernmental Committee Asylum Working Group meeting 
in Geneva on 15/16 November 2005 http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/New%20R 
WRP/R WRP%20Public 
ations/GenderissuesintheasylumclaimintheEUNovember2005. pdf   
5 A gender-specific approach might be said to have been slow in emerging in Britain, 
for example, a Home Office published in 2004 found only six academic publications 
on refugee women and integration in the UK produced between 1996–2001  
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr2803.doc . This is perhaps less 
surprising when one considers in the preceding year (2003) only 31% of asylum 
seekers were women. Available at 
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/laws___policy/policy_instructio
ns/apis/gender_issues_in_the.html? [accessed 10 January 2012].  
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where it amounted to persecution, did not establish refugee status unless it 
could be shown to have been primarily motivated by a Convention ground 
(such as race, religion, membership in a particular group). It has been 
observed “[g]ender is absent as an overt ground for protection under the 
Refugee Convention and readings of the Convention have commonly 
excluded it.”6 It might be thought that gender as an overt ground for 
protection is unnecessary. Following the recognition of women’s rights as 
human rights in CEDAW7 in the 1970s it seems shocking, although perhaps 
unsurprising, that female refugees still struggle(d) to get their claims 
recognised.   
 
A central conceptual obstacle in establishing a claim to refugee status based 
on gender violence is a confusion, or conflation, of violence against women 
and gender violence. Gender violence is often used simply as a synonym for 
‘violence against women’ i.e. violence where the victim is a woman. This not 
only overlooks the possibility of men being subjected to gender persecution 
but also muddies the conceptual category of gender violence to an extent that 
can render it meaningless. There are distinct forms of harm involving 
different elements of gender persecution: 
‘gender-specific harm’ refer to harm that is unique to, or more commonly 
befalls, members of one sex … [and] ‘gender-related persecution’ refers to a 
                                                
6 McPherson et al ‘Marginal Women, Marginal Rights: Impediments to Gender-Based 
Persecution Claims by Asylum-seeking Women in Australia’ Journal of Refugee 
Studies (2011) 24 (2) 323, 323. 
7 n 16 chapter three. 
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causal relationship between the persecution and the reason for the persecution 
[ie the victim’s gender].8 
A woman may be subjected to violence as a woman or because of her gender. 
Equally, a man might be subjected to violence as a man or because he is a man. 
Only the latter is gender-related persecution or ‘gender-specific violence’.9 
This important conceptual distinction is also reflected in arts 7(1)(h) and 
7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute where it is acknowledged that persecution may be 
suffered solely due to socially constructed roles of male/female or that 
persecution may take a specific form because of the socially constructed roles 
of male/female.10  Despite the danger of oversimplification, a general 
observation can be made at this juncture that there is an important distinction 
between ‘gender violence’ and ‘violence inflicted due to the victim’s sex’. To 
accurately reflect real experiences, to clearly see the existing problems and to 
combat such problems in the future, it is necessary  to be clear about the type 
of violence being dealt with. Whether a crime is labelled as gender violence or 
not is of empirical and conceptual importance in order to have a clear 
conceptual and legal category to be applied in the future. The conflation of 
these two distinct forms of violence, violence against women and gender 
                                                
8 Roberts ‘Gender and Refugee Law’ (2002) 22 Australian Yearbook of International 
Law 159 164. In an observation as pertinent to international criminal law as to 
international refugee law, Roberts observed the distinction between gender violence 
and violence against women. Although it may be useful analytically we should keep 
in mind that persecution may be multilayered, ibid 189.  
If a woman who was vaginally raped would have been persecuted in another way 
had she been a man, then the crime may be gender-specific, but it would not amount 
to gender-related persecution. However, if that woman would not have been 
subjected to persecution had she been a man, then the persecution may be gender-
related.  
9 For discussion of gender violence perpetrated against men, in particular the use of 
sexual violence with the intention of ‘emasculating’ victims, see, e.g., Sivakumaran 
‘Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict’ (2008) 18 The European Journal of 
International Law 253. 
10 The Rome Statute could be said to provide solid legal footing for addressing gender 
violence as a separate crime. 
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violence, has been particularly damaging to female refugees. Gender violence, 
it is argued here, is rightly included within the scope of article 1(2). The 
conceptual explanation for the inclusions of gender violence within article 1(2) 
is offered through the concept of collective violence. It is argued that gender 
violence is a form of collective violence.  
 
In order to assess gender violence, we must consider whether the victim’s 
gender was a key factor in explaining the violence. If another causal factor 
was primary such as race, religion or ethnic origin, then although the form of 
violence may have been selected due to the victim’s sex, this would not be 
primarily categorised as gender violence. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
applications for refugee status by rape victims were routinely denied on the 
basis that the motive for the attack had been personal (‘because she is a 
woman’) rather than political, racially or religiously motivated. In the United 
States, the case of Campos-Guardando11 is considered by Anker to have resulted 
in a “sea change”12 in judicial attitudes towards rape victims seeking asylum. 
Ms Campos-Guardando, a native of El Salvador, sought refuge in the US after 
she was raped by political opponents of her Uncle, whilst he, and other male 
relatives, were murdered. A federal court found that Ms Campos-Guardando 
was not a refugee as rape constituted private violence and could not, 
therefore, be classed as persecution.  The outcry post-Campos-Guardando saw a 
judicial change of heart by the time Ms Lazo-Majano filed a very similar claim 
later that same year, asylum was granted on the basis of rape constituting 
persecution inflicted due to ‘imputed political opinion.’ Similarly, in Germany 
asylum was granted under the German constitutional provision granting 
                                                
11 Campos-Guardado v INS 809 F. 2d. 285 (5th Circuit 1987). 
12  Anker (n 83 chapter 1) 140. 
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asylum to political persecutees to a Romanian woman sexually abused by the 
mayor of her town.13 Although, as Anker states, the outcry surrounding the 
decision in Campos-Guardando resulted in a shift in views of rape in the context 
of asylum decisions- at least where the victim could demonstrate a clear 
political motive behind the attack- this did not result in an immediate change 
in attitudes to other gender-targeted violence or a lessening of the emphasis 
on public violence. As Peace notes, “Where rape has been interpreted as 
persecution the decision-making body of the relevant jurisdiction will have 
been convinced of the political dimension of the relationship between the 
violator and victim, the significance in asylum claims is upon this causal link 
and proving it is crucial to the case.”14  
 
The problems for other areas of international law, specifically international 
refugee law, in ignoring the gender element to acts of violence can be when 
one examines refugee cases concerning sexual violence as a form of 
persecution following the ICTY case of Kunarac.15 In Kunarac, three male 
defendants were convicted of the mass rape and enslavement of Muslim 
women during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.16 This built upon the 
                                                
13 CAS/DEU/95. For other cases where applicants were successful in having sexual 
abuse recognised as persecution, see, Appeals Nos. HX/73695/95 (17 May 1996) 
(unreported) and HX/70880/96 (10 Feb. 1997) (unreported) in Crawley Women as 
Asylum Seekers; A Legal Handbook, (ILPA 1997) 59. These cases, the first the case of a 
Kurdish woman from Turkey whose gang rape by Turkish police meant she had 
suffered persecution and similarly, in the second case, the granting of asylum to a 
Kenyan woman who was raped by police officers because of her alleged political 
opposition. In both these cases refugee status was awarded because 'state 
responsibility and grounds for persecution were clear' (Crawley, ibid) yet as Peace 
notes “Where these factors are not as unambiguous -the granting of asylum is less 
certain” (‘An Examination of the International Understanding of Rape and the 
Significance of Labeling it Torture’ 2003 International Journal Refugee Law 534 556).   
14 ibid 557.  
15 Kunarac (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, 
Case Nos IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001). 
16 ibid. 
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precedent that rape could be an act of genocide set by the ICTR in Prosecutor v 
Akayesu17 and represented the first prosecutions and convictions of rape as a 
crime against humanity. In recognising rape as a weapon of war, Kunarac 
marked a radical transformation of the position of sexual violence in 
international law.  
 
The classification of rape as a crime against humanity had a considerable 
influence on the jurisprudence of refugee law and, in particular, the central 
term ‘persecution’ in the definition in article 1A(2). Initial reactions to Kunarac 
hailed it as a victory for feminist jurisprudence,18 in particular, as a challenge 
to the private/public dichotomy that had previously seemed so entrenched in 
international law.19 The definition of ‘refugee’ contained in the Refugee 
Convention requires, amongst other elements, that the refugee fears or has 
been a victim of persecution on Refugee Convention grounds — specifically due 
to the refugee’s political opinion, religion, race, ethnicity or membership of a 
particular social group; these grounds often seems to require a clear public 
element. The public/private divide often, if not invariably, served to place 
activities of women and violence against women in the apolitical private 
sphere. This has the effect that ‘[i]n an international society peopled by States, 
women are analytically invisible because they belong to the State’s sphere of 
personal autonomy’.20 
 
                                                
17 Akayesu Trial (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, Case 
No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998). 
18 Bergoffen ‘Towards a Politics of the Vulnerable Body’ (2003) 18 Hypatia 116 117.  
19 Oosterveld ʻGender, Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee 
Law's Relevance to the Crime against Humanity of Gender-Based Persecutionʼ 17 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 49 70. 
20 Knopp, ‘Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law’ 
(1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 293 295.  
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Since the ICTY characterised rape as a crime against humanity in Kunarac it 
has been accepted that rape in and of itself is conduct amounting to 
persecution.21 To this extent, Kunarac has resulted in great progress for 
international refugee law by challenging this public/private divide. Yet, 
Kunarac has not dismantled this divide entirely and indeed it could be said to 
have reinforced this dichotomy by relying heavily on the circumstances of 
war and genocide to ‘bring the private into the public’.22 The mixed legacy of 
the approach taken by the ICTY in Kunarac has rendered it the subject of much 
debate, particularly amongst feminist scholars.23 Some feminists, in particular 
MacKinnon, argues persuasively that the approach taken was valid as the 
most significant factor of rapes in Bosnia was their part in the genocide 
against non-Serbs; thus, the extreme nature of these rapes as genocide 
committed by the Serbian military forces should be emphasised.24 Yet, other 
feminists cautioned against overplaying the exceptionalism of ‘mass rape’ as 
genocide, arguing that rape as genocide would set too high a threshold that 
                                                
21 Kunarac (n 14). 
22 ibid.   
23 See Copelon ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in 
Humanitarian Law’ (1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243, 264; Edwards, ‘The 
“Feminizing” of Torture, 356!7; Oosterveld, ‘Gender, Persecution, and the 
International Criminal Court’ 70.  
24 MacKinnon ‘Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights’ (1994) 17 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 5. MacKinnon did, however, express concern that this 
emphasis led to the rape not perpetrated by Serb forces. Similar concerns have been 
expressed in connection with the ICTR prosecutions of rape as genocide, in Prosecutor 
v Kajelijeli, the dissenting judgment noted that ‘rape and sexual violence were 
exclusively perpetrated against Tutsi women (of which only some cases were 
reported to us) and were committed on grounds of their ethnicity’: Prosecutor v 
Kajelijeli (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber 
II, Case No ICTR-98-44A-T, 1 December 2003) [97] (Judge Ramaroson). Although 
Buss notes that there is considerable evidence of rape of Hutu women as well, this 
could not be charged as genocide “[t]he rape of Hutu women could only be 
prosecuted as a crime against humanity if it could be shown the rape of the Hutu 
woman constituted or was part of the attack against the Tutsi population … Under 
art 4 of the ICTR statute, rape of Hutu women could be prosecuted as a war crime, 
though this is generally seen as a less significant category of crime than genocide or 
crimes against humanity” Buss (n 3) 159.  
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might erase less exceptional forms of violence against women.25 Of particular 
note here is the argument that ‘rape and genocide are separate atrocities’ and 
that eliding them means that international condemnation would be confined 
to particular facts and circumstances.26  
 
Following Kunarac and building on the ICTR, the approach has been to label 
sexual or domestic violence as ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ 
amounting to torture as recognised in international law under the Geneva 
Conventions and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘UN Convention against Torture’).27 It is 
noteworthy that international law has chosen to link rape predominately with 
torture rather than classifying it as its own form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.28 Whilst linking rape to torture rightly recognises the 
                                                
25 See especially Copelon (n 22) 245–8. 
26 ibid 246. Although rape was charged separately as a crime against humanity and a 
method of genocide, the context of armed conflict is a key element to both crimes. 
Although armed conflict is not a necessary element to label a conduct a crime against 
humanity, the requirement that such a crime is part of a widespread or systematic 
attack is easily satisfied by the armed conflict context and is thus a short cut to 
moving individual instances of violence into the realm of international law. This 
presents a problem for victims of similar conduct outside of an armed conflict if the 
wider conflict is seen as of primary importance in rendering the conduct of 
international relevance, ibid 257. 
27 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into 
force 26 June 1987). 
28 This is not to argue that it cannot be both but rather that international refugee law 
through the UNHCR Gender Guidelines (n 14 chapter 4) and Kunarac has chosen to 
focus on rape as torture. A similar definition of rape as torture was put forward by 
the ICTR in Akayesu (n 16) the trial chamber stated [687]: 
[l]ike torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, 
humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like 
torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture 
when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.   
However, the Semanza Trial rejected a requirement of state participation or 
acquiescence stating that ‘outside the framework of the Convention against Torture, 
the “public official” requirement is not a requirement under customary international 
law in relation to individual criminal responsibility for torture as a crime against 
humanity’: Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment and Sentence) (International Criminal 
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seriousness of the act, it might also be said to perpetuate the view that only 
sexual violence with a clear public element is of international concern and that 
other violence remains in the realm of domestic law. This is not an inevitable 
result of labelling rape as torture, rather this result is due to the prevailing 
interpretations of torture under international law such as in the UN 
Convention Against Torture which still contains a requirement that the act is 
committed by public officials.29 Although other definitions and interpretations 
that do not require state involvement are available “[v]ery few cases have 
raised rape or other forms of sexual violence, and only an exceptional case has 
sought redress for harm outside state custody or by non-state actors, in spite 
                                                
Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Case No ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003) [342]. It is 
disappointing that the Kunarac approach to linking rape to torture has been the more 
influential, particularly in refugee law: Kunarac (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Case Nos IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 22 
February 2001). The Akayesu Trial (n 16) approach not only removes the requirement 
of state or military involvement but also contained a clear statement that coercive 
circumstances need not include force but that threats and intimidation might be 
sufficient. This moves us a step away from a general requirement of an armed 
conflict or wider violent context such as genocide (although, of course, this was a 
requirement for the prosecutions before the ICTR).   
29 See, for example, Byrnes ‘The Convention against Torture’ in Askin and Koenig 
(eds), Women and International Human Rights Law (Transnational Publishers 2000) 
183–4, 187, 189; Romany ‘State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of 
the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law’ in Rebecca J Cook 
(ed), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 85, 85–6; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976) (‘ICCPR’) provides in art 7 that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his [or her] consent to medical or scientific experimentation’. 
Although usually used to address torture within state custody, art 7 does not 
positively require a state agent and the Office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights has urged that it be interpreted in a non-discriminatory way: see Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 44th sess, UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol I) (10 March 1992) para 2, 13; Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, 2187th mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (26 
May 2004, adopted 29 March 2004) [8].  However, the ICCPR is not the primary 
instrument used in international criminal law but is instead used when litigating 
torture as a human rights violation. 
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of favourable commentary and jurisprudence on these forms of torture in 
recent years.”30  
 
The impact of rape framed as a method of torture focuses on two key areas 
which are not of great value to refugee law and arguably fail to represent the 
totality of the crime of rape — namely, rape is portrayed as a weapon of war 
and as a form of torture connected to sexuality, rather than gender. This 
characterisation of rape makes it relevant to international law specifically only 
during armed conflicts. The fact that the sexual violence had taken place 
during an armed conflict was of considerable importance to the ICTY in their 
convictions in Kunarac as it provided the authority to the Tribunal to charge 
the defendants.31 As noted above, the approach was not to focus on the 
individual cases but on the coercive circumstances created by ethnic strife and 
armed conflict with the effect that where the Tribunal determined that sexual 
intercourse had taken place, consent was presumed not to have been given.32 
Thus, although the mens rea of rape continued to include knowledge that the 
act occurred without the consent of the victim, after the Appeals Chamber had 
labelled the circumstances as ‘inherently coercive’, the issue of consent was 
not addressed. The unfortunate effect of the Kunarac approach to sexual 
violence was to suggest that the motive for the attack must be demonstrably 
linked to, or as in the case of refugee law, it must be in circumstances 
analogous to an international crime such as genocide to bring this within the 
scope of international concern. Although motive is not an element of the crime 
of rape, in international refugee law, the victim herself is putting forward the 
                                                
30 Edwards (n 22) 355. 
31 ICTY Statute art 1; Kunarac (n 14) 430–431, 567– 569. 
32 Kunarac (n 14) [461–464]  [567–569]. 
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argument for rape as ‘persecution’ in order to satisfy art 1A(2) of the Refugee 
Convention. In international refugee law the focus is not on prosecuting the 
perpetrator or the elements of rape as a crime but on rape as an international 
crime in contradistinction to rape as a domestic crime. The refugee is seeking 
to demonstrate — and, indeed, must do so in order to receive refugee status 
— that the conduct amounts to persecution and is not just a crime that can be 
addressed by domestic law. 
 
This requirement has the practical effect that, in order to bring conduct within 
the scope of art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, it is necessary by implication 
to demonstrate that the motive for the conduct is one that renders it 
international and not national such as those enumerated in art 1A(2) of ‘race, 
nationality, ethnicity, religion or membership of a particular social group’. 
Constructing rape as a crime against humanity required a link to systematic 
and widespread violence even if the rape itself was an isolated instance. 
Similarly, constructing rape as genocide required that the instances of rape be 
linked to genocide.33 Thus, facets of the crime that are not elements of criminal 
conduct but form instead part of the wider context that renders the crime to 
be of international concern, often become conflated with the elements of the 
crime when the former is transposed to other areas of international law. This 
presents not only a confusing picture but also one where gender — as it has 
not been recognised as a defining element — appears not to play a central role 
in rendering the conduct to be of international concern.  
 
                                                
33Akayesu (n 16) [731–734]. 
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The implication of this for other areas of international law does not necessarily 
concern international criminal law but, as noted above, international criminal 
law sets precedent for other areas of international and domestic law as it is 
perceived to single out the conduct which amongst the plethora of criminal 
conduct is capable of constituting an international crime.34 Thus, the 
acknowledgment of rape as an international crime was conducive to the 
‘moving’ of rape into the category of conduct capable of constituting an 
international crime depending on the circumstances.35 Kunarac appeared to 
unintentionally establish a requirement for the motive of the crime to be such 
that it ‘moved’ the crime from the domestic arena to the international. 
Prosecutors in Kunarac were not concerned with motive as it is not an element 
of the crime of rape and the circumstances of genocide were proven 
separately; however, the implication of the compound ‘rape as genocide’ 
seems to have been taken by many when interpreting refugee law in relation 
to a claim for refugee status where rape is the conduct amounting to 
persecution to require the victim to show a similarly non-personal motive 
which would ‘allow’ the violence to be treated as public rather than private.36 
The focus on the genocidal circumstances, and by implication the motive of 
the perpetrator, seemed to suggest to many post-Kunarac interpreters of 
international refugee law that gender alone — which could be separated from 
                                                
34 For further discussion on the interaction between international criminal law and 
domestic criminal law see, Marston Danner and Martinez ‘Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 75; Kadish, SH ‘Complicity, Cause 
and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine’ (1985) 73 California Law 
Review 323. 
35 See Pearce An Examination of the International Understanding of Rape and the 
Significance of Labeling it Torture’ (2003) 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 
534 556.  
36 Pearce ibid 557.  
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individual sexual desire — did not constitute a non-personal motive.37 For the 
Kunarac prosecutors, the need to demonstrate motive was set aside as in the 
context of genocide motive can be assumed similarly to the coercive 
circumstances that allow the presumption of non-consent.38 However, this did 
nothing to prevent the public/private dichotomy from being applied to claim 
that rapes committed outside of the context of genocide remain private 
violence and outside the protective scope of international law. 
 
This approach is clearly practical and justifiable in ensuring successful 
prosecutions where sexual violence is rife but precise evidence is scarce; 
however, this approach can be problematic for setting a precedent in 
addressing sexual violence more generally.39 The presumption of motive and 
non-consent are not carried outside of this context. Thus, the burden of proof 
remains on the women seeking international protection, particularly in 
refugee law where a link to a Refugee Convention ground is required. Female 
refugees have faced considerable problems in establishing gender as a non-
personal motive that would ‘move’ the private violence into the public sphere 
and they have been unable to rely on Kunarac to dismantle the public/private 
divide entirely as had initially been predicted. This is not to say that the ICTY 
needed to label the sexual violence experienced by women during the 
Yugoslavian conflict as gender violence; quite the reverse, it can be said that 
                                                
37 The notion that rape is ever connected purely with sexual desire can be challenged. 
Although this is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that  
even in non-political situations where the attack is directed towards a randomly 
selected individual, the primary motivation is likely to be either power or anger: 
‘rape, then, is a pseudo-sexual act … concerned much more with status … [and] 
control … than with sensual pleasure or sexual satisfaction’ ibid. ibid 540 (citations omitted).  
38 Kunarac (n 14). 
39 Aside from the arguments present above, this approach has also been criticised for 
failing to recognise the agency of women even during armed conflicts. See, for 
example, Bergoffen (n 17).  
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the context of genocide clearly predominates there. However, a clear 
statement as to why this was not primarily gender violence but violence 
against women may have provided a clearer understanding on how gender 
violence as a separate category may be used in subsequent cases and in other 
areas of international law.40 Whilst this might be seen as a justifiable by-
product of the focus of international criminal law, it is important to recognise 
that the position of a wrongdoing in international criminal law’s ‘hierarchy of 
harm’ also dictates the legal force or recognition of harms in other areas of 
international law and domestic law.  
 
Rape ought to be established as a serious violation of human rights and a 
crime capable of attracting international legal concern without linking it to 
torture. Rape is a recognised crime and a grave breach of an individual’s 
human rights. The notion of human dignity set out in chapter three ought also 
to be sufficient explanation of why and how rape is a human rights violation. 
It is a clear example of the treatment of another human as an object, namely an 
object for male use, in way that must surely be acknowledged as denying her 
dignity.  It is for this reason that the continuing failure by many jurisdictions 
to criminalise spousal rape ought to at least raise the question if women in 
those countries face sufficient discrimination to be considered within the 
scope of refugee law.41  The extra layer of legal analogy, linking it to torture 
                                                
40 This is not to say that there was not a significant gendered element to violence in 
Yugoslavia; there was clear evidence that the type of violence suffered by both 
women and men was heavily influenced by gender including the rape of women and 
man and the castration of men but this must be seen in the context of genocide which 
was of primary importance in the victim’s exposure to violence.  
41 Whether or not it is sufficient in and of itself will depend on the context. It may for 
example have no practical impact that there is no law if women are able to report the 
rape and have it addressed under another law, as for example, is the case in Norway. 
This is in particular is relevant for explaning why women in those countries should 
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seems unnecessary. This suggests that the primary right violated by the act is 
the victim’s right to be free from torture, which obscures the gender element 
of the crime. Seeking to ‘feminise’ gender-neutral crimes by adding gender 
violence against women to gender-neutral crimes runs the risk of  
playing into the male-gendered international system by seeking to raise the 
profile of violence against women through equating the seriousness of the 
harm with male conceptions of torture, rather than as grave human rights 
violations in their own right.42  
This, combined with the notion of inherently coercive circumstances created 
by conflict, creates a characterisation of rape as a crime which does not allow 
much room for gender elements and did not allow for progress to be made in 
international criminal law to be transposed into refugee law. 
 
Despite early promise, Kunarac did not provide a basis for international 
protection to be awarded to refugees against sexual violence as Kunarac 
appeared to limited to cases where racial or political motive could be 
demonstrated by linking to the situation in former Yugoslavia.43 The lack of 
real judicial exploration of the significance, if any, of gender roles in the 
violence against women being prosecuted in Kunarac meant that it could only 
be used to establish rape as a serious enough violence to constitute 
                                                
be considered members of a particular social group. Now that rape is prima facie 
accepted as persecutory, this remains a key way in which women are excluded from 
refugee status. Domestic violence victims, and indeed victims of human trafficking, 
remain excluded from refugee status under this reasoning, for example, the author 
represented a Mongolian lady excluded from refugee status on this basis. Mongolia 
does not have a law prohibiting spousal rape.  
42Edwards (n 22) 379. 
43 Buss (n 3). For an account of the progress of international refugee law in addressing 
gender violence see generally Anker (n 83 chapter 1)  
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persecution.44 However, it could not be used by analogy to establish other 
forms of violence against women such as domestic violence as a crime in 
international criminal law. A violation of the right to be free from torture does 
not suggest anything particular as to the impact of gender roles in shaping the 
behaviour and views of the perpetrators, victims and indeed society more 
generally. Therefore, it might be preferable to characterise rape and sexual 
violence as a very specific sort of outrage against personal dignity. The 
concept of personal dignity would allow for the acknowledgment of gender 
elements to the extent that they are significant. This would be similar to the 
gender approach that should be taken with regard to forced marriage as it 
could allow for twofold harms — the rape itself and gender persecution.  
 
The conception of rape as torture adopted in Kunarac failed to recognise the 
possibility of a significant gendered element of the crime; that is, it failed to 
acknowledge the distinction between the times when a woman is targeted as a 
woman — or a man is targeted as a man — and when she is targeted because 
she is a woman — or he is targeted because he is a man. If rape is viewed as a 
method of torture, it is often assumed that the victim has been targeted for 
reasons other than gender and that the only gender element is the form of 
torture, which might arguably be said to be dictated by the victim’s sex. For 
decades, this assumption was transferred to international refugee law with 
little or no challenge arguably until the British case of Fornah v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.45 The view of violence against women as 
                                                
44 Gender was only viewed in terms of an aggravating circumstance in relation to the 
crimes committed in Kunarac (n 14) [867]. 
45 [2007] 1 AC 412 [459]. Fornah v SShD [2006] UKHL 46 (a) overturned the Court of 
Appeal denial of refugee status which had relied on the fact that, within Sierra Leone,  
female genital mutilation is ‘clearly accepted and/or regarded … as traditional and 
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persecution stagnated with the picture presented in Kunarac where it required 
victims to show a clear political, racial, religious or ethnic motive for the 
violence.46 A victim was not able to refer to her identity as a woman to 
constitute membership in a particular social group as gender roles had not 
been acknowledged as a relevant factor in determining if violence against 
women was to be brought within the scope of international law.47 
 
A main reason for this, it could be argued, is that that in the eyes of main 
jurisdictions48, the question of the motive of the rape still remains relevant. 
Although motive is not an element of the crime of rape, in international 
refugee law the victim herself is putting forward the argument for rape as 
‘persecution’ in order to satisfy art 1A(2). The view of violence against women 
as persecution stagnated with the picture presented in Kunarac; where it 
required victims to show a clear political, racial, religious or ethnic motive for 
the violence. This focus on motive has led to, aside from limited circumstances 
of recognised racial or political conflicts (such as in Rwanda or Yugoslavia), to 
                                                
part of the cultural life of its society’ Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] EWCA Civ 680 [44] (b).  
46 This is implied from the focus on the ethnically informed nature of the crimes 
committed in Kunarac in particular [16–18], [577], [592], [654], [669]. 
47This is implied from the fact that gender was only viewed as one of the aggravating 
circumstances in relation to the crimes committed in Kunarac [867]. 
48 This is not limited to certain jurisdiction, see also, Ankerbrand ‘Women under 
German Asylum Law’ 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 45 2002 46 “The focus 
on state persecution causes particular difficulties for refugee women. Women are 
victims of especially severe and systematic violence within the private sphere where 
state protection is not available because domestic criminal law is not enforced or is 
non-existent.” Although the formal requirement of state persecution has been 
removed from German asylum law, the focus on state persecution arguably remains. 
See also, Kneebone ‘Women Within the Refugee Construct: 'Exclusionary Inclusion' 
in Policy and Practice the Australian Experience’ (2005) 17 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 7. See also, Harris who states that despite South Africa’s refugee law 
including gender under the grounds of persecution “[t]he findings in this Article 
show that women and survivors of gender-related persecution remain disadvantaged 
in the South African refugee status determination process” ‘Unheard Stories: Gender-
Related Persecution and Asylum in South Africa’ (2008-9) 15 Michigan Journal of 
Gender & Law 291 295.  
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rape continuing to be labelled ‘personal’ violence.49  This requirement has the 
practical effect that, in order to bring conduct within the scope of art 1A(2) of 
the Refugee Convention, it is necessary by implication to demonstrate that the 
motive for the conduct is one that renders it international and not national such 
as those enumerated in art 1A(2) of race, nationality, ethnicity, religion or 
membership of a particular social group. Following the characterisation of 
rape as torture and as part of a larger genocidal campaign, rape was 
recognised as ‘persecution’ under international refugee law. Yet, when men 
act ‘in their own home’, this is considered ‘private violence’ — these acts 
persist and remain unchanged by the recognition of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence as capable of being within the definition of ‘persecution’.  
 
The implications of the continued adherence to the public/private binary are 
two-fold. It denies women effective agency in the political sphere. In 
international law, women are recognised as agents in the public sphere only 
exceptionally and are thus, presumed to be active only in the private sphere 
and present in the public sphere only as passive victims. This is not only 
empirically questionable but produces a highly gendered concept of agency 
whereby male agency is recognised and female agency limited. In addition, 
the public/private binary also renders male action against women in the 
private sphere prima facie unpolitical.  This characterisation of ‘private 
violence’ when men act ‘in their own home’ results in refugee applications 
                                                
49 See, for example, Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales, Australia, which 
stated “even where it is accepted ... that a woman has been raped by the military or 
other government official, she then has to demonstrate that the person who raped her 
was not acting in his private capacity rather than his official capacity before it is 
considered relevant to her claim for refugee status" (Violence and Women's Refugee 
Status at: www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/pulications/reports/69/vol 
II/ALRC69Ch 1I.html, 3.)  
! &D9 
involving battered women, where there is no overtly political motive, being 
routinely rejected for failing to fulfil their persecution criterion. Indeed, it has 
even been claimed, such by Pogge as discussed in chapter four, that domestic 
violence does not constitute a human rights violation due to the non-
government agent of persecution.  
 
The public/private distinction presents problems not only for victims of 
domestic violence but also for the many, and predominantly female, victims 
of human trafficking. Where refugee status is applied for by a victim of 
trafficking, the granting of this status is often said to require the victim to 
demonstrate not only that she has been a victim of trafficking but that there is 
a risk of re-trafficking. This might be thought to reflect the general rule that 
past persecution does not automatically signify current danger required for 
refugee status. In Britain, the newness of trafficking-specific mechanisms has 
not allowed time for many cases to reach judicial consideration, however, the 
reasons for refusal letters served on those recognised as trafficking victims 
continue to echoes this public/private distinction. It has been argued, for 
example, that a victim of trafficking is not in danger of re-trafficking because 
her family, complicit in the initial trafficking, are unlikely to attempt to re-
traffick the victim given the initial ‘failure’. This demonstrates no examination 
of the harm a trafficking victim might come to at the hands of her family even 
if she no longer likely to be re-trafficked. If the victim cannot demonstrate that 
her trafficking involved a wider network than her family, she is not entitled to 
refugee status as she cannot satisfy the ‘public’ element of refugee status.50 
                                                
50 These observations are based on actual cases worked on by the candidate that have 
not resulted, yet, in court hearings or published material. The observations are, 
therefore, at this stage, purely anecdotal but might be said to at least appear to fit 
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Following Campos-Guardando Mrs Kuna, a battered wife, filed an asylum claim 
in Canada but was denied refugee status on the grounds that he treatment she 
suffered, which included repeated violent- often life-threatening- attacks, did 
not amount to persecution. The court accepted that Mr Kuma’s ties to the 
ruling government might have resulted in Mrs Kuna’s being unable and 
unwilling to avail herself of national protection but did not consider even 
severe beatings to constitute persecution when the perpetrator was a spouse 
rather than government agent.51 This has been reiterated in other cases, such 
as, MIMA v. Ndege52 in which a victim of domestic abuse from Tanzania was 
denied refugee status to on the grounds that although there was sufficient 
evidence that her husband following customary marriage laws, viewed her as 
property to be treated as he wished. This, it was held, could not constitute a 
Convention ground as the woman’s well-founded fear was of her husband 
not the state.53 The continued impact of the public/private divide, Millbank 
argues, can be seen also in the differentiated treatment of gay and lesbian 
refugees. Millbank’s research found “a stark contrast between lesbians 
trapped in their homes, persecuted by their families, and gay men entrapped 
                                                
within the general pattern of problematic decisions reached through adherence to the 
public/private dichotomy that assumes violence from within the family to be a 
family problem rather an example of collective violence.  
51 A76491421 (unpublished) US BIA Apr. 25 2000 cited Anker (n 83 chapter 1) 149 Mrs 
Kuna was, however, granted humanitarian relief under the Geneva Convention 
against Torture. This presents a fascinating dichotomy between persecution and 
torture, suggesting that not all torture amounts to persecution, at least in the eyes of 
the US courts. 
52 [2000] 59 ALD 758 (Australia).  
53 See also, Cauchi, Ilerodiaconou and Perry in coalition with Feminist Lawyers and 
Women Rights Action Network Australia, The Invisible Women: A Report on Gender 
Based Persecution Claims by Women Asylum Seekers in Australia (Melbourne, Nov. 2003). 
Musalo and Knight 'Steps Forward and Steps Back: Uneven Progress in the Law of 
Social Group and Gender-Based Claims in the United States', 13 International Journal 
of Refugee Law 51-70 (2001).  
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in parks and toilets, persecuted by the police. Lesbians had great difficulty 
grounding their claims, as their experiences were ‘too private.’54  
 
The problem of violence inflicted both in the private sphere and by a non-
governmental agent (usually a spouse) remained unresolved by the Campos-
Guardando case, or following the progress made in Kunarac, and persists in 
posing problems for female refugees. The considerable resistance to 
establishing ‘battered wives’ as a social group demonstrates the continuing 
weight given to the private/public dichotomy in assessing the persecution 
criterion. Mullally found this divide was reflected across jurisdictions, stating 
“recent cases such as Jessica Gonzalez v the United States and Opuz v Turkey 
reveal, significant gaps remain between the rhetoric of human rights law and 
the reality of everyday enforcement and implementation on the ground. These 
gaps are most keenly felt by refugee women. While State practice suggests 
greater gender inclusivity and sensitivity in the practice of refugee law, 
women fleeing domestic violence continue to face obstacles in making their 
claims heard.”55 Even if an individual can persuade decision-makers to accept 
the violence as persecution, the issue of state protection, or lack thereof, 
constitutes a second stumbling block for female refugees. In R v. IAR ex p. 
Subramaniam56 the opinion given was that 'atrocities such as rape would not 
come within the Convention ... unless it was systematic or condoned by state 
                                                
54 Millbank (2012) "Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee Claims on the Basis 
of Sexual Orientation," Seattle Journal for Social Justice 1(3) 61 725. Millbank found 
that if the claims of male refugees on the grounds of persecution due to sexuality 
were rejected the public/private divide was not invoked. Indeed, Millbank found 
that claims were rejected on the grounds that the men’s actions were ‘too public’, an 
argument which was entirely rejected in UK jurisprudence by HJ(Iran) (n chapter ).  
55 Mullally (2011) ‘Domestic Violence Asylum Claims and Recent Developments in 
International Human Rights Law: A Progress Narrative’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 60 459, 459. 
56 [2007] 1 IAR 359. 
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inaction against the perpetrators, neither of which [the claimant] had shown.' 
This, in itself, might seem merely a reiteration of the lack of national 
protection requirement of article 1(2) and as such an unsurprising statement 
by the court. However, to demonstrate state inaction has proven difficult as 
the mere existence of a police force57 or the existence of a statute on the matter 
in question58 have been held sufficient for the potential host state to establish 
state protection is and was available.  
 
In South African case law, for example, Harris found a confusing picture, 
“[w]hile very extreme cases of rape are often recognized, some seemingly 
obvious cases of rape-as-persecution are not granted. For example, a 
Rwandan woman, having been repeatedly gang-raped by the Interahamwe, 
and subsequently rejected by her community, was awarded refugee status. 
Conversely, a Zimbabwean woman, the daughter of a national politician, was 
repeatedly tortured and raped to secure her involvement in the military, but 
was declined refugee status.”59 In one decision the court held, "there can be no 
well founded fear of persecution that can be established from the fact that the 
rebels were raping girls. Rape is a crime that appears to be rampart [sic] all 
over the world."60  
 
Similarly, although Islam and Shah61 is seen as a victory for feminist 
jurisprudence in that women subjected to domestic violence in Pakistan were 
found to fall within the definition of “membership of social group”, the 
                                                
57 Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 WLR 379. 
58 Boodal Cited in Macklin (n 80 chapter 1) 215.  
59 Harris (n 46) 16. 
60 DRC Female, File No. DBR/004022/04, Refugee Reception Office, in Durban, S. Afr. 
[3] (Aug. 3, 2006). 
61 n 1. 
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dissenting judgment contained many troubling echoes of previous denials of 
refugee status for female refugees. The court had been presented with 
considerable evidence, accepted by the bench, that domestic violence was rife 
in Pakistan62, that this violence was condoned by the state63 and supported by 
many religious leaders64 and was exacerbated by societal norms concerning 
women.65 Yet Lord Millett still concluded:  
these norms are not a pretext for persecution nor have they been recently 
imposed. They are deeply embedded in the society in which the appellants 
have been brought up and in which they live. Women who are perceived to 
have transgressed them are treated badly[…] But this not because they are 
women. They are persecuted as individuals for what each of them have done or 
are thought to have done. 
Lord Millett accepts that the appellants had been treated badly and that this 
violence was inflicted on women who had transgressed social norms. To state 
that the women have been treated badly “for what they have done” falls once 
again into the trap of focusing on the actual motive of the perpetrator (to 
punish his wife for not acting as he wished her to) rather than the constructive 
motive (to enforce societal norms that deem women inferior). The actual 
motive, it is argued, is irrelevant here. The constructive motive, however, 
reveals the link between the violence the appellants had suffered and societal 
attitudes to women. These women were subjected to violence by their 
husband not “because of what they had done” but because their husbands 
could beat their wives with impunity and believed it to be their right to do so. 
Mrs Islam’s claim that she was a victim of political persecution was also 
                                                
62 n 1 [629]. 
63 n 1 [664-5] 
64 n 1 [635] 
65 n 1[664] 
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rejected despite the fact that her husband’s violence began after she 
intervened in a political argument between boys at her son’s school. Mrs Islam 
husband was angry she had become involved in politics and began to beat 
here. Yet to the court there was no political link. It is argued here that that Mrs 
Islam’s involvement in a political argument is many ways conceptually 
distracting. Even if Mrs Islam had never expressed a political opinion, as her 
co-appellant Mrs Shah was found to have done, there remains a political 
element to the transgression of social norms. There is an implicit rejection of 
these norms in acting in a way that transgresses them. This a political act, 
whether labeled as such or not. In a society that insists women can be treated 
by men in any manner they see fit to seek refugee status as a victim of 
domestic violence can be seen as another political act. These societal norms 
are, after all, enforced and adhered to by women also. This is particularly the 
case in societies where the concept of honour killings is prevalent. To have 
offended the honour of one’s family is, in effect, an intensely political act. It 
not only rejects one’s family’s view but a norm system adhered to by society. 
It is, in the sense of chapter four, collective violence as the violence is justified 
on the basis of patriarchal norms. To go against this system is to reject a norm 
widely adhered to. In this sense it might be seen as political.  
 
The cases discussed above highlight that the impoverished concept of political 
agency not only denies women who act in the private sphere agency but also 
labels the acts of men in the private sphere ‘unpolitical’ when they may be 
anything but. There is a crucial difference between the act of a man committed 
in private because to act so in public would risk public sanction and/or shame 
and a man who acts violently in private knowing no sanction would be 
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attached to his action and believing it to be ‘his right’ to act so. This distinction 
not only reveals the untenable nature of the public/private divide in refugee 
law but is also the basis of the ‘lack of national protection’ element of refugee 
law- the latter example is clearly one where no national protection is available 
to the female victim whereas in the former it is. The lack of national protection 
is what renders the act political irrespective of the actual motives of the 
perpetrator. Collective violence explains also how even in a state where there 
are good faith political acts to protect women this may not be sufficient to 
constitute protection if the cultural norms to which much (or a significant 
section) of society adheres are sufficiently discriminatory or display a 
significant enough disregard for the rights of women.    
 
The public/private dichotomy poses a particular problem for female refugees 
(who of course are not the only victims of domestic violence or rape) because 
women are still seen in many jurisdictions as ‘belonging to the private (or 
domestic) sphere.’ This is not a perception that male applicants have to 
overcome. Women struggle then to establish materiality in the public sphere 
where men are presumed present. This interpretation of women’s (and men’s) 
roles has the effect of limiting the scope of article 1(2) when applied to 
women. The issue of materiality in the public sphere is something feminist 
scholars in many disciplines have sought to address, Judith Butler, in 
particular, is keen to establish that “materiality is the cause of the discourse” 66 
and not merely the effect. A perceived lack of presence in the public sphere 
both leads to and is in part a consequence of a diminished concept of agency 
in relation to women. Recognition of agency is vital because, as Long notes, 
                                                
66 Bodies that Matter:On the Discursive Limits of "Sex” (Routledge 1993) 9. 
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“the notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process 
social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most 
extreme forms of coercion.”67 Diminished agency restricts women’s options in 
reality and an impoverished concept of agency limits recognition of 
demonstrations of continued agency in refugee-producing circumstances, 
which are by definition coercive. It has been argued in chapter one that the 
concept of agency is one focused on the choice act, with migration described 
as forced where the alternative to migration is such that it cannot be 
characterised as a real alternative but rather a ‘tragic choice.’68 This recognises 
that agency can be exercised even in the most coercive circumstances but that 
the acts it is possible to undertake under such circumstances may be 
materially different to those undertaken where no such limits to action exist. If 
avenues of action are entirely closed to the individual due, for example, to her 
gender, then failure to act within those avenues cannot be justification for 
denial of agency or blanket denial of refugee status.   
 
This is especially pertinent to refugee law, where it is the perceived lack of 
presence of women in the public sphere that creates the discourse that women 
belong to the private sphere in refugee producing countries, which is so 
damaging to women seeking recognition as refugees. This is not only 
damaging to female refugees but also creates an unrealistic distinction 
between public and private spheres. As Greatbatch notes, “the bifurcated 
version of society itself ignores the realm of women’s lives outside 
domesticity, and creates a rhetorical and theoretical wall between domestic 
                                                
67  Long (1992). From paradigm lost to paradigm regained? The case for an actor-
oriented sociology of development in Long and Long (eds). Battlefields of knowledge, 
The interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development (Routledge) 23.  
68 See p6-8 in chapter one. 
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and social culture. It roots women’s oppression in sexuality and private life, 
disregarding oppression experience in non-domestic circumstances.”69  
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The predominant factor in motivating violence might be rightly said to form 
part of the relevant enquiry for decision-makers deciding on refugee status. 
As Amatya Sen notes in Identity and Violence, the reduction of a person to one 
dominant feature of their identity is part of the process of violence, for a 
perpetrator of violence seeing the target as ‘a Muslim’, ‘a Christian’ or ‘a 
woman’ whilst disregarding other characteristics of identity is part of what 
allows them to act in such a violent manner.70 In this sense, whilst it is always 
somewhat simplistic to speak as if there is only one contributing factor to 
violence, identification of the predominant factor motivating violence might 
be seen in this context as justifiable. Indeed, the concept of gender violence 
would not exist without there being instances where the predominant factor 
motivating violence might be said to be gender inequality or gender roles.  
 
Thus, the persecutor’s motivation is often said to be the proper focus of the 
persecution enquiry, as the Supreme Court in Canada stated, ‘the examination 
of the circumstances should be approached from the perspective of the 
persecutor, since that is the perspective that is determinative in inciting the 
persecution.’71 However, this approach might be said to conflate actual and 
imputed motivation for violence. Here it will be argued that whilst imputed 
motive is entirely relevant for refugee law, actual motive is not. The danger of 
                                                
69 Greatbatch  ʻThe Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourseʼ 1 
International Journal of Refugee Law 518 520.  
70 Sen (n 57 chapter 4).  
71 Ward v Canada [1993] 2 SCR 689 [747]. 
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such a ‘actual motive’ approach is illustrated by the British case of Omoruyi72 
where Simon Brown LJ recorded the submission for the Secretary of State thus 
(paragraph 10):  
discrimination is an essential feature of persecution for a Convention reason 
and that this requires the persecutor to be motivated by the reason in question, 
here religion … [H]e must establish that the Ogboni are intent on harming him 
because he is a Christian and not merely because he crossed them. And this … 
the appellant cannot do … There is no reason to suppose that the Ogboni 
would not be equally intent upon harming anyone else who crossed them … 
Mr Ogboni’s application was denied, the court accepting that:  
this case fails not for want of enmity or malignity on the part of the Ogboni 
(these feelings, we must assume, were present in abundance), but rather 
because that motivation (that hostility and intent to harm) was in no realistic 
sense discriminatory against the appellant on account of his Christianity but 
rather stemmed from his refusal to comply with their demands73 
So an applicant targeted for refusal to comply with a cultural norm was not a 
refugee under article 1(2) because he failed to establish a Convention ground 
for persecution.  
 
These decisions rest on the assumption that the court can discover the actual 
motive of the persecutor through examination of facts. In practice, it is, of 
course, imputed motivation that is the focus. Unless the persecutor recorded 
somewhere his motivation for the attack the assessors and appeal courts 
cannot possibly know the actual motivation behind the attack. Nor indeed 
should the actual motive be relevant. There is precedence for this approach. It 
                                                
72 [2001] IAR 17: 
73 ibid [26].  
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could be argued international law already ignores actual motive when 
considering international crimes such as genocide or war crimes. Here, the 
fact that the actual motivating factor behind acts of violence during genocide 
might be personal enmity is deemed irrelevant if it can be said to be part of a 
general scheme of violence.74 If the focus is on imputed motivation then it 
should be acknowledged that the courts already look beyond personal 
motivation to the circumstances of the country of origin.  
 
This is the case in all refugee status determination cases, if one seeks refugee 
status on the basis of religious persecution, one would have a far stronger case 
in arguing not that the individual attack (or feared attack) was motivated by 
religious intolerance but that the general conditions in the country of origin 
are that of persecution of a particular religious group such that an attack on 
the basis of holding that religious belief is likely. Similarly, with political 
cases, one must demonstrate that one holds a certain political view and then 
establish that holders of that particular political view are subject to violence 
and/or severe discrimination. What is relevant, the Czech Asylum Court 
reminded decision makers, is the motive for failure to provide of protection.75 
If this motive is linked a Convention ground it is irrelevant what the motive 
for the persecution is. For example, if failure to provide protection to a 
domestic violence victim is due to discrimination against women within the 
legal system this would be sufficient to establish a Convention ground 
                                                
74 For example, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, when considering if forced 
marriage could constitute a new and distinct crime against humanity, required 
prosecutors to show a nexus between the enumerated act and broader widespread 
and systematic violence. Prosecutor v Sesay (Trial Judgment), Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04- 15-T, 8 April 2009 (‘RUF Trial 
Judgment’)[159]. These criteria stemmed from the Kunarac case at the ICTY, 
discussed above.    
75 5 Azs 7/2009-98 
! &9K 
(namely membership of a particular social group discussed below) even 
though the persecution is the violence suffered at the hands of an abusive 
husband. RT (Zimbabwe) further reminded decision makers that there can be 
no requirement of ‘double persecution’. Baroness Hale firmly rejected such a 
requirement. Given the serious nature of domestic violence this is likely to be 
sufficient to establish treatment constituting persecution. The functional 
fusion of the persecution and state protection elements will then operate to 
allow refugee status where the victim of domestic violence shows that this 
domestic violence is a part of a large societal attitude to women. Alternatively, 
refugee status may also be appropriate where society is opposed to a norm 
but the government support it. Collective violence is put forward as an 
alternative to state persecution not an additional requirement. 
 
The previously predominant approach of labelling sexual and domestic 
violence as ‘private’ due the personal motivation of the perpetrator is, then, 
illogical within international refugee law. To dismiss a claim due to personal 
motivation of the perpetrator not only rests on a claim that is virtually 
impossible to prove76 but a misunderstanding of the operation of article 1(2). 
The reconceptualisation of rape cases, such as Campos-Guardando, ought to be 
seen as recognition that personal motivation is irrelevant where an underlying 
Convention motive can be imputed. This view is supported by Lord Justice 
Waller in his partly dissenting opinion in Sepet when he states:  
If what is being relied on is an implied political opinion by reference to 
conduct of a government which is being challenged, i.e. if what is being 
alleged as being persecution is the very fact that the government is operating 
                                                
76 In addition, the claim of personal sexual motivation failed as a defence in Kunarac. 
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a law which it is not entitled to operate so far as the challenger of the law is 
concerned, the causal nexus will in my view be supplied without any 
examination of “motive”.77 
Regrettably, this was not a view taken by the court as a whole in Sepet and is a 
point, which has largely been overlooked in many refugee status 
determination cases, particularly in relation to gender violence, where the 
notion of a ‘purely sexual motive’ continues to be raised.   
 
The issue then of when Convention grounds can be imputed remains. The 
imputed motivation approach has, as demonstrated above, led to a change in 
attitude to rape cases in particular and to some success for rape victims in 
receiving refugee status. However, where there is no element of overt 
political, racial or religious persecution, women still face difficulties in 
establishing that violence against women could have even imputed political 
aspects. The political argument is effectively a catch-22 for women, in order to 
establish persecution she must show she has been severely discriminated 
against or subject to serious violence; this usually takes the shape of 
demonstrating that women are marginalised in the country of origin’s society, 
to be granted refugee status she must now show a Convention ground for this 
persecution, if women are marginalised, argues the host country, they are 
apolitical and the tormentor could not have assigned any political opinion to 
his victim. Host countries argue then that where women have been targeted 
as a woman this cannot be political persecution.   
 
                                                
77 Fornah (n 43a) [160].  
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However, it could be argued that there is a constructive political aspect to 
victimisation of many women, which coupled with the lack of national 
protection and/or opportunity for redress, does amount to persecution under 
article 1(2). This depends, however, on the concept ‘political act’ the 
adjudicator applies as will be demonstrated below. ‘Political act’ is still 
confined to acts with an overt political dimension and there remains a general 
reluctance to recognise the political dimensions of social or cultural norms.  
There remains in international refugee law, Spijkerboer notes, “a hierarchy of 
harm where overtly political violence is privileged.”78  
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In Refugee Law, it could be argued that the ultimate expression of agency is 
through a political act as it presumed that any response to a political act must 
represent political persecution (which as Chapter One demonstrated is the 
cornerstone of refugeehood). Refugee law assumes, in many ways, that 
‘political’ is easy to define and identify. Article 1(2) rests on this assumption 
that it is clear what is and is not political (or indeed racially or religiously 
motivated).  To an extent, this is the by-product of the need to assess claims 
against workable criteria. In order to place the applicant into a neat category 
within article 1(2) certain features of identity (such as race, religion or political 
opinion) are emphasised and a multifaceted individual becomes ‘a political 
persecutee’ or ‘a victim of racial violence.’  
 
Although it cannot be overlooked that in many refugee-producing countries, 
active participation in a narrowly defined public sphere is severely restricted 
                                                
78 Spijkerboer Gender and Refugee Status (Dartmouth Publishing 2000) 45.  
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for women, women do still participate in even the most restrictive public 
sphere; although it may not be through ‘traditional’ methods of political 
engagement, such as standing for office, but instead through alternative 
methods. A woman challenging gender norms, such as dress or behavioural 
codes, in public or private is an active political agent. As the UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines notes, “While religious tenets require certain kinds of behaviour 
from a woman, contrary behaviour may be perceived as evidence of an 
unacceptable political opinion.”79 An expanded notion of political agency in 
relation to women reveals the many ways in which the public/private binary 
is untenable and is necessary to reflect a reality where many women’s options 
for action are restricted in ways not expected of men and are, thus, simply 
unable to demonstrate agency in the same way as their male counterparts. It 
contended here that the impoverished concept of political agency employed in 
relation to women in international refugee law significantly restrains 
application of article 1(2) to female refugees. 
 
This compounded by the traditional (and in many ways legally necessary) 
focus on the identity ascribed by the persecutor to the victim, which, as noted 
above, is most often one-dimensional.80 However, it is important to note that 
the individuals seeking refugee status do not actually have the one-
dimensional identities their persecutors assign to them; the persecutor 
reduced what in reality is a complex identity to ‘key features’ when inflicting 
persecution. Focusing solely on the persecutor’s view of the refugee can create 
                                                
79 UNHCR guidelines (n 14 chapter 4) [23]. 
80 Sen (n 57 chapter 4) 171. As noted above, Sen argues that the reduction of a person 
to one dominant feature of their identity is part of the process of violence, for a 
perpetrator of violence seeing the target as ‘a Muslim’, ‘a Christian’ or ‘a woman’ 
whilst disregarding other characteristics of identity is part of what allows them to act 
in such a violent manner.  
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considerable problems when addressing gendered persecution. It could be, for 
example, that a persecutor believed himself to be motivated solely by the 
presence of a woman within his reach when committing rape or sexual 
violence but this does not mean that the act itself is necessarily apolitical, as 
was confirmed in the Kunarac ruling. Whether or not the act is political 
depends on far more than just the persecutor’s motivation and when 
examining gendered violence it is necessary to look beyond the act itself to 
surrounding circumstances before determining the political nature or 
otherwise of the act.  
 
There are two ways in which the concept of a ‘political act’ enters into refugee 
status determination cases both of which create particular problems for 
victims of gendered-persecution. Although the issues often overlap and are 
certainly interrelated it is important to draw a distinction as to the point at 
which the applicant brings in the concept of a ‘political act.’ Firstly, in relation 
to establishing persecution the notion of a ‘political act’ is key. As noted in 
Chapter One, persecution is seen as political in nature, therefore, denial of the 
political nature of the persecutory acts makes any chance of fulfilling the 
persecution criterion slim. This, then, is an issue in all refugee status 
determination cases; if the applicant cannot demonstrate a political element 
(no longer confined to state involvement but vicarious state culpability at the 
least) then not only will she find it difficult to satisfy the persecution criterion 
but she may also encounter difficulties in establishing a lack of national 
protection. 
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Secondly, if the applicant wishes to rely on the Convention ground of 
‘political opinion’ it must be shown that the persecution was inflicted due to 
their political opinion thus the act(s) which resulted in (fear of) persecution 
must be deemed political in order to have sufficiently demonstrated (imputed 
or actual) political opinion to the persecutor. This is a particular concern for 
female refugees as the rejection of ‘women’ as a ‘social group’ means a woman 
cannot argue that the persecution was inflicted merely because she was a 
woman but must show a separate Convention ground. Where there is no clear 
racial or religious motive that leaves ‘political opinion’ as the only possible 
avenue.81  
 
Refugee status decisions, as Thomas Spijkboer demonstrates in his 
comprehensive empirical study, do not usually define ‘political acts’ so 
instead we must rely on acts, which have been labelled ‘apolitical’ or ‘non-
political’ to gain a clearer understanding of the interpretation of ‘political’ 
being applied.82 Spijkerboer makes five key observations when considering 
                                                
81 Nationality is of limited use in countries where there is not a civil war or at least 
serious attempts to divide the current country into different ‘nations.’ It might, for 
example, be a Convention ground for a Chechnyian refugee but even then they 
would be more likely to ascribe racial and/or religious motives to the persecutor 
than ‘nationality.’ It was, however, of use in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War when, for example, an individual might be targeted for being German 
but outside of Germany’s new borders.   
82 Spijkerboer (n 75). The empirical study is unusual as access is rarely given to initial 
or tribunal level decisions, this represents one of the few studies in this area. 
However, it could also be argued that the types of appeals being heard across Europe 
and Common Law jurisdictions broadly bear out Spijkboer’s findings and 
demonstrate that the issues identified are still being encountered. For example, in the 
UK, Human Rights Watch has warned that the issues facing female refugees have 
been compounded by the introduction of the detained fast-track asylum process; 
designed to speed up decisions the process has led to a crystallisation of previously 
held assumptions, particularly views on the role of women within refugee-producing 
countries which inevitably leads to higher level of rejection amongst female 
applicants (a refusal rate of between 94-96% yearly stands testament to this). See, 
‘Fast-Tracked Unfairness: Detention and Denial of Women Asylum Seekers in the 
UK’ (February 23, 2010) http://www.hrw.org/node/88671.  HRW argue that it is 
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the concept of the ‘political act.’ Firstly, he notes that acts which are ‘viewed 
as based on emotions’ are deemed non-political and cites the Chinese one 
child policy as an example, but, it could be argued, that non-compliance with 
dress code cases might come under this heading. The acts are characterised as 
‘matters of personal preference’ i.e. personal preference to have another child 
or to not conform to a dress code. In these cases the issue of what is deemed a 
political act was key to the attempt to establish refugee status, the harm 
suffered or feared was usually serious and inflicted by the state or state-
sanctioned but refugee status was not awarded due to lack of a Convention 
ground for the persecution.  
 
Secondly, Spijkboer argues that acts which can be deemed ‘self-interested’ are 
also labelled non-political as they are considered to be economically 
motivated. This relates to the concept of persecution as well as to notion of a 
‘political opinion.’ As demonstrated in Chapter One, persecution operates a 
proof that the migration was forced, thus the applicant must demonstrate that 
she had no option but to leave by showing she has been persecuted or feared 
persecution. Traditionally this was limited to political or racial persecution on 
the grounds that state involvement was necessary yet even once non-state 
agents of persecution had been accepted the notion of political persecution 
has been retained and narrowly applied. However, there seems to be little 
reason conceptually to limit ‘persecution’ to instances of political persecution 
and not to expand it to other instances where it is clear that the individual had 
no viable alternative to migration. Building on Shellman’s models of 
migration, Chapter One argues it is conceptually incoherent to ascribe 
                                                
simply inappropriate to put most female asylum seekers on the fast track process as 
the claims are too complex to be handled quickly. 
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economic motivations to those who leave due to a lack of viable alternatives to 
migration, whatever has caused the lack of viable alternatives. Where the 
migration can be said to have been motivated by push factors rather than pull 
factors it cannot be characterised as either voluntary or ‘self-interested.’ All 
refugees are self-interested to the extent that, like all people, they have an 
interest in survival. The distinction then between economic, self-interested 
motives for migration and political, selfless motives is as untenable as it is 
unhelpful.  
 
In Chapter One, it was noted following Zollberg, that there has been a 
tendency to view refugees in two categories, helpless victims (here racial or 
religious motivation is usually relevant) or political martyrs. This view of 
refugeehood requires the refugee either to be a passive victim, targeted due to 
unalterable characteristics, or political activists, who selflessly puts 
themselves in the line of fire. This conceptualisation of ‘political’ as active 
results in involuntary acts being depicted as non-political. Thus, persecution 
due to forced membership in a group, even a political party, is often 
considered apolitical as the victim’s act “lacked the motivation which makes 
an act political.”83 Here the issue is with whether the applicant can find a 
Convention ground for the persecution, that is although they have engaged in 
an act, which brought about serious consequences which could be 
characterised as persecutory, the act itself is deemed ‘non-political’ and the 
response to this act, therefore, is characterised as apolitical whomever the 
respondent is. If the act is not deemed to be ‘political’ the conclusion is that it 
cannot have either revealed an actual political opinion or caused the 
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persecutor to impute a political opinion, where one was not actually held and 
the persecution could not have been ‘for reason of…political opinion’. Thus, 
where there is no clear racial or religious motive, it is then impossible for the 
applicant to establish that the act is persecution inflicted on a Convention 
ground rather than ‘random violence’, which is not thought to be included 
under article 1(2). 
 
Fourthly, acts that could be deemed ‘minor’ or ‘subordinate’ were not 
considered political. Here Spijkboer routinely found that asylum adjudicators 
argued the applicant could not have been ‘known to the regime’ (or opponent 
non-state actors) if the acts she was engaging in were too minor to draw 
attention to herself. This has been given as another objection to including 
dress code violations as evidence of a ‘political opinion.’ This was not a 
contention backed up by any particular in country evidence but rather a 
general opinion held to unless specifically contradicted by in country reports.  
 
Finally, Spijkboer identified a general trend of attributing motives for flight to 
female refugees, which disqualified them from refugee status even where 
another interpretation was available which could have founded a successful 
claim. There can be little doubt from Spijkboer’s study or dearth of successful 
appeals by female asylum seekers that this trend is bolstered by the general 
assumption underlying many refugee status decisions for female refugees, 
namely that women are simply not present in the public sphere. If it is not 
considered the norm for women to be political a woman must prove herself to 
be exceptional before her case can have even a hope of succeeding.  
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A core issue in applications from female refugees is the characterisation of the 
nature of the act the applicant seeks to have recognised as persecution. It is 
clear throughout the case law, both in refugee status decisions at first instance 
and appeals, that persecution, as a legal concept, refers to serious harm. As 
noted in Chapter One, the notion that the harm is ‘targeted’ is also central to 
the conceptualisation of persecution under article 1(2). Thus, women fleeing 
‘general violence’ are not granted refugee status even if they have suffered 
serious harm. This affects, in particular, those fleeing civil wars. In addition, 
as noted above, victims of ‘random violence’, that is violence with no clear 
cause or without an easily ascribable political or racial motive, are also 
excluded. Rape is often portrayed in this manner, as an act ‘out of the blue’, 
which bore no relation to the political situation in the country. As Spijkboer 
notes in his empirical study, in Dutch refugee applications this was commonly 
labelled ‘irrational violence’ and having no identifiable motivation it could not 
hope to be labelled ‘political’.  
 
The notion of ‘rational violence’ also entered into status determination cases, 
particularly in cases where the applicant seeks to establish that a law of 
general application is persecutory in and of itself. Recently, it could be argued, 
there has been a radical shift in attitudes to these cases, at least in relation to 
practicing homosexuals from countries where homosexuality is illegal.84 The 
UNHCR Gender Guidelines declare that a law may be considered persecutory 
                                                
84 It could, of course, also be argued that banning homosexuality is not a law of 
general application but a law specifically targeted at individuals due to their sexual 
orientation; it does not after all apply to heterosexuals who are not affected by the 
law as they are not homosexual. Thus, it is no different to a law targeted people due 
to their racial origin or religious beliefs.  
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in and of itself and argued that this has “proven material to determining some 
gender-related claims.”85 This is particularly the case where the law does not 
comply with international human rights standards. As the Guidelines note, 
the applicant must demonstrate either that they fear persecution under that 
law (i.e. that the punishment for breaking that law is disproportionate enough 
to be classified as persecution and not prosecution) or that being forced to 
conform to this the law is persecutory in and of itself. In most cases the 
applicant argues both points, the latter has been a successful argument in cases 
involving homosexual couples where homosexuality is banned. One element 
of the decision was clearly the violent punishment (in many cases death) that 
the applicant would suffer if caught but since HJ (Iran), in Britain at least, it 
has been made clear that forcing an individual to comply with the law (even if 
the punishment were less extreme) is persecution in and of itself because it 
involves a violation of a core human right, the right to a private life.  
 
There is no doubt that this is a considerable move towards a human rights 
based approach to refugee law. However, Spijkoboer identified other areas 
where violent punishments are considered ‘rational violence’ and, therefore, 
not persecutory. Such reasoning was often employed in rejecting applications 
from Chinese women who suffered under the one child policy, even where 
the women had suffered forced abortion or sterilisation. These acts, states 
Spijkboer, were characterised as methods of “intended to restore the situation 
to what it was before the illegal act [getting pregnant]” or as enforcement 
measures. Spijkboer also found that female Iranian applicants who objected to 
the strict dress codes and restrictive social norms were also rejected on this 
                                                
85 UNHCR Guidelines (n 14 chapter 4) [10] 4. 
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basis. It was argued that law applied to all Iranian women and that, as such, 
objection to the law, even where the punishment contravened human rights 
treaties, was not sufficient to establish persecution. These were instances of 
prosecution and could not then represent harm or violence so as to bring the 
act under the persecution criterion in article 1(2).  
 
The concepts of ‘harm’ and ‘violence’ are then key to establishing persecution. 
This is particularly the case when assessing applications where the act 
identified as constituting persecution is sexual violence. As noted above, here 
female applicants have had to overcome several hurdles in establishing rape 
as a method of persecution. Firstly, the private/public dichotomy was used to 
argue that as ‘private violence’ sexual violence could not found refugee status. 
This is linked, of course, to the notion of a ‘political act’, rape not being 
considered politically motivated but attributed to the personal lust of a man. 
Rape was then characterised as ‘random violence’, initially, therefore, even 
where rape was endemic and perpetrated by government agents it was not 
recognised as persecution. Although this perception of rape has been slowly 
eroded and there is now a general acceptance that rape can be a method of 
torture and persecution (particularly since the Kunarac ruling established rape 
as a crime against humanity) there remain several problems with 
conceptualisation of rape as persecution in refugee status determination cases.  
 
Collective violence provides a limiting factor connected to the notion of 
illegitimate violence, provided in Chapter One and as such the type of 
violence considered a human rights violations within the scope of article 1(2) 
depends on the view of the content of the relationship between state and 
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citizen, and as this evolves so too must the type of violence considered as a 
human rights violations. It is dependent, therefore, on what is considered to 
be a relevant human rights violation to international law i.e. which violations 
represent the state falling below international standards. To an extent, this can 
be seen in refugee law, the UNHCR Guidelines are frequently ahead of 
domestic governmental or judicial recognition of the change in attitude to a 
specific right, moving it from something less persuasive to a ‘human right’. 
This was very much the case with gender persecution, where domestic 
recognition of gender persecution lagged behind its inclusion under article 
1(2) according to the UNHCR. There was a time where rape was not 
considered a human rights violation but an act of ‘private violence.’ Yet, the 
issue of ‘private violence’ continues to be overlooked. This is based on a 
fundamental disagreement over the meaning of international law. The 
assertion that domestic violence is not a relevant human rights violation for 
international law depends entirely on your view of international law, namely 
what you consider to be covered by international law. As Andrew Clapham 
asserts in his attempt to expand human rights obligations to non-state actors, 
the claim that non-state actors are not the concern of international human 
rights law, indeed that attempts to include them would trivialise the notion of 
human rights, amounts to a statement “that political prisoners are a legitimate 
subject of concern and violence against women in the home is not.”86  
 
Human rights in international law need not be interpreted this way, for 
example, in The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone, the 
                                                
86 Clapham ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors’ in de Bu ́rca, de Witte 
and Francion (eds) The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (vol XV/1 
Oxford University Press 2006) 37. 
! &KU 
commission uses the term ‘human rights violations’ to refer to the acts of all 
parties in the conflict, whether these acts were committed within a ‘bush 
marriage’ (forced marriage) or in armed conflict against a combatant.  Indeed 
as Clapham notes, if the acts of private individuals cannot constitute human 
rights violations under international law then the acts of terrorists are not 
relevant human rights violations to international law, he goes on to cite the 
paper ‘Human Rights, the United Nations and the Struggle Against 
Terrorism’ which express relief that “[f]ortunately, human rights thinking and 
even jurisprudence has evolved and now certain non-state actors like rebel 
groups and multi-national corporations can be held responsible for rights 
violations.”87 If international law in general has evolved, in some areas 
international refugee law has resisted such evolution.  !
The exclusion of acts of private individuals implies a view of international law 
resting on the (traditional) premise that human rights laws are essentially 
negative laws, that is to say human rights laws restrict state action but do not 
require positive action at all. This is not the way international law works but 
rather the way it is interpreted as functioning. The now widespread 
acknowledgment that private actors may violate human rights in a way that is 
relevant to international law shows the evolution of international human 
rights law from entirely negative to, at least partially, positive. The expanding 
scope of international human rights law now requires states to act in certain 
situations rather just to refrain from acting. One area that states are expected 
to act is in protecting the human rights of their citizens, failure to do so makes 
the human rights violation by the private individual a public matter and a 
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relevant human rights violation to international law. Here the notion of 
collective violence again clarifies why this human rights violation attracts 
international legal obligations. The human rights violation where the 
perpetrator has acted in conformance with societal norms and without fear of 
punishment as she is aware the state is unwilling or unable to act to prevent 
her from violating another’s human rights is both an instance of collective 
violence and a situation in which violation of human rights by a private actors 
is very much relevant to international law, be that international human rights 
law (which condemns the violation and the lack of state action to prevent or 
redress it) or international refugee law (which offers surrogate protection to 
the individual whose rights have been violated).   
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One area where the concepts of human rights violations and collective 
violence could be seen as most controversial is in relation to cultural practices 
and norms. Restrictive social or cultural norms might be based on long-held 
cultural beliefs or expressions of religious belief, which could be included 
under the rubric of ‘cultural rights’. The tension between protecting universal 
rights and cultural rights is present throughout human rights law and this is 
not the place to engage in a discussion on universalism and cultural relativism 
but the issue will be explored in relation to refugee law, it suffices to say that 
it is contended here that if human rights are universal and as such they must 
apply everywhere and in every situation.88 It has been argued that it is not the 
                                                
88 As Thomas Franck argues human rights are labelled ‘universal’ not ‘western’, even 
if one believes they originated in the West (a disputable claim) this does not render 
them culturally specific. They are instead intended to add a layer of transcultural 
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place of international law to declare traditional practices as human rights 
violations or even that to do so would be racist or imperialist and that, 
therefore, asylum ought not to be granted on the basis of exposure to 
traditional, cultural practices.  The Canadian Minister for Immigration, at the 
time of adopting the UNHCR Gender Guidelines into Canadian law, 
expressed his apprehension in applying these guidelines in difficult cases 
stating, “[b]ut will Canada act as an imperialist country and impose its values 
on other countries around the world? . . . I don't think that Canada should 
unilaterally try to impose its values on other countries regarding laws of 
general application.”89 
 
Yet, as posited above, the granting of refugee status goes beyond the 
individual application and is also a statement about what constitutes 
illegitimate violence. Refugee status says that the international community 
extended surrogate protection here because of a grave human rights violation 
demonstrative of failure of state protection. Refugee law, then, cannot avoid 
issues of cultural relativism, by its very nature if judges whether the violation 
was legitimate or not (this is what, for example, the prosecution or 
persecution question turns on) and it must, therefore, engage with traditional, 
cultural practices and make similar determination. In order to make this 
determination of whether there has been a human rights violations within the 
scope of article 1(2), as noted above, international refugee law draws on 
                                                
universal rights built on social, economic and historical development and do not to 
reject cultural rights per se. Franck “Are Human Rights Universal?” (2001) 80 Foreign 
Affairs 196. For an overview of the debate see, Franck or Brown “Universal Human 
Rights? An Analysis of the Human Rights Culture and its Critics” in Patman (ed) 
Universal Human Rights (Bantam 2000) 31.  
89 Cited in Macklin (n 80 chapter 1) 252. 
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international human rights law.90 As Macklin noted, in response to the fears of 
the Canadian minister: 
If a Kurd comes to Canada claiming that he was whipped by Iraqi police 
interrogators for his political activities, Canada does not consider whether 
whipping is a time honored tradition in the man's country of origin, or 
whether the assertion of Kurdish nationalism is against the law in Iraq. 
Canada does not worry about offending the sensibilities of states that flog 
people because of their ethnicity or political opinions when Canada declares 
that the claimant was persecuted.91 
Yet concerns about cultural traditions have presented considerable barriers to 
female refugees fleeing from practices such as FGM and, in particular, 
arranged marriages and honour killings. These victims have not often found 
protection abroad.92  
 
In short, in the push and pull between universal rights and cultural relativism, 
international refugee law is already in the universal rights camp. Universal 
human rights norms are the standards against which the act grounding the 
refugee status application is judged to determine whether or not this act 
amounts to persecution. Refugee law has to assume human rights to be 
universal in order to provide protection on the basis of human rights 
violations that can take place any time in any location. This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the view rights are defined and realised only within a given 
social context, and does not disclaim that there are cultural differences in the 
                                                
90 Christian Tomuschat’s observation bears repeating here, “[the country of origin] 
behaved in consonance with current human rights standards, the whole problem 
would simply disappear.” (n 23 in chapter 4) 76.  
91 Macklin (n 80 chapter 1) 253. 
92 For example see, Shapiro, ‘She Can Do No Wrong: Recent Failures in America's 
Immigration courts to Provide Women Asylum from Honor Crimes Abroad' ’ 18 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 293.  
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interpretation and recognition of human rights, but the claim that “there are 
no general moral standards that apply” is rejected.93 It is posited here that 
there are general moral standards and that in relation to refugee law these can 
be found in international human rights norms, such as those expressed in the 
UDHR.94 It has been argued, by Price and Martin amongst others, that many 
human rights are simply too subjective to be used in refugee status 
determination cases, yet the UN, the WHO, the World Bank and the IMF95 all 
make daily determinations of human rights abuses around the world, as 
indeed do most national governments in determining foreign policy and 
producing country of origin reports for immigration tribunal use.   
 
One instance where the tensions between universal and cultural rights came 
to the fore in refugee law has been in relation to refugee status applications 
where the conduct submitted as amounting to persecution is Female Genital 
Mutilation (FGM), either fear of this practice or having been forced to submit 
to it. FGM is practiced predominately in western and eastern Africa but also 
occurs in parts of Asia and the Middle East.96 Although often associated with 
                                                
93 Brown (n 87) 119 
94 It also agrees with Beitz, then, that our objection to human rights violations is based 
on the consequential harm of a human rights violation, Beitz states “our belief that 
genocide is a great wrong has nothing to do with the fact that other people agree it is 
so, but with the nature and consequence of the genocide itself” “Human Rights as a 
Common Concern.” The American Political Science Review 95 (2001) 269 274. 
95 The World Bank and IMF, for example, have a three point scale to determine if 
human rights protection is sufficient for a country to qualify for a structural 
adjustment loan, which involves classifying rights as 1. Not protected by the 
government 2. Somewhat protected by the government or 3. Protected by the 
government. If the IMF can do this, there seems no reason why international refugee 
law can not require decision makers to do the same (or indeed simply to refer to 
determinations by international bodies such as the UN or IMF).  
96 World Health Organization on Female genital mutilation, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/index.html 
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Islam, it is not required, or indeed even referred to, by the Quran97 and the 
WHO confirms it has no identifiable health benefits.98 It is not often practiced 
by state officials but by private individuals considered to be of authority in 
the community.99 Long considered a cultural tradition, protected even by 
international legal provisions on cultural practices, FGM is now almost 
universally perceived as a human rights violation, as a violation, for example, 
of article 5 of the UDHR.100  
 
Recent case law on FGM reveals a trend towards recognising FGM as a 
relevant human rights violation for international refugee law101, which runs 
alongside condemnation of this practice in international human rights law 
                                                
97 Although it is interpreted by some Muslims as being required, such as in Muslim 
minority in Togo where FGM is seen as a religious requirement.   
98 n 95. 
99 See Cisse ‘International Law Sources Applicable to Female Genital Mutilation: A 
guide to Adjudicators of Refugee Claims Based on Fear of FGM’ 35 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 429.  
100 It also violates the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women and, in the case of children (and FGM is often 
practiced on girls approaching maturity), it is a violation of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which calls for the abolition of “traditional practices prejudicial 
to the health of children.” As well as contravening article 18 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 adopted by the 18th Assembly of the Organisation 
of African Unity (but neither signed nor ratified by Ethiopia). Yet women are still 
being deported from UK to countries where they are at risk of FGM: Female genital 
mutilation: asylum seeker fights deportation to the Gambia (6 November 2012) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/nov/06/female-genital-mutilation-
asylum-gambia (accessed 6 November 2012). 
101 See for example, the US case of Adelaide Abankwah v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 2nd Circuit, 185 F.3d 18, 1999, Farah (CAN). This contrasts with cases in 
Germany, for example, where before a change in law applications were rejected due 
to the non-state agent of persecution and applications continue to be rejected on the 
basis that an internal flight option exists, see Ankenbrand, ‘Refugee Women under 
German Law’ 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 45. Ankenbrand also disputes 
the claims to internal flight options such as moving from a rural to an urban area and 
seeking protection in NGO run camps. Not only are these option dependent on 
mobility (but the same could be said of seeking refugee status abroad) but they do 
not reflect in country circumstances such as tribal areas, whereby it is simply not 
possible to move to an area inhabited predominately by another tribal or ethnic 
group and to enter a NGO run camp may be to condemn the refugee to eternal 
dependence on an NGO rather than offering any sustainable form of surrogate 
protection.   
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and demonstrates the evolving nature of the term ‘persecution.’ This might be 
said to have been further confirmed by RT and KM (Zimbabwe)102 where the 
UK Supreme Court clearly rejected the notion of a hierarchy in the forms of 
persecution. It not only demonstrates the evolving nature of human rights law 
but also why it is of central importance to international refugee law that the 
category of relevant human rights violations is kept broad and fluid.  In 
addition, it reveals why the notion of collective violence could prove useful in 
refugee law. In Home Office guidance on Sierra Leone, for example, it is noted 
that FGM “is accepted as the norm in society.”103 It ought, therefore, to give 
rise to a good case for refugee status as a human rights violation and an 
instance of collective violence perpetrated because of a Convention ground 
(namely due to the victims membership in a particular social group).  
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A seminal case in recognition of FGM as giving rise to a good case for refugee 
status which provides a good illustration of the possibility of progressive 
interpretations of article 1(2) is the British case of Fornah104. Although Canada 
was the first jurisdiction to grant refugee status on the basis of FGM, in the 
Farah case of 1994105 and refugee status had been awarded in the UK 
previously in cases concerning fear of FGM106, the reasoning employed by the 
House of Lords is ground breaking and serves as an example of how article 
1(2) ought to be interpreted. It also points towards a new conceptual 
framework for international refugee law, in which article 1(2) could be 
                                                
102 [2012] UKSC 38.   
103 Cited in Fornah (n 43b) [680]. 
104 ibid. 
105  [1994] IRB Refugee Div. (Toronto) T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197.   
106 See, for example, P and M v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1640; [2005] Imm AR 84. 
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interpreted in line with the presented formula of ‘human rights violation 
amounting to collective violence = refugee status.’  In Fornah, the House of 
Lords overturned the Court of Appeal decision to reject Ms Fornah’s 
application for refugee status. Ms Fornah had applied for refugee status as an 
unaccompanied minor, who had fled Sierra Leone after her family had been 
killed. Ms Fornah’s application centred on fear of being subjected to FGM if 
returned to Sierra Leone as her father was no longer alive to protect her from 
undergoing the procedure. FGM, here, was the harm alleged as constituting 
persecution under article 1(2).  
 
The Court of Appeal held that FGM did not come within the definition of 
persecution. In addition, the Court of Appeal opined that women at risk of 
FGM did not amount to a social group under the ‘membership in a particular 
social group’ ground for persecution because all women in Sierra Leone were 
all likely to be subject to FGM as the practice is “clearly accepted and/or 
regarded…as traditional and part of cultural life.” 107  Lord Justice Auld said, 
"[t]o confine the grouping to young, single girls who, for the time being, have 
not been circumcised, though logical, would be contrary to the general rule 
that it is impermissible to define the group solely by reference to the threat of 
the persecution."108 Auld LJ, with Lord Justice Chadwick concurring, 
                                                
107 Fornah (n 43b).  
108 ibid [1]. The notion of a group being unable to constitute a particular social group 
under the Convention due to being defined by fear of persecution had also been used 
to defeat claims to membership in a particular social group for victims of domestic 
violence, for example in the early stages of Shah and Islam (n 78 chapter one)(of Shah 
and Islam [1999]) the special adjudicator and Court of Appeal found that Mrs Islam 
had been persecuted in Pakistan and that authorities in Pakistan are both unable and 
unwilling to protect her. But held that as a matter of law the appellant was not a 
member of a "particular social group" because the group did not exist independently 
of the feared persecution (IAT (unreported) 2 November 1996 and Regina v. 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex parte Islam [1998] 1.W.L.R. 74). This was 
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concluded that fear of FGM could not be defining feature of a group as it was 
not an immutable characteristic (i.e. it was something which could change, 
namely by submitting to FGM women would no longer have to fear FGM). 
This was disputed by Lady Justice Arden, who persuasively argued: 
To take account of that factor and conclude that this characteristic is not 
immutable… would be to conclude, in the case of persecuted left-handed 
people, that they could not constitute a particular social group for the 
purposes of the Refugee Convention because, when the persecution succeeds, 
they no longer have their left hands.109   
 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal demonstrates again the dangers of 
overlooking the purpose of the Convention; the test for whether a reading of 
the Convention is an acceptable interpretation ought to be with reference to 
                                                
overturned at the House of Lords, Lord Steyn stating ‘particular social group’ 
“covers Pakistani women because they are discriminated against and as a group they 
are unprotected by the state. Indeed the state tolerates and sanctions the 
discrimination” [34]. Lord Hoffman further stated: “the legal and social 
conditions[…]left her unprotected against violence by men were discriminatory 
against women. For the purposes of the Convention, this discrimination was the 
critical element in the persecution. In my opinion, this means that she feared 
persecution because she was a woman. There was no need to construct a more 
restricted social group simply for the purpose of satisfying the causal connection 
which the Convention requires.” [96]. On the other hand, in his dissenting opinion 
Lord Hope argued that the appellants had failed to satisfy the requirements for 
refugee status, conceding “[t]he evidence in the present case is that the widespread 
discrimination against women in Pakistan is based on religious law, and the 
persecution of those who refuse to conform to social and religious norms, while in no 
sense required by religious law, is sanctioned or at least tolerated by the 
authorities…[w]omen who are perceived to have transgressed them are treated 
badly, particularly by their husbands, and the authorities do little to protect them. 
But this is not because they are women. They are persecuted as individuals for what 
each of them has done or is thought to have done.” [110-2]. For Lord Hope, Lord 
Steyn’s careful distinction between domestic violence in Britain, present but 
condemned and prosecuted and that in Pakistan, accepted on the evidence as 
systemic yet largely ignored was not addressed. This view is unsustainable when one 
considers the cases of Mrs Islam and Mrs Shah through the lens of collective violence, 
the facts of their cases fall within the notion of collective violence as the individual 
instances of domestic violence are a symptom of societal norms condoning violence 
against women, in particular within a family. . 
109 Fornah (n 43b) Lady Justice Arden [67]. 
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the purpose of providing surrogate protection to those who have suffered or 
fear human rights violations. It also repeated the error of reading Convention 
ground as seeking the motivation for persecution, in discussing whether or 
not the group could be defined other than by reference to the alleged 
persecution, the Court of Appeal, in suggesting that it was relevant whether 
or not victims were selected due to an immutable characteristic or not were 
again focusing on the motive of the potential perpetrator. If one begins by 
considering the motive of a man carrying out FGM, it can easily be argued 
that his motive was to complete a traditional ritual rather than to harm the girl 
in question, it follows then that once FGM has been completed then the girl is 
no longer at risk and has nothing to fear from him. In addition, she was 
selected then only because she had not yet been circumcised and now she has 
been, again, it follows she is no longer at risk.  
 
This is flawed logic. The actual reason, or motivation, for the human rights 
violation may well have been cultural practice or local tradition, it could be 
accepted that the perpetrator does not necessarily choose to circumcise the girl 
simply in order to cause pain or harm but this is not relevant to the 
Convention. What is relevant to the Refugee Convention is that FGM is a 
practice, which violates human rights (and it must qualify as a severe human 
rights violation, FGM passes the threshold for gravity of harm and is a 
violation of the right to freedom from torture and the right to bodily integrity) 
and that girls undergo this procedure because they are female (an immutable 
characteristic). The fact that it is an accepted practice does not render it less of 
a human rights violation. That it is an accepted practice makes it conversely 
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more relevant to international refugee law, as it allows it satisfy the collective 
violence element as well as being a human rights violation.  
 
The House of Lords (Lord Bingham, Lord Hope, Lord Rodger, Baroness Hale 
and Lord Brown) took an entirely different approach to the Court of Appeal. 
Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale focused on the fact that this human rights 
violation was committed only against women and as justified due to the 
perceived position of women in society (in this case in Sierra Leone). The 
court also rejected the Court of Appeal assertion that this did not amount to a 
Convention ground for persecution, as ‘women’ could not constitute a social 
group, membership in which could be the reason behind the persecution.110  
Lord Bingham stated: 
Women in Sierra Leone are a group of persons sharing a common characteristic 
which…is unchangeable, namely a position of social inferiority as compared to 
men. They are perceived by society as inferior, that is true of all women, those who 
accept or willingly embrace their inferior position and those who do not. 
FGM, Lord Bingham further noted, did not define the group but was “an 
extreme and cruel expression of male dominance.”111 Women do not, then, 
have to publicly object or even try to avoid the practice in any way, simply 
being a woman in a society where women are perceived as inferior and 
                                                
110 This was key to the rejection of Ms Fornah’s refugee status application, instead she 
was awarded humanitarian protection until she turned 18. The court did not explain 
how she could qualify for humanitarian protection yet not be a refugee- this 
disconnect is rarely explained despite repeated statements that the purpose of the 
Refugee Convention is to provide surrogate protection.  
111 Fornah (n 43a) [31] (emphasis added).  
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therefore subject to human rights violations gives rise to a good case for 
refugee status.112  
 
This also tackled the issue of women who had already been subjected to FGM, 
in the past applications made on this basis were rejected as she had nothing to 
fear as she had already submitted to the practice, this was clearly rejected. 
Baroness Hale stating: 
The stumbling block seems to have been the fact that FGM is a once and for all 
event. Once done, it can neither be undone nor repeated. Thus, it was argued, if 
many members of the group are no longer at risk, because they have already 
suffered, it can no longer constitute a group for this purpose. But if the group 
has to be defined only to include those at risk, it then looks as if the group is 
defined solely by the risk of persecution and nothing more. This is a peculiarly 
cruel version of Catch 22: if not all the group are at risk, then the persecution 
cannot be caused by their membership of the group; if the group is reduced to 
those who are at risk, it is then defined by the persecution alone…. It is those 
characteristics which lead to the persecution, not the persecution itself which 
leads to those characteristics.113 
 
Baroness Hale and Lord Bingham presented FGM as an expression of severe 
discrimination against women, a conceptualisation, which could be, and 
ought to be, applied to other forms of gender persecution such as rape and 
domestic violence as well as punishment for deviance of other gender specific 
                                                
112 One formulation of a social group successfully used in an FGM asylum claim is 
“women opposed to FGM who belong to an ethnic group that practices FGM” Re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).   
113 ibid [112-113].  
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laws. Baroness Hale’s speech points towards this, she considered it ‘blindingly 
obvious’ that Ms Fornah belonged to a particular social group and argued: 
[T]he world has woken up to the fact that women as a sex may be persecuted 
in ways which are different from the ways in which men are persecuted and 
that they may be persecuted because of the inferior status accorded to their 
gender in their home society. States parties to the Refugee Convention, at 
least if they are also parties to the international Covenant on Civil and 
political Rights and to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, are obliged to interpret and apply the 
Refugee Convention compatibly with the commitment to gender equality in 
those two instruments.114 
This view was echoed by Lord Rodger who emphasised, "The harm is 
'gender-specific.' So, being a woman is a causa sine qua non of being a victim: 
in other words, 'but for' being a woman, the persons concerned could not be 
selected as victims of the practice although accepted that that may well be an 
oversimplification."115 This again underlines the importance of moving away 
from examining motivation for the persecution in defining persecution or 
finding a causal link between persecution and the Convention grounds. What 
is relevant is not the individual motivation of the perpetrator but what 
exposed the victim to the human rights violation, be that her gender (social 
group)116, her religion, her race, nationality or political opinion (implied, 
imputed or actual).   
 
                                                
114 Fornah (n 43a) [86]. 
115 ibid [74]. 
116 And as argued in chapter two, gender must be a social group as it is a role 
assigned to the individual by society due the individual’s sex, whilst man/woman is 
not assigned by society, male/female are roles defined by society.  
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Only recently, in cases such as Fornah, has it begun to be recognized that the 
question must at least be asked ‘is this gender violence?’ The answer to be 
determined by the extent to which the victim was selected for violence due 
not only to her gender but to gender relations in the home country. It is 
important that cases continue to develop in this jurisprudential direction to 
counter the charge, still valid after Kunarac, that  “international…law 
incorporates a problematic public/private distinction: it operates in the public 
realm of the collectivity, leaving the private sphere of the individual 
untouched.”117 If refugee law is to move beyond the damaging public/private 
divide collective violence offers a path to a expansive yet conceptually robust 
definition of refugeehood. It offers an alternative distinction between those 
victims of violence qualifying for refugee status and those victims of violence 
who will not qualify for refugee status.  
 
Collective violence retains the notion of national protection inherent in article 
1(2) but demands enquiry more broadly than merely in to government or state 
measures and is heavily influenced by international human rights law as it 
reflects a judgment that the collective behaviour or attitude in the country of 
origin is rightly described as violent. It is of paramount importance though, 
that collective violence is not interpreted as mass violence or as having any 
requirement of frequency or being widespread, to repeat collective violence 
only requires that the violence be said to be in some way accepted or 
condoned by societal norms in the country of origin. This also allows 
                                                
117 Charlesworth ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ 93 American Journal of 
International Law (1999) 387. 
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determination of the lack of national protection element, it would not rely on 
superficial factors such as the existence of a national law to deal with the 
human rights violation in question but on whether it could actually be said 
that someone committing such a human rights violation acted contrary to 
societal norms. This demands effective national protection of human rights 
rather than just legal lip-service. Such determinations are already made in 
Country of Origin reports, briefing documents produced by embassies, the 
UN, the World Bank and indeed many NGOs. It would also require that more 
weight and respect is given to expert testimony intended to provide 
background information for the court.118  
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, there continues to be applications from 
female refugees that are rejected on the grounds that they do not come within 
article 1(2). The reasoning behind many of these exclusions might be traced to 
a lack of understanding as to how gender violence can be experienced by 
women as a form of persecution. Collective violence, it has been argued, offers 
a lens through which to see these experiences of gender violence more clearly 
as a form of refugeehood. It has been argued also that collective violence does 
not obscure the political element of much of this violence but rather highlights 
this. Charlesworth and Chinkin, quoting Charlotte Bunch, state 
[Violence against women] is caused by “the structural relationships of power, 
domination and privilege between men and women in society. Violence 
against women plays a central role in maintaining those political relations at 
                                                
118 This is a particular problem in refugee law, for example in the UK the case of Sepet 
(mentioned above) was decided in direct contradiction with expert opinion, similarly 
in the US Shapiro details a number of cases involving the threat of honour killings 
where expert testimony which emphasised the prevalence and likelihood of honour 
killings in the cases before the court were seemingly ignored. See Shapiro   
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home, at work and in all public spheres . . . .” The maintenance of a legal and 
social system in which violence or discrimination against women are endemic 
and where such actions are trivialized or discounted should engage state 
responsibility to exercise due diligence to ensure the protection of women.119 
It is not the structural inequalities between men and women that could give 
rise to a good case for refugee status but the violence caused by these 
structural inequalities, collective violence reinforced by state failure to act.  
 
Thus, violence is not simply ‘wrongs done to women’ but is a product of ‘the 
socially produced capacity for women to be wronged’.120 Sharon Marcus, for 
example, argues for the adoption of the approach to gender violence that sees 
it as a language through which gender inequality is defined, expressed and, 
possibly eventually, contested. Marcus uses the term ‘rape script’ to refer to 
rape as a process made possible by gender inequality and in turn scripting 
anew the terms of gender inequality. The content of the rape script is clearly 
variable and is determined by the ‘gendered grammar of violence, where 
grammar means the rules and structures which assign people to positions 
within a script’.121  In adopting a gendered approach to analysing violence, the 
force and consequences of the gender stereotypes expressed in social norms 
that are expected of women and wives point towards a primary form of 
violence that may escalate in times of conflict but constitutes a form of 
violence in and of itself as well. This broadens the notion of violence to 
include severe pressure imposed on individuals due to restrictive social 
                                                
119 Charlesworth and Chinkin The Boundaries of International law (2000) citing Bunch 
‘Passionate Politics Essays 1968–1986’ (1987) Feminist Theory in Action 491.  
120 Brown ‘Women's Studies Unbound: Revolution, Mourning and Politics’ (2003) 9 
Parallax 3 11.  
121 ibid 392. 
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norms; in the case of forced marriage, this includes practices expected of and 
inflicted on individuals that are justified due to the social construction of 
gender.  
 
The actual acts of domestic violence, sexual violence and severe discrimination 
(such as denial of access to education, health care or work) are all acts of 
collective violence and fall squarely within article 1(2). This does not, 
however, require that an individual suffer violence of that kind before coming 
within article 1(2), as acknowledged in HJ(Iran), refugee law must not require 
an individual to place themselves in harms way by publically flaunting 
societal norms until they suffer physical violence. Violence means both injury 
and harm and harm need not be physical harm. If an individual has only 
‘tragic choices’, to return to chapter one, where she may only conform to 
social norms, which do not adhere to international human rights standards 
(representing the harm) or face further persecution (which may be 
characterised as a subsequent instance of harm), or leave, if she is able to leave 
and chooses to do so, she is a refugee.   
 
There remain then several key issues in the area of gendered-persecution 
within existing international refugee law. It is paramount that cases are 
addressed on a case-by-case basis, thus what fits for one case may not be 
appropriate conceptual analysis of a subsequent case and it must be 
remembered that not all female refugees are victims of gendered persecution, 
just as male refugees are not excluded from the concept. However, some 
general observations can be made. Firstly, it is important to recognise that 
sexual violence can be conceptualised within the personal dignity paradigm 
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and need not be expressed solely in terms of violence akin to torture. The 
ICTY eluded to this conceptual distinction in labelling rape as both a crime 
against humanity and torture. The over reliance on the torture paradigm when 
addressing the issue of sexual violence within international law has stilted the 
progress made by the ICTR and the ICTY in addressing the issue of rape and 
sexual violence in the international context by making it conceptually 
problematic to transpose progress made in these tribunals to other areas of 
international law, particularly refugee law. Here a link between personal 
dignity and sexual violence is vital in establishing rape and sexual violence as 
above all human rights violations and, therefore, forms of persecution 
irrespective of the motivation of the perpetrator or the use of severe physical 
violence or substantial force. This is vital if victims of sexual violence 
committed outside of a recognised war or conflict are to be recognised as 
refugees. These women may not be able to rely on general conditions in 
country or evidence of wide spread coercive circumstances; rape is still 
possible as persecution even if it is an unusual act within the home country if 
other circumstances, such as lack of national protection, are present.  
 
Secondly, it is still vital to maintain the distinction between sexual violence 
and gender crimes such as forced marriage, repressive social norms addressed 
solely to women, where the crime either does not include or goes beyond 
sexual violence and is rooted primarily in roles assigned to the victim due to 
their gender. There is a place in international refugee law for sexual 
persecution, gendered persecution and persecution that may accurately be 
characterised as including elements of both alongside, and indeed within, the 
traditional notions of persecution. The progress made in international law in 
! &>R 
recognising sexual violence, and indeed gender crimes, is not insignificant 
and is much to be praised but within refugee law there remains considerable 
work to be done before international refugee law can accurately lay claim to 
gender neutrality. At present, there remain significant barriers to female 
refugees being recognised as such, not least because of a lack of 
understanding of the similarities and differences between sexual violence and 
non-sexual gender violence, where the progress made in the HJ case ought to 
point the way for determining cases concerning female victims of gender 
persecution. Whilst violence may be linked to the victim’s sex, or sexual in 
character, it is important also to acknowledge that in many cases sexual 
violence is more accurately described as part of or a consequence of gendered 
societal norms and roles, which ascribe certain roles to women and allow 
certain behaviour of men that often form and provide the context for the acts 
of sexual violence female refugees have fled in fear of or suffered.  
 
And finally, underlying all discussions of gendered violence within refugee 
law is a fatal tendency to overlook the importance of, and potential for, a new 
concept of political within article 1(2). At present, progress made in improving 
the rate of recognition for female refugees, in line with male counterparts, is 
inevitably halted when it comes up against the concept of ‘political.’ This 
chapter has demonstrated that reform is not only necessary but possible 
within existing conceptual framework of article 1(2) and the Refugee 
Convention. A new notion of political, which dispenses with the 
private/public dichotomy to acknowledge the pervasive and fluid nature of 
politics, would allow article 1(2) to continue operating and more accurately 
reflect the varied experiences of female refugees.    
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Glynn recently argued “discussions over the need to adapt a more ‘political’ 
or ‘humanitarian’ refugee definition do not represent a new phenomenon; 
they merely resemble a modern continuation of the contrasting views put 
forward by a variety of personalities involved in the formation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention.”1 This thesis has sought to suggest a direction in which 
this continuing debate might head. The task of interpreting article 1(2) retains 
its relevance until or unless other forms of protection offered to those fleeing 
danger in their homeland offer the same legal protection and subsequent right 
as those offered by the 1951 Convention. There has been a tendency to argue 
that instead of reinterpreting article 1(2) other categories of protection, such as 
the so-called ‘humanitarian protection’, can be offered to those whose 
experiences of persecution may not mirror those envisaged by the drafters of 
the 1951 Convention. Suggestions of this kind are rejected here not only for 
failing to secure comparable legal protection for such individuals but also as 
failing to recognise the dynamic potential of article 1(2).  
 
The thesis has considered the concept of persecution through the prism of 
human rights law and the concept of human dignity. The approach taken by 
this thesis may be summed us as follows: 
1) The key structural and normative assumptions of Robert Alexy theory 
serve as the underpinning of this thesis’ reconstruction of refugee law. 
                                                
1 Glynn ‘The Genesis and Development of Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ 
(2012) Journal of Refugee Studies 25 (1) 134 136. 
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2) Alexy’s principles theory demonstrates a) that fundamental rights are 
principles b) that principles are characterised by the dimension of 
weight and as such are subject to balancing c) that balancing requires a 
determination of relative weight  
3) Alexy’s correctness thesis demonstrates a necessary connection 
between law and morality which requires that balancing decisions are 
justifiable and justified relative to the requirements of morality 
4) In order to produce a justified decision the principle given the greater 
weight must be a) of greater abstract weight or b) of greater abstract 
importance (or value) 
5) The principle of human dignity or principles of human rights are 
always at stake in refugee law cases  
6) Competing principles must, therefore, be shown to be of a greater 
abstract importance or value to be ranked higher in conditional 
preference  
7) Definitive preference can be given to absolute fundamental rights 
which definitively excludes greater weight being given to the claims of 
host states when the refugee’s claim concerns these absolute rights 
8) Conditional preference can be given to the principle of human rights 
protection, which excludes greater weight being given to the claims of 
host states than to the claims of refugees unless, on the facts, greater 
weight can be given to the competing principle in arguing either the 
infringement of human rights is minimal or the importance of 
satisfying the competing principle is so great so as to outweigh the 
infringement.  
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9) This provides the background standards for interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention and places limits on plausible interpretations of 
the Convention. 
 
These basic propositions, constructed in chapters one to three of this thesis 
form the basis of the key claim put forward, namely that article 1(2) and the 
1951 Convention as a whole are capable of supporting shifting interpretations 
of key concepts such as persecution in order to reflect the evolving notion of 
refugeehood. The task of this thesis has been to identify where one may draw 
the line between refugee and refugee-like so as to render article 1(2) a more 
expansive but still workable definition of ‘refugee.’ Central to this task is the 
persecution criterion which has been identified as representing this line 
between migrant and refugee. This, in and of itself, is perhaps an 
uncontroversial claim.  Those advocating a restrictive or traditional 
interpretation of article 1(2), such as Price and Martin, focus similarly on the 
persecution criterion. Where the approach advocated here departs from Price 
and Martin is in arguing that the persecution criterion does not operate to 
limit article 1(2) to paradigmatic experiences of refugeehood only. The 
political opponent and the religious persecutee might be paradigmatic 
examples of a refugee but these are far from the only individuals entitled to 
assert a claim for refugee status and the protection of the 1951 Convention. 
This thesis has sought to explain how the above claim to an expansive 
definition of ‘refugee’ can be conceptually constructed within the current 
refugee law regime.  
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Following Gilbert it has been argued that international law, including refugee 
law, now represents a limitation on state’s power to control entry to or 
expulsion from its territory.  This rejects the notion that state sovereignty is an 
established rule all international law is subject to and instead affirms Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of the state as an ‘imagined community’2 capable of being 
re-imagined in line with shifting standards of legitimacy. International 
refugee law might be said to place several limitations on state sovereignty. It 
is, in the first place, a limitation on the home state’s sovereignty by denying 
their jurisdiction over a citizen.  
 
More importantly here refugee law might be said to also represent a formal 
expression of the claim that both in reference to its own population and those 
in their territory states are bound by the principles of human rights. The 
priority to be accorded to human rights protection could be said to have been 
recognised in international refugee law in the prohibition on refoulement 
contained in article 33. Although the definition of refugee status is not in and 
of itself a limitation on a receiving state’s power to expel the individual as 
refugee status is declaratory and not constitutive in theoretical and practical 
terms it represents a significant limitation. The Refugee Convention might be 
said to represent a voluntary concession, in the sense that a state cannot be 
compelled to sign the Convention. However, it might also be seen as an 
unavoidable concession in the sense that the Refugee Convention is merely a 
formal expression of the theoretical and practical implications of the 
universality of human rights and the notion of secondary duty-holders.  This 
                                                
2 n 43 (chapter 5) 5-7.   
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supports Gilbert’s claim that “[i]nternational refugee law and international 
human rights law act in parallel to limit the state’s power.”3   
 
The foundational principles of refugee law provide also a reference point for 
evaluation of interpretations of the Refugee Convention. Interpretations of 
refugee law that contradict these foundational principles might be rejected as 
invalid, rather than merely not preferable. As ‘refugee’ is to be interpreted in 
line with foundational notions such as human rights and political legitimacy 
the scope of international protection can be seen as dynamic rather than static. 
As such the definition is capable of shifting without dissolving the boundary 
between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. The continuing exclusion of certain 
experiences of refugeehood from article 1(2) shows this widened 
interpretative scope to be not only conceptually possible but conceptually and 
practically necessary in order for the Refugee Convention to fulfil its 
protective function within international law. 
                                                
3 n 94 (chapter 3) 177. 
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